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Abstract
The thesis evaluates the effectiveness of the official zakat policy in Pakistan in delivering 
welfare and justice to poorer sections of society over the period 1980-1994.
The thesis contrasts the idealistic and theological aspirations of Islamists regarding zakat 
with the practical outcomes of zakat policy in Pakistan. It also compares zakat policy 
outcome with the objectives of the government. It is argued that the performance of zakat 
can be easily manipulated and influenced because it is not only a welfare instrument but 
also a political tool in the hands of the Islamic state, and thus can be used to advance 
political ends entirely divorced from the specific welfare goals of zakat. The lack of clarity 
of Shariah regarding zakat’s aspirations for welfare and justice can facilitate this 
politicisation of the zakat policy. The thesis also argues that the religious nature of zakat 
does not guarantee automatic compliance with zakat policy, and that if individuals are to 
internalise the welfare goals of zakat it is necessary for them to have trust in the Islamic 
state’s commitment to these goals.
The thesis shows that in Pakistan the Islamic state manipulated zakat policy formation and 
that there existed a lack of commitment on its part regarding zakat which hampered zakat’s 
effectiveness. This is visible in the shape and the process of zakat policy formulation which 
demonstrates that the ideals of zakat policy were sacrificed by Zia’s Islamic state to gain 
political patronage and power. This had huge negative implications for the workability and 
effectiveness of zakat.
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An analysis of micro-data derived from Household Income and Expenditure Surveys for 
Pakistan from 1985 to 1994 reveals that zakat failed to exploit the wealth of the rich, with 
the heaviest incidence being borne by the lowest income groups. Zakat disbursements 
seemed inadequate and were less than 30% of the poverty line for the respective years. 
Additionally, there was non-negligible mis-allocation of zakat funds towards higher income 
households.
Zakat achieved some minor alleviation of poverty but its impact was unimpressive 
regarding reduction in the poverty gap and reduction of the poverty headcount measure. 
Regarding inequality, the thesis uses the Atkinson-Kohl inequality index and shows that 
zakat managed to create a positive statistical impact but the improvement was marginal. It 
seems that most of the time zakat was being taken from the poor and disbursed among them 
as well.
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Glossary:
■ adl: justice
■ Allah: Islamic word for God which distinguishes his Oneness
■ Ameer-ul-Momeneen: defender of the Islamic faith
■ amir: leader or commander
■ caliph: successor and refers to a vicegerent of Allah; Islamic ruler. Caliphate or 
khilafate means the system of succession in Islam that combined both religion and 
state under the rule of one caliph. After the assassination of the fourth caliph Ali in 
661 AD, the caliphate became dynastic
■ fa lah : welfare
■ fiq h : Islamic jurisprudence
■ Fiqh Jafferia: Ja'fari school of thought, Jafari jurisprudence or Jafari Fiqh is the 
name of the jurisprudence of the Shia Muslims, derived from the name of Jafar-al- 
Sadiq, the seventh Shia Imam out of twelve
■ hadith, Ahadith (plural): saying of Prophet Mohammad
■ Hanafi sect: the Hanafi school of thought (one out of four Sunni schools of thought)
was one of the earliest established under the jurist Imam Abu Hanifa, who was bom 
in Iraq (689 A.D.). The Hanafi law is followed in Turkey, the Balkans, Central Asia,
Indian Sub-continent, Egypt, China. The other three sects are the Maliki, Shafi and
Hanbali
■ homo economicus: economic man
■ homo Islamicus: Islamic man
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■ ijtihad: effort or striving. It refers to individual exertion as a process in arriving at 
new interpretations or judgements in Islamic Law as opposed to blind adherence to 
tradition. It also refers to the legal judgement based on human reasoning
■ imam: a word used in several senses. In general use and lower-cased, it means the 
leader of congregational prayers; as such it implies no ordination or special spiritual 
powers beyond sufficient education to carry out this function. Imam is also used 
figuratively by many Muslims to mean the leader of the Islamic community
■ isnad: the citations or ‘backings’ that establish the legitimacy of the hadith, which 
are the sayings of Prophet Muhammad
■ israf: avoiding excessive consumption
■ majlis-e-shura: ‘body for consultation’ specifically the duty of the ruler in Islamic
law to consult his followers in making decisions. It refers to the assembly that meets 
for this purpose. The rules of shura are used to solve every problem that a group of 
individuals faces starting from within the family, to the problems of the community 
and continuing even to the political affairs of a country
■ modarabah: The term refers to a form of business contract in which one party 
brings capital and the other personal effort. The proportionate share in profit is 
determined by mutual agreement. But the loss, if any, is borne only by the owner of 
the capital, in which case the entrepreneur gets nothing for his labour. The financier 
is known as irab-al-maaV and the entrepreneur as ''mudarib>
■ musawat: equality
■ mustahiqeen: deserving persons
■ nazrana: an offering or a gift or sacrifice
■ nisab: minimum amount of wealth liable to zakat
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■ NIT Units'. The National Investment Trust is the largest and oldest mutual fund in 
Pakistan. It was constituted under the Trust Deed on 12 November 1962. The 
Government of Pakistan established NIT, in order to encourage the broad basing of 
the ownership of the growing industrialization in the country. NIT is supposed to 
make investing simple, accessible and affordable. It is supposed to provide investors 
with a convenient access to Pakistan's equity markets.
■ Nizam-e-Islam: Islamic system of economic, political and social setup
■ Nizam-e-Mustafa: system of economic, political and social setup in the time of 
Prophet Mohammad
■ Pir. spiritual leader
■ Quran: holy book of the Muslims
■ Ramadan: ninth month out of twelve of the Muslim lunar calendar, month of fasting 
throughout hours of daylight. The Muslim calendar is also known as the Hijri 
calendar marking the emigration of the Prophet Mohammad and his companions 
from Makka to Madina in 622 AD
■ riba: interest
■ roti, kapra aur makaan: food, shelter and housing
■ Shaban: eighth month of the Islamic calendar
■ Shaikh al Islam: leader of Islam
■ Shariah: Islamic law
■ Shia: a Muslim religious sect; see Fiqh Jaffaria
■ sunnah: actions of Prophet Mohammad
■ Sunni’, a Muslim religious sect. See Hanafi sect
■ sura: verse from the Quran
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tafsir. ‘explanation’: Quranic exegesis or commentary. Someone who writes tafsir 
is a mufassir
taqlid: rigid conformity or orthodoxy
ulema (plural): Islamic scholars; allama (singular)
ummah: community or nation. It is commonly used to mean either the collective 
nation of Islamic states. In the context of Islam, the word implies community of the 
believers and thus the whole Islamic world
ushr. Zakat in the case of agricultural produce is known as us hr. It is payable on the 
harvesting of each crop, on 940 kg of wheat or its equal value in case of other crops. 
Ushr is liable at the rate of 5% on artificially irrigated land and 10% on naturally 
irrigated areas
zakat or zakah: its literal meaning is ‘purification’ and ‘growth’. It is one of the 
most important and obligatory religious duties in Islam. It must be paid on surplus 
wealth: whatsoever is over and above the lawful necessities of an individual and his 
dependants, thus exempting Muslims of limited means. It is levied on all Muslims, 
including minors, orphans and Muslims of unsound mind. Zakat is charged annually 
at the rate of 2.5% on accumulated wealth of the individual’s assets 
zulm: injustice
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Abbreviations
■ CII: Council of Islamic Ideology
■ CZA: Central Zakat Administration
■ CZC: Central Zakat Council
■ CZF: Cental Zakat Fund
■ ICP: Investment Corporation of Pakistan
■ LZC: Local Zakat Council
■ NIT Units: National Investment Trust Units
■ PZA: Provincial Zakat Administration
■ PZC: Provincial Zakat Council
■ PZF: Provincial Zakat Fund
Chronology of Pakistan
■ 570-632 birth and death of Prophet Mohammad
■ 711-712: Mohammad Bin Qasim (a Syrian Arab general of Caliph Al-Walid I army)
conquers Sindh and Southern Punjab. Beginning of the establishment of Muslim 
rule in the Indian Sub-continent
■ 976-1148: Ghaznavids period, Mahmood of Ghazni invades
■ 1148-1206: Ghaurids Period
■ 1206-1526: Formation of Delhi Sultanat
■ 1526-1857: Mughal ascendancy (1526-1707), nominal rule by Mughals (1707- 
1857)
■ 1760-1849: Sikhs become dominant force in Punjab, Ranjit Singh rules (1799-1839) 
British defeat Sikhs and annex Punjab and NWFP (North West Frontier Province) 
(1848-49)
■ 1857: Failure of ‘War of Independence’ or ‘Mutiny’
■ 1885: Indian National Congress founded
■ 1906: All India Muslim League founded at Dacca by Nawab Salimullah Khan as
forum for Indian Muslim representation
■ 1930: Allahabad Address (separate homeland for Muslims) by Allama Mohammad 
Iqbal
■ 1940: Pakistan Resolution where Muslim League endorses idea of separate nation 
for India's Muslims
■ 1947: Emergence of Pakistan on the world map. Muslim state of East and West
Pakistan created out of partition of India at the end of British rule
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■ 1948: Muhammed Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan and the first governor general 
of Pakistan, dies
■ 1951: Jinnah's successor Liaquat Ali Khan is assassinated
■ 1956: First constitution drafted on 23 March, Pakistan proclaimed an Islamic 
Republic
■ 1958: Martial Law imposed by General Ayub Khan
■ 1965: Indo-Pakistan war- lasts 23 days
■ 1969: General Ayub Khan resigns and General Yahya Khan takes over
■ 1970: Victory in general elections in East Pakistan for breakaway Awami League, 
leading to rising tension with West Pakistan
■ 1971: East Pakistan attempts to secede, leading to civil war. India intervenes in 
support of East Pakistan which eventually breaks away to become Bangladesh.
After civil war power transferred to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto
■ 1973: New constitution adopted
■ 1977: Riots erupt over allegations of vote-rigging by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s Pakistan 
People’s Party (PPP). General Zia ul-Haq stages military coup and imposes martial 
law
■ 1978: General Zia becomes president
■ 1979: Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto hanged
■ 1981: Opposition Movement for the Restoration of Democracy formed
■ 1985: Non-party elections held, amended constitution adopted, martial law lifted
■ 1986: Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s daughter Benazir returns from exile to lead PPP in 
campaign for fresh elections
■ 1988: General Zia killed in an air crash and in November Benazir Bhutto’s PPP 
wins general election
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■ 1990: Benazir Bhutto dismissed as prime minister on charges of incompetence and
corruption and Nawaz Sharif elected asdhime minister
■ 1991: Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif begins economic liberalisation programme.
Islamic Shariah law formally incorporated into legal code
■ 1993: President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Prime Minister Sharif both resign under
pressure from military. General election brings Benazir Bhutto back to power and in 
October, Benazir elected as Prime Minister
■ 1996: President Leghari dismisses Bhutto government amid corruption allegations
■ 1997: Nawaz Sharif returns as Prime Minister after his Pakistan Muslim League
party wins elections
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Introduction
This thesis aims to analyse the zakat policy in the context of Pakistan from 1980 to 1994. 
Zakat is a redistributive and an obligatory tax levied at 2.5% per annum on the wealth of a 
Muslim who has more than the specified amount of wealth. Zakat is to be utilised for 
alleviation of poverty by disbursing it to the poor, widows, orphans and the handicapped 
eligible to receive.
This thesis assesses zakat’s performance in Pakistan as a social welfare policy and 
calculates its effectiveness not only in terms of its ideological rhetoric, i.e. its objectives in 
terms of the assertions of the Islamists, but also in terms of its official objectives, i.e. what 
the government promised zakat would achieve and what it actually did. It assesses zakat’s 
policy-making procedure and evaluates its performance in terms of its revenue take and its 
redistributional impact in connection with the role of the Islamic state in the zakat policy 
mechanism.
Soon after coming to power in 1977, General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq announced the 
Islamisation of Pakistan to be his prime objective. Thus on 10 February 1979, President 
Zia-ul-Haq addressed the nation on ‘The Introduction of the Islamic System in Pakistan’, at 
the National Assembly Hall in Islamabad, and he selected zakat (one of the five 
fundamentals of the Islamic faith) as the beginning of the Islamisation process. To this 
effect, the formal institutionalisation of zakat took place under the Zakat and Ushr 
Ordinance 1980, No. XVIII on 20 June 1980. The law held all the sahib-e-nisab (those who 
hold a certain amount of wealth) Muslims to pay zakat and for the Islamic state to
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endeavour to secure its proper organisation. Thus, the Government of Pakistan undertook 
the collection and distribution of Islamic taxes on a national basis. With the passing of the 
Ordinance a Zakat Fund was created with the amount of Rs.2250 million ($228 million).
The zakat system of taxation was parallel to the federal fiscal system and thus its revenue 
and expenditure were not part of the secular budget. Zakat funds were to be utilised for the 
poor, widows, orphans and the handicapped eligible to receive zakat for their subsistence or 
rehabilitation, directly through the Local Zakat Committee or indirectly through 
educational institutions, hospitals or clinics. Additionally, the funds were to be utilised for 
the purpose of expenditure on the disbursement and administration of zakat at the local 
level.
Thus Pakistan’s zakat policy was a government-imposed welfare system that aimed to 
provide subsistence and a source of revenue to those members of society who found 
themselves in poverty and were unable to earn a living.
The rationale for the imposition of zakat derived perhaps from domestic concerns as well as
international ones. The internal rationale for the imposition of zakat arose perhaps with the
raison d ’etre of Pakistan inherent in its Islamic Ideology. It could perhaps also have been
the result of the era of economic development in Pakistan, which is identified with the
1960s. The economic growth of the time was the outcome of the economic policies pursued
by Ayub Khan whose martial law replaced civilian rule in 1958. He stayed in power till
1968. His policies favoured the capitalist class and were geared towards creating
monopolies, thus creating a gulf between the rich and the poor. The subsequent Bhutto
government adopted a socialist path for economic organisation and nationalised most of the
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industries. The outcome was the creation of more employment and bureaucratisation. This 
led to industrial inefficiency, as labour was not discarded despite losses and low 
production. Additionally, despite Bhutto’s concern for the well-being of the masses, he 
failed to make gains in the field of social investment. The promise of labour-intensive 
projects did not materialise leaving high unemployment, and the gap between the rich and 
the poor created in the 1960s was only exacerbated in the 1970s. Thus when Zia came to 
power he decided to impose zakat, which after the Ayub and Bhutto economic policies 
seemed like a gesture not only to uplift the condition of the poor but also to gain 
acceptability and legitimacy from the general masses for his political ascendancy.
The external rationale for the Islamisation of policies found fertile ground in the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, which prompted the jihad  movement there among the right-wing 
factions. The movement received heavy support from the United States in the face of the 
apparent growing Communist threat. The US support for the Islamisation of the region was 
lubricated with massive financial support to set up Islamic madaris (schools), which 
glorified Islamic political, economic and social ideologies. Even before the Soviet invasion, 
in the wake of the Islamic revolution in neighbouring Iran (1979), Zia found solid cause to 
advance his agenda for gaining influence and control by going back to Pakistan’s raison 
d ’etre as an explicitly Islamic Republic, consequently introducing Islamic social policies 
such as zakat. Such policies with overtly Islamic overtones would ideally give him the 
legitimacy that he needed to rule.
Also, the oil boom of 1974 engulfed the Muslim world with the fervour to revive Islamic
ideological concepts, which Zia eagerly imported from the Middle East. More developed
concepts of political Islam, the Islamic state, Islamic economics and the Shariah were
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emerging. One of the major countries to support Zia’s pursuance of Islamic ideology was 
Saudi Arabia. It helped Zia’s government not only by donating huge sums of money, for 
example to establish a zakat fund, but also by providing it with intellectual assistance. This 
helped to foster that brand of Islam that sanctioned Zia’s Islamic policies through the idea 
of an Islamic state, consequently strengthening his hold on power.
In the wake of such developments, the world witnessed Islamist intellectuals strive for the 
emergence of a new economic order known as the Islamic economic system. This system is 
based on the Islamic economic philosophy, which takes its origins from the Quran, Sunnah 
and the Hadith (practices and sayings of the Prophet Mohammad). The adherents of this 
system claim it to be a superior economic order to both capitalism and communism as they 
regard these as based on exploitation of the poor, the former via the market and the latter by 
the state. They say that the Islamic economic order, on the contrary, is based on principles 
of equality and justice as it prohibits riba (interest), which exploits the poor and instead it 
introduces modarabah (profit and loss sharing) where every economic agent gets his/her 
rightful share of the resources. They assert that the Islamic state makes sure that justice is 
done in the economy by introducing a charity tax system based on zakat. Zakat is the jewel 
in the crown of the Islamic economic order and forms the basis of the Islamic social 
security system.
Islamists say (for the purpose of this treatise the term ‘Islamist’ will be used to mean
proponents of Islamic economics, and ‘Muslims’ will mean followers of Islam) that the
homo Islamicus (the Islamic man) would follow the ideals of the Islamic economic
philosophy regarding the strongest pillar of equity and welfare, i.e. zakat and would pay it
willingly to the Islamic state due to zakat’s religious nature. They also assert that the
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Islamic state would instrumentalise zakat in a way that would eliminate destitution and 
poverty in the Islamic society, and break the association between the rich and the powerful, 
as wealth would flow from the rich to the poor. This would promote welfare and reflect the 
ideals of Islamic distributive justice. The social, economic and the political importance of 
zakat are unrivalled due to its charitable nature, which gives it popular appeal. Optimism 
surrounding zakat is rooted in the claim of the Islamists, who assert that the religious nature 
of zakat renders it superior to the secular social security network. In Pakistan, it was hoped 
that this divine injunction would work wonders for poverty and inequality in society.
It is the purpose of this thesis to test the ideological claims of the Islamists and the official 
objectives of Pakistan’s Islamic state regarding zakat policy against its operational reality in 
Pakistan. The normative aspects of equity and justice in the Islamic economic system need 
to be assessed on the ground via zakat. Therefore, it is important to weigh empirically the 
extent to which zakat in Pakistan operated in accordance with its redistributional rationale.
Importance of this Topic
The study of Islam with its political and economic ideology and its social codes is perhaps
more relevant today than it was in the Middle Ages or even a century ago. The post colonial
revival of Islamic political, economic and social thought makes the study of zakat with its
social and economic connotations very significant. Zakat is one of Islam’s most important
pillars of belief and to study its economic history in the context o f Pakistan, a country at the
forefront of Islamisation, would be a valuable undertaking. Not only this, but zakat’s
redistributive intent should attract the attention of those who are interested in studying
poverty and inequality reduction issues (not only at a theoretical but also at the applied
level). It should also be of interest to students of political economy and also of social policy
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who are interested in conducting the study of a welfare instrument within an idealised 
economic system. This study would demonstrate how normative Islamic economics has 
translated itself into a positive one regarding zakat, with what level of success and whether 
the Islamic social welfare system has been effective in delivering the objectives of welfare 
and justice to which it aspires.
Pakistan as a Case Study
The present analysis uses the Islamic Republic of Pakistan as a case study. Pakistan 
appeared on the world map as an independent country in 1947 by the partition of India by 
the British. It was founded on ideological grounds and is the only country to be created in 
the name of Islam. Although the religious orientation of the state was explicitly embodied 
in the formal name of the country, and despite the early inclusion of Islamists within some 
elements of the state apparatus, it was not until 1980 that the then President, General Zia, 
embarked upon a process of Islamisation of economic and social activity within Pakistan.
Islamists in Pakistan asserted that Islamisation is a natural consequence of an ideological 
state and advocated the imposition of zakat (which was to be imposed in addition to an 
already operative secular tax system). This makes Pakistan an appropriate case study not 
only due to its ideological basis but also due to the fact that it was one of the first Islamic 
countries to initiate the Islamisation of the society via political, economic and social laws. 
A central element of this process of Islamisation was the introduction of zakat to a degree 
never undertaken by any other Islamic country.
Pakistan’s Islamisation began with the declaration of the Zia government to turn Pakistan
into an Islamic state. This included the introduction of Islamic laws within the banking
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system via the introduction of modarabah (profit and loss sharing) and moved towards the 
abolition of riba (interest). Additionally, in 1979 the Hudood Laws (which are seen as the 
beginning of the implementation of classical Islamic criminal law) were also imposed.1 
Furthermore, in 1984 the Qanune-e-Shahadat (Law of Evidence) was enacted.2
Does the imposition of such ideological essentials label a country as Islamic and following 
an Islamic economic system? Pakistan has had Islamic laws in operation for almost 26 
years, which is ample time for the individuals to internalise policies and laws and also for 
policies to reveal their consequences, results, and their strengths and weaknesses. Thus in 
the case of Pakistan one can safely assume that there is sufficient material to provide scope 
for an empirical test of the effectiveness of Islamic policies, in this case zakat, which was 
imposed as a highly structured and stratified system as envisioned by the Islamic state of 
the time.
Previous Work on Zakat
There is a plethora of literature on the ideological underpinnings of zakat in general, and 
this will be analysed in Chapter One. However, the existing literature on zakat in Pakistan 
is not vast, and there have been few comprehensive empirically based studies assessing its 
efficiency.
1 R. Mehdi, The Islamisation o f  Law in Pakistan (Surrey: Curzon Press, 1994).p. 109. A person charged under 
Hudood laws faces severe punishments, including public flogging or the amputation o f limbs. The martial law 
regime in Pakistan enforced four Hudood Ordinances: Offences against Property; the Prohibition Order; the 
Offence o f Q azf (when a person makes a false allegation o f fornication or rape with the intention to harm and 
the knowledge or reason to believe that such imputation will harm the reputation or hurt the feelings o f the 
person to whom the crime has imputed, p. 132); and the Offence o f  Zina. Zina is defined as sexual intercourse 
out o f wedlock. With the adoption o f Zina laws, for the first time in Pakistan's history, fornication along with 
adultery became a crime against the state and, made non-compoundable, non-bailable and punishable by 
death.
2 Ibid. p. 147
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Not only do these studies lack hypothesis and tend to be descriptive rather than analytical 
but they also lack any historical context. They are deficient in questioning the ideological 
and political rhetoric, which are central to any assessment of zakat considering its 
theological background. Most of the works are of an ad-hoc nature and lack a contextual 
relationship with the government’s zakat policy as they fail to question the government’s 
motives. The sources also have a propensity to transcribe the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance 
from its legal jargon into a non-legal language and present it as a piece of research. 
However, there are a few studies that have somewhat managed to transcend the above- 
mentioned limitations, and these have been used in the present thesis. The following 
literature review examines the most important works on zakat in Pakistan. The aim is to not 
only inform the reader of what other researchers have done but the literature review will 
also aim to show why the present research needs to be carried out.
The literature is reviewed under five categories: a descriptive evaluation of zakat, a 
historical evaluation, a legal evaluation, a social evaluation and an economic evaluation. 
The rationale of this review is to orientate the present thesis, which aims to transcend, 
empirically and intellectually, the previous works that have been written on zakat in 
Pakistan.
Descriptive evaluation:
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Writers such as Imtiazi,3 Kahf4 and Butt5 have written articles that provide a description of 
the administration, i.e. the working of the zakat system. However, their works are rather 
succinct in their evaluation. They have failed to explore the operational challenges faced by 
the zakat mechanism. A common theme in their work is to replicate the Zakat and Us hr 
Ordinance or copy various passages from the official Guide Book of Zakat and Ushr. In 
case of Imtiazi, this is not a surprise because interestingly, he was the author of the Guide 
Book and the first Administrator General of the Central Zakat Administration. Nonetheless, 
his account of the zakat administration is a reliable source for referencing. What comes 
across from these sources is a narrative of the procedure of zakat’s major mechanics as they 
operate in Pakistan.
However, these authors do provide a cursory quantitative glimpse into the collection and 
disbursement of zakat at the national aggregate level, even though they do so via the 
replication of the published government sources. Their presentation of the aggregate level 
qualitative and quantitative data is however without any detailed examination and thus 
offers no valuable conclusive remarks. The time period covered in these sources ranges 
from the mid-1980s to the late 1980s.
Historical evaluation:
3 1. A. Imtiazi, "Management o f  Zakah Collection and Disbursement: The Administrative and Managerial 
Structures in State Organisations: The Pakistan Experience" (paper presented at the International Training 
Seminar on Zakah Management, Islamabad, May 20th-23 2002), I. A. Imtiazi, "A Model System for the 
Assessment Collection and Disbursement o f Zakat (Case Study o f Pakistan)", 1987, Lahore Staff College, 
Lahore , I. A. Imtiazi, "Organisation o f Zakah: The Pakistan Model and Experience" (paper presented at the 
Management o f Zakah in Modem Muslim Society, Karachi, 22nd April to 2nd May 1985).
4 M. Kahf, "Zakah Management in Four Muslim Countries," in Zakah Management in Some Muslim Societies 
(Jeddah: Islamic Development Bank, Islamic Research and Training Institute, 2000).
5 P. A. Butt, "Pakistan," in Institutional Framework o f  Zakah: Dimensions and Implications, ed. Ahmed 
Abdel-Fattah El-Ashker and Muhammad Sirajul Haq (Jeddah: Islamic Research and Training Institute, 
Islamic Development Bank, 1995).
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Jamal Malik’s6 study of the zakat system in Pakistan is a chapter in a book called 
‘Colonisation of Islam’. It is an effort to relate the social and the economic situations of the 
Muslims with the process of Islamisation in Pakistan. He forwards the hypothesis that the 
colonial state (by which one supposes he means the structure of the state inherited from the 
Imperialist powers) enacts its policy of integration by traditionalising colonial institutions 
on the one hand and by colonising the traditional institutions on the other. Malik states that 
such a policy brings about the disintegration of the traditional systems of social welfare and 
health insurance. He uses this chapter on zakat to test this hypothesis by giving the history 
of zakat in Pakistan and then continues with detailed description of the government’s 
operation regarding the policy making process, the bureaucratic structure and the flow of 
zakat funds. It also puts zakat revenue in the context of the secular receipts and 
expenditures by comparing zakat expenditure with the secular social welfare expenditure at 
the provincial level. The data used is based on the publications of the zakat agencies. The 
analysis tends to be ephemeral as he not only fails to undertake critical analysis of zakat 
policy making, he does not offer insight into who received or gave zakat, how much, was it 
adequate or what effect it had on poverty reduction or income inequality. Although the 
study does not undertake the effects of zakat on poverty or inequality, the chapter is a 
helpful source for getting an overall picture of zakat’s operation for its formative years as 
the analyses end in 1985.
Legal evaluation:
A recently published book by Khalid Nazir,7 called ‘The Zakat Law’, could be considered a 
quick reference source and a guide to the understanding of the Zakat Ordinance from a
6 J. Malik, Colonialization o f  Islam: Dissolutions o f  Traditional Institutions in Pakistan  (Dhaka: The 
University Press Limited, 1999).
7 K. Nazir, The Zakat Law  (Islamabad: Ammar Publications, 2002).
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legal perspective. This book outlines the conceptual development of the Zakat Ordinance in 
Pakistan. It analyses the text of the law as passed in 1980 from the Shariah perspective and 
also aims to study the amendments made in the Ordinance. It concludes by recommending 
the need to boost public confidence in and awareness of the system and to avoid making 
changes that would jeopardise benefits for the poor. It is a good secondary source and a 
starting point for anyone interested in evaluating zakat policy. The time period covered is 
from the imposition of zakat in 1980 to 1997.
Another piece of work that evaluates zakat from its legal perspective is by Elizabeth Ann
o
Mayer undertaken in 1982 . Mayer places the zakat law within the Pakistani secular tax 
structure and hypothesise that zakat was just another way for the government to raise 
revenue: and for this purpose the classical Shariah tax principles and terminology were 
combined with the current governmental taxation goals. She claims that for this reason the 
religious obligation of zakat had been transformed into a mundane tax liability. How this 
translates into an effective poverty-alleviating tool during the 1980s and 1990s will be 
shown in this thesis.
Social evaluation:
Two names ought to be mentioned here: Grace Clark9 and Faiz Mohammad.10 Both authors 
undertake analyses of the entire system of zakat i.e. evaluating its administrative set-up, its 
disbursement procedure and its interaction with the recipients. The studies are based on 
sample surveys, interviews and government publications and aim to bring out the strengths
8 E. A. Mayer, "Islamisation and Taxation in Pakistan," in Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan: The Application o f  
Islamic laws in a Modern State, ed. A. M. Weiss (Syracuse N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1986).
9 G. C. Clark, "Pakistan's Zakat and Ushr System: An Islamic Public Welfare System in a Developing 
Country" (University o f  Maryland, 1985).
10 F. Mohammad, "Evaluation o f  nizam-e-zakat and ushr in Pakistan", October, 1992, International Institute 
o f  Islamic Economics, Islamabad
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and weaknesses of the zakat system. Mohammad’s study spans from 1980 to 1988 and 
manages to point out the deficiencies and achievements of the system. However, his work 
falls short of evaluating the findings in terms of the government’s objectives and goals, 
which could be viewed as its limitation.
Clark’s work needs special mention. Her work was her PhD dissertation covering the first 
four years of zakat from 1980 to 1984. It presented a case study and policy analysis of 
Pakistan’s national zakat system as a public welfare system. The study evaluated both the 
administrative structure of the system and the manner in which the progression and 
implementation of the policy occurred. It based its assessment on a theoretical premise of 
evaluating the zakat policy under such criteria as adequacy, stigma, equitable efficiency, 
and effect on work, cost and public opinion, which allowed the thesis to form an opinion 
upon policy effectiveness. It aimed to describe how the policy was intended to work as well 
as documenting how it actually worked. Her study found that zakat benefits are inadequate 
for subsistence. Rehabilitation grants, though adequate, are not accompanied by proper 
training for the beneficiary, which wastes zakat resources. Clark states that Pakistan’s zakat 
system has made a modest start but can serve as a basic model for a public welfare system 
in developing countries with limited resources.
Clark’s work is a comprehensive study on zakat, though covering only its first four years. 
Additionally, the study does not examine the economic effects of the system based on 
quantitative data of zakat disbursements.
Economic evaluation:
38
With regards to zakat expenditure in Pakistan and its effects, there are few sources. 
However, these make their point potently and thus substantiate their conclusions. Writers 
such as Faiz Mohammad,11 Shirazi12 and Jehle13 undertake analyses of zakat’s effect on 
poverty alleviation in Pakistan.
Mohammad tries to assess the extent to which the system as practised in Pakistan has the 
potential to eradicate poverty. He quantifies the gap between the financial needs for 
eradicating poverty and the zakat potential in Pakistan for 1988. His study is based on a 
sample survey of 257 Local Zakat Committees out of the total of 36,658. The number of 
recipients interviewed stands between 4-7 for each selected LZC and similar numbers of 
non-recipients were been interviewed from a population of 5000 to 10000 in each locality. 
His study shows that the existing system’s potential even without leakages is not sufficient 
to cater to the subsistence needs (excluding rehabilitation) of the poor in Pakistan. 
Mohammad asserts that the zakat will have to be reformed if it is to make a positive mark 
on the poverty situation in Pakistan.
Shirazi’s study attempts to estimate the impact of zakat and ushr on household poverty 
alleviation. He uses the Household Integrated Economic Survey (HIES) for two years: 
1987-88 and 1990-91. Shirazi estimates the share of zakat and ushr in the average 
disposable income of the lower income deciles. He concludes that the impact was not that 
significant, but he does assert that zakat and ushr accounted for 39% of the average
11 F. Mohammad, "Prospects o f Poverty Eradication Through the Existing Zakat System in Pakistan," The 
Pakistan Development Review  30, no. 4 Part II (1991).
12 N. S. Shirazi, System o f  Zakat in Pakistan: An Appraisal (Islamabad: International Institute o f Islamic 
Economics, 1996).
13 G. A. Jehle, "An Islamic Perspective on Inequality in Pakistan," The Pakistan Development Review  31, no.
3 (1992), G. A. Jehle, "Zakat and Inequality: Some Evidence from Pakistan," Review o f  Income and Wealth 
40, no. 2 (1994).
39
disposable income of the lowest income decile, which he applauded as extremely 
encouraging and evidence that zakat was targeting the right group. Shirazi also attempts to 
highlight the problems in raising zakat revenues and disbursing them. The absence of an 
evaluation yardstick means his assessment offers no conclusions as to how the zakat policy 
was intended to work in Pakistan.
Like Shirazi, Jehle also uses the HIES data to assess zakat performance but only for 1987- 
88. Although covering only one year, this is a significant study, mainly because of the 
methodology employed and the analyses undertaken. He uses the data to construct two 
income distributions: one that would have existed without zakat and the other with zakat. 
Jehle assesses the impact o f zakat on income inequality using the Sen, Kohl and Atkinson 
relative indices of income inequality in Pakistan. Jehle’s research shows that a high 
proportion of the Pakistani population gives zakat although many give very little. He also 
observes that there is a tendency for the collection of zakat to decline across the income 
spectrum as income rises. He concludes that zakat has fulfilled some of its promise of 
reducing income inequality, but he adds that this impact has been marginal, due to the fact 
that zakat does not reach the poorest in Pakistani society. However, because Jehle’s study 
covers only a single year, the real impact of zakat over the years cannot be assessed.
Premise of the Present Thesis
This thesis estimates the quantitative and qualitative aspects of zakat’s performance as a
social welfare policy in terms of who pays and receives and how much; if zakat reduced
poverty and inequality in Pakistan over fourteen years. The thesis evaluates zakat’s
capability regarding its ideological beneficence as held by the Islamists. It also weighs the
system against its official objectives. The thesis analyses zakat’s policy-making process and
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evaluates the role of the Islamic state in its development and in the running of the zakat 
system. The zakat system is not analysed in an ideological, historical or a political vacuum.
The thesis questions zakat’s workability on the premise that welfare policies (such as 
zakat), even if they are deemed sacred and hallowed as divine injunctions, become political 
instruments (especially considering the unclear injunctions regarding it in the Shariah). As 
such, they are vulnerable to manipulation by the Islamic state, taking into account the 
economic and political power bestowed upon it by the Shariah. Furthermore the thesis also 
shows that zakat needs more than ideological and religious rhetoric (as asserted by the 
Islamists) to achieve its goals. Effectiveness of policies requires trust between the ruler and 
the ruled, which is dependant on the political legitimacy o f the government, fairness in 
policy formulation procedure and the state’s lasting commitment towards the policy.
To achieve the above, the analytical framework in the present thesis is forwarded in a 
manner that firstly assesses the institutionalisation of zakat i.e. the political economy of the 
Islamic welfare policy making and secondly, the role of the Islamic state’s commitment to 
zakat and its consequences and how it affected zakat’s evolution as a system in Pakistan.
It needs to be clarified here that because a significant part of the empirical analysis 
conducted in this thesis covers Zia’s era from 1977 to 1988, it might appear that the 
analytical framework used in this thesis (described above and which will be examined in 
detail in Chapter Two) pertains only to Zia’s period and is therefore not applicable for the 
post Zia regimes. This however is not the case as Islam continued to play an important role 
in Pakistan’s polity even after Zia’ demise in 1988. Whereas this is not true of Benazir 
Bhutto’s government, Islamisation was very much at the core of Nawaz Sharif s.
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Sharif s policies continued to be geared towards the Islamisation of Pakistan’s society via 
the Islamic state. This was partly due to his apprehension of the destabilising potential of 
the religious parties, and partly to distract people from Pakistan’s economic ills and security 
threats, internal as well as external.14 On coming to power in late 1990 Sharif declared 
himself to be the guardian of Zia’s legacy.15 His government and Nawaz personally was 
committed to pursuing the goal of Islamization.16 Nawaz held the view that Pakistan was 
created in the name of Islam, but its rulers had failed in enforcing it in the country.17 Under 
the fifteenth amendment to the constitution, Nawaz Sharif (like Zia) sought to become the 
Ameer-ul-Momeneen (commander of the faith) and undertook to make the Quran and the 
Sunnah the supreme law of the land. The proposed amendment sought to make all the 
functionaries of the state, including the army chief of staff and the chief justice, subject to 
the Quran and the Sunnah, however interpreted. Second, it put the judiciary as well as 
parliament in the shade, leaving the prime minister and his appointed advisers on Islam as 
the would-be arbiters of Pakistan. However, Sharif s recourse to Islam is widely perceived
I o
as hollow symbolism.
Even though Sharif stood for upholding Zia’s Islamic policies, one observes the erosion of 
the authority and prestige of the zakat system after 1988. This was mainly due to Bhutto’s 
more secular political stance and the political upheaval that Pakistan went through in the
14 A. Jalal, "Pakistan’s Tangle: the Politics o f  Conflicting Security and Economic Interests," Government and  
Opposition: An International Journal o f  Comparative Politics 34, no. 1 (1999). p. 13
15 R. A. Khan, "Pakistan in 1992: Waiting for Change," Asian Survey 33, no. 2 (1993). p. 131
161. Husain et al., "Islamization and the Pakistani Economy", 2004, Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars, Washington, D.C. p. 107
17 S. V. R. Nasr, "The Rise o f  Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: The Changing Role o f Islamism and the Ulama in 
Society and Politics," Modern Asian Studies 34, no. 1 (2000). p. 178
18 Jalal, "Pakistan’s Tangle: the Politics o f Conflicting Security and Economic Interests." p. 13-14
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form of frequent changes in governments after 1988. This subsequently had its effects on 
the zakat system.
Wheras it would have been interesting to assess the zakat system in Pakistan post 1994 (at 
least till 1999 during which Sharif was in power for three years till his over throw in a coup 
by Musharraf) the unavailability of data has hindered this possibility.
Nonetheless, this is the first time that the zakat policy in Pakistan has been evaluated over a 
period of fourteen years. Much of the data employed in the thesis has not been used for this 
purpose before, including the six years of Household Integrated Economic Surveys, some 
of the annual reports of the Central Zakat Council and some reports of the Council of 
Islamic Ideology to name a few (data limitations will be described later in the Introduction).
This research provides a comprehensive appraisal of the procedure of zakat policy 
formation, an assessment of its revenue and disbursement patterns and an examination of 
the bureaucratic practices of zakat. Throughout the assessment this thesis contrasts the 
practical reality of zakat with its ideological and religious underpinnings (which inspired 
the zakat law in Pakistan), in addition to contrasting it with its objectives and goals as 
declared by the Pakistani Government. Moreover, this thesis goes beyond using ideological 
benchmarks and uses economic criteria expressed through poverty lines and inequality 
indices (as used by Shirazi and Jehle) to conduct the evaluation of zakat’s effectiveness. 
This study therefore breaks new ground in analysing the imposition of zakat in Pakistan by 
making an across the board analysis and observes how normative notions regarding zakat 
performed when applied in real life in an Islamic country.
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Ushr in the Thesis
Zakat on agricultural produce is called ushr. Ushr is the first charge on the produce. It is 
charged and collected on a compulsory basis from the produce of the land (including 
horticulture and forestry) of the landowner, grantee, allottee, lessee, lease-holder or land 
holder at the rate o f 5% above the value of 5 wasqs (940 kilograms) of wheat or its 
equivalent in value in case of other crops. In Pakistan ushr is levied at a flat rate of 5%. 
This flat rate differs from the traditional method of levy, which requires a 10% ushr levy on 
the produce if the land is irrigated with rain water or gravity flow water channels, but only 
5% if the land is irrigated by artificial irrigation such as wheel pumps, tube wells and lift 
pumps.19 However, Pakistani law encourages the owners of rain-fed areas to pay an 
additional 5% for ushr as a voluntary contribution, but not many do; Ushr is liable only in 
cash and not in kind.20
Exemptions from ushr include those who are eligible to receive zakat under Shariah, and 
those whose produce from the land is less than 940 kilograms of wheat or its equivalent in 
the case of other crops. Tenants are encouraged to pay although they are not legally 
required to do so.21 In an amendment to the Ordinance on 7 May 1983, the Ushr assessee 
became entitled to reduce one third of the ushr due in the case of produce from land 
irrigated by tube wells and one fourth in the case of a possible overestimation in 
assessment. Land revenues are not chargeable in respect of land on whose produce ushr
19 Imtiazi, "A Model System for the Assessment Collection and Disbursement o f Zakat (Case Study o f  
Pakistan)", pp. 66-67
20 Clark, "Pakistan's Zakat and Ushr System".p. 222
21 Nazir, Zakat Law.pp. 72 & 75
22 Ibid. pp. 153-4
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has been charged and recovered compulsorily. Where compulsory realisable ushr falls into 
arrears, it is recoverable as arrears of land revenue.23
In the present thesis the word ushr has mostly been used synonymously with zakat. Where 
zakat collection and disbursement commenced as soon as the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance 
took effect in 1980, the collection of ushr did not start till the spring of 1983 due to issues 
with the workability of policy procedures.24 This thesis does not present any explicit and 
detailed analyses of the ushr policy making or implementation process. This is because of 
the acute shortage of qualitative data on ushr. There is little systematic centralised record 
keeping as ushr is collected and disbursed at the local level. This implies that the 
quantitative data presented at the national aggregate level does not include ushr. Despite 
this, the micro-level data based on the Household Integrated Economic Surveys used }n this 
thesis include ushr as well as zakat, and so the impact of ushr is therefore included in the 
revenue and distributional analysis in Chapters Four and Five.
The following table displays ushr collection in Pakistan since its commencement until 
1994. It shows that ushr collection was decreasing at an average rate of -27% in real terms 
and by the mid-1990s ushr collection was negligible as a percentage of GDP,
23 Imtiazi, "A Model System for the Assessment Collection and Disbursement o f  Zakat (Case Study o f  
Pakistan)", p. 66
24 Mayer, "Islamisation and Taxation in Pakistan." p. 73
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Ushr Collection in Nominal & Real Prices & as Percentage
of GDP
Years
Ushr
Collection
(nominal
prices) % of GDP
Ushr Collection 
(real prices 
rebased to 1980 
prices)
1982-83 179.23 0.10 147.60
1983-84 258.71 0.11 202.37
1984-85 261.04 0.10 186.22
1985-86 246.4 0.07 168.15
1986-87 225.43 0.05 148.94
1987-88 239.88 0.05 151.63
1988-89 177.04 0.03 102.09
1989-90 107.57 0.01 57.13
1990-91 121.65 0.01 60.69
1991-92 40.7 0.00 17.96
1992-93 10.35 0.00 4.15
1993-94 0.2 0.00 0.07
Source: Central Zakat Administration (1994). Zakat and Ushr System in Pakistan. Ministry o f Finance, and 
Author’s own calculations.
There are many reasons for the low revenue from ushr. The self-assessment procedure for 
ushr could be contested. Ushr is made vulnerable to disputes between the payer and the 
Local Zakat Committees (LZC). If the LZC challenged the self-assessment then it arranged
25its own assessment by a committee member, local tax collector or a special agent.
However, the assessee could appeal to the Tehsil Zakat Committee if dissatisfied wjth the
LZC’s judgement. Later on, in an amendment to the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance in 1990, the
appeal against the LZC’s judgement was not to be lodged with a higher zakat authority but
26with the local government at the level of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate.
Secondly, the LZCs, which were responsible for the collection of ushr, were voluntary 
agencies and hence hard pressed for time due to other obligations. The members of these 
committees felt uncomfortable in pestering their neighbours for ushr due. Thirdly, it is 
believed that the LZC members may have felt hesitant to harass the influential
25 Clark, "Pakistan's Zakat and Ushr System", p. 224
26 Nazir, Zakat Law. pp. 153-4 & 166
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27landowners who also happened to be the LZCs’ members’ personal landlords. And 
finally, another important factor that contributed to the meagre ushr revenues was that 
many times the LZCs were un-knowledgeable of the importance of the ushr collecting task 
and lacking the knowledge of revenue matters.28
In 1990, because of the low ushr revenues, the Government decided to withdraw the task of 
ushr collection from the LZCs and assign it to the Provincial Revenue Department via an 
amendment to the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance.29 However, according to Shirazi it was only 
in 1993 that the Central Zakat Administration actually handed over the responsibility of 
assessing and collecting ushr to the Provincial Revenue Department.30 Due to non­
availability of data on ushr after 1993-94 it is impossible to assess the impact of this 
amendment on ushr collection.
Considering that the value of aggregate ushr raised is extremely low for the period under 
consideration, and there is little qualitative and quantitative ushr data (if any exist in a 
comprehensive form), it is not only futile but also impossible to undertake detailed ushr 
analyses. However, for this thesis it is fortunate that the micro-level HIES data, on which 
the crux of Chapters Four and Five are based, include ushr, which makes it part of the core 
analysis of the thesis.
Data Collection
27 Central Zakat Administration, "Zakat and Ushr System in Pakistan," ed. Central Zakat Administration 
(Ministry o f  Finance, Government o f  Pakistan, 1991).p 3
28 Central Zakat Administration, "Zakat and Ushr System in Pakistan," ed. Central Zakat Administration 
(Ministry o f  Finance, 1994).p. 7
29 Ibid. p. 6. A lso, Nazir, Zakat Law. pp. 166-7
30 Shirazi, System o f  Zakat in Pakistan, p. 37
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The data for the research on this thesis were collected between December 2002 and 2004. 
Before I give an account of the data, I would like to thank the people and the institutions 
that I mention in this section that helped me with data collection. Although most of the data 
were collected during the researcher’s fieldwork in Pakistan from December 2002 to July 
2003, some of the most important data, such as the HIES, were not acquired till April 2004.
Pakistan’s libraries and archives are a far cry from what one encounters in the western 
world. Most of these libraries and archives are nominal as there is no systematic method of 
record keeping. It would not be a gross exaggeration to state that the concept of data 
preservation is non-existent. Whatever is published is not catalogued either and remains 
mostly forgotten in some dark comer of a storeroom if not discarded. Thus whatever one 
can secure is either through sheer luck or influence via personal connections.
The present thesis thus suffers from such obstacles. The qualitative data from the Central 
Zakat Council are available until 1988. This could be due to the anti-Islam bias of the 
Bhutto government that succeeded Zia in 1988, and consequently curtailed the powers and 
the importance of the Central Zakat Council and thus the incentive for data-processing. 
Additionally, the published quantitative data on zakat disbursements made from the Central 
Zakat Fund at the national aggregate level since the launch of the system are of poor 
quality, and no consolidated data after 1992-93 are available (a fact acknowledged by the 
first Central Zakat Administrator, Mr. I. A. Imtiazi (1979-1985). Therefore, in this thesis, 
the last year for which data is recorded in the tables presented in the following chapters will 
range from 1988 to 1994 (till whatever year the data is available). The following is the
31 Imtiazi, "Management o f Zakah Collection and Disbursement", p. 41
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researcher’s account of the way she secured data on zakat (only the institutions from which 
the researcher was able to secure data are described below).
The researcher’s experience with the zakat personnel and most of the bureaucrats was that 
they appeared to be rather suspicious of her. The researcher’s premier point of contact was 
the Joint Secretary Khalid Rashid (Ministry of Finance), who provided contacts he believed 
to be useful for information on zakat. From then on the researcher met up with many 
people, not all o f whom were useful in providing data per se but were instrumental in 
introducing her to others who could potentially be helpful.
The Minister for Religious Affairs, Mohammad Syed Ghazi, was particularly helpful. He 
granted the researcher access to the library of the Ministry. Sadly, the library did not hold 
material according to any cataloguing system and was shockingly devoid of primary 
sources or even official publications on zakat. The Zakat and Us hr Wing of the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs, which houses the Central Zakat Administration, also held no records on 
zakat and proved to be of little use in providing much practical help. The people met were 
Nusratullah Khan (Senior Joint Secretary), Nisar Ahmed Goraya (Director Accounts) and 
Suleiman Shah Afridi.
However, the Council of Islamic Ideology proved to be extremely helpful. In this regard the 
Director General of the Council, Dr Murtaza Azad, furnished the researcher with the 
original copies of the annual reports of the Central Zakat Council from 1977 until 1988 
(which should have been at the library of the Ministry of Religious Affairs) from their 
library and also provided photocopies of parts of the Council’s annual reports.
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The Federal Shariat Court was a source of little but useful information. In this regard the 
Senior Advisor, Fazal Elahi Qazi, was very helpful. The Director of Zakat Audit, Farah 
Ayub Tarin, obligingly provided the researcher with a few published zakat audit reports 
from 1991-95.
As the researcher obtained little data despite her efforts she visited and met up with many 
officials from the Ministry of Finance, the State Bank of Pakistan, the Central Board of 
Revenue (which provided some of its annual reports on taxation) and the Planning 
Commission of Pakistan, in the hope of getting any sliver of data available on zakat. These 
visits and the leads that they provided were educational but not very fruitful in research 
terms.
The libraries that the researcher visited in Islamabad were the National Library, library of 
the National Assembly Secretariat and the Senate of Pakistan. Mr Hattar at the National 
Assembly library was very cooperative and the researcher managed to look at the debates 
of the Majlis-e-Shura (Zia’s hand-picked Parliament) for any discussion of zakat. However, 
zakat did not appear in these debates in a way that would prove useful for any coherent 
analyses. Then there was the library of the International Institute of Islamic Economics (at 
the International Islamic University, Islamabad). The Dean, Zafar Ansari, and the Rector, 
Justice Khalil-ur-Rehman, were very enthusiastic about the researcher’s project and offered 
their full support. This came in the form of providing any material on zakat they had (which 
was mostly of a secondary nature). As an outsider and a woman who did not wear the hijab 
the researcher could not access the library herself but Mr. Nauroz, the assistant librarian, 
took it upon himself to bring the relevant sources to the researcher to be photocopied.
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In Islamabad the researcher also visited the Institute of Policy Studies and met up with 
Professor Khursheed Ahmed (a well-known Islamic economist who was asked by Zia to 
head the Planning Commission of Pakistan in 1977) and tape-recorded an interview with 
him about the passing of the Zakat Ordinance. Another institution visited was the Pakistan 
Institute of Development Economics, from where the researcher acquired published articles 
on poverty in Pakistan but nothing specifically on zakat.
A source from where the researcher secured most of her qualitative data, including relevant 
sections of the annual reports of the Council of Islamic Ideology and annual reports of the 
Central Zakat Council, was the Administrative Staff College in Lahore. It is the only library 
that the researcher visited and found to be decently catalogued with a competent staff in the 
Assistant Librarian Naeema Naeem and Librarian Talat Ali Sher.
The last bit of data the researcher secured from Islamabad was the quantitative data, namely 
the Household Integrated Economic Surveys. The researcher paid Rs. 6000 for the data 
(which is the official requirement). However, the data were recorded in an obsolete 
computer language called ‘CoboT, and could not be read by any modem computer system. 
Hafeez Ahmad, a systems analyst who furnished the researcher with the data, promised to 
convert some variables into an Excel spreadsheet. The researcher got eleven variables 
converted into Excel out of the fifteen requested (out of the whole database). Such were the 
circumstances and constraints under which the researcher had to operate and scrounge for 
any bit of data on zakat that could be secured.
Outline of the Thesis
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Chapter One sets the background for the central question of the thesis. It reviews the 
philosophy of the Islamic economic system of which zakat in an integral part. It evaluates 
the sources from where the Islamic economic philosophy originates. The chapter also 
explains the beginning of the modem concept of Islamic economics and thus presents a 
literary survey of the works of the twentieth century Islamic scholars who have contributed 
towards the initiation of the discipline of Islamic economics. It also presents the thoughts of 
historical Muslim figures who contributed to the evolution of the Islamic economic 
thought. The chapter ends by trying to assess the goals of the Islamic economic system.
Chapter Two analyses the tools of the Islamic economic system, including the Islamic state, 
modarabah (profit and loss sharing) and the absence of riba (interest), and zakat, through 
which the goals of the system have to be realised. It puts special emphasis on zakat and puts 
forward the viewpoints and claims of the Islamists regarding it. The chapter also analyses 
the political economy of Islamic welfare policy-making and assesses the repercussions for a 
policy formulated under an Islamic political system or the Islamic state. Lastly, the chapter 
endeavours to underline the fact that a policy based on a religious premise still needs the 
state’s commitment to the policy and the creation of trust between the state and the 
individual to make it effective.
Chapter Three sets zakat within the history of Islam in Pakistan. It starts by reviewing the 
importance and development of zakat within the country’s historical evolution. This chapter 
also explores the reasons for Zia’s formal introduction of zakat in Pakistan. The chapter 
proceeds to study the zakat policy-making process and examines the influences on the 
policy under Zia’s Islamic state within the framework of the political economy of the 
Islamic welfare policy mentioned in Chapter Two.
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Chapter Four evaluates the pattern of zakat giving at the national aggregate level and also at 
the household level. The chapter puts the analysis within a framework in which it conducts 
an historical investigation of the kind of governments that came to power in Pakistan after 
its establishment and their demonstration of credible commitment to their declared 
objectives for the people of Pakistan. The chapter shows the way in which this historical 
lack of commitment affected the development of trust between the state and its citizens. It 
proceeds to show how this bigger historical context affected the revenue-raising capability 
of zakat. Based on the framework presented in Chapter Two regarding the importance of 
trust, the chapter aims to show how the level of state commitment towards zakat per se 
affected the creation of trust between the state and the individual and how it affected the 
zakat’s achievements.
Chapter Five tries to assess the benefits of zakat in Pakistan keeping in mind the state’s 
commitment to the zakat policy as discussed in Chapter Four. It offers a narrative of the 
historical development of social welfare in Pakistan since its creation in 1947, in order to 
acquaint the reader with the conditions of social welfare before the introduction of zakat. 
The chapter then examines the disbursement of zakat at the national aggregate level and 
then at the household micro level to address the specific question of zakat and its ability to 
alleviate poverty. Lastly, the chapter investigates the effects of zakat on income inequality 
in Pakistan.
The Conclusion sums up the arguments and the hypothesis forwarded in the preceeeding
chapters and concolidates the answer to the question posed in the thesis i.e. if zakat
delivered welfare and justice in Pakistan between 1980-1994. It concludes that there exists
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a wide gulf between the ideological aspirations of the Islamists and the official objectives 
of zakat on the one hand and the way zakat performed on the ground on the other. It 
deduced that zakat underperformed regarding its objectives of poverty eradication and 
inequality reduction. Finally it expresses a few thoughts on how zakat may be salvaged on 
practical grounds and live up to its ideological stance.
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Chapter One
Understanding Islamic Welfare Ideals 
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to contextualise the main question of my thesis, that is, did zakat 
deliver welfare and justice in Pakistan between 1980 and 1994? Grasping the nature of this 
question is important, as it will prove to be indispensable for the orientation of the reader as 
the analyses unfold. As zakat originates from the economic ideals of the philosophy of 
Islam, it is not possible to fathom its true nature and importance unless assessed in the light 
of Islamic economic philosophy of which it is a central pillar.
Thus, this chapter not only introduces Islamic economic philosophy, it also examines its 
sources, and the works of its proponents (modem and early modem literature). It aims to 
contextualise, theologically and theoretically, zakat within Islamic economic thought and 
seeks to contribute to the understanding of the nature of the Islamic economic system, 
which is central for grasping the character and rationale of zakat and thus the central 
question of this thesis.
In recent decades Islamic economic philosophy has been trying to take a definite shape in 
the form of an Islamic economic system. The adherents (‘Islamists’) of this system claim 
that it is quintessential^ geared towards not only the welfare of the individual but of 
society as a whole and pays utmost regard to equality and justice. Islamists insist that the 
Islamic economic system is more welfare-oriented than the secular economic systems such 
as Capitalism or even Socialism. It is important to clarify at this juncture that this chapter
does not aspire to give a comparative analysis of the Islamic economic system and 
Capitalism, Socialism or Communism, as it is concerned solely with the critical 
investigation of the premises on which the Islamic economic system is based.32 This 
chapter will direct its evaluation exclusively to the claims of the Islamists with regard to 
their notions of welfare and justice in an Islamic economic system and examine the extent 
of the welfare orientation of this system.
The analyses of this chapter are based on secondary sources and aim to comment on, and 
examine the nature of established theories and ideas propounded by various Islamic 
thinkers and economists. Section 1.1 reviews the origins and development of Islamic 
economics. It introduces the works of the personalities who have contributed to its 
advancement as an economic discipline. Section 1.2 presents an analysis of the main 
sources, such as the Quran, Hadith and the Sunnah, from which the philosophy of Islamic 
economics originates. Section 1.3 elucidates upon the philosophy of the Islamic economic 
system and examines the tenets on which Islamic economics is based. Finally section 1.4 
focuses on the goals of the system.
1.1 The Formalisation of Islamic Economics
The development of Islamic economics in the latter part of the twentieth century was 
intended to form an Islamic social order and provide an answer to the economic crises of
32 For such an analysis from an Islamist’s perspective, see M. A. Rauf, The Islamic Doctrine o f  Economics 
and Contemporary Economic Thought: Highlight o f  a Conference on a Theological Inquiry into Capitalism  
and Socialism  (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Policy Research, 1979). M. U. Chapra, Islam 
and the Economic Challenge (Leicester, UK: The Islamic Foundation, 1992), M. Kahf, "A Contribution to the 
Theory o f Consumer Behaviour in an Islamic Society" (paper presented at the Studies in Islamic economics: a 
selection o f papers presented to the first International Conference on Islamic economics held at Makka under 
the auspices o f  King Abdul Aziz University, Makka, February 21-26 1976). For a powerful critique o f Islamic 
economics from a mainstream neo-classical perspective see T. Kuran, Islam and Mammon: the economic 
predicaments oflslamism  (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).
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the developing world (mostly the Muslim World). Islamists felt that Capitalist, Communist 
and Socialist ideologies had failed to provide welfare and economic justice to the people of 
the Muslim world and thus felt the need to develop a system through which these people 
would achieve a just society. They wanted to establish a system that would be different 
from the ideology of Capitalism (which they viewed as being based on individualistic, 
selfish and acquisitive men and women, who worked to serve their own interests, giving 
secondary consideration to the welfare of the people). They also believed that the Islamic 
system did not, in any way, reflect the ideology of Socialism, which they regarded as 
reflecting the other extreme, i.e. of nationalising the means of production, thus killing 
individual incentive, and additionally, denying the individual the chance to exercise his/her
• • • i i  #initiative. Additionally, they asserted that the Islamic system would not be akin to 
Communism, in which people were community oriented and denied the right of freedom to 
own, and where potential individual entrepreneurship was crushed by the dominant state’s 
interference in the economy.34 Islamists asserted that they would achieve their goal of a 
welfare-oriented and a just economic society through a third way; known as the way of 
Islam, which would manifest itself in the form of the Islamic economic system.
In addition to this rationale, a reaction to Western colonialism was also implicated in the 
development of the Islamic economic discipline. Islamists from around the world and from 
various walks of life and social orders felt that Muslims had no reason to adhere to alien 
prescriptions for economic development imposed on them based on secular perceptions. 
They sought to develop economic strategies based on Islamic philosophy, which, as they
33 Rauf, The Islamic Doctrine o f  Economics, pp. 17-19
34 M. N. Siddiqi, "Muslim Economic Thinking: A Survey o f Contemporary Literature" (paper presented at the 
Studies in Islamic economics: a selection o f papers presented to the first International Conference on Islamic 
economics held at Makka under the auspices o f King Abdul Aziz University Makka, February 21-26 
1976).pp. 242-43
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thought, would solve the economic problems of the poor Islamic countries and bring about 
a fair allocation of resources, thus creating a more equal society.
The ‘open door’ attitude of some Islamic governments to Islamise their countries also 
spurred attempts to theorise economic injunctions of Islam. However, it would not be 
inappropriate to state that Islamisation in such cases was more geared towards the 
fulfilment of political ambitions rather than any earnest desire to see the Islamisation of the 
economy.
In 1976 the First International Conference on Islamic Economics took place in Mecca, and 
was attended by over two hundred Islamists from all over the world, heralding the birth of a 
new economic discipline.35 In 1981, the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) established the 
Islamic Research and Training Institute (IRTI), the purpose of which was to organise and 
conduct basic and applied research with a view to develop models and methods for the 
application of Shariah (Islamic law) in the field of economics, finance and banking. In this 
way the proponents of this discipline (who will be labelled ‘Islamic economists’ or 
‘Islamists’ in the present thesis) tried to formalise the rationale and intent of Islamic 
economic philosophy and aspired to translate it into a methodical and workable system of 
economic activity.
Medieval Muslim Economic Thinkers
Even before the modem interest in the revival of Islamic economic and socio-political 
thought, there were Muslims in the fourteenth to the nineteenth century who were engaged
35 K. Ahmed, "Problems o f  Research in Islamic Economics," in Readings in the Concept and Methodology o f  
Islamic Economics, ed. A. Ghazali and O. Syed (Selangor Darul Ehsan Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications, 
1989).p. 148
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in the theoretical enquiry into economic activity. The early thinkers dealt with economics as 
‘the science of the regulations of the household’ (ilm tabir al-manzil). Although the 
practical regulation of economic life had been treated to some extent by the canon law 
under the Quran and Hadith, theoretical research into the fundamentals of economic life 
started only after the study of philosophy began with the translation of Greek philosophical 
literature into Arabic in the ninth century.36 Thus it is fair to state that most of the Muslim 
thinkers mentioned in this section cannot be strictly labelled as ‘Islamic economists’ as 
their theoretical enquiries were inspired by classical Greek literature. However, as these 
personalities were Muslims who were at the same time also inspired by the Quran and the 
Hadith, it would not be inappropriate to describe them as ‘Muslim economic thinkers’.
The writings produced by the early Muslim thinkers comment on issues related to 
economic activity rather engagingly. The works of at least two authors ought to be named: 
Kitab al-ishara ila mahasin al-tijara wa-marifa jayyid al-a rad wa-radi iha wa-ghushush 
al-mudallisin fiha  (The Book of Hint at the Beauties of Commerce and the Knowledge of 
Good and Bad Merchandise and the Swindlers’ Falsification in Them) by al-Dimishqi, 
completed around 1175, and the second collection of works called the Kitab al-I bar, of 
which volume one is known as Muqqaddima, written in 1377 by Ibn-Khaldun.37
Dimishqi’s book is considered to be a work of great importance dealing with the knowledge 
of many wares and their counterfeit substitutes, and with the theory and practice of 
commerce and economic subjects. He examined questions such as the true meaning of 
wealth and ownership, the various kinds of possession, the origins and use of money, how
36 J. DeSomogyi, "Economic Theory in Classical Arabic Literature," Studies in Islam II (1965).p. 1
37 See the two articles by J. DeSomogyi, "Economic Fundamentals in Classical Arabic Literature," Studies in 
Islam III, no. 3 (1966). And DeSomogyi, "Economic Theory in Classical Arabic Literature."
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to determine the average prices of goods, and how to protect property. He was the first to 
declare that value is inherent in everything suitable to the satisfaction of human needs 
reflected in the price of the commodity. It appears from his work that rather than viewing 
economics as a religious discipline, his views preceded the modem Western view of 
economics, seeing it as a positivist discipline. Additionally, Dimishqi’s work comments 
upon and analyses the positivist aspects of economic activity of his time rather than 
chastising the economic agent with references to religion.38
The second of the great works among the early Muslim economic thinkers was written by a 
famous Tunisian-born Arab called Ibn-Khaldun in the fourteenth century. He was an avant- 
garde thinker and is considered by some to be the father of sociology. He is known 
primarily for his work on the history of the world, called Kitab a l-I’bar, of which volume 
one, known as Muqqaddima, is devoted to economic concerns and is considered to be a 
pioneering work on the discipline.39
In this treatise, Ibn-Khaldun elaborates upon the theories of production, value and 
distribution, which in turn combine into a coherent general economic theory, constituting 
the framework for his analysis of world history. Although his commentary upon economics 
makes constant references to the Quranic injunctions incumbent upon a Muslim, he offers 
an intrinsic acknowledgement of the homo economicus.40
38 DeSomogyi, "Economic Theory in Classical Arabic Literature." p. 2. DeSomogyi, "Economic 
Fundamentals in Classical Arabic Literature."pp. 115-118
39 J. D. C. Boulakia, "Ibn-Khaldun: A Fourteenth Century Economist," Journal o f  Political Economy 79, no. 5 
(1971).p. 1117
40 Ibid. However, there were some other medieval Muslim thinkers such as al-Ghazali (958-1111) and Ibn- 
Taimiyah (1263-1328), whose work was heavily inspired by Islamic religious sources. Their works are 
sometimes reflected in the works o f  some modem Islamic economists such as Chapra, M. N. Siddiqi, and 
Kahf to name a few.
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Early Islamic Thinkers
Almost four hundred years later, it was the Ulema (Islamic scholars) in the mid-eighteenth 
to early nineteenth century who were instrumental in the inception of the discipline we now 
study as Islamic economics. These Ulema, such as Shah Wali Ullah (1703-1762) and 
Mohammad Iqbal (1873-1938), although not economists, were great theologians and well 
versed in fiqh  (Islamic jurisprudence). It was also they who offered the economic aspects in 
Islam as an economic ideology based on religious doctrines immersed in morals and 
dogmas.
Shah Wali Ullah was one of the first to realise the intellectual, social and cultural 
degeneration of the Muslim World. He laid the foundation of the Islamic doctrinal 
resurgence in the Indian Sub-continent and became a source of inspiration for almost all the 
subsequent Islamic social and religious reform movements of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries.41
He believed that the introduction of Islamic codes of behaviour in every sphere of life, 
starting from the personal, spiritual to the social, economic and the political arenas wou|d 
be the decisive element in the restoration of the Islamic Shariah and thus Muslim self­
esteem. In order to achieve this end he translated the Quran into Persian42 (the language of 
the officials and the ruling Muslim elite of the Indian Sub-continent) so that the message of 
Islam could be made available to the understanding of the dominant Muslim elite. Centuries
41 Shah’s influential contemporary was Abdul Wahhab (1703-1792). Whereas Walliullah stood for a dynamic 
interpretation o f  the Sharia and a revival o f Ijtihad as a tool for making the practice o f Islam relevant to the 
times, Wahab’s approach was in sharp contrast. He stood for rigidity with the aim o f evoking an 
understanding and interpretation o f  Islam firmly grounded in the times and conditions o f  the seventh century.
42 Pakistan Historical Society, A History o f  the Freedom Movement 1707-1947, ed. Board o f Editors, vol. I 
1707-1831 (Karachi: 1957).pp. 493-500
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later, his efforts were instrumental in providing the impetus for the institutionalisation of 
the Islamic political and economic system in the Muslim world.
One of Shah’s most important contributions was his stress on the need for Ijtihad 
(independent interpretation) in Islamic law. This meant interpreting cases and situations in 
accordance with present times while keeping the classical precedence in view. While he 
considered reverting to the original and classical form of Islam, i.e. Islam during the years 
of the Prophet Mohammad and his four Caliphs, he also believed that taqlid (rigid 
conformity or orthodoxy) was an important element responsible for the lack of awareness 
and of the social backwardness of the Muslims.43 His idea of reverting to the classical form 
of Islam inspired some modem Islamic economists to use the same reasoning when 
interpreting classical sources, such as the Quran, in formalising the discipline of Islamic 
economics.
Iqbal (1897-1938) was another personality whose socio-economic thought exerted immense 
influence on the development of Islamic economic thought in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. His poetry, philosophy, and political thought provided a backdrop for 
the development of Islamic economics in the twentieth century.44
Iqbal was a scholar o f fiqh , and Islamic law was his answer in seeking a way out of the 
economic, social and political underdevelopment of the Muslims. He entertained notions of 
equity via zakat and justice via Islamic law. He viewed the Islamic social order to be
43 Ibid.pp. 504-505 & 536-39
44 A. Ahmed, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, 1857-1964 (Karachi: Oxford University Press,
1967).p. 141. Apart from these Islamic revivalists in the Indo-Pak sub-continent there were other Islamic 
revivalists in the Islamic world. The five most prominent during the latter half o f  the nineteenth century were: 
Jamal al Din al Afghani (1838-97) in Iran, Namik Kemal (1840-88) and Zia Gokalp (1876-1924) in Turkey, 
Muhammad Abduh (1849-1924) in Egypt and Rashid Rida (1865-1935) in Syria.
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distinct from any system that the West had introduced in the world. It was he who 
introduced the belief that whatever the positive or practical result of Capitalism, 
Communism and Socialism might be for the West, he considered these ‘isms’ to be 
incapable of bringing about prosperity for the Muslim world.45 He believed this could be 
achieved only through the Islamic ideals of equality and justice.46
The writings of Shah Wali Ullah and Iqbal identify a number of desirable economic 
outcomes such as social welfare and justice for all, but provide no definite guidelines for 
the institutionalisation of Islamic economics. Nor do they articulate ideas geared 
specifically towards providing Islamic solutions to economic problems. However, one can 
definitely argue that their ideas were thought provoking and that such ideas held the basis 
of the conception of modem Islamic socio-economic thought.
It was Ulema such as Syed Abul A ’ala Mawdudi, also an expert on Islamic fiqh , who in the 
mid-twentieth century started formalising statements regarding the economic attitude of 
Islam. However, his formalisation lacked any profound knowledge of the discipline of 
conventional economics. In 1932 he started his own publication of Quranic exegesis, called 
Tarjuman-al-Quran. The journal was to revive conformism and conservatism in all the 
social traditions of Islam. He advocated that the laws arid traditions of Islam, which were 
valid fourteen hundred years ago, were applicable in contemporary societies, as the canon 
laws of Islam hold good for all times.47 Mawdudi followed the vein of Islamic orthodoxy in 
theology and set out to shape the economic commandments of the Quran into a workable 
economic theory.
45 J. Iqbal, Ideology o f  Pakistan (Lahore: Pakistan Movement Workers Trust, 1971).p. 17
46 Ibid. p. 52
47 Ahmed, Islamic Modernism, pp. 216-217
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Mawdudi founded one of the leading institutions for the revival of Islamic social, political 
and economic thought, called the Mansura Academy, in Lahore in 1963. The institution’s 
curriculum attempted to find solutions to the socio-political and economic problems facing 
the Muslim countries. Special attention was given to the codification of Islamic law and to 
the development of an Islamic economic system through the preparation of pioneering 
literature for its practical implementation according to the needs of Muslims.
The above-mentioned Ulema considered the position of the Shariah on various economic 
questions and although their contribution to the development of Islamic economics was not 
‘economic theory’ as such, their work created a point of departure on which Islamists 
trained in conventional economics could base their hypotheses.48
Modern Islamic Economists
For a better understanding of what is presently known as Islamic economics, this section 
introduces the group of modem Islamists who are trained economists and actually 
responsible for the formal inauguration of the discipline. It was they who moulded the early 
Islamic economic thought of the Ulema into a potentially workable economic system.
These economists started by using secular economic logic to question Islamic doctrines 
regarding the individual’s economic behaviour. This practice yielded a conflicting and 
confusing theoretical hybrid. It also led to disagreements between Ulema trained in fiqh and 
Islamic economists over such fundamental issues as the prohibition of riba (to quote one
48 M. A Khan, "Islamic Economics: The State o f the Art," in Readings in the Concept and Methodology o f  
Islamic Economics, ed. A. Ghazali and O. Syed (Selangor Darul Ehsan Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications, 
1989).p. 122
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example). Fiqh-trained Islamists put an absolute ban on riba whereas some Islamic 
economists tend to be divided on its outright prohibition and instead prefer to weigh the 
economic implications of its proscription. Despite their knowledge of economics, Islamic 
economists cannot boast a mastery of Islamic jurisprudence and other Islamic disciplines, 
and those who are equipped with the knowledge of the latter disciplines are deficient in 
their understanding of economics. The result of this predicament is that there seems to be a 
lack of fusion and interaction between formal economics and Islamic economic ideas. It 
appears that there is still a long way to go before Islamic economics comes up to the 
standards of conventional neo-classical economics where consistency, meticulousness and 
pragmatism in theorisation and application are concerned.
This chapter analyses the works of six widely quoted and acknowledged mainstream 
Islamic economists (among many other prominent ones). They are the pioneers and 
founders of what we know to be Islamic economics and how it stands today. They are M. 
N. Siddiqi,49 A. Rauf,s0 M. Kahf,51 M. A. Manan,52 M. U. Chapra53 and Z. Ahmad.54 These 
writers are all strong proponents of Islamic economics and are devoted to its dissemination. 
Most are affiliated with the Islamic Research and Training Institute of the Islamic 
Development Bank or the King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah as professors or senior 
researchers. They are also active in other institutions operating for the development and
49 M. N. Siddiqi, "Economics o f  Islam," Islamic Thought 14, no. 3 (1971).
50 Rauf, The Islamic Doctrine o f  Economics.
51 Kahf, "A Contribution to the Theory o f Consumer Behaviour in an Islamic Society", Kahf, "Zakah 
Management in Muslim Societies."
52 M. A. Mannan, Islamic Economics: Theory and Practice (Sevenoaks: Hodder and Stoughton, 1986).
53 M. U. Chapra, The Economic System o f  Islam A Discussion o f  its Goals and Nature (London: The Islamic 
Cultural Centre, 1970), Chapra, Islam and the Economic Challenge, M. U. Chapra, "The Islamic Welfare 
State and its role in the Economy" (paper presented at the Studies in Islamic economics: a selection o f papers 
presented to the first International Conference on Islamic economics held at Makka under the auspices of  
King Abdul Aziz University, Makka, February 21-26 1976), M. U. Chapra, Towards a Just Monetary System: 
A Discussion o f  Money, Banking and Monetary Policy in the Light o f  Islamic Teachings, vol. 8, Islamic 
Economic Series (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1985).
54 Z. Ahmad, "Public Finance in Islam", September 6, 1989, The International Monetary Fund, Washington
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propagation of Islamic economics and banking, such as the Islamic Foundation in Leicester 
(UK). Siddiqi, Kahf, Chapra and Mannan have all received the Islamic Development 
Bank’s award for Islamic economics or the King Faisal International Award for Islamic 
Studies for their contribution to the development of this subject. The chapter will also 
comment on the works of other Islamic economists, Nawab Haider Naqvi55 and Khurshid 
Ahmed.56
Although all of the above can be described as Islamic economists, their stance on various 
economic issues discussed below can sometimes differ from one another. Some Islamic 
economists reject Western economic models outright and stress the need to return to classic 
Islamic values and ethics, while others attempt to utilise Western economic models without 
losing touch with the fundamentals of the Islamic faith. Nonetheless, all these writers can 
still be examined under the joint umbrella of the general analysis of the Islamic economic 
system, because they all concur on the fundamentals of the Islamic economic system, i.e. 
the philosophy with its normative aspects, and the sources and the tools.
One of the few writers to have produced a critical analysis o f the works of the above- 
mentioned economists is Timur Kuran.57 Although Kuran is the King Faisal Professor of 
Islamic Thought and Culture at the University of Southern California, he cannot be
55 S. N. H. Naqvi, Islam, Economics and Society (London: Kegan Paul International, 1994).
56 Ahmed, "Problems o f  Research in Islamic Economics." K. Ahmad, ed., Islamic Law and Constitution 
(Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd., 1958).
57 T. Kuran, "Economic Justice in Contemporary Islamic Thought," in Islamic Economic Alternatives: critical 
perspectives and new directions, ed. K. S. Jomo (London: Macmillan Academic and Professional, 1992), T. 
Kuran, "The Economic System in Contemporary Islamic Thought: A Critical Interpretation," in Islamic 
Economic Alternatives: critical perspectives and new directions, ed. K. S. Jomo (London: Macmillan 
Academic and Professional, 1992), T. Kuran, "Further Reflections on the Behavioural Norms o f Islamic 
Economics," Journal o f  Economic Behaviour and Organisation Vol. 27 (1995), T. Kuran, "Islamic 
Economics and the Islamic Subeconomy," Journal o f  Economic Perspectives 9, no. 4 (1995), T. Kuran, 
"Islamic Redistribution Through Zakat: Medieval Roots o f  Contemporary Problems" (paper presented at the 
Poverty and Charity in Middle Eastern Context, Ann Arbor University o f  Michigan, May 4-7 2000).
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categorised as an Islamic economist, but is rather a new institutional economist. His 
research draws on multiple disciplines such as economics, political science, sociology, 
psychology, history and legal studies. Kuran’s work provides a crucial critical review of 
Islamic economic literature and discipline, and has generally expressed dissatisfaction with 
the way in which the Islamic economists have failed to develop an articulate and a 
workable Islamic economic system.
Islamic economics is made up of normative statements because assumptions regarding an 
individual’s behaviour are not based on actual observation. There is lack of proper 
theorising of consumer or firm behaviour. Whatever hypotheses Islamic economists 
propound are conceptual in nature and lack modem empirical evidence. As a result of this 
predicament, Islamic economics also lacks study into institutional arrangements that might 
force or encourage an individual to behave according to Islamic ideals. The normative 
nature of the discipline makes many of its doctrines non-verifiable. This has to be kept in 
mind when analysing the Islamic economic system or when comparing it with an 
operational and a positive economic discipline.
Islamic economists are fully aware of these limitations but continue to stress that the 
subject deals with an ideal Islamic society and would only work under an all-embracing 
Islamic environment. Their explanation for non-achievement is that there is no single fully 
developed Islamic society in the world, and therefore a Muslim’s behaviour is constrained. 
This makes Islamic economic theory impossible to apply in practice and thus non- 
verifiable. Islamists argue that the presence of an Islamic state that would be able to create 
the right environment, via education or even coercion, for Islamic norms to flourish would 
then make the testing of hypotheses possible.
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In response, it would be fair to conclude that the introduction of Islamic economics in a 
country starts with the imposition of the fundamentals of the system, for example, the 
introduction of zakat, abolition of riba, introduction of modarabah and the presence of an 
Islamic state. Once these fundamentals exist, then one can safely assume a country to be 
Islamic and following an Islamic economic system, intimating to a social scientist that 
he/she can conduct analyses of such a country’s Islamic policies. For example, if a country 
has had fundamental Islamic policies imposed in its economy (say for 10 years), then one 
can suppose the time to be ripe to conduct economic or political analyses of such a 
country’s Islamic policies, as by this time, the Islamic state of such a country would have 
exerted enough power to educate or coerce people into abiding by Islamic economic 
doctrines. Additionally, a Muslim’s behaviour would not be constrained by un-Islamic 
economic considerations, as 10 years is sufficient time for him/her to internalise the 
philosophy of Islamic economics imposed with the assistance of the Islamic state.
There is an ongoing effort to establish Islamic economic institutions in many Islamic 
countries, and there are some countries, such as Pakistan and Malaysia, which have taken 
relatively serious measures to Islamise their economic and political institutions. These 
measures include interest-free banking and Islamic modes of finance and zakat. In Pakistan, 
especially, such efforts have been going on for the past 25 years, so at this point there 
should be enough potential for applied research on Islamic policies. These studies could 
demonstrate how normative Islamic economics has translated itself into a positive one, with 
what level of success and whether the Islamic social welfare system has been effective in 
delivering its declared objectives of welfare and justice.
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In the light of the work of the authors mentioned above, this chapter begins by describing 
the sources from where Islamic economic philosophy originates.
1.2 Sources of Islamic Economic Philosophy
Islamic economic philosophy has its roots in the core sources of Islam, i.e. the Quran, 
Hadith and the Sunnah. These are responsible for the inspiration, emergence and 
development of thought, tradition and philosophy of Islamic economics. Through these 
sources Islamic economists and jurists seek to answer every conceivable question dealing 
with all types of human interaction in society, politics and economics. However, if an 
answer cannot be found in these sources then resort is made to the principle of analogy.58 
Hence it is important to examine these sources, which would help in explaining some 
limitations of the system, before we embark on analysing its philosophy and tools.
After the death of Prophet Mohammad, Muslims were left with a void, as immediate 
answers to social issues were difficult to obtain in his absence. The Prophet would provide 
solutions to varied issues in his lifetime, but after his death the only source left with the 
Muslims was the Quran. The Quran is considered a major and an indispensable source for 
all dimensions of the Islamic faith and is the source of all Islamic law. However, the 
Quranic law is not a legal code in the modem sense of the term. It is a written revelation, 
and for Muslims it is the book of Allah.59
58 Rauf, The Islamic Doctrine o f  Economics, p. 2
59 Mannan, Islamic Economics: Theory and Practice.p. 29
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In its present form, the Quran was compiled and organised sura by sura (verse by verse) in 
a uniform manner by Usman (644-656 AD), the third Caliph.60 However, this compilation 
is not free of controversy. This is because Usman’s personality in the Islamic history is 
more revered by the Sunni sect of Islam than by the Shia sect, as the latter regard him as a 
historically controversial figure, especially where the compilation of the Quran is 
concerned. This state o f affairs has important consequences for the universal validity of the 
Quran as a source of guidance for Muslims of all sects. According to some, the Shias 
accuse Usman of omitting verses relating to the glory of Ali, the fourth Caliph (and son-in- 
law of the Prophet), whom the Shias hold as the spiritual and political successor of the 
Prophet and thus their first Imam (spiritual leader).61 What this implies is that there can be 
divergent readings of the Quran regarding different traditions between these two major 
sects. This of course holds true for economic issues as well. An important example of this is 
the fact that the Shias refuse to pay zakat to the state as they consider it to be against their 
belief to pay it to the state. Consequently, their zakat payments are at an interpersonal level.
Very few phrases in the Quran deal with economic matters, and those that do are not 
specific enough to provide unambiguous guidance.62 A characteristic of the Quran that 
would cause confusion for the reader is the fact that some legal stipulations are followed by 
cryptic phrases like: ‘And, Allah is Mighty, Wise and knows best.’ Such phrases, when 
preceded or followed by a verse (from which one is to stipulate an analogy), greatly 
obscure the logic for deduction or reasoning.
60 www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/history/chronology, A B rief Chronology o f  Muslim History (University of  
Southern California, 2007 [cited April 9 2007]).
61 H. Lammens, Islam: beliefs and institutions, trans. Sir E. Denison Ross, Islam and the Muslim W orld; no. 
6 (Frank Cass and Co., 1968).p. 41. The Quran was revealed to the Prophet verse by verse over 
approximately 23 years (610- 632 AD)
6 Kuran, "Further Reflections on the Behavioural Norms o f Islamic Economics."p. 161
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To resolve this problem the Quranic scholars indulged in intellectually sophisticated
reasoning to clarify obscurities in the meaning of the Quran. This branch of Quranic
(%discourse is called tafsir or Quranic exegesis. The rationale of this science of tafsir was to 
explicate with clarity the philosophy of ethics, codes of politics and laws of state and 
sovereignty. The pride that the scholars of this science took was in the certitude that these 
exegeses were free from logical inconsistencies, and presented the Quran in a way that 
crystallised its directives for everyday life. The number of these commentaries is 
innumerable and the disciplines they cover are vast.64 Therefore one observes that the 
Quran becomes the source from which all Islamic activity is derived, including of course 
the philosophy of Islamic economics. Considering the vast array of disciplines for which 
the Quran is interpreted, it is not difficult to see that the meanings one can derive from 
Quranic verses for a solution to a specific problem, whether social, political or economic, 
can be myriad i.e. possess many meanings for many people especially in a multi-sectarian 
society and among individuals with differing and conflicting interests.
The second source of knowledge on Islam and its economic philosophy for the Muslims are 
the Hadith and the Sunnah. The Hadith is the narration of the behaviour of the Prophet 
while the Sunnah is the law deduced from this narration. They are distinguished on the 
basis of being practical (Sunnah) and theoretical (Hadith). These are termed as the ‘science 
of tradition’ transmitted through a methodology known as isnad65 and are a corpus of 
Islamic knowledge. The Quran enjoins upon Muslims to follow the conduct of the Prophet 
while the Sunnah is regarded as a dynamic source of law capable of handling contemporary
63 F. Schuon, Dimensions o f  Islam, trans. P. N. Townsend (London: Allen & Unwin, 1970).p. 61
64 Z. Ahmed, "The Science o f  Quranic Exegesis," The Islamic Literature 4, no. 6 (1952).p. 24
65 Isnad means tracing the chain o f  narrators o f  the Hadith all the way back to the Prophet. This was done by 
investigating the qualities o f  the narrator with regards to his memory, accuracy, truthfulness and objectivity.
A. Kannoun, "The Hadith-Its Scientific and Religious Value," The Islamic Review  55, no. 1 (1967).
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issues. For example, the Quran mentions zakat but does not lay down the details, whereas 
the details of its implementation can be deduced from the Sunnah, as it was the Prophet 
who explained them to his followers.66
It must be mentioned here that Sunnah contradicts Sunnah, and some scholars have been 
led to doubt that one is dealing with a unitary body of information.67 This is because during 
the rule of the Umayyad Caliphs (661-750 AD), the Hadith and the Sunnah were corrupted. 
There were several political reasons for this conspiracy, which are beyond the scope of this 
thesis. The record of the Sunnah and the Hadith proliferated and by the ninth century the 
number had reached hundreds of thousands. These included pious fabrications by those 
who believed that their conduct was in conformity with Islam, and forgeries by factions 
involved in political and theological disputes. To overcome such limitations, throughout the 
ninth and tenth centuries Muslim scholars travelled all over the Muslim world collecting 
information on the narrators of the Ahadith (plural of Hadith) so as to check the 
authenticity of the source. It took two centuries after the promulgation of the Quran for the 
collection, publication and authentication of the Ahadith and the Sunnah.68
After this quest for authentication, six collections came to be authenticated: Ismail al- 
Bukhari, Muslim ibn-al-Hajjaj, Adu Dawud, Al-Nisai, Al-Tirmidhi and Ibn Maja.69 Both
66 Mannan, Islamic Economics: Theory and Practice.p. 31
67 J. Burton, The sources o f  Islamic law: Islamic theories o f  abrogation (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 1990).p. 3
68 Kannoun, "The Hadith-Its Scientific and Religious Value." Other sources o f  Islamic law are called ijma and 
ijtihad. Ijma is a practice based on the consensus o f  either the community or the doctors o f religion. The 
necessity for ijma is the realisation o f emerging institutions and their regulation. A Mawdudi, Islamic Law  
and Constitution (Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd., 1967).p. 62. Ijtihad  is a general term for legal reasoning 
or interpretation. It deals mainly with the question o f Shariah that emerges in society over time, but its ruling 
cannot be the same for all times.
69 J. P. Esposito, Islam (Oxford University Press, 1991).p. 81. What has to be kept in mind is the fact that 
these sources belong to the Sunni sect; the Shias have their additional sources o f  Hadith and the Sunnah and 
the most important one o f  them is the Jafari School o f Law.
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the Sunnis and the Shias accept the Sunnah of the Prophet as an authoritative textual source, 
though they may differ on its context and thus its interpretation.
It is a matter of debate as to how these traditions can be interpreted with respect to the 
economic realities of the present world. Islamists believe that analogy is the way forward in 
such cases. But considering the contentious tendency of interpretations among some major 
Islamic sects, one becomes rather sceptical towards the workability and acceptability of 
analogies.70 One comes to the conclusion that one is not dealing with an amalgamated body 
of literature as it is replete with internal contradictions and ambiguities. Contentions in the 
interpretation of the sources of Islamic economic philosophy give rise to questions about 
which interpretation of Islam is normative and appropriate for seeking solutions to 
economic conundrums. With so much left to interpretation it is unclear who should 
determine an enforceable economic perspective and whether it is possible to institutionalise 
an economic system that would confront the economic realities of the modem world and 
make it conducive to the welfare of diverse Muslim societies.
1.3 Islamic Economic Philosophy
Islamic economic system derives its principles from the philosophy governing the monetary 
and the financial concerns of human beings in Islam. The purpose of this philosophy is to 
channel economic pursuits via Islamic ethics and thus lay the basis of the system’s 
implementation. Therefore, Islamic economic philosophy is the point of departure for the 
understanding of the Islamic economic system.
70 I Goldziher, Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law, trans. Andras and R. Hamori, Modern classics in 
Near Eastern studies (N. L. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).p. 50
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The following exposition is a survey of the literature as it stands today. These analyses 
evaluate the Islamic economic philosophy from a welfare perspective and assess the 
fairness and justice aspects of the system. This section analyses the established system of 
beliefs on which the premise of Islamic economics rests.
It is not incorrect to state that religion in general has always, in major ways, influenced the 
direction and evolution of economic activity in various societies over centuries. From the 
ancient apocalyptic writers in 2000 B.C. to prophets such as Amos, Jesus and later 
Mohammad, philosophies based on theocratic reasoning have had implications for the way 
people behave in their economic dealings. These prophets had a vision of society for people 
where piety and righteousness were encouraged, which they said would lead to a brotherly, 
free, just and equitable society.71 Whenever such philosophies have turned to methods of 
resource allocation, the result has been ‘economic theology’.72 Even in recent times 
sociologists such as Max Weber also acknowledged the nexus between religion and 
economics, because according to him it was the Protestant Ethic that laid the foundations of
7 *^Capitalism in the West.
Islamists consider Islam to be a complete religion with a code o f behaviour encircling all 
aspects of human life, inclusive of its own distinct economic system. They assert that the 
economic system of Islam is better than other economic systems followed in the world 
today. According to them, the concept of social welfare is central to the Islamic economic
71 H. W. Laidler, Social-economic movements: an historical and comparative survey o f  socialism, 
communism, co-operation, utopianism; and other systems o f  reform and reconstruction (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1949).p. 8
72 J. S. Prybyla, Comparative Economic Systems (New York: Appleton Century Crofts Meredith 
Corporations, 1969).p. 69
73 M. Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit o f  Capitalism, trans. T. Parsons, 2005 ed. (London & New  
York: Routledge, 1930).
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system as it is based on values of equity and justice where societal welfare takes 
precedence over individual interests.
In the view of the Islamists, economic activity in Islam is regarded as a form of worship 
and that is why Islamic economic philosophy proposes that economics is not value free or a 
positive pure science, but has substantial normative aspects to its basis that act as its 
incentive structure. Islamists say that this normative approach would create the desired 
economic justice and therefore promote welfare in society.
Islamic economists lay out these normative aspects that form the basis for the incentive 
structure of the system as four axioms. These are Unity, belief in the Day of Judgement, 
Moderation, and Fairness. These axioms are the cornerstone of the faith of homo Islamicus 
and are demonstrated in his actions, consequently leading to economic justice in society.74
Unity
The axiom of Unity declares that Allah is one; He created everything. Everything belongs 
to Him and everyone is subservient to His will. Man (homo Islamicus) is Allah s vicegerent 
on earth and is vested with specific duties and responsibilities, both at an individual and 
collective level, which would lead towards the welfare of the society as a whole. The 
mission of homo Islamicus is to promote Allah’s cause, i.e. act in a way that would spread 
brotherhood and justice for all on earth. Allah has created man free, but it is not absolute
74 See Kahf, "A Contribution to the Theory o f Consumer Behaviour in an Islamic Society" .pp. 19-24. Siddiqi, 
"Muslim Economic Thinking".pp. 194-96. See also Chapra, The Economic System o f  Islam A Discussion o f  its 
Goals and Nature.pp. 11-16. For a definition o f homo Islamicus see Kuran, "The Economic System in 
Contemporary Islamic Thought: A Critical Interpretation."
freedom that he is granted, and he has to act within the confines of the Shariah, which mark 
parameters for him regarding all aspects of his life.75
According to the Islamists, homo Islamicus is superior to the neo-classical economic 
individual, i.e. homo economicus, as unlike the latter he will not capitalise on his utility or 
profit at the expense of society, and will regard social good before his own. All the 
decisions of homo Islamicus regarding consumption and production will be guided by the 
Shariah norms, which would result in a just distribution of resources and wealth in society, 
hence advancing welfare.76
Day o f Jud2ement
The second axiom that formulates the incentive structure of the Islamic economic system is 
the homo Islamicus ' belief in the Day of Judgement. In order to seek the pleasure of Allah, 
a Muslim would hold all things in this life as transitory, will commit good deeds and have 
faith that he will be answerable for his deeds on the Judgement Day.77
Islamists assert that this concept extends the time horizon of a Muslim to include the 
Hereafter, i.e. the individual would not limit his behaviour to doing things that will give 
him immediate benefit, but would have the motivation of attaining the goodwill of Allah in 
eternal life by committing fair and just actions towards his fellow brethren.78 Thus a 
Muslim’s actions would demonstrate that his ultimate concern is to keep societal benefit 
ahead of his own material gain.
75 M. Kahf, "Islamic Economics and its Methodology," in Readings in the Concept and Methodology o f  
Islamic Economics, ed. A. Ghazali and O. Syed (Selangor Darul Ehsan, Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications, 
1989).p. 76. See also, Siddiqi, "Muslim Economic Thinking".p. 195
76 Chapra, Islam and the Economic Challenge.pp. 206-208
77 Kahf, "Methodology o f  Islamic Economics."p. 76
78 Siddiqi, "Muslim Economic Thinking".p. 244
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Moderation
According to the Islamists the satisfaction of the Islamic consumer should lie with the fact 
that he is living up to the Islamic standards of israf (avoiding excessive consumption),79 i.e. 
he would be ‘moderate’ in his drive for consumption and not be ‘extravagant’. However, 
extravagance is described rather loosely in Islamic economic literature. It is defined as 
excess of what is necessary to fulfil a need, which implies not making big departures from
O A
the standard patterns of consumption in society. They say that the standard patterns of 
consumption are established by the status and the income of the individual and the general 
level of wealth in the society. According to them, moderation in consumption would solve 
the scarcity problem through the lowering of aggregate demand.81
It would be pertinent here to raise concern vis-a-vis the ideal of ‘moderate consumption’. 
With regard to the current economic condition of the Muslim countries, ‘moderation’ 
(whatever methodology Islamic economists decide upon for its measurement) might have 
the effect of reducing the already low level of consumption. This might lead to the lowering 
of the aggregate demand, which might in turn lower economic growth. If consumption is to 
be limited to need fulfilment and pursued as an absolute standard of consumption at all 
times, then demand cannot act as an engine for growth with its implications for general 
welfare of the Islamic masses. Therefore moderation in consumption in itself may not be 
sufficient to improve social welfare.
79 M. A. Chaudhry, Contributions to Islamic economic theory: a study in social economics (London: 
Macmillan, 1986).p. 17
80 M. N. Siddiqi, "Chand ma'ashiyati haqiqaten," Tarjuman al-Qur'an 33, no. 6 (1950).pp. 340-360
81 Rauf, The Islamic Doctrine o f  Economics .p. 146. Islamists assert that Islamic standards o f consumption also 
mean abstaining from the goods and services that are prohibited in Islam.
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Kahf tries to address this problem and differentiates between personal consumption and 
altruistic consumption. He suggests that the neo-classical concept of consumer rationality 
and utilitarianism would have to be adapted to the axiomatic system of Islamic economic 
philosophy and stretched to include non-economic gains such as spiritual reward and 
fulfilment as a consequence of altruistic consumption in the form of spending on charity 
and for the benefit of society. Islamic economic rationalism would consider the axiom of 
the Day of Judgement, which would lengthen the time horizon of a Muslim to incorporate 
the Hereafter when thinking in terms of his utility.
Kahf emphasises that such rationality would affect the Islamic consumer in a way that 
would make him consider not only the immediate benefit o f his action in the neo-classical 
utilitarian sense of the term, but will also induce him to practice moderation in his own 
consumption. He would behave as part of a brotherhood by being charitable to others, 
which would enhance his spiritual accomplishment and his life in the Hereafter, thus 
making him ‘rich and successful’ and consistent with the Islamic economic philosophical 
criteria.83 According to Kahf, examples of this form of consumption would be giving to the 
poor and needy, spending for the welfare of future generations, and investing in areas that 
would enhance communal life even though they generate no significant profit. According to 
him altruistic consumption would bring more resources (human and material) into 
circulation in the economy, leading to a more economically just and welfare-oriented 
society.84
82 Kahf, "A Contribution to the Theory o f  Consumer Behaviour in an Islamic Society".p. 22
83 Ibid.p. 23
84 Ibid.p. 24
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However, one needs to assess the possibility of altruistic consumption negating 
entrepreneurial incentives, when the fruit of an individual’s business efforts might go 
towards the community at large. Additionally, it seems Kahf assumes that such an altruistic 
individual will be facing no material constraints in the course of his life that would force 
him to make judgements based on ‘un-Islamic’ ideals.
Fairness
Islamists say that the Islamic producer would comply with the axiom of fairness, i.e. he 
would denounce concepts of profit and utility maximisation for his own self and aim for the 
maximisation of societal benefit instead. They state that the Islamic producer would 
undertake production in areas where it is spiritually gratifying i.e. aspiring towards the 
eradication of poverty, illiteracy, hunger and disease,85 because his incentive would be to 
seek the approval and pleasure of Allah.
Chapra says that the Islamic producer would pay ‘just wages’ and charge ‘fair prices’. He 
goes on to say that an employee is entitled to a ‘just’ wage for his contribution to output 
and it is unlawful for a Muslim employer to exploit his employee. In Islam, a ‘just’ wage is 
equal to the value of the contribution to output made by the labourer. So the question is 
how can wages be regulated? Islamic economists assert that there are Ahadith through 
which ‘minimum’ wages can be deduced. According to some Ahadith the ‘minimum’ wage
85 S. V. R. Nasr, "Towards a Philosophy o f Islamic Economics," The Muslim World 77, no. 3-4 (1987).pp. 
184-5
should be such that it enables an employee to obtain a ‘sufficient quantity of food and 
clothing for himself and his family’.
From the point of view of economic philosophy, not only is the concept of ‘moderation’ 
ambiguous, but also Islamists introduce terms such as ‘just’ and ‘fair’ which grapple with 
ways of quantification. What would be the threshold of ‘moderation’, ‘just’ and ‘fair’, 
which would allow a generally foreseeable operation of a firm? There could be several 
interpretations of ‘moderation’, ‘just wages’ and ‘fair prices’ deriving from several notions 
of justice prevalent in different sections of society. It would not be wrong to assume that 
the result of widely divergent moral convictions would give rise to uncertainty that could 
easily lead to economic chaos and unrest.87
Siddiqi adds to the list of ‘just’ and ‘fair’ when he proposes that the Islamic producer would 
be happy with ‘satisfactory profits’. He asserts that the Islamic producer would not 
maximise his profits if he feels that by lowering his profit margins he can further the good 
of society, and also, he would not increase his profit at the cost of ‘explicit injury’ to the
86 Chapra, The Economic System o f  Islam A Discussion o f  its Goals and Nature.pp. 11-14. Mannan, Islamic 
Economics: Theory and Practice.pp. 115-117
87 Notions o f moderation, justice and fairness, which the Islamic economists claim to be peculiar to Islam 
have been part o f the economic curriculum in Christian societies as well. The works o f Thomas Aquinas, the 
Scholastic writers, and the torch bearers o f Protestant economic thought such as Calvin and Luther reflect 
this. They understood the just wage to be a product o f the morally accountable participants in free bargaining 
where employers and employees negotiated in the light o f their mutual responsibility before God, and any 
type o f bargaining that pushed the people below subsistence was clearly regarded as unjust. For a detailed 
discussion see R. S. Donald, "Adam Smith and the Natural Wage: Sympathy, Subsistence and Social 
Distance," Review o f  Social Economy 55, no. 3 (1997), E. S. Noell, "In Pursuit o f the Just Wage: A 
Comparison o f  Reformation and Counter- Reformation Economic Thought," Journal o f  the History o f  
Economic Thought 23, no. 4 (2001). Even classical economists such as Adam Smith were also concerned with 
moralistic concepts such as the ‘natural price’ where Smith’s concept o f  the ‘natural price’ is in fact a 
descendant o f the Scholastics’ notion o f  a ‘just price’. The ‘natural wage’ o f labour meant to Smith much the 
same as the ‘just wage’ did to medieval thinkers, i.e. that society should be concerned when labour markets 
did not provide a subsistence that was ‘plentiful’. Donald, "Adam Smith and the Natural Wage." p. 293. 
Additionally, the concept o f  just wage is also a matter o f great concern to academics working in the neo­
classical tradition o f economics. M. Arnold, "What is Just Profit?," Review o f  Social Economy 47 (1989).
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consumer.88 His definition of ‘satisfactory profits’ relates to any profit in between two 
limits, where the upper limit is the legally binding Islamic code of conduct and the lower 
limit is that which affords the entrepreneur a decent living and a surplus to average out the
Q Q
losses that satisfies the entrepreneur. This definition of satisfactory profits is purely 
subjective and unclear. This is because the parameters of the ‘legally binding Islamic code 
of conduct’ lack precision regarding the conditions under which it is applicable. Adhering 
to the concept of ‘satisfactory profits’ would prove difficult for the homo Islamicus as he 
will have to make sure that while pursuing ‘satisfactory profit’ he does not violate the 
Islamic code of justice and fairness. Also, it seems that due to the subjective nature of this 
definition, an Islamic producer will always be ‘injuring’ some part of the population if he 
adheres to the upper limit of the profit gain, leading to injustice for consumers with lower
90incomes.
Siddiqi acknowledges that the concept of ‘satisfactory profits’ could mean that 
entrepreneurial actions would become unpredictable and non-uniform once the assumption 
of profit maximisation has been cast off and the notion of ‘satisfactory profits’ is introduced 
instead,91 which in turn would create uncertainty in the investment scenario of an economy.
‘Satisfactory profits’ are supposed to grant the homo Islamicus a ‘decent living’. However, 
among a spectrum of definitions of ‘decent living’ out of ‘satisfactory profits’, it is unclear 
which one the Islamic producer is to choose so as not to deprive himself or his family of 
their right claim to the fruits of their hard work and risk bearing in business, and at the
88 M. N. Siddiqi, The Economic Enterprise in Islam (Lahore: Islamic Publications Limited, 1972).p. 136
89 Ibid. p. 107
90 For a further discussion o f the Islamic notion o f economic justice, see Kuran, "Economic Justice in 
Contemporary Islamic Thought."
91 Siddiqi, Economic Enterprise in Islam.pp. 137-141
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same time be fair and just to his brethren in society. Notions o f justice and fairness as 
described within the Islamic philosophy are hard to follow with precision in a complex and 
interwoven society when fairness or welfare for one individual might come at a detriment 
to the other.
Where fairness in production is concerned, Islamic economists say that fairness commands 
upholding the spirit of Islamic brotherhood by not indulging in rivalry and cut-throat 
competition, but producing via ‘co-operation’ with each other.92 Islamists have defined the 
term generically and hold that co-operation implies production while considering common 
interests, i.e. producing what is best for society, and avoiding activities that are injurious to 
other producers and consumers. Justice with regard to the relations of production means 
‘co-operation’, no cut-throat competition and avoiding injurious activities to other 
producers or consumers via ‘constructive competition’ aiming for the good of society. 
Islamists believe that Islam’s ideological axioms supply ample direction in all economic 
spheres.
There is no body of literature that states how the concept of competition is to be tamed via 
co-operation. Positive analysis at a microeconomic level about the nature of co-operation is 
still anticipated in Islamic economic literature. A preliminary study on the topic (which 
Kahf has made), suggests that co-operation is enforced via the supervisory and control 
functions of the Islamic state and that these functions have to be permanent fixtures in the 
market.94 Interestingly, what this implies is that Kahf recognises enforcement problems and
92 Siddiqi, "Economics o f Islam."pp. 22-33
93 Ibid.p. 27
94 See Kahf in Siddiqi, "Muslim Economic Thinking", p. 208
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free riding by the altruistic homo Islamicus and seeks to rectify it via coercion from the 
Islamic state. (The topic of the role of the Islamic state has been discussed in detail in this 
chapter). Moreover, it would be interesting to see how the idea of ‘co-operation’ will 
translate itself into operation where millions of individual units are involved, knowledge is 
imperfect and communication involves costs.
Considering from the above paragraphs that terms such as ‘just’, ‘fair’ or ‘satisfactory’ 
connote far from obvious meanings as the productive techniques of one homo Islamicus 
might not be ‘just’ or ‘fair’ according to the perceptions of the other members of society (as 
he/she might be regarded as an individual who indulges in excesses).
Additionally, different Islamic governments might interpret Islamic norms differently. And 
if this is the case, there is no guarantee that such a scenario would not lead to the 
manipulation of interpretation of Islamic economic philosophy by self-serving Islamic 
authorities. This also implies that the lack o f a uniform standard of justice and fairness 
might lead to confusion or arbitration among different Islamic countries regarding 
economic affairs.
So what does the above analysis state about the specific goals of the Islamic economic 
system? The following section tries to specify them by exploring the concepts of welfare, 
justice and equality.
1.4 Goals of the Islamic Economic System
The above-outlined Islamic economic philosophy has provided values to uphold to the
aspirants of the Islamic economic system. It has shown that the Islamic economic system
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strives for the welfare of society as a whole where all are to be accorded justice in a way 
that will lead to equality.
According to the Islamists, Islamic economics aims to provide scope for individual 
economic initiative (just as proponents of economic liberalism do), but without callous 
disregard for the evils of the market mechanism that polarises extreme poverty and wealth. 
The Islamic system presents itself as a ‘third way’, being situated between laissez faire 
Capitalism, and centralised Socialism or Communism.95
The classical writer Mawdudi holds that the aim of the Islamic economic system is to fulfil 
the basic needs of every individual by providing subsistence, social security in terms of 
food, shelter, education and medical aid.96 Other writers such as Kahf (while not differing 
from the above point o f view) add that the ‘maximisation of the rate of utilisation of 
resources’ is the first goal of economic policy in Islam along with the ‘minimisation of the 
resource distribution gap via zakat and observance of the Islamic code of conduct by 
various economic agents’.97 Chapra has a broader and more generic agenda for the system 
and gives priority to economic 'well-being ', followed by ‘justice ’, ‘equitable ’ distribution
no
of income, freedom of the individual and the creation of a Muslim universal brotherhood.
Chapra says that Falah (welfare) in the Islamic economic system embodies satisfaction of 
both the material and spiritual needs of all human beings, where spiritual fulfilment is an 
integral part of the welfare of a human being. He claims that it is this factor of spiritual
95 Dr. H. Weiss, "Zakat, Poverty and Social Welfare- Islamic Economics and the Critique o f the Secular State 
in Ghana and Nigeria (project plan)," in Docent in African History (University o f  Helsinki, 2001).p. 1 & 2
96 A. Mawdudi, Ma'ashiyat-e-Islam  (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1969).p. 406
97 See Kahf in Siddiqi, "Muslim Economic Thinking", p. 202
98 Chapra, The Economic System o f  Islam A Discussion o f  its Goals and Nature.p. 5
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need fulfilment that is lacking in the neo-classical concept of welfare, as it embodies only 
the concept of material welfare." Adi (justice) is another vital goal in Islamic economics. It 
implies an equitable distribution of the resources, giving everybody their rightful share. 
This share need not, however, be equal to that of others as Islam recognises differences in 
human beings due to natural endowments (without, however, depriving anyone of his 
due).100 According to Chapra, justice implies the opposite of zulm (injustice), which implies 
exploitation, inequality, wrongdoing to others and the failure to meet one’s social 
obligations as a Muslim.101 Justice also implies the need for redistribution of output to 
provide a just share of output for those who cannot obtain it through market forces. 
According to Kahf, this could be done via compulsory charity in Islam to be collected by 
the Islamic state.102
Naqvi, in his work on the relationship between Islam, economics and society asserts that 
the Islamic position on justice and welfare is closer to the Rawlsian Difference Principle 
because both judge the goodness of the state of affairs by reference to the welfare of the 
least privileged people in the society.103 However, he asserts that the difference between 
Rawls’ theory and the Islamic concept of equality is that Rawls does not provide a principle 
of equality, as he does not put limits on how much is being done for the well-off individuals 
in society. This is opposite to the Islamic perception of justice because the Islamic concept 
of equality aims to limit the disposable income of the rich by transferring an adequate 
amount to the poor. Additionally, Naqvi claims that Islamic notions of equality also aim to
99 Chapra, Islam and the Economic Challenge, footnote 3 p. 11 and footnote 10 p. 12
100 Chapra, The Economic System o f  Islam A Discussion o f  its Goals and Nature, p. 16
101 Chapra, Islam and the Economic Challenge.p. 209
102 Kahf, "Methodology o f Islamic Economics."p. 78
103 Naqvi, Islam, Economics and Society, p. 31
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reduce the number of people present in the poorest sectors of the society.104 This indicates 
that the Islamic idea of equality not only aspires to create vertical equity but also to 
alleviate poverty.
The concepts of justice and welfare are the embodiment of the goal of equality in Islam. 
According to this embodiment the Islamic concept of equality seems a rather holistic 
concept. However, in Islamic literature, the stress on equality when it boils down to its 
implementation is primarily concerned with monetary aspects. The Islamic brand of 
equality implies that wealth should not be allowed to circulate among the rich only and 
should be spent to safeguard and elevate the economic position of those members of the 
society who suffer from economic backwardness.105 It entails need fulfilment, a respectable 
source of living, supremacy of social gains over private ones and the absence of acute 
income inequality.106
According to mainstream secular literature, ‘Equality is judged by comparing some 
particular aspect of a person (such as income, or wealth, or happiness, or liberty, or
107opportunity or right or need fulfilment) with the same aspect of another person.’ It can
10ftconnote ‘social equality ', i.e. equal status under the law, equal concern and respect. It 
can also imply ‘equal opportunity' where all are given equal support and help, but 
thereafter inequalities are allowed to multiply as individuals make what they can of their
104 Ibid. p. 64
105 M. M. Siddiqi, "Economic Teachings o f the Qur'an in their Application to Modem Times," Islamic 
Literature (1968). pp 41-47
106 Chapra, Islam and the Economic Challenge.pp. 210-11
107 A. Sen, Inequality Re-examined (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1997). p. 2
108 R. E. Goodin, The Real Worlds o f  Welfare Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).p. 
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opportunities that are distributed according to merit.109 Some others argue for equality of 
outcome i.e. after social policy interventions, differences between people in terms of their 
welfare should be less.110 There are all these notions of equality represented by different 
schools of thought (Libertarians, Liberals, Rawlsians, Socialists and Marxists) that 
advocate a particular ‘central social exercise ' for the prevalence of equality.111
Although the Islamic brand of equality is not entirely different from the secular definition, 
the latter’s concepts of equality appear to be relatively more articulate and lucid in addition 
to being holistic, i.e. encompassing different monetary and non-monetary concepts of 
equality. The concept of equality in Islamic literature to begin with is concerned primarily 
with the functionality of income and wealth112 and only then evolves to include non­
monetary aspects of equality in terms of fairness and justice, which are again rather vague.
In an Islamic system consensus might be difficult to reach over a particular policy position, 
as the Quran, Hadith or Sunnah are vulnerable to myriad interpretations and policy 
positions. Consequently, equality may be approached as a relative ethical construct that 
leaves a wide margin of discretion for the policy makers.113
Does the Islamic concept of equality desire an equal distribution of income, or 
redistribution according to ‘contribution’ or ‘need’? Chapra’s assertions regarding the 
equitable distribution of income mentioned above mean that the Islamic economic system
109 J. Baldock, N. Manning, and S. Vickerstaff, Social Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).p. 75
110 Ibid. p. 75
111 Sen, Inequality Re-examined, p. vii
112 Z. Hasan, "Distributional Equity in Islam," in Distributive Justice and Need Fulfilment in an Islamic 
Economy, ed. M Iqbal (Islamabad: International Institute o f Islamic Economics, International Islamic 
University, 1986).p. 29
113 Ibid. pp. 61-2
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does not desire equal distribution of income but an equitable distribution as no two human 
beings are of the same disposition. (This thought involves keeping human diversity and 
heterogeneity under consideration, acknowledging that human beings are bom with 
different endowments, characteristics and circumstances, and equality in one aspect does 
not automatically imply equality in others). Also, it seems that the Islamic economic system 
acknowledges that absolute equality would lead to the dampening of incentives for those 
who are naturally more able bodied than the others.114
It might be sufficient to say that the Islamic economic system advocates income 
distribution ‘according to contribution’, via its operational tools of profit and loss 
investment and abolition of interest. However, as mentioned above, the Islamists also stress 
income distribution according to ‘need’ as they acknowledge that the market mechanism 
cannot always provide for ‘need’ as there are those who cannot work for their upkeep. Need 
is defined as food, clothing, shelter, drinking water, fuel and electricity (depending on the 
climatic conditions). Medical care, education and basic Islamic instruction are also 
.regarded as a basic need. Some writers have also included financial support necessary to 
get married as a need.115 Islamists assert that the mechanism for achieving this goal is 
through the system of zakat, which can provide subsistence and correct market failure and 
supply social security.
From the above paragraphs it appears that there seems to exist an overarching idea of 
welfare and justice within which not only are the questions of poverty alleviation and
114 Chapra, The Economic System o f  Islam A Discussion o f  its Goals and Nature, p. 16
115 M. N. Siddiqi, "Guarantee o f  a Minimum Level o f Living in Islamic State," in Distributive Justice and 
Need Fulfilment in an Islamic Economy, ed. M. Iqbal (Islamabad: International Institute o f Islamic 
Economics, International Islamic University, 1986).p. 259
income inequality reduction submerged, but there are also sub-questions -  such as equality 
according to which criteria, of what and how much -  the answers to which become an 
exercise in deductive reasoning through the Islamic economic literature. This vagueness 
regarding goals makes their achievability problematic.
It is important to examine the tools of the Islamic economic system that are supposed to 
realise the welfare goals of Islam. The Islamic economic system operates through the 
presence of the Islamic state, the operation of modarabah (profit and loss sharing), and the 
imposition of zakat in a riba-free, (interest-free) economy. The next chapter undertakes this 
exercise.
Conclusion
To create a framework within which the central question of this thesis can be 
contextualised, this chapter has aimed to explain the Islamic economic philosophy. The 
chapter was designed to provide an understanding of the nature of the Islamic economic 
thought (its theological and theoretical perspective) that would assist in comprehending 
zakat’s nature and its underlying principles {zakat is analysed in the next chapter). The 
chapter elucidated upon various economic ideas such as fairness, justice, co-operation and 
moderation, and drew out and commented upon a range of policy implications. It revealed 
that these are far from definitive and therefore open to myriad interpretations.
The chapter also assessed the goals of the Islamic economic system and concluded that
these involve the creation of welfare, justice and equality. What came across was that the
Islamic system’s goals to create welfare, justice and equality seems to embody mostly
equilisation of income and wealth for poverty alleviation and reduction of income
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inequality. But it is not clear how these goals are to be achieved i.e. redistribution to be 
achieved according to which principle and how much?
The chapter revealed that the Quran, Hadith and Sunnah are exposed to various 
interpretations depending on the different schools of Islamic religious thought. This 
interpretative vulnerability not only poses a challenge to the policy makers in terms of 
striking an accord over a specific policy stance but also provides them with ample scope for 
discretion and manipulation. Consequently, this exposure to vagueness regarding how goals 
are to be achieved adds to the challenge of their realisation.
This chapter sets the backdrop to reveal how these vulnerabilities can affect zakat. The 
above assessment undertaken will show in the following chapters how zakat when 
implemented could be subject to many different interpretations within different schools of 
Islamic thought considering the lucidity in Shariah’s interpretation. How this vagueness 
leads to various versions of zakat’s execution and operation theoretically and empirically, 
which could consequently make it vulnerable to exploitation. How it can prevent zakat 
from achieving its redistributive goals and frustrate its objectives of poverty alleviation and 
equality.
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Chapter Two
Tools of the Islamic Economic System and the Political Economy of 
Islamic Welfare Policy
Introduction
The last chapter laid down the premise of the Islamic economic system and explained its 
origins, its philosophy, and the goals it wants to accomplish. This chapter aims to reveal 
how the Islamic economic system operates in pursuit of its goals of creating welfare and 
justice in society. Therefore this chapter extends the analyses of Chapter One and examines 
the tools of operation of the Islamic economic system: the presence of the Islamic state, the 
operation of modarabah (profit and loss sharing) in an economy without riba (interest), and 
the imposition of zakat. In particular, it aims to assess the assertions of the Islamists 
regarding the most important welfare instrument of the Islamic economic system, i.e. zakat.
Consequently, the purpose of this chapter is to challenge the Islamists’ presupposition that 
when imposed as a governmental policy, the zakat’s religious nature will lead to a positive 
outcome in terms of realising welfare and justice in society. The counter argument stresses 
that instruments of welfare, regardless of their ideological origin and nature, do not 
function in a political vacuum and are vulnerable to manipulation. Additionally, this 
chapter also considers the role of commitment in the effectiveness of a policy. It asserts that 
the Islamic state will have to create trust between itself and the individual by showing 
commitment to the zakat policy and that the zakat’s divinely ordained nature will not 
guarantee automatic compliance.
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The outcome of these analyses will lead to the enquiry of how the zakat, when 
operationalised as a welfare system within an Islamic welfare state, performs on the 
ground? This investigation will be the focus of subsequent chapters in the context of 
Pakistan.
This chapter is divided into two sections. Section 2.1 analyses key operational tools of the 
Islamic economic system, such as the Islamic state, modarabah, the riba-irtQ economy and 
the zakat. It aims to reveal the extent of their benevolent nature. Section 2.2. firstly 
endeavours to delve into the political economy of Islamic social welfare policy by 
examining the policy making process in an Islamic polity. Secondly, the section also 
considers the challenges posed by the imposition of and the operational stage of the policy 
and examines the importance of the establishment of trust between the state and the 
individual via the state’s commitment to the policy.
2.1 The tools of the Islamic Welfare System 
Islamic State
In Islamic economic literature, the market mechanism is not regarded highly as a form of 
resource allocation and income distribution in society. Islamic economists hold that in 
Islam there are two grounds for entitlement to income: work and need. They say that the 
market may reward work, but it certainly does not provide for need. All Islamic economists 
uphold that the Islamic state should step in to rectify this market problem and modify 
glaring income disparities, by distributing income in conformity with the Islamic ideals of 
distributive justice and providing need fulfilment for every individual.116
116 Chapra, "The Islamic Welfare State and its role in the Economy".p. 150
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Islamic economists hold that the creation of the secular welfare state was initiated by the 
capitalist class to guarantee the social order without a transfer of essential power from the 
upper echelons of the society to the lower strata.117 In other words, it was created to ease 
the discontent of the labouring masses without any true fervour for social justice and 
fairness. They say that opposed to this, the rationale of welfare and justice is embedded in 
Islamic economic philosophy, which strives for the advancement of all humankind, and that 
the Islamic state, which is a welfare state, is a tool for its realisation.
Most Islamists, classical and modem, concur on the point that the history of Islamic 
economic thought has always stressed the presence of spiritual, religious and even political 
authority in the form of Imams or Caliphs over the entire Muslim people. Mawardi in the 
eleventh century, Shah Wali Ullah in the seventeenth and Mawdudi in the twentieth century 
felt that a value-oriented authority in the form of an Islamic state is needed to realise the 
Islamic goals of economic justice and the material and spiritual welfare of the people
lift
preached by the Islamic philosophy. Modem writers such as Chapra also agree that the 
philosophy of the Islamic system has to be realised via an Islamic state, which would make 
Islamic economic policies conducive to economic justice and welfare.119
The following paragraphs outline some of the general economic and political functions that 
Islamists say the Quran prescribes for the Islamic state to realise its welfare objectives and 
targets. This exposition gives the reader an idea of the extent of economic and political 
power the Islamic state can exercise to achieve what it considers to be Islamically justified 
and thus good for the people.
117 Chapra, Islam and the Economic Challenge.p. 113
118 Chapra, "The Islamic Welfare State and its role in the Economy", p. 143
119 Siddiqi, "Muslim Economic Thinking".p. 210. See also Ahmad, "Public Finance in Islam",
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In the economic milieu, one of the main duties of the Islamic state as directed by the 
Shariah is to eradicate poverty, provide fulfilment of all basic human needs, and full and 
efficient employment of human and material resources to attain an ‘optimum’ rate of 
economic growth and improve the standard of living of all people. Chapra points out that 
the use of the word ‘optimum’ is preferred to ‘maximum’ to allow for harmony with the 
goals of spiritual uplift and social welfare. The Islamic state would create conditions that 
would avoid situations generating excess demand and leading to unemployment and 
inflation.120
For the growth, development and prosperity of the economy, the Islamic state will
undertake the construction of physical and social infrastructure. Additionally, instead of
relying on the interaction of market forces for the allocation of resources and for the
creation of aggregate demand, the state will play an active and conscious role in
determining, guiding or channelling scarce resources for the general welfare of the homo
121Islamicus according to the dictates of the Shariah.
Islamists affirm that the Islamic state will ensure social and economic justice in society by 
guaranteeing that everyone gets their due for their contribution to society and that there is 
no exploitation of one individual by another. For this purpose it would undertake the task of 
maintaining healthy conditions in the market by curbing cut-throat competition and 
preventing self-interested individuals from exploiting others. To achieve this end it will 
impose direct and indirect controls such as wage and price controls and investment
120 Chapra, "The Islamic Welfare State and its role in the Economy" .p. 12
121 Ibid.pp. 12-13
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regulations, which would ensure need fulfilment for each member of the society.122 
Additionally, the Islamic state is also authorised by the Shariah to tax the entire surplus 
wealth, to use coercion in purchase or hire, to nationalise private enterprise and also to have 
the power to impose a ceiling on property ownership.123
Some critics have drawn parallels between the Islamic state and the interventionist state by 
arguing that the Islamic state’s objectives to control market forces through central planning 
makes it no different to an interventionist state.124
Much like the Western welfare state, the Islamists also see an active role for the Islamic 
state where the provision of social security is concerned. The Islamic state will undertake 
this function by providing unemployment benefits, old age pensions, and assistance to those 
with disabilities (physical or mental handicaps). It will take up social assistance activities of 
guaranteeing minimum income in cash or kind via transfer payments of zakat. (There is 
contention on this point of the right of the Islamic state to collect zakat, which will be 
addressed below in the section on zakat). Finally, the Islamic state will provide law and
122 Ibid.p. 149
123 Siddiqi, "Muslim Economic Thinking", p. 20
124 An interventionist state’s policies to control the magnitude o f production and fix prices give rise to an 
imbalanced market where privately owned enterprises are at a disadvantage. Not only does such a system o f  
governance inhibit a healthy competitive environment, but also tends to disturb the selling price and cost o f  
production and thus hampering the normal supply and demand principle. All these interventionist rules render 
the market vulnerable to politicisation, and thence to further instability. Besides damaging the economy by 
creating politically manoeuvred economic structures, one o f  the strongest arguments supporting its criticism is 
the breakdown o f the society’s moral infrastructure. The ills o f a centrally controlled market actually corrupt 
other institutions, making corruption and bribery the benchmarks o f  survival in a politically, economically 
and socially dysfunctional society. For a detailed critique o f intervention, see L. von Mises, Critique o f  
Interventionism (Irvington-on-Hudson, N.Y.: The Foundation for Economic Education, 1996).
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order for all its inhabitants and improve international relations with other countries and 
build up its national defensive capabilities.125
However, the Islamic state is not akin to the Western secular state. This is because the 
circumstances under which the two states undertake their duties are quite distinct, which 
sets them intrinsically apart. Whereas the modem secular state, apart from providing social 
security, defence and maintaining law and order in the country, would interfere in the 
market mechanism only when markets fail, the Islamic state would be an omnipresent 
entity in the economy. Whereas the secular state’s nature is not pervasive, the Islamic state 
would be the paternalistic and benevolent state sanctioned by Allah to be His trustee and 
discharge its duty in accordance with the command of the Shariah to realise the purpose of 
the Islamic economic system of establishing a just society. As mentioned earlier, such an 
attitude of the Islamic state will be apparent in the form of fixing of prices, wages, rents and 
rates of profit.
A fundamental way in which the Islamic welfare state also differs from the secular welfare 
state is the Islamic state’s stance on property rights. Whereas the secular welfare state 
upholds individual property rights, there is scarce disagreement among Islamists that the 
ownership of property belongs to Allah under the Islamic state.126 Allah’s ultimate 
ownership is a source of ambiguity in property rights in Islam, as Allah’s ownership implies 
that His ownership supersedes the right of the individual to property. This implies that an 
Islamic state, which is representing the will of Allah and is a trustee of His resources, may 
impose limits on individual property rights if it feels that the individual property rights are
125 Chapra, "The Islamic Welfare State and its role in the Economy".p. 150
126 Siddiqi, "Muslim Economic Thinking", p. 7
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interfering with the will of Allah in an Islamic society. The Islamic state will be the judge 
and the abrogator of individual property rights. The Islamic state may limit the use of 
property or confiscate it if  the fiduciary principle is violated.127
There are other characteristics of the Islamic welfare state that set it far apart from the 
secular welfare state. Baqir al-Sadr, another Islamic economist and a great advocate of a 
dominant Islamic state, points to an additional feature and asserts that it has the authority to 
undertake fresh legislation to regulate and guide social life, including economic affairs left 
unregulated by the Shariah. Whereas the Islamic state cannot legalise something that is 
prohibited in the Shariah or it cannot prohibit what the Shariah deems fit for an individual 
to do, it can surely issue a fresh list of dos and don’ts.128 This point implies that in those 
areas on which the Shariah’s stand is undetermined, the state can easily manipulate clauses 
regarding those areas and reshape them to fulfil its own political ambition. The immense 
political power bestowed upon the machinery of the state can make the Islamic state 
authoritarian and dictatorial with vast possibilities to steer policies and affect their 
operation to suit its own agenda.
Some other differences that set the Islamic welfare state apart from the Western welfare 
state might be of a non-economic nature, but these can have direct economic implications. 
The differences come in the form of the Islamic state’s intrusion into the lives of 
individuals by enforcing Islamic values such as compulsory prayer and fasting at work.129 
To achieve this Islamisation of society, the state would venture to introduce Islamic-
127 S. Behdad, "Property Rights in Contemporary Islamic Economic Thought: A Critical Perspective," 47, no.
2 (1989).
128 Siddiqi, "Muslim Economic Thinking", p. 209
129 Chapra, "The Islamic Welfare State and its role in the Economy".p. 145
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oriented policies such as Islamising the educational system, but if education were not 
enough it would resort to coercion. Islamists insist that the Islamic state cannot be a passive 
observer of the ethical norms in the country and thus it would levy penalties for violations
|  -»A
of Islamic teachings and policies.
It is clear that the Islamic state has substantive interventionist powers. Islamic economists 
concur with the view that in order to bring about a just, fair and equitable society, there has 
to be a dominating agenda for state intervention not only in the economic milieu of the 
society but also in the personal realm to make it conducive for the operation and success of 
its Islamic policies.
One would expect that with homo Islamicus’s altruistic behaviour based on Islamic 
economic philosophy (as outlined in the previous chapter), the Islamic state would have a 
peripheral role in the working of the economy, but as one observes, this is not the case. The 
Islamic state’s aspirations to impose ‘just wages’ and ‘fair prices’, to combat the inhumane 
interaction of market forces, to enforce ‘co-operation’ by taming unruly competition among 
individuals, seem redundant if homo Islamicus is the individual operating in the market. 
Islamic economists such as Kahf and Chapra, who initially hailed the role of the market 
mechanism in the economy with minimal state intervention, have increasingly proposed a 
strong case for state intervention in their later writings.131 They began by supporting a 
minimum role for the state as they came from the neo-classical economic tradition, but 
soon afterwards, when they aspired to theorise Islamic economic philosophy with all its 
moral connotations, they embarked on prescribing an extensive list o f governmental duties
130 Ahmad, "Public Finance in Islam", p. 5
131 Kuran, "The Economic System in Contemporary Islamic Thought: A  Critical Interpretation."p. 16
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to curb all sorts of problems, such as free riding by homo Islamicus and the possibility of 
conflict due to the un-definitive nature of Islamic economic morals.
It is a matter of concern to see the extent of authority the Islamic state would be willing to 
exert as a trustee from Allah with the desire to act in accordance with the dictates of the 
Shariah (depending on the interpretation, as there can be myriad) to meet its objectives of 
creating a just society. The Islamic state has similar pervasive autonomy in the political 
realm and the rationale behind it is once again to promote people’s welfare. It is important 
to explicate the political nature of the Islamic state as this has important economic 
implications and thus repercussions for policy formation within the Islamic economic 
system.
Islamic Political Authority
The term used in Islam for government or political authority is ‘Khilafaf or ‘Caliphate,’
which means vicegerency. A ‘Caliph’ is considered to be Allah’s deputy exercising
delegated powers. Thus the Islamists insist on using the word ‘Vicegerent’ instead of
1‘Ruler’, ‘Monarch’ or ‘Sovereign’ for Islamic governance.
Any mention of the Islamic state would be incomplete without the mention of Mawdudi. 
His ideas have been by far the most powerful and effective in the resurgence of the Islamic 
political thought that worked to create a revivalist sentiment for an Islamic state. 
Mawdudi’s philosophy not only influenced the Muslims of South Asia, but many agree that
132 Chapra, Islam and the Economic Challenge.p. 202
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Islamic revivalism in the Muslim world has evolved around his prolegomenon.133 Many 
believe that a study of his vision of Islamic revolution and the Islamic state is essential for 
understanding the politicisation of Islamic thought in recent times.134 Thus, the present 
exposition regarding the structure of the Islamic state’s political power takes its origins 
from Mawdudi’s political thought.135
Charles Adams, an expert on Mawdudi’s philosophy, explains that his view of the Islamic 
polity rests on three fundamental principles. The first is the acceptance of Allah’s 
sovereignty and the need to follow His word in the form of the Shariah. Secondly, the 
Islamic state is to accept the authority of the Prophet and follow in his footsteps according 
to his Sunnah or Hadith,136 The third basic principle of the Islamic state is its status as the 
vicegerent of Allah. The key official in the Islamic state is its head or leader, called the 
Imam, Caliph or Amir. He has the major responsibility for the conduct of the state, and he is 
the real locus of power since he acts as the representative of Allah on earth on the one hand 
and representative of the Muslim people on the other.
Mawdudi coined the term ‘theo-democracy\ which meant that the Islamic polity would be 
run like a theocracy by one man carrying the title of Amir. The Amir would rule only 
because the other vicegerents, i.e. the Muslim people, would delegate to him the authority
133 S. V. R. Nasr, "Mawdudi and the Jama'at-I islami: The Origins, Theory and Practice o f Islamic 
Revivalism," in Pioneers o f  Islamic Revival, ed. A. Rahnema (New Jersey: Zed Books Limited, 1994).p. 98
134 Ibid. p. 98
135 There are other revivalists, such as Hasan A1 Banna (1906-49) and Sayyid Qutb (1906-66), who have the 
similar stance on Islamic political ideology. They all adhere to a pyramidal structure o f polity in an Islamic 
society and promote an authoritarian and a puritan system in the society aspiring to the times o f the four Pious 
Caliphs. (The four Pious Caliphs were Abu Bakr, Umer, Usman and Ali who succeeded the Caliphate 
immediately after the death o f the Prophet). Then there are the reformists, such as Mohammad Iqbal and Ali 
Shariati, whose philosophies have not found sincere followers to promote their ideologies.
136 C. J. Adams, "Mawdudi and the Islamic State," in Voices o f  Resurgent Islam, ed. J. Esposito (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1983).pp. 115-6
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137to govern. The Amir can be elected, appointed or selected by the Ummah (Muslim 
people). Mawdudi did not explicate the method of this election, appointment or selection.138 
However, one of the main requirements for holding Islamic office is that the choice of the 
head of state shall depend on the general will of the people with no one having the right to 
impose himself by force as ruler.139
The Amir should rule via a consultative body, formally called the majlis-e-shura, which 
consists of the representatives of the Muslim people and should theoretically have the full 
support of the masses. Thus the majlis-e-shura should have representation from all ethnic 
clans and societal classes.140 The shura can also appoint the Amir of the state. The Islamic 
state must conduct its affairs by mutual consultation with the shura. With regard to the 
formation of shura, Mawdudi does not prescribe any particular guidelines; he says that 
Islam does not prescribe the institutional form in which consultation must occur, thus 
leaving it to the community to devise the best and fairest means as may suit the conditions 
of a particular place and time.141 In addition to the shura’s role as a consultative body for 
the Amir it also acts as a legislature. This legislative function ensures and oversees that the 
laws in the country conform to the requirements of the Shariah. The shura is to spell out 
what has been left understated in the Islamic law. It appears that this body is to possess the 
total legal wisdom of the entire community and have intricate knowledge of the Shariah.142
According to Mawdudi, the shura will be at the disposal of the Amir for him to consult, but 
its advice is not binding on him. The consequence of such a situation would be that
137 Ibid. p. 116
138 S. Mahmood, The Concept o f  an Islamic State (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989).pp. 51-52
139 Ibid. p. 46
140 Chapra, Islam and the Economic Challenge.p. 243
141 Ahmad, ed., Islamic Law and Constitution p .  281
142 Mahmood, Concept o f  an Islamic State.p. 51
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complete power would remain with the Amir, who may disregard the legislature’s opinion. 
It is important to note that where the Shariah ’s position is indeterminate the Islamic state 
can effortlessly manoeuvre clauses and remodel them to accomplish its own political 
ambition. Mawdudi’s vision of the Islamic state contains no political parties and no 
provision for opposition. According to him there would be no reason for elections at regular 
intervals or for a change of administration as the Islamic state’s policies would be 
calculated to meet the real needs of the population and to keep it satisfied.143
Keeping the above stance in mind, some authors have labelled the Islamic state 
‘totalitarian’.144 The Amir could easily assume the role of a dictator who would seek 
political alliances to strengthen his mle and thus transform the rationale of the ‘Islamic 
vicegerent state’. It would become easy for the state apparatus to tamper with any 
institution to secure its own economic and political interests. The God-sent Amir or 
Khalifah with his consultative body would meet with little opposition to shape and 
manipulate policies. Additionally, considering that the Islamic norms and injunctions, as 
noted earlier, are unclear, the state could take advantage of this lack o f clarity to satisfy its 
own vested interests. Therefore, it would not be surprising if the Islamic ruler and his 
advisory body were to interpret the Shariah to serve their own objectives.
One could argue that it is not inevitable that the Islamic state would assume a totalitarian 
and a dictatorial nature due to the powers vested in the Amir, because the Amir might be of 
a democratic disposition. However, this does not remove the internal vulnerabilities of the
143 B. P. Barua, "The Political Authority o f Maulana Mawdudi," The Indian Political Science Review  16, no. 2 
(1982).
144 Ibid. Adams, "Mawdudi and the Islamic State." Mawdudi also mentions the judiciary as one o f  the 
fundamentals o f  the Islamic state, but explains nothing about its nature, power or function.
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Islamic political system as potentially the Islamic state operates under few checks and 
balances, unlike a parliamentary democracy. Parliamentary democracy functions under 
various branches of the government such as the executive, legislature (bi-cameral), 
judiciary, and a well-defined electoral system that is responsive to popular vote. In the 
absence of such a multi-polar axis of power, much of the Islamic polity’s manifestation of 
its democratic disposition depends on the whims of a single Amir.
Riba (Interest)
Islamic economists say that lack of riba in an economy would ensure fairness for 
individuals in a society and would guarantee economic justice and welfare for all. The 
presence of riba is seen as a tool for transferring wealth from the poor to the rich, because it 
is held to be exploitative, to increase income differentials and thus to work against the 
Islamic ideals of economic justice. Islamic economists hold that Islam bans interest on all 
types of loan, be it a consumption or investment loan.145 According to them, the lender of 
consumption loans should not earn any return on his money, and in the instance of loans for 
production, the lender and the investor have to share profits and losses in the venture 
according to a predetermined formula. They hold that in this way, the lack of interest would 
lead to a more equal distribution of wealth and would be conducive to the growth of 
welfare in society.146
145 However, according to some writers, the prohibition o f interest is limited only to interest on consumption 
loans and not on loans for production, because the former constitutes exploitation o f the poor. The latter is an 
investment co-operation between the lender and the borrower where the lender is a weaker and vulnerable 
party and profit and loss sharing is allowed. But the traditionalists argue that it is interest on production loans 
that might be disallowed due to its historical significance in Mecca at the time o f  the Prophet. Al-Araby, 
"Contemporary Bank Transactions and Islam's Views Thereon," Islamic Thought 11, no. 3,4 (1967).
146 Chapra, Towards a Just Monetary System: A Discussion o f  Money, Banking and Monetary Policy in the 
Light o f  Islamic Teachings .pp. 62-64
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According to the Islamists, the principle of fairness requires that the supplier of capital for 
investment has to incur profits and losses that depend on the risk level of the project and the 
work effort involved in it. The fusion of labour and capital is the only fair way of creating 
surplus, as the provider of capital should not obtain a fixed return regardless of the outcome 
of the borrower’s business.147 Islamists reckon that the Islamic economic ethic discourages 
Muslims from acquiring wealth that does not involve hard work on the part of the 
individual, and they claim that riba creates an idle class and robs society of the labour and 
enterprise of individuals.148
Kuran criticises the above stance and argues that when Islamic economists claim that 
interest creates an idle class that does not invest its money in entrepreneurial activities and 
obtains returns on its money without any risk, they perhaps forget that not all individuals in 
a society are either capable or in a position to take financial risks, particularly low-income 
groups or the elderly. By bearing all the risk, the financial institutions can pay these 
individuals a set return that will keep the money of these people intact and therefore protect 
the savings of those on low incomes from being swallowed by the vulnerability to profit 
and loss sharing. Perhaps one can state that under such circumstances the absence of riba 
can actually increase income differentials in society and thus prevent the attainment of a 
just and equitable outcome.149
Furthermore, Islamic economists ignore the issue of inflation. Kuran asks whether under 
conditions of inflation the borrower of a consumption loan is obliged to compensate the
147 L. R. Presley and J. G. Sessions, "Islamic Economics: The Emergence o f  a N ew Paradigm," The Economic 
Journal (1994).p. 586
148 Kuran, "Islamic Economics and the Islamic Subeconomy." p. 157
149 Ibid.
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lender for changes in purchasing power.150 Non-compensation would go against the axiom 
o f justice held central to the Islamic economic system. Additionally, if individuals were not 
compensated for inflation, they would be more likely to invest in non-financial assets such 
as gold or real estate, which might protect them against inflation but on the other hand 
would result in a reduction in the pool of resources available for investment. It is not 
difficult to see the negative consequence this scenario could have on the long-term welfare 
o f the people.
Modarabah (Profit and Loss Sharing)151
Riba in Islamic economics is to be replaced by modarabah or Qirad. Modarabah is 
described by Islamic economists as a sort of partnership between the owner of monetary 
assets, i.e. the lender and the entrepreneur or businessman i.e. the borrower. A businessman 
who has no monetary assets for his project may enter into a partnership with the owner of 
monetary assets in which the latter provides his money or funds for investment while the 
former manages the project and is the working partner. This partnership would not be on 
the basis of definite income return, as in the case of interest, but on the basis of sharing the 
profits and losses of the investment. The profits incurred in such a partnership would be 
distributed in a predetermined ratio. It is a limited liability investment arrangement as the 
lender only suffers loss to the extent of that which he/she has invested.152
150 Kuran, "Economic Justice in Contemporary Islamic Thought."p. 58
151 Chapra, Towards a Just Monetary System: A Discussion o f  Money, Banking and M onetary Policy in the 
Light o f  Islamic Teachings.p. 248-251. There is another method for investment in an Islamic economy akin to 
modarabah and also seen as an alternative to interest called musharakah. Musharakah is more similar to the 
secular concept o f  a partnership, where everybody contributes financially, reserves the right o f decision­
making and all partners share the profit according to a specific ratio. The liability o f the partners is normally 
unlimited. If the liabilities o f a business exceed its assets and the business goes into liquidation, all the 
exceeding liabilities shall be borne pro rata by all partners. But if  the partners agree that no partner shall incur 
any debt during the course o f business, then the exceeding liabilities shall be borne solely by that partner who 
has incurred a debt on the business in violation o f the aforesaid condition.
152 Kahf, "Methodology o f  Islamic Economics."p. 79
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The way in which modarabah differs from the profit and loss sharing implicit in the 
structure of the joint-stock corporation (where the supplier of the capital [shareholder] 
receives a dividend and experiences a capital appreciation or loss contingent on the 
performance of the company), is that the lender in the modarabah mode of finance does not 
have any power regarding the running of the business, whereas the holder of equity can 
vote at the general meetings of the company. In this way a modarabah partnership differs 
from profit and loss sharing with regard to equity. However, modarabah is more akin to the 
mode of operation similar to a corporate bond, as holders of corporate debt do not have any 
decision-making power in the corporation.
Islamists insist that although the lender does not participate in the daily decision-making in 
modarabah, he has direct interest in the activity of the firm, whereas, they assert, all the 
concerns of an interest-earner lie in his income, which does not depend in any way on the 
degree of efficiency with which his capital is used. Islamists hold that in allocating finance 
between different projects the lender in an Islamic society would be interested in the most 
efficient and most qualified entrepreneur, as well as the most profitable projects. They 
assert that the goal of a lender in Islamic economics is consistent with the goal of an 
entrepreneur, while there is no internal consistency between the objectives of the interest-
1 C ' learner and that of the entrepreneur in a secular society.
This sentiment of the Islamists seems suspect, because an interest earner (e.g. holder of a 
corporate bond) like the lender in modarabah has a general desire for the borrower/ 
entrepreneur to be successful, so that he/she can be redeemed. Similarly, if one considers
153 Ibid. p. 79
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the structure of the joint stock corporation, the desire to influence the firm’s investment 
decisions will be exercised by the dividend receiver with the help of his/her voting power at 
the corporation’s general meetings.
Kuran makes a point in which he shows interest to have some advantage over modarabah. 
According to him, by fixing the obligation of the borrower, interest removes his 
opportunistic behaviour. Such behaviour might be present in circumstances of profit and 
loss sharing due to informational asymmetries between the lender and the borrower. The 
borrower will have better knowledge of the revenue and cost structure of the venture, 
whereas the lender can only make rough calculations. Under this situation the borrower can 
understate his earnings and overstate his costs. Thus, it might be better for the lender to 
have a fixed return for his money in the form of interest.154 Furthermore, the lenders might 
actually be reluctant to invest via modarabah in the presence of informational asymmetries 
and absence of a fixed return. As a consequence, even projects that are economically viable 
would not get any funding. Consequently, the levels of investment would be artificially 
constrained, and the overall rate of growth would be reduced.
Zakat
The fourth tool for the realisation of welfare and justice in the Islamic economic system is 
zakat. Zakat literally means ‘purification’ and ‘growth’. It is not only a tool for the working 
of the Islamic economic system, but is one of the fundamentals of Islam’s belief structure 
and, consequently, is one of the most important religious duties in Islam. It is considered as 
the right of the poor people to the wealth of the rich.155 It is to assure the basic necessities
154 Kuran, "The Economic System in Contemporary Islamic Thought: A Critical Interpretation."p. 32
155 Z. Khan, The H oly Quran (London-Dublin: Curzon Press, 1981). 51: 19 and 70: 24 & 25
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of life for those who cannot undertake gainful employment or otherwise deserve society’s 
help and assistance.156 Islamic economists hail zakat as a compulsory obligation in the 
redistribution scheme of Islamic economics that lays down the ground for the Islamic social
1 ^ 7security system. It is levied on the net wealth of all Muslims, including minors and 
orphans who possess wealth above a certain exemption level.158
The wealth that is liable for zakat has to remain in the possession of an individual for the 
entire zakat year, i.e. for twelve months for zakat to be levied on it. The zakat year starts on 
the first of Ramadan and ends on the thirtieth of Shaban A H  (After Hijri)}59 This means 
that if an individual has lost part of his wealth just before the first of Ramadan that amount 
of wealth will not be liable for zakat. Similarly, zakat will not be liable on the wealth of an 
individual that has been gained a few months prior to the first of Ramadan.16° Zakat is 
independent of income, which may be positive or negative, as long as the net worth at the 
end of the zakat year is above the minimum exempted level (the minimum level will be 
dealt with later in this section). Also, its payment is obligatory on net worth and not on total 
wealth, i.e. zakat will not be levied on due debts that have been incurred during the year. 
Debts are counted for the levy of zakat only if they are recoverable.161
156 Siddiqi, "Muslim Economic Thinking", p. 181
157 Justice Dr. Tanzil-ur-Rehman, "Introduction o f  Zakat in Pakistan", 1981, Council o f  Islamic Ideology, 
Islamabad p. 2
158 Some jurists hold that the levy o f zakat on the assets o f minors and the insane depends on the types o f  
assets they hold. Y. A1 Qardawi, Fiqh Al Zakat: A Comparative Study: The Rules, Regulations and 
Philosophy o f  Zakat in the Light o f  the Quran and Sunna, trans. M. Kahf, vol. 1, Islamic Economics Research 
Series (Jeddah: Scientific Publishing Centre, 1999).pp. 38-39
159 The Islamic calendar is based on the year Prophet Muhammad and his followers emigrated to Madina from 
Mecca in the year 622 AD. Thus it is called Hijri, which means emigration in Arabic. The Islamic calendar is 
lunar and each month begins with the evening when the new moon is sighted. It is made up o f twelve months 
when the New Year begins with the month o f Muharram and ends with Zil-Haj. Ramadan is the ninth month 
o f the Islamic calendar and Shaban is the eighth month o f the Islamic calendar.
160 Al Qardawi, Fiqh A l Zakat: A Comparative Study: The Rules, Regulations and Philosophy o f  Zakat in the 
Light o f  the Quran and Sunna.pp. 67-70
161 A. Waheed, "Traditional and Recent Fiqh Rules and Economic Arguments Concerning Zakah Revenues" 
(paper presented at the International Training Seminar on Zakah Management, Islamabad, May 20-23
2002).p. 10
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Islamists say that zakat’s nature conforms to the generally accepted criterion of horizontal 
equity in which the Shariah treats all individuals equally, as their criterion for considering
1 /I?two individuals as identical is that they possess wealth above the exemption level. This 
concept seems questionable because considering the emphasis that the Islamic economic 
system places on justice and equality, it does not seem equitable to consider a person with 
2000 and another with 20,000 to be similar in terms of the financial burden of zakat 
payment just because they are above the exempted level.
Islamists also believe that due to the religious nature of zakat, people would be more 
willing to pay it as zakat will bring the pleasure of Allah and it will remove greed from 
the Islamic society. They insist that because the zakat rate is so low (as compared to the 
mostly heavy burden of income tax), the incentive to evade zakat will be very low.164 
Mannan also concurs with this point that the likelihood of evasion of zakat would not be a 
problem.165 They assert further that the imposition of zakat would break the association 
between wealth and political power because of its redistributive scope, as power is seen to 
be a function of wealth.166
The levy o f  Zakat
The Quran did not lay down the specifics of the extent and the scope of zakat, such as the 
items on which it is to be levied, but it was the Sunnah from which Islamic jurists derived 
specifications. Zakat covers all kinds of traditional forms of wealth such as: gold, silver,
162 M. A. Khan, "Public Finance in Islam," Islamic Studies 40, no. 2 (2001).p. 243
163 Ibid.p. 240
164 Ibid.p. 245
165 Kuran, "The Economic System in Contemporary Islamic Thought: A Critical Interpretation."p. 21
166 Siddiqi, "Muslim Economic Thinking", p. 252. See also Ahmad, "Public Finance in Islam", p. 20
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jewellery, cattle, mineral resources, buried treasures that have been recovered and
167 •cereals, It is not difficult to perceive that the classical scope of zakat is very narrow, as it 
does not take into items that are identified as wealth in modem times. This implies that if 
zakat were imposed in a poor country, it would hamper its redistributive objective due to its 
own constricted capacity. However, some Islamic economists perceive zakat’s classical 
coverage to be enough to generate equity.168
Acknowledging the limitations of the limited assets on which zakat is imposed, some 
Islamic economists such as Kahf suggest that coverage of zakat should be extended to new 
forms of wealth. He holds that if zakat is collected only from traditional forms of wealth, 
revenue generated from it will not be enough to provide poverty relief to the poor, let alone 
make them self-sufficient. However, there are jurists such as Awad who state that the 
sources of zakat are divinely fixed and cannot be changed. He argues that zakat revenues 
will not be insignificant and hence there is no need to change its coverage.169
The issue of zakat on modem wealth has been on the agenda of many Islamists for decades. 
For this purpose the Arab League held the first seminar on the issue of levying zakat on 
present-day assets in Damascus, in December 1962. A report was prepared by Shaikh 
Muhammad Abu Zahrah of the Faculty of the Shariah at the University o f Cairo, and 
Shaikh Rahman Hassan of the Al-Azhar University, Egypt.170 It entailed that profits of
167 For detailed analysis see Al Qardawi, Fiqh Al Zakat: A Comparative Study: The Rules, Regulations and 
Philosophy o f  Zakat in the Light o f  the Quran and Sunna. Zakat is levied on productive wealth, i.e. wealth 
with potential or actual productivity. Potential productivity denotes such wealth as gold, silver and money 
kept as savings and actual productivity denotes agricultural produce and money invested in trade or articles o f 
trade. See A. A. H. Sadeq, "A Survey o f the Institution o f Zakat: Issues, Theories and Administration", 1994, 
Islamic Development Bank, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia p. 37
168 M.A. Khan, "Public Finance in Islam." pp. 227-256
169 Sadeq, "A Survey o f  the Institution o f Zakat", p. 33
170 Mannan, Islamic Economics: Theory and Practice p .  257
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professions and trades not known in the past would now be subject to zakat. The Damascus 
report dealt with the question of zakat levy with regards to bank notes and other forms of 
currency and bills of exchange, such as stocks, shares and bonds. It concluded that if these 
instruments were acquired for the purpose of trade then these would be dealt with as 
commodities subject to zakat. However, if the instruments were acquired for investment, 
then zakat would be payable on the profit or dividend obtained from the investment.171
Mannan recognises that the indiscriminate application of zakat on stocks, shares and bonds 
goes against the spirit of the Shariah. This is because the return on stocks and shares gives 
a dividend and it varies according to the investment environment of the market for that 
product, which is in accordance with the spirit of Islamic profit and loss sharing, whereas 
the return on bonds is more akin to earning interest and thus can be deemed as illicit under 
the Shariah principles.172 The issue of zakat on modem forms of wealth is an area of 
discussion packed with controversies, opinions, arguments and counter arguments.173
Rates o f  Zakat
The rates of zakat stipulated from the Quran is that it be charged annually at a flat rate 
ranging between 2.5% to 20% (for mines and treasure troves its rate is 20%) on the total 
personal net worth of an individual’s assets.174 Zakat on agricultural produce, which is also 
called ushr, ranges between 5% and 10%. Its rate is 10% on the produce if the land is 
irrigated with rainwater or gravity flow water channels. If the land is irrigated by artificial
171 Ibid. p. 259
172 Ibid.
173 Siddiqi, "Muslim Economic Thinking", p. 212
174 F. G. Zayaz, Law and Philosophy o f  Zakat (Syria: Al-Jadidah Printing Press, 1960).pp. 95-113
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175irrigation, then the liability of ushr is 5%. Its rate on wealth in the form of gold and silver
is 2.5%, and the same rate is applied to monetary assets and livestock.
Islamic economists argue that the proportional rate of zakat is better than a progressive rate, 
because a progressive rate of taxation not only has a negative impact on the economic 
incentive of an individual but also goes against the Islamic injunctions of justice and
17(\actually undermines general welfare. An additional reason they give is that zakat is 
levied on net worth and not on income, and hence, its proportion to income is much larger 
than its literal ratio of 2.5%. They thus say that zakat would mobilise a large portion of
177wealth for redistribution. However, it will be wrong to state that a proportional levy at a 
low fixed rate can be expected to play a major redistributive role in eliminating gross 
inequalities, especially where wealth is difficult to tap and the scope is narrow.
Though the rate of the zakat has its root in the Sunnah, it was not specified and has been 
inferred by Islamic scholars and jurists. Many Islamic economists recognize that the rates 
of zakat should be increased. Mannan stresses that if a sizeable amount of wealth is to be 
channelled from the rich to the poor then the rates of zakat will have to be revised.178 Some 
others support this stance that if zakat is to be successful in its objective of poverty 
alleviation, its rates need to be reconsidered. They provide historical evidence to support 
their claim. They evoke the times of the pious Caliphs where it seems that zakat rates were
170changed according to the social and economic circumstances of the time. They hold that
175 M.A. Khan, "Public Finance in Islam."pp. 227-256
176 S. M. Yusuf, Economic Justice in Islam  (Lahore: Chaudhry Mohammad Ashraf, 1971).p. 67
177 Kahf, "Methodology o f  Islamic Economics."p. 79
178 Mannan, Islamic Economics: Theory and Practice.p. 237
179 A. A. Shaik, "Concept o f  Zakah: A  Survey o f Qur'anic Texts and their Explanation in Shari'ah and 
Contemporary Economics," in Some Aspects o f  the Economic o f  Zakah, ed. M. Raquibuzzaman (1980).p. 18-
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contrary to what some Islamic jurists assert, zakat rates are not a divine injunction that 
cannot be changed. There are many Islamic jurists and economists who toe a rather puritan 
line and believe in retaining the originality of zakat law. Ahmed insists that the rates that 
have been inferred from the Sunnah hold true for all times and are immutable. He further 
adds that tampering with zakat rates of levy would lead to political manipulation of this 
form of prayer.180
Nisab
The minimum amount of wealth liable to zakat is called nisab.lsl In the time of the Prophet 
nisab was generally defined as the minimum wealth required for the sustenance of a family 
for at least a year.182 This level is also not clearly specified in the Shariah but is inferred 
from it. The nisab for silver is 595 grams and for gold is 88.65 grams (if the wealth of a 
person is in the form of gold only). For modem paper currency, nisab is pegged to either 
silver or gold.183
According to Kuran, these exemption limits stipulated by the Prophet probably reflected the 
relative prices of gold and silver that prevailed in his time.184 In recent times, the price of 
gold has adjusted to a higher degree of inflation than silver. Therefore, some Islamic 
scholars have stressed the need to reconsider nisab. Kahf notes that relative prices of items 
liable for the levy of zakat have been changing over time: for example silver has
28. The historical evidence that Shaik mentions is that the rate o f zakat on a horse during the time o f  the 
Prophet was 2.5% o f  its value, but in the time o f  the Pious Caliphs it was doubled to 5% o f its price.
180 Z. Ahmed, "Comments on M. A. Manan's Effects o f Zakah Assessment and Collection on the 
Redistribution o f Income in Contemporary Muslim Countries," in Management o f  Zakah in Modern Muslim 
Societies, ed. I. A. Imtiazi (Jeddah: Islamic Development Bank, 1989).p. 55
181 Zayaz, Law and Philosophy o f  Zakat.p. 3
182 Al Qardawi, Fiqh A l Zakat: A Comparative Study: The Rules, Regulations and Philosophy o f  Zakat in the 
Light o f  the Quran and Sunna. p. 64
183 A. M. Sadeq, Economic Development in Islam (Selangor Dar-ul-Ehsan: Pelanduk, 1990).p. 62
184 For a general discussion see Kuran, "Islamic Redistribution Through Zakat: Medieval Roots o f  
Contemporary Problems".
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deteriorated in value relative to gold over the years, and the existing nisab of silver does not 
correspond to the present cost of living. What he suggests is some sort of a formula that 
examines the nisab of the items in the Prophetic traditions, their relative prices and weight, 
and the cost of living at that time and applying this formula to determine the nisab on items 
in the contemporary world.185 Another Islamic economist, Raquibuzzaman, supports this 
view and adds that the nisab of zakat should be equivalent to the amount that is adequate to 
maintain a reasonable standard of living, and this should be changed from time to time to 
reflect the changes in the cost of living. However, no progress has so far been made in 
developing this formula. The low level of the nisab especially relative to an annual poverty 
line income implies that if zakat is imposed in an Islamic country with its present 
exemption limits, redistribution via zakat would occur from the poor to the poor, and 
people who are eligible to receive zakat would also be paying it. This would be against the 
dictates of Islamic welfare, justice and equality.
Heads of Zakat
The Shariah permits zakat funds to be used only for specific purposes. According to verse 
60, Sura IX of the Quran, the lawful beneficiaries of zakat are, firstly, the paupers. The 
pauper is he who has no living and is unable to earn a living. This category includes all 
Muslims whose means are, in spite of their best efforts or due to some physical disability, 
either totally lacking or are so deficient as to deny them the basic lawful material 
necessities of life. Secondly, there are the poor whose income is insufficient to cover 
expenses. Third are captives or slaves who need to be freed. Fourthly, zakat can be used to 
pay off the debts of the poor. This implies that all debtors who find themselves unable to
185 Sadeq, "A Survey o f  the Institution o f Zakat", pp. 33-4
186 Ibid.p. 35
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repay their debts without suffering undue distress or destitution may seek relief from their 
burden through zakat. Fifthly, zakat can be used for its administrators, and sixthly, for the 
cause of Allah, which many agree implies giving zakat for lawful warfare for the defence of 
Islam and of the Muslim people and territories. The seventh category are those whose 
hearts are reconciled, i.e. converts to Islam, Receiving zakat is supposed to confirm them as 
Muslims and supposed to encourage and attract others in following them. Lastly, zakat can 
be used for the wayfarers. This means that zakat may be given to travel the land, which 
implies learning practical wisdom from the vast wealth of experience that travel alone
I  o»7
affords. Among these categories, priority is given to the poor and the needy.
Zakat disbursement can be made in cash or in kind. Disbursements in kind are encouraged 
as they are supposed to make the recipient self-sufficient in the long run.188 One of zakat’s 
real challenges lies in the fact that the Quran does not state how zakat is to be divided 
among the eight classes of beneficiaries.189 This has added to the trials of the Islamic 
scholars who, though they agree on the types of beneficiaries of zakat, do not seem to have 
solved the issue of percentage allocation of zakat among the categories mentioned above.
Collection o f Zakat and the role o f the Islamic State
The role of the Islamic state is an important but a controversial one in the working of zakat. 
Jurists and economists adhering to the Hanafi school of law, i.e. of the Sunni majority, 
agree on the point that the state ought to be responsible for the collection and disbursement
187 Al-Ghazzali, "Kitab Asrar al-Zakah," in 'Ihya 'Ulum al-Din (Lahore: Sh. Mohammad Ashraf, 1966; 
reprint, 1980).pp. 56-63
188 Maulana T. Usmani, "Questions and Answers on Zakah," The Pakistan Accountant 38, no. 4 (2005).
189 Zayaz, Law and Philosophy o f  Zakat p .  306
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of zakat.190 They say that their claim is supported by verse 9:103 in the Quran. However, 
the idea of state intervention in the zakat mechanism is contested by other Sunni minority 
Islamic jurists, who hold that zakat is not a tax imposed by the state, and thus, is not 
dependent on it for its function, which they say is confirmed by the Quran in verse 170, 
sura VII. The ambiguity is enhanced further by the historical fact that payment of zakat was 
a public duty in the time of the first Caliph, Abu Bakr, who waged war on those who 
evaded it. Consequently, the supporters o f state intervention in the zakat mechanism assert 
that whenever payment of zakat or its distribution to the rightful beneficiaries was 
neglected, it has been the state's duty to intervene. However, in the time of the third Caliph 
Omer, the prospective zakat payers were spared from paying to the state, as corrupt 
collectors were a cause of annoyance for them.191 It is not only the Sunni scholars who 
differ on this point, since Shias do not uphold the idea of state intervention with regard to 
payment of zakat either.192
The analysis of the Islamic state given earlier revealed that the Islamic state can enjoy 
undisputed economic and political leverage, and the role of the state in the zakat collection 
further highlights the grey area regarding zakat’s various injunctions that make it rather 
vulnerable in the hands of the political authority.
Goals and Objectives o f  Zakat
Proponents o f the Islamic economic system claim that zakat is the cornerstone for the 
realisation of welfare and justice for all. They assert that the system of zakat is geared
190 Chapra, "The Islamic Welfare State and its role in the Economy" .p. 161. See also Sadeq, Economic 
Development in Islam. And Mannan, Islamic Economics: Theory and Practice.
191 Siddiqi, "Muslim Economic Thinking", p. 216
192 Shi’as give zakat to a freely selected religious scholar, whom they consider as acting as the delegate o f the 
Imam. Y. Richard, Shi'ite Islam, Polity, Ideology and Creed (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995).p. 146
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towards advancing social justice and equity via the redistribution of wealth from the rich to 
the poor.
If  zakat were imposed as a policy in a country, then what would be its explicit objective? 
Would it be for the welfare of the least privileged in society, reducing poverty, creating 
vertical equity or just need fulfilment? It is important to know which of the above 
objectives the state is pursuing since these apparently similar goals encompass significantly 
different meanings, and are assessed using different criteria.
Judging from the heads of zakat expenditure, it is easy to see that zakat has multiple aims. 
Islamists assert that zakat is to guarantee subsistence and need fulfilment for those who 
cannot undertake productive activities and thus are reliant on society’s assistance. In 
addition, zakat not only strives to provide for the needy but also aspires to alleviate 
poverty.193 Islamists also affirm that zakat has major potential for mobilising resources in 
favour of reducing income inequality.194
Many injunctions regarding zakat are ambiguous and sometimes contentious. Moreover, 
there is conflict as to which injunctions are alterable and which are not. All these 
contentions regarding the rate and scope of zakat, the nisab and the role of the Islamic state 
in the zakat mechanism have huge implications for the workability of zakat and its 
effectiveness in meeting its targets of welfare and equity. However, for the Islamists, 
regardless of these limitations, the supposed superiority o f zakat due to its religious nature
193 M. T. Mansoori, "Objectives and Targets o f Zakat in the Quran and Sunnah" (paper presented at the 
International Training Seminar on Zakat Management, Islamabad, May, 20-23 2002).pp. 5-10
194 Siddiqi, "Muslim Economic Thinking".p. 251
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has made it a jewel in the crown of Islamic public finance with major redistributive 
potential.
Islamists seemed to have overlooked the fact that all policies are created in a political 
environment and are political instruments, and hence suffer from several challenges that 
emanate out of the interplay of the two. Islamists appear to ignore the vulnerability of zakat 
to becoming an instrument of political bargaining. In addition, they do not seem to realise 
that zakat (although a form of prayer and a divine injunction) does not come in a political 
vacuum and is dependent on political structures not only for its initiation but also for its 
consequent operation, which leaves it vulnerable to manipulation from interest groups.
The following account examines the political economy of the formation of the Islamic 
welfare policy and assesses how a policy may be influenced and consequently shaped by 
the interest groups. This section also examines the importance of trust (regardless of the 
sanctity of Islamic institutions) between the state and the individual, created through the 
state’s commitment to the policy.
2.2 Political Economy of Islamic Welfare Policy
Social policy is intertwined with government and politics as it involves attempts to change 
current social arrangements in one way or another and therefore involves the exercise of 
power. Bringing about this change is never a straightforward process and always involves 
the ulterior motives of those involved in the process. The rationale of the policy and the real 
agenda of the state behind the official rhetoric can usually be laid bare by examining the 
policy-making process, and this holds true for the Islamic welfare policies as well.
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One cannot examine the policy-making process divorced from the components of the state. 
Therefore, one needs to consider the apparatus of the state, including the bureaucrats, 
legislators, interest groups and the politicians.
The secularists who theorise about social policies in general (especially their social, 
economic and political dynamics) seem to be aware of the interplay of institutions and key 
groups through which a welfare policy emerges.195 They also seem to be aware of the 
politics of welfare and the influence of politics on policies due to the various intricacies and 
proportions of power interaction.196 They acknowledge the reality of a policy process as an 
experience relating to relationships between political phenomena.197 The secular literature, 
divided into pluralist, corporatist, Marxist and the elitist categories, describes the 
trajectories of policy formation via different formulae of power play among various 
participating groups. These categorisations explicate various influences that operate in the
10Rprocess of policy formation. The secular theorists hold that the policy-making process is 
a series of political activities with many dimensions involving identifying problems, setting 
the agenda, formulating policy proposals, legitimising policies and implementing them. 
Even the evaluation part of the policy process is ridden with political considerations.199
Policy Making in an Islamic Context
Most Islamists seem to be unaware of the politics of policy formation, although the 
government structure that they envisage in an Islamic polity (as described earlier) has clear
195 C. Jones, Patterns o f  Social Policy an Introduction to Comparative Analysis (London: Tavistock 
Publications, 1985).p. 5
196 L. N. Gerston, Public Policymaking in a Democratic Society (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2002).p. 154
197 R. Rose, "Comparing Public Policy: An Overview," European Journal o f  Political Research 1, no. 1 
(1973).p. 74
198 Baldock, Manning, and Vickerstaff, Social Policy.p. 43. For complete definitions o f  these categories, see 
pp. 43-44
99 T. R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1992).pp. 17-18 & 333
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implications for policy formation, operation and evaluation. The politics of welfare that 
could emerge as a consequence of the Islamic mode of governance seems to have eluded 
the Islamists as they have apparently failed to consider the peculiarities of the exercise of 
power incumbent in their model. It seems that in the Islamists’ minds there exists an 
underlying assumption that the Islamic ruling authority would have internalised the 
philosophy of the Islamic economic system and would operate for the collective good. 
There does not appear to be any internal critique of the possibility and consequently of the 
politics of welfare.
According to the economic and the political nature of the Islamic state described earlier, the 
question arises as to what is to be the policy-making process in an Islamic polity. In an 
Islamic state, the policy-making process would be based on a system of decision-making 
that would have only few individuals contributing to the decision-making process. The 
diagram below attempts to visualise the policy-making process in an Islamic polity.
Figure 2.1
Policy Making in an Islamic Polity
Amir
(Allah's vicegerent: elected, selec ted  or appoin ted)
| Technocrats ■►I Policy ImplementationPolicy Imposition>1 B ureaucrats
Policy
Elite Cabinet
(selected from the Shura)
Source: Author
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As seen from the figure above, the authority, i.e. the Amir takes the decision to enforce a 
policy. As explained earlier, it is important to point out that there is no specific prescription 
for the appointment of the shura as it can be elected, selected and appointed in any way. 
The Amir has his shura from which he chooses his elite cabinet. Between the Amir and his 
elite cabinet there is a strong two-way communication, which denotes not only consultation 
between them regarding the shape of the policy (which is represented by the bold lines in 
the diagram) but also denotes collaboration between them regarding mutual interests. 
Similarly there is a two-way communication between the amir and the bureaucrats, which 
again shows consultation of the practical sort. The amir commands the technocrats 
regarding policy formation, which is denoted by the one-way command communication. 
From here onwards one notices a flow of process akin to a policy-making process under 
any form of rule.
The above diagram indicates how the actors in an Islamic polity may influence the 
decision-making process of a policy and affect its shape. It reveals that the Islamic state can 
potentially manoeuvre the policy in a manner that could detract the policy from its 
objectives to retain and forward its own agenda and thus have a negative impact on its 
effectiveness. Under an ambience of such elitism, it would not be a problem for the god- 
sent Amir and his shura to fight off any opposition. Additionally, considering the myriad 
interpretations of the tenets of Islamic economic philosophy regarding justice and fairness, 
it will be in the power of the amir and his advisory body to interpret policies (based on the 
Shariah) to achieve their own political objectives and security.
The above analyses indicate the point that policies are not immune from vulnerability even
if the political and economic system is based on divine injunctions. The altruism of the
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welfare instrument does not blunt its political edge, as devices of welfare are fertile ground 
for winning political support and bargaining for power. As analysed earlier, the Islamists 
seem to proceed with the underlying notion that the Islamic political authority would have 
internalised the broader philosophy of the Islamic economic system and so will naturally be 
working for the collective good. They do not provide for situations of detraction. The 
challenge of a policy imposition does not end with policy formation, as the operation of 
policy is another challenge that the Islamic economic literature does not seem to have 
tackled. Here again the Islamists seem to underestimate the challenges posed by the 
operational stage of the policy process, as they seem to presuppose that the humanitarian 
and benevolent disposition of the policy is sufficient for individuals to turn into homo 
Islamicus and carry out their duties sincerely. Thus the Islamists seem to believe that there 
would be a smooth transfer o f the Islamic economic philosophy into the world of real 
politik and economics through the tools of the Islamic economic system.
The Importance o f  Being Earnest and Generating Trust
The fact that the policy is Islamic and imposed by the Islamic state is not enough for the 
individual to deem it acceptable. An individual will make his/her own calculations 
regarding the 'fairness of the policy process and the shape of the imposed policy. The 
Islamic state will have to assure the public that it is not operating to forward its own good 
but that it is working earnestly for the collective good. For this reason it will have to 
establish the element of trust between itself and the homo Islamicus.
The factor of trust between the individual and the state is of pivotal importance for a
successful policy mechanism. Trust in the state by the individual strengthens the ideals,
beliefs and the values that form the basis of success of any social policy imposed by a
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government. Therefore, trust between the state and the individual helps the socialisation of 
the individual with the policy, which in turn facilitates co-operation with the state and 
compliance with the policy. The following analyses comment upon some of the ways in 
which the state can generate trust that would be beneficial for the success and effectiveness 
of a policy. Before elaborating upon the stated claim it is imperative to explain what is 
meant by trust.
Levi states that the act of trust is the knowledge or belief that the trusted will have an 
incentive to do what she/he/it engages to do.200 Among many aspects of trust that Blackburn 
points out in his work, the one most suited for the present analyses is where he uses the 
tripartite relationship, i.e. X trusts Y to do Z, in a certain way, and with a certain motive.201 
The notion o f trust can be applied to individuals or institutions such as the government.202
It is the level of trust between the individual and the state and its institutions that ensures a 
degree of compliance with governmental demands and regulations. Its absence can lead to 
widespread antagonism to governmental policies and even active resistance. It is trust that 
holds the individual, the state and the policy together in a workable relationship. One can 
assert that societal actors would not respond positively to labels such as homo Islamicus, 
the Islamic state and zakat as these would not command allegiance automatically unless 
there are universal concepts and values, such as that of trust, underpinning their
200 M. Levi, "A State o f  Trust," in Trust and Governance, ed. V. Braithwaite, & Levi. M., Russell Sage 
Foundation Series on Trust (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1998).p. 78
201 S. Blackburn, "Trust, Cooperation and Human Psychology," in Trust and Governance, ed. V. Braithwaite 
& M. Levi (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1998).p. 30.
202 Levi, "Trust and Govemance."p. 80. With regards to institutional trust, what is implied is the procedure for 
selecting and constraining the agents o f  institutions so that they are competent, credible, and likely to act in 
the interests o f  those being asked to trust the institutions.
203 J. T. Scholz, "Trust, Taxes, and Compliance," in Trust and Governance, ed. V. Braithwaite, & Levi, M., 
Russell Sage Foundation Series on Trust (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1998).p. 136 Also see J. 
Edlund, "Trust in Government and Welfare Regimes: Attitudes to Redistribution and Financial Cheating in 
the USA and Norway," European Journal o f  Political Research 35, no. 3 (1999).
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relationship that would strengthen and complement the interaction between them, leading to 
positive consequences for the assertions of the Islamists.204
The state can generate trust by showing commitment to the policy that it has imposed, as 
demonstrating commitment to the policy would consequently strengthen the individual’s 
trust in the state. This implies that the state should take steps that would demonstrate to the 
public its sincerity towards the policy (especially if the policy in question has direct 
financial consequences for the people). The state can demonstrate commitment by making 
sure that the individual perceives the government as one that meets the prevailing standards 
of fairness, i.e. considers all relevant interests in the procedures of making and 
implementing welfare policies.205 If the policy’s introduction and decision-making process 
is perceived cynically by the public, the rationale of the policy will be received with 
suspicion. If the policy-making process suggests the state is being disingenuous then the 
policy could be undermined, as the public’s perceptions will also be negative. In most cases 
citizens are willing to go along with a policy they do not prefer as long as it is made 
according to a process they deem legitimate, as they are less willing to co-operate with a 
policy they agree with if the process was problematic.
The perception of the individual should be that the policy is legitimate and created for 
his/her benefit. Historically, these procedures have ensured that citizens, who quasi-
204 There are debates regarding the governance methods o f the state, which has consequences for the creation 
or destruction o f  communal, familial, or generalised trust among the individuals see F. Fukuyama, Trust (New  
York: Basic Books, 1995). However, this thesis deals with ideas that relate to the relationship of the 
individual with the state, which holds that state actions directly influence its relationship with the individual in 
the form o f increased or decreased trust, which then in turn facilitates or impedes the economic, political and 
social progress in the society.
205 Levi, "Trust and Governance." pp. 90-92
206 B. Barry, Justice as Impartiality, ed. D. & Ryan Miller, A., vol. II, Oxford Political Theory A treatise on 
Social Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).p. I l l
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voluntarily pay taxes, generally credit governments with doing the right thing with their
207monies.
The state can signal its commitment and fairness through the coercion of those who are not 
obedient, i.e. by punishing lawbreakers and establishing credible courts. Scholz argues that 
enforcement is necessary and that the agency (or the state) should form a basis for trust by 
ensuring that it conveys the message that untrustworthy citizens will be made to comply 
with the law via statutes and punishments that would prevent the erosion of public 
confidence in the agency.208 Thus the enforcement factor of the policy also strengthens the 
commitment and fairness nexus with the state, which leads to increasing compliance. 
Enforcement includes certainty, severity of punishment and extent of monitoring.209 
Individuals will comply with policies if they fear punishment in case of non-compliance, as 
punishment of the most flagrant violators serves as an example to those considering non- 
compliance.
Commitment can also be conveyed via the public perception that the policy involves the 
standardisation of the provision of services. It is suggested in the literature that 
discriminatory practices and violations of policy promises are likely to provoke non-co- 
operation from the citizens. Also, the state on its part should make sure that the citizen 
realises that the recruitment and promotion of state bureaucrats has taken place on grounds 
of competence as the implementation of policy is handled by the state bureaucracy.
207 Levi, "Trust and Governance." p. 90
208 J. T. Scholz, "Trust, Taxes, and Compliance,"K. J. Meier and D. R. Morgan, "Citizen Compliance with 
Public Policy: The National Maximum Speed Law," The Western Political Quarterly 35, no. 2 (1982). p. 262
209 Ibid.p. 163
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All the above-mentioned measures for the facilitation of policy operation create 
reputational effects, which are beneficial for the acceptance of policies,210 and consequently 
advantageous for the fulfilment of its stated objectives.211
In the context of the Islamic state, it will have to create these reputational effects if it is to 
make policy effective, because the Islamic status of the policy and polity is not by itself 
sufficient to generate automatic trust between the individual and the state, nor would 
zakat’s religious nature elicit acceptance and compliance from the individual. It would take 
a concerted effort on part of the state authority, i.e. the Islamic state, to facilitate an 
environment conducive to the generation of tmst between the homo Islamicus and itself by 
demonstrating commitment towards policy imposition, operation and effectiveness.
Conclusion
The chapter has examined the political economy of Islamic social policy through the 
political structure of the Islamic state. It has argued that welfare instruments are susceptible 
to political manipulation despite their sacred origins. It has shown that the nature of the 
Islamic state could influence the decision-making process of a policy and affect its shape in 
a way that could derail the policy from its objectives and hence have a negative impact on 
its effectiveness. The chapter has also shown that regardless of the religious overtones of 
the policy and the institutions involved in its operation, the state needs to win the tmst of 
the public through demonstrating commitment towards the policy in order to ensure its 
effectiveness.
210 Levi, "Trust and Governance." pp. 87-93. S. Svallfors, "Political Trust and Attitudes Towards 
Redistribution," European Societies 1, no. 2 (1999).
211 Svallfors, while researching political trust and attitudes in Sweden and Norway, nullifies the claim that 
there are obvious links between political efficacy and trust on the one hand and attitudes towards 
redistribution on the other. However, at the same time he acknowledges the fact that his findings could be 
relevant only to the case o f  Sweden and Norway. Svallfors, "Political Trust and Attitudes." p. 241
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This chapter has also analysed the operational tools o f the Islamic economic system 
namely, the absence of riba, the operation of modarabah, the presence of the Islamic state 
and the imposition of zakat, through which the system aspires to create economic justice in 
the society. Considering the pivotal place attributed to zakat in economic redistribution and 
social security by the Islamists (as examined in section 2.1 of this chapter), it follows that 
their assertions need to be tested on empirical ground, keeping the analyses of the political 
economy of the Islamic welfare policy under consideration. This therefore leads to the 
principal question of this thesis: did Zakat deliver welfare and justice in Pakistan between 
1980 and 1994?
The above question will be answered in stages in Chapters Three, Four and Five. Chapter 
Three considers the political and ideological origins of zakat policy in Pakistan from the 
time of Pakistan’s creation until zakat's formal institutionalisation in 1977 following Zia’s 
military coup. The chapter proceeds to analyse why zakat (one of the fundamentals of the 
Islamic faith) was not introduced immediately after the creation of Pakistan and why was it 
introduced when it was. Within the framework of the political economy of Islamic welfare 
policy discussed above, Chapter Three explores the formalisation of zakat by investigating 
the policy-making mechanism of zakat and examining the influences on the policy. Finally, 
it conducts analyses of the eventual shape that the zakat policy assumed under Zia’s Islamic 
state. The chapter aims to highlight the fact that zakat's divine ordination does not 
guarantee that it will remain true to its objectives when imposed as a policy. This is because 
it is also a welfare instrument that can be manipulated by the Islamic polity (considering its 
economic and political leverage and considering the grey area in the Shariah regarding
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zakat) to advance political ends that have little to do with zakat’s theological rationale of 
creating welfare and justice in the society.
Chapter Four examines zakat in action by focusing on the revenue side between the years 
from 1980 to 1994. It examines the amount of zakat revenue at the national aggregate level 
and assesses the pattern of zakat given by the individuals at the micro level. The chapter 
compares the assertions of the Islamists regarding zakat’s ability to tap the wealth of the 
rich, its resource mobilisation capacity and compliance aspects with its actual functioning 
in Pakistan. The chapter advances to analyse the role of the Islamic state regarding its 
commitment towards the zakat policy that had major implications for the creation of trust 
between the state and the individual. The chapter conducts these analyses as a consequence 
of an historical investigation of the kind of governments that came to power in Pakistan 
after its establishment and their ability to demonstrate credible commitment to their 
declared objectives to the people of Pakistan. This exercise aims to underscore the 
implications that the absence of trust had for zakat’s ability to achieve its objectives. The 
chapter endeavours to draw attention to the fact that the zakat policy, based on a sacred 
ideology, does not hold a promise of compliance from the individual towards zakat. For the 
zakat policy to be effective, the Islamic state needs to create the element of trust between 
itself and the individual by showing commitment to the policy.
Chapter Five assesses the benefits of zakat in Pakistan. It aims to evaluate these benefits in
the light of the results of Chapters Three and Four and how these results affected the
Islamists’ aspirations regarding zakat’s ability to reduce poverty and inequality in Pakistan.
Initially the chapter narrates the historical development of social welfare in Pakistan since
its creation in 1947 with the aim of acquainting the reader with the conditions of social
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welfare before the introduction of zakat. Secondly, the chapter examines the disbursement 
o f zakat at the national aggregate level and thirdly, it provides answers at the household 
level regarding the questions of who received zakat and how much. The chapter then moves 
on to answer the specific question of zakat and its ability to alleviate poverty and reduce 
inequality.
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Chapter Three
Institutionalisation of Zakat in Pakistan 
Introduction
Within the framework of the political economy of Islamic welfare policy discussed in 
Chapter Two (which analyses not only the ideological and political context of the Islamic 
way of governance but also explores the policy making process in an Islamic polity), this 
chapter investigates the process of the formal institutionalisation of zakat by examining its 
policy-making process and the influences operating on it. The goal of this chapter is to 
elucidate the point that zakat (a welfare instrument with redistributive economic 
consequences), although part of an idealised economic system, is at the same time also a 
political structure that is handled by a human agency and therefore is not divorced from 
interest groups that create and steer policies to cater to their own vested interests.
The present chapter also reflects on the political and ideological origins of zakat policy in 
Pakistan. It places zakat within the historical context of Islam in Pakistan (as it would be 
futile to discuss any aspect of zakat in Pakistan without considering Islam’s importance and 
development in the country’s history). For many Pakistan’s emergence appears to have 
been a determinant of religion.
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section introduces the reader to the role 
of Islam in the creation of Pakistan and its subsequent history in which the roots of zakat 
lie. It begins by tracing the historical origins of Islamism in Pakistan to the time of British 
rule in India, when the demand for the constitutional safeguards of the Muslims of the Sub­
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continent became popular in the 1940s under the banner of the Two-Nation theory. The 
proponents of this theory hold that there are two nations inhabiting India with their own 
distinct culture, history, society and customs, namely the Muslims and the Hindus. It 
considers India to be inhabited by people who are deeply divided by racial, religious and 
linguistic antagonisms, and lack homogeneity.212 It considers Muslims to be one nation 
with Islam at the centre of their existence where Islam transcends the geographical 
boundaries of Punjab, Balauchistan and Bengal, along with the racial confines of caste, 
colour and creed.213 This ideology was expressed in the country’s various constitutions and 
Pakistan’s Islamic nature was formalised in the 1973 Constitution. This section also 
endeavours to bring to the forefront the schism in this Islamic ideology that explains why 
Islamisation and hence zakat were not introduced by governments immediately after the 
formation of Pakistan in 1947 and why this move was finally made after Zia came to power 
in 1977.
The second section explains why and how Zia introduced and pursued his agenda of 
Islamisation in Pakistan, as a consequence of which zakat was introduced. It focuses on the 
development of the zakat policy under the influence of the Islamic polity created by Zia. It 
examines the zakat policy development. A comparison of orthodox clerical views of zakat 
with the details of the policy as implemented by Zia reveals some of the broader political 
objectives of zakat policy. It examines how the nature of the Islamic state helped it to steer 
and influence zakat policy.
212 A. Hamid, Muslim Separatism in India: a brief survey 1858-1947 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 
1967).p. 36
213 For full analyses see Iqbal, Ideology o f  Pakistan.
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It is not the purpose of this thesis to provide a detailed analysis of Pakistan’s emergence. 
Nonetheless as pointed out earlier, considering the subject of this treatise i.e. zakat in 
Pakistan, it becomes imperative to asses the role of Islam in Pakistan’s creation, as 
according to the claims of the official historiography, Islam is supposed to be Pakistan’s 
raison d ’etre. This perspective is rather linear and assumes that the achievement of a 
homeland for the Muslims of South Asia was the result of almost a century of Muslim 
aspirations and sacrifices. The following passages assess the Islamic character of Pakistan’s 
emergence as this would not only shed light on the shape that zakat finally took but will 
also elucidate upon its achievements which are assess in the last two chapters. In assessing 
the role of Islam in Pakistan’s creation, this assessment will assess both the traditional i.e. 
the official historiography and the revisionist perspective i.e. sources that have challenged 
the Islamic heroicism embedded in the conventional historiography of its creation.
3.1 Islam and the Emergence of Pakistan 
Pakistan’s Islamic Ideology
Since the emergence of Pakistan the role of Islam has assumed centre stage as Islam seems 
to have determined the establishment of Pakistan. In Pakistan the more widespread version 
of the birth of Pakistan is attributed to the application of the Two-Nation theory (as 
explained above),214 in other words that the Islamic nation was engaged in a political 
mobilisation that led to the creation of Pakistan. This led to the Lahore Resolution passed 
on 23 March 1940, which explicitly demanded the partition of India to create Pakistan; a
2141. H. Qureshi, The Muslim Community o f  the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent (610-1947): A B rief Historical 
Analysis, Publications in Near and Middle East Studies/Columbia University; series A .l Columbia 
University. Publications in Near and Middle East Studies; series A .l  ( ’S-Gravenhage: Mouton, 1962). Also 
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2151. H. Qureshi, The struggle fo r  Pakistan, Publications o f  the University o f  Karachi (Karachi: University o f  
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Affairs Press, 1963).
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seperate homeland for the Muslim nation of India, and independence on the 14th of August
sy-t jT
1947 was the eventual achievement of this movement. There are several inconsistencies 
in this interpretation, including the fact that the Lahore Resolution called for the 
establishment of Muslim ‘states’ and not ‘a state’, calling into question the validity of this 
interpretation of the Two-Nation theory. This takes us to the revisionist interpretation of the 
emergence of Pakistan which argues that Jinnah did not necessarily want a separate state 
and employed the Two-Nation theory as a ‘tactical bargaining counter’ to unite the 
Muslims of India to ensure a secure and legitimate place for the Muslims within the
7 17constitutional framework of a united India.
The Two-Nation theory in this view was not synonymous with separatism.218 The merit of 
this theory was that as opposed to being considered a community which would consign the 
Muslims’ status to that of a minority, this would give them equal status with the Hindus in 
the governance of India irrespective of their numbers, since the family of nations contains 
the big and the small.219 The thrust of Jinnah’s political strategy was initially to secure the 
recognition of the Indian Muslim nationhood on the basis of the acceptance of the 
‘Pakistan’ demand by the British and the Congress, and thereby gain an equal say for the 
Muslims in any arrangement about India’s political future at the centre. Once the principle 
of the Muslim right to self-determination, as embodied in the 1940 Lahore Resolution, was
216 R. J. Moore, "Jinnah and the Pakistan Demand," Modern Asian Studies 17, no. 4 (1983). p. 529
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and a weakened British raj in the specific circumstances o f world war and the effect o f the conflict and its 
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conceded, the resultant Muslim state or states could either ‘enter into a confederation with 
non-Muslim provinces on the basis of parity at the centre’ or as a sovereign state (or states) 
engage in treaty arrangements with the rest of India on matters of common concern.220 As 
late as 6 June 1946, when Jinnah accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan, it seems that he was 
willing to abandon the ‘Pakistan’ plan. The Cabinet Mission offered a grouping of Muslim 
provinces and offered Jinnah the effective content of a federation that could protect the 
interests of Muslims in India. Though the centre itself would not have been as strong and 
thus the prospects for ‘parity’ at the centre that Jinnah would have liked (to ensure his 
authority over the Muslim provinces) were doubtful, the communal provisions of the Plan 
held out the promise of a power broking role for the Muslim League at the centre. The Plan 
denied the principle of secession and stood for preservation of India’s integrity.221 It 
represented the last serious attempt to reconcile the notion of Pakistan as territory with the 
notion of Pakistan as a symbolic marker of a larger community.222 But, the Cabinet Mission 
Plan was killed: and Nehru did more than anyone to kill it by his refusal to accept the 
formula of ‘Grouping’,223 and the weak centre which would thwart the prospects of 
Congress dominance at the federal level. With the failure of the Plan, Pakistan’s realisation 
as a territorial state became inevitable. Jinnah had held the view that in the face of the 
‘Pakistan’ plan, the Congress would be forced to accommodate his demands and prevent 
the calamity of India’s dismemberment. However, after Jinnah’s acceptance of the Cabinet 
Mission Plan, the Congress called Jinnah’s bluff, shattering his political strategy and 
ambition224 but actually precipitating the emergence of Pakistan.
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The Two-Nation theory was incorporated by Jinnah in his politics only after the 1937 
elections. There is hardly any debate about the outcome of these elections as their results 
proved to be an embarrassment for the League candidates against the overwhelming 
success of the Congress in the non-Muslim constituencies. These results not only revealed 
the limitations of Jinnah and the League but also positively reduced their importance to the 
Congress225 and the prospect of the Congress’ dominance at the centre became clearer.226 It 
was then that Jinnah embarked on a new strategy by formally demanding independent 
Muslim states, repudiating the minority status which separate representation necessarily 
entailed and instead asserted that the ‘Muhammadans’ of India were a nation. This was a 
tactical move to overcome the Muslim Leagues’s political crises.227 His aims however still 
continued to be to secure Muslim interests ‘within’ and not in total separation from India.228
The Two-Nation theory manifested itself in the Lahore Resolution of 23 March 1940. 
Although, the resolution was far from a complete and coherent statement of Muslim 
demands, one of its most outstanding features was that it declared the Muslims to be a 
nation, rejecting once and for all their minority status. And although it formally demanded 
independent Muslim states, it made no mention of partition and none of Pakistan. The 
nature of this resolution was also obscure on the territorial demarcation of the regions and 
their relation to each other.229
225 Moore, "Jinnah and the Pakistan Demand." p. 534
226 Roy, "The High Politics o f  India's Partition." p. 390
227 Jalal, The sole spokesman, p. 4
228 Roy, "The High Politics o f India's Partition." p. 391
229 Jalal, The sole spokesman, p. 58-9
135
It appears that apart from defining Muslims of all India as a nation, there was no other firm 
resolve in this resolution. This was because Jinnah was aware that there was not one policy 
platform that would suit the interests of all the Muslims of India, and that was why the 
resolution was left vague leaving the League followers to make of it what they wished and 
leaving Jinnah plenty of room for manoeuvre. Any precise scheme would have divided the 
League because there were contradictions in Muslim interests between majority and 
minority provinces and between an apparently separatist demand for autonomous Muslim 
states and the need for a centre capable of protecting the interests of Muslims in the rest of 
India.230 Indian Muslims were as heterogeneous as the Hindus of the Sub-continent, divided 
by social and economic standing, by theology and by region. Certainly, there was not a 
united Muslim political community with a common national aim even as late as 1945.231 
The appeal of the resolution and that of the Two-Nation theory lay in its loose knit 
definition of a nation without compromising the interests of any Muslim community. The 
use of religious slogans and symbols proved immeasurably useful not just in rousing 
sentiments against the Congress ministries in the provinces but it also helped the League in 
reaching the Muslim masses over the heads of provincial leaders.
From the above exposition it appears that the official historiography can be challenged on 
the grounds that the creation of Pakistan was not a direct consequence of the Two-Nation 
theory and a single Muslim political identity; and that the Two-Nation theory was just a 
rallying call for the Muslims to take up the cause of securing a legitimate place for 
themselves within the constitutional framework of a united India.
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However, even if Islam was used just as a symbol, the important question is how powerful 
was this symbol and how significant was this rallying force considereing the manner in 
which it changed the fortunes of Muslim League? To what extent did the cohesive power of 
Islam in identifying all Muslims as ‘one nation’ in the context of South Asia impact on the 
social and economic policies of the Pakistan that emerged, even if it had not directly driven 
the emergence of Pakistan in the way described by the official historiography?
The role of Islam in Pakistan’s emergence is clearly controversial. Apart from the official 
historiography and those that hold Islam’s role in the pre-independence Muslim League to 
have been a tactical one, there are those who hold that Islam’s role was manipulated by the 
Muslim political elite in order to legitimise their bid for power. To make its message 
more appealing, the League utilised Islamic jargon and traditional Islamic idioms to put its 
message across.234 These historians like the revisionists hold that the League overhauled its 
political startegy of operating from a political, religious minority position to that of 
asserting themselves as a separate nation with its own identity and culture which at many 
levels appealed to the religious sentiments of the Muslims of India and created widespread 
religious backing for ‘Pakistan’ in the mid-1940s. This in turn transformed the Muslim 
League into ‘a chiliastic movement rather than a pragmatic political party.’235 It is 
important to note that these historians do not necessarily attribute the creation of Pakistan to 
Islamic ideology per se.
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Then why did Islamic symbolism have such an extensive and colossal effect on the politics 
of south Asia and why did the umbrella of Islam which knitted together the identities of all 
the Muslims of India prove to be so compelling for a heterogeneous Muslim population and 
produce a rallying force of significant proportions? Was there ever a single Muslim identity 
with Islam at its centre? The evidence suggests that this was not the case. Was there an all- 
encompassing Islamic moral order that created an Islamic identity which transcended the 
myriad particularistic and fragmentary identities and interests that shaped the lives and 
experiences of India’s Muslims?
A view of the formation of a collective Muslim identity from below in the context of the 
demand for ‘Pakistan’ suggests that it was through the ‘arena of public performance’ and of 
‘collective activities in public spaces’ that a sense of shared moral collectivity or identity 
was expressed. This importantly entailed that ‘community’, as enacted in such public 
arenas, was never fixed or static which in turn helped to crosscut the conflicts and divisions 
between varied Muslim identities rooted in everyday life. It was through this route that 
larger notions of moral order and therefore identity were expressed and created.236 This 
‘public realm’ of cultural and religious ceremonials created a common language of religion 
and order which consequently fostered a sense of ‘moral collective’ or ‘community’ among 
the Muslims of India. With the transformations of nineteenth and twentieth-century politics, 
this process shaped the politics of the public realm in India, which became instrumental in 
the demand for ‘Pakistan’. Men with claims to communal leadership (such as the Ali 
brothers, Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, Muhammad Iqbal, and, ultimately, Jinnah) increasingly
236 A. Freitag, Collective Action and Community: Public Arenas and the Emergence o f  Communalism in 
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sought to mobilize broad religious categories of identity. They progressively depended on 
their ability to successfully deploy the language of moral community and collectivity, as 
they rallied for the support of autonomous individuals in public platforms.238 Of course this 
does not imply that there was a long history of the formation of an ‘Islamic political 
identity’ or that this identity when fostered was an exclusive one. It merely asserts that 
there existed a sense of a Muslim identity at a rather generic level.
Another view of Muslim identity is from the top which asserts that the origins of the 
Muslim collective idendity in the Indian Sub-continent are related to the political and socio­
economic crises of the Muslim people. However this view asserts that the identity that was 
fostered after the fall o f the Mughal Empire was more about religious and cultural 
awareness rather than with active political engagement with the colonial state. With the 
arrival of the British in the Sub-continent the Muslims began to fear the loss of their 
integrity among the ruling Christians and the aspiring Hindus. The Muslim Ulema troubled 
by the social and economic dislocation drew on their own traditions for interpretations and 
patterns of action. They were of the opinion that the only way to restore Muslim self- 
respect and Islamic political supremacy was to go back to the spirit o f classical Islam, i.e. to 
revert to the practices o f the four Pious Caliphs, as their practices were seen to be the tme
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basis of Islamic ideals. They initiated movements that contributed to substantial religious 
consciousness and reflected and encouraged the growing sense that Muslims in British
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India were tied together in a separate community. The Ulema leading these movements 
exemplified an inward looking sphere for their religious life while at the same time they 
moved toward an acceptance of ‘Indian Muslim’ as their fundamental social identity.240 
Initially these movements appealed to different social groups and geographic locations. 
Over time, however, each attracted a more geographically dispersed and more 
heterogeneous following.241
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These movements can be categorised broadly under modernism, reformism and 
traditionalism and were represented by the Aligarh, Deobandi, Ahl-i Hadis, Nadwa and the 
Barelvi movements.242 The reformist group of Ulema such as the Deobandi and the 
traditionalist such as the Barelvi mainly strove to provide religious leadership and their aim 
was to reconstruct Muslim society in a way that would conserve the Islamic way of 
learning and its traditional theological stance. Their goal was to create a community that 
was observant of Islamic religious law and committed to spiritual life. These Ulema in the 
nineteenth century were rather apolitical towards their relationship with the colonial 
government and shunned or ignored politics. Even though they did not encourage the 
politicisation of the Muslims, their stress on the differentiation o f Muslim and non-Muslim, 
regardless of numbers, inadvertently evolved into a demand for parity of representation 
held dear by Jinnah in the years immediately preceding partition. The ‘logic of parity’ 
might not have been the consequence of slow evolution of a Muslim political identity but it 
was religious in origin.243
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It was only in the first quarter of the twentieth century that the curriculum of social, cultural 
and religious consciouness of these movements provided significant impetus in initiating a 
politicisation of Muslim identity. It was during this time that religious symbols became a 
basis for political participation which started signifying a Muslim political consciouness 
(considering the numerous and unique situation of Muslims scattered all over the Sub­
continent).
It is important to assert that not all movements initiated by the Ulema had an apolitical 
stance. Aligarh and Nadwa sought an active political role in relation to the colonial 
government.244 This movement included liberals, secularists and modernists and followed 
western ideas of nationalism. A group of north Indian Muslims, led by Syed Ahmad Khan 
founded the MAO College Aligarh in 1877 and the Aligarh Movement associated with it. It 
was Syed Ahmad who had initially spoken in terms of ‘two nations’ inhabiting India and 
made a point of not supporting the Indian National Congress. He asked the British to 
acknowledge the political importance of the Muslims and not marginalise them because of 
their numbers.245 The alumni of MAO were to form the All-India Muslim League in 1906, 
and in the same year representatives of this movement went in deputation to the Viceroy to 
ask for special representation for Muslims and recognition of their ‘political importance’ in 
the new legislative councils. It was through the efforts o f this movement that the Morley- 
Minto reforms granted Muslims separate electorates with extra seats, over and above their
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proportions of the population, in those provinces where they were ‘politically important’.246 
These reforms opened provincial and national level politics to nationalism and Islam started 
to become an important force in galvanizing localised Muslim communities into a larger 
unit capable of competing in the broader political arena.247
The two nation idea of Syed Ahmad was later formalised by Mohammed Iqbal in 1930 
when he linked Pakistan to a definite territory. He suggested a territorial Muslim state, ‘a 
Muslim India within India’ in northwest India (Iqbal did not at that point use the word 
‘Pakistan’).248 It appears that there was a political pedigree to the idea of the ‘two nation 
theory’ that huddled Muslims all over India under a single political identity which was 
officially employed by the League in 1940. It is important to assert that no direct line 
should be drawn between the establishment of a Muslim political identity in the 
constitution in 1909 (Morley-Minto reforms) and the emergence of Pakistan in 1947, 
although it can be considered one of the many enabling developments.249 This is because as 
we discussed earlier, the struggle for ‘Pakistan’ was not so much to create a separate 
homeland for India’s Muslims, as it was to create a Muslim political community, to define 
a symbolic center to give moral and political meaning to the concept of a united ‘Muslim 
community’ in India which would stand for political parity with the Hindus in an 
independent India.250
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However, after the First World War even the reformist Ulema started to assert their 
political identity and began to play an active role in opposition to the British administration. 
The Deobandi conception of the political role of Muslims in India had been shaped by the 
nature of their religious reforms. They sought the answer to the decline of the Muslim state 
in the development of a Muslim community guided and regulated by the Ulema. They 
emphasized religious education as the key to the united participation of Muslims in politics. 
They sought to develop a view of religious solidarity which was itself political and based 
on the authority of the Ulema, who interpreted the religious law and Muslim public 
opinion. This political role was demonstrated first during the Khilafat movement founded 
in 1919 to protect the temporal and spiritual power of the Ottoman caliphate under the 
banner of pan-Islamism. Also, Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani (who was a principal of 
Dar-ul-Ulum252) was prominent in the formation of the Jamiat-i-UIama-i-Hind in 1919 
which happened to be the first independent organisation originating from the Ulema 
leadership in India.253 This Jamiat joined the Indian National Congress and campaigned for 
Muslim and Hindu unity in an independent India.254 Most of the Ulema were opposed to the 
League and its irreligious leadership and they gave almost no support to the League on 
account of its secular politics. These Ulema were wary of the authority of Muslim
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politicians and of the idea of yielding power to a state controlled by such politicians.255 
Their disquiet had been increased by Jinnah’s incorporation of the notion of discretion in 
choosing between Islamic law and customary law during the passage of the Muslim 
Personal Law Bill in the Central Legislature in 193 7.256 Additionally, they were not 
sympathetic towards the concept of Pakistan as they held pan-Islamic beliefs. For them 
Pakistan was basically a territorial construct and was thus alien to the philosophy of Islamic 
brotherhood, which was universal in character.257 The notion of a western model of a 
nation-state was not compatible with Islamic political values. According to them, Islam 
could not be confined within national borders, as Muslims around the world were one 
nation.258
There were some reformist Ulema and many of the Pirs o f the shrines who supported the
League. Foremost among the reformist Ulema was Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, who
had once been an active member of the Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Hind, and who now was called
upon to head the new, pro-Pakistan Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam. Maulana Shabbir Ahmad
Usmani subsequently issued a statement supporting the League in the name of the 300 or so
Ulema. The most vital religious support for the League came from the Pirs of the shrines
who had long sought an outlet for expressing their religious concerns in the political 
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According to the above analysis, there appears to be a twofold thrust to the creation of a 
Muslim identity (even if not immediately a political one) in many parts of south Asia. 
There was the impetus being build in the ‘public realm’ which consequently fostered a 
sense of ‘moral collective’ or ‘community’ among the Muslims of India and then, there 
were the movements initiated by the Ulema that fostered not only Muslim social, cultural 
and religious identities but in the beginning of the twentieth century initiated a process of 
politicisation of the Muslim identity. Over time these movements began to attract a more 
geographically dispersed and more heterogeneous following among Muslims. What also 
needs to be mentioned here is that the period of British rule brought firmer edges to Muslim 
identities. There was a sharpening of the distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim, 
which was in part an outcome of the impact of British understandings of India and in part 
that of religious revivalism through the Ulema. There was also the development of a 
separate Muslim political identity against the claims of an all-inclusive Indian national 
identity.261 The politicisation of the Muslims during the Khilafat agitation contributed to 
new communal demands. Islamic ideas exerted immemse normative power not only on the 
Muslim masses but importantly on the Muslim elite. Economic and political threats also 
created communal factions and increasingly Muslims began to define themselves in terms 
of religious identification.262 Even after asserting the above, it is important to point out that 
it was not the emergence of this identity and its expression that lead directly to Pakistan’s 
emergence, as the rationale of politicisation of the Muslim identity was to create a Muslim 
political distinctiveness, and Islam was to be the emblem which would provide the moral 
and political basis to the concept of a united ‘Muslim community’ in India.
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After the fall of the Mughal Empire the Muslims were compelled to become culturally, 
socially and religiously self-consciouness due to various factors discussed above. This 
awareness at various dimensions augmented into political recognition of themselves at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. The League was able to ride the religious sentiments via 
alliences with not only some of the reformist Ulema but also with the Pirs. It was also able 
to organise itself over and above the divisions between the political concerns of rural 
interests versus urban, Ulema versus Pirs and was therefore in many instances able to 
overcome the tension between images of a ‘collective moral unity’ and the divisions and 
hierarchies of everyday local existence.
Even though Pakistan’s emergence cannot be directly attributed to the Two-Nation theory, 
the demand for the constitutional safeguards of the Muslims of the Sub-continent was 
indeed popularised in the 1940s under its banner. The League, although secular in its 
political orientation recognised the importance of growing Islamic universalism and its 
importance in the general conciousness of Muslim identity. It therefore used Islam’s 
rallying power to cut across parochial political loyalties to build a broad based movement to 
seduce Muslims to converge under the Muslim League’s single point agenda i.e. special 
constitutional rights and previliges to protect Muslim interests in independent India. Islam 
proved to be a strengthening force for the League’s demands. It was only with the 
Congress’s rejection of Jinnah’s demands of Muslim participation in shaping the future of 
the Indian republic that Pakistan emerged on the world map on 14 August 1947, priding 
itself for being the first country in the world to be created in the name of Islam under the 
leadership of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, popularly known as Quaid-e-Azam (the great leader).
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Schism in Pakistan’s Islamic Ideology
Considering the diverse strands of political strategy embedded in the Lahore Resolution, 
the Two-Nation theory and Jinnah’s acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan, it is not 
surprising that on the eve of Pakistan’s emergence, Pakistanis were rather ill equipped for 
statehood and constructing their own federal organisation. Indeed, there does not appear to 
have been any systematic or structured political preparation for a separate Muslim state. 
The Pakistan state was from its inception a weak one and its roots in the provinces that 
made up Pakistan were feeble. The population of these provinces had little in common 
apart from the fact that they were Muslim. There existed deep seated ethinic divisions 
which culminated in tensions between Punjabi, Muhajir, Bengali and Sindhi nationalists 
over power sharing and resource allocations.263 The West Pakistani elite (mostly elite 
Punjabi and Muhajir) were concerned by the more populous East Pakistan’s (Bengali) 
‘threat’ of political and cultural domination and therefore wanted to restrain the Bengali 
demands for a bigger proportion of economic investments, military expenditure and greater 
representation in the government service. The constitution making process (which will be 
discussed in Chapter Four) and the debates there started to reveal the cracks that existed in 
the newly created state. Bengal started to become increasingly alienated from the West 
wing due to the political centre’s aversion to its claim on resources. Issues such as the 
distribution of power between East and West Pakistan, the question of the national 
language and the role of Islam preoccupied the political elite.264
263 S. V. R. Nasr, Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making o f  State Power (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2001). p. 58-60
264 L. Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University o f California Press, 
1963). Also see, R. Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1972). p. 25-7
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Many Pakistani leaders were against giving Islam a central role in national politics, as they 
had only used the Islamic slogan to make Muslims aware of their identity as a distinct 
nation. For these leaders, the basis of the state was political rather than religious. However, 
the League was aware that they had mobilised the masses under the slogan of Islam and the 
legitimacy of the new state would have to found in some manifestations of Islamism in the 
new polity. Additionally, in the face of ethnic, linguistic and class conflicts, Islamic 
symbolism could be utilised in the service of state formation.265 Moreover, because the 
League, that held the reins of the government at the time, lacked a definitive ideology of 
their own, they started to yield to the pressure of Islamising forces in Pakistan.
However, as far as Jinnah’s view on state formation was concerned, he saw the role of 
Islam as symbolic and the Pakistan that he had achieved was to be built as a non-theocratic 
state. He did not anticipate Islam’s religious assertion in Pakistani society. He foresaw the 
‘Islamic state’ of Pakistan as embracing the qualities of an ideal secular state, ‘where in the 
course of time Hindus will cease to be Hindus and Muslims will cease to be Muslims, in the 
political sense as the citizens of the State’.266 Jinnah distinctly and emphatically pointed 
out, ‘Make no mistake, Pakistan is not a theocracy or anything like it. Islam demands from 
us the tolerance of other creeds and we welcome in closest association with us all those 
who of whatever creed are themselves willing to play their part as true and loyal citizens of 
Pakistan’.267 He did not see Pakistan’s polity to be founded on or designed to promote the 
viewpoint of any one sect but like an ideal secular state, it was to project the welfare of all 
its citizens regardless of their caste, colour or religion. Thus, Islam was not to be 
implemented rigidly, since this would lead to the alienation of minority groups in the
265 Nasr, Islamic Leviathan, p. 60
266 Iqbal, Ideology o f  Pakistan, pp. 5-6. Presidential address to the Constituent Assembly, 11 August 1947.
267 Ibid. p. 5
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country. With regards to the kind of economic system Jinnah foresaw for Pakistan, he 
believed in a mixed economy on a pattern that could be termed ‘Islamic Socialism’. He 
used the term Islamic Socialism to emphasise Islamic ideals of equality and social justice, 
where the sense of community would overtake individual interests whether financial or 
political. The implication of this thought for him was to realise a classless society through 
the politico-moral principles of equality, justice and evolution (i.e. with the consent of the 
people secured through democratic means). Jinnah did not live long enough to clarify his 
statements regarding religion and to develop a political legacy or philosophy for Pakistan, 
as he died only one year after the birth of Pakistan. His death provided an opportunity for 
Islamic elements in Pakistan to seize every word he had uttered in favour of Islam, 
moulding them to create a religiously driven political environment for the present and 
future of Pakistan.
Even if Jinnah had lived longer, it is by no means certain that Islam would not have taken 
centre stage in Pakistan’s polity. The state struggled to consolidate power at the centre and 
failed to address fundamental socioeconomic issues and carry out meaningful land reforms 
which consequently gave way to the entrance of Islamic parties in the fray and allowed 
Islamism to influence the national political discourse. Additionally, the Ulema and the 
Pirs that had collaborated with the League wanted Pakistan to emanate ideals of a 
traditional religious state firmly based on Shariah. After all, the Muslim League’s 
popularity in the decade leading to the Partition owed considerably to this group and this 
inadvertently laid the grounds for a religious mandate for Pakistan.270
*
268 Ibid. p. 1-7 & 13. Jinnah once used the term to distinguish his economic stance from the Socialism of 
Pandit Nehru. The word was used in a speech at Chittagong on 26 March 1948.
269 Binder, Religion and Politics.
270 Gilmartin, "Religious Leadership and the Pakistan Movement in the Punjab." p. 517
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The Islamic political voice became more strident when in 1948 the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam, 
led by Maulana Shabbir Ahmed Usmani, passed a resolution in Karachi demanding that the 
government appoint a leading scholar to the office of Shaikh al Islam (leader of Islam) with 
appropriate ministerial and executive powers over the judges throughout the country and 
that this ministry be immune to ordinary changes of the government.271 Maulana Shabbir 
Ahmad Usmani had quit Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Hind and formed Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam in 
1946 as it was opposed to the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Hind’s position of supporting the Congress. 
The Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam supported the concept of Pakistan and therefore after Partition, 
the party shifted to Karachi and began lobbying for the Islamisation of the country. There 
was also the Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam founded in 1931 under the leadership of Ataullah Shah 
Bukhari. Although it was one of the most active and influential in its political agitation 
against the League, after the Partition the Ahrar leaders dissolved their organisation and 
migrated to Pakistan. In addition the Jamaat-i-Islami founded by Maulana Mawdudi (who 
was a graduate of Dar-ul-Ulum, see Chapter One) in 1941 migrated to Pakistan from India 
where his party started its demand for an Islamic state in Pakistan.272 Decades later, the 
Jamaat-i-Islami was to be instrumental in the Islamisation of Pakistan under Zia’s regime as 
it forwarded its Islamic point of view in a manner that became synonymous with Islam for 
the Pakistani masses.
Incrementaly, there started to appear a schism between the secularists and the religious 
groups as the secular forces were unwilling to abandon their secular stance of making
271 Ghazali, "llusions and Reality." Chapter III, p. 1
272 Nasr, Islamic Leviathan, p. 94
273 S. Mahmood, Islamic Fundamentalism in Pakistan, Egypt and Iran (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1995). pp. 
98-99
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Pakistan a. thoroughly secular state, even in the face of a weak federation. As the Islamic 
forces became more influential in political discourse, there appeared a tug of war between 
those who wanted Pakistan to be a ‘Muslim Homeland’ or an ‘Islamic State’. This schism 
remains among the Pakistani liberals and the Ulema till today and has manifested itself in 
the political arena of successive governments.
Immense pressure was exercised by religious groups on the law-making body of Pakistan. 
Disputes over Pakistan’s Islamic character dominated the debate over the specific form of 
the constitution. The religious Islamic factions argued that Pakistan was created in the name 
o f Islam, and that the establishment of an Islamic state should be the natural outcome of its 
creation.274 The secular and liberal groups in Pakistani politics found themselves playing 
into the hands of the organised Ulema who were determined to make Pakistan an Islamic 
country, and wanted an Islamic constitution for it.275 A brief look into the first legal 
document of Pakistan that defines its character as a nation state is pertinent here, as it 
highlights the place of Islam in the country and how this document was to pave the way for 
the future Islamisation of Pakistan.
On 7 March 1949, the Objectives Resolution was the first important document presented 
before the Constituent Assembly as a preamble on which the future constitution of Pakistan 
was to be based. It was deliberately vague regarding the Islamic future of Pakistan. On the 
one hand it paid lip service to Islam in statements such as, ‘Whereas sovereignty over the 
entire universe belongs to God Almighty alone and the authority which He has delegated to 
the State of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by
274 A. Iqbal, Islamisation o f  Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard, 1986). p. 42-57
275 A. Wilder, "Islam and Political Legitimacy in Pakistan," in Islam and Democracy in Pakistan, ed. M.A. 
Syed (Islamabad: National Institute o f Historical and Cultural Research, 1995).p. 38
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Him is a sacred trust’, and also, ‘Wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives 
in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings of Islam as set out 
in the Holy Quran and SunnaK. On the other hand it made no attempt to define the form of 
the Islamic state in Pakistan. It offered highly imprecise broad Islamic objectives and 
interestingly, the word ‘Shariah’ was not mentioned in the entire document.276 It means that 
the Muslim League, who held the reins of the government at the time and were responsible 
for the formation of this Resolution, although lacking a definitive ideology of their own, 
were not going to permit any Islamisation of society that could potentially fall out of their 
purview. Through this Resolution, the League was able to retain control over the flow of 
Islam in the political process and limit the scope of Islamisation. After the Resolution was 
passed, the modernist Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan (once Jinnah’s right hand man) lost 
no time in emphasising that Pakistan would not be a theocratic state run by the priesthood 
or any sacerdotal authority, as this concept was alien to Islam.277
From the above analysis it appears that the League was unwilling to introduce Islam in the 
political arena, and was able to check its role in Pakistan’s politics through ambiguous 
declarations regarding Islam. However, it also appears that due to problems with state 
consolidation, owing to ethinic divisions and disputes between the provinces, the League 
had no option but to accommodate (to whatever extent) Islamic demands and consider 
Islamic political forces as a natural part of the political discourse. Islam slowly began to 
emerge as the raison d ’etre of Pakistan and a default ideology in the process of nation 
building.
276 The Constituent Assembly o f  Pakistan was formed to give the country a constitution, and serve as its first 
parliament. It first convened on 11 August 1947, just three days before the end o f British rule. Mehdi, The 
Islamisation o f  Law. pp. 72-3. A lso see, Binder, Religion and Politics.p. 152
277 Mehdi, The Islamisation o f  Law.p. 73
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Islam and Zakat under the First Islamic Republic
Under increased political pressure from the religious factions of Pakistan, Islam was taking 
centre stage and the modernists found it difficult to counter this development. Days after 
the presentation of the Objectives Resolution on 12 March, in response to unrest from 
religious factions, Liaqat Ali set up a Basic Principles Committee whose aims was to advise 
the government on Islamic principles of the future constitution.278 Under this Committee, it 
was decided that a Board of Islamic Teachings, consisting of five members, should be set 
up to deal with the specifics of the Islamic aspects of the future constitution of Pakistan.
On 13 March 1950 the government started with the basics of Islam and constituted a Zakat 
Committee under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance. This Committee consisted of 
four members of the clergy of different schools of thought and seven non-religious
i O A
members. In 1952 its report was finalised on the basis of a questionnaire. The issues 
discussed were the exact scope of zakat, the assets on which it should be levied, the rate 
and period of assessment, the purposes on which zakat could be spent, and the suitable 
organisation for the assessment and collection of zakat.2*1 The Committee resolved that the 
assets on which zakat was to be levied were cash, gold, silver, trade commodities, 
livestock, agricultural land, mines and treasure troves. The Committee also dealt with 
questions of property and assets belonging to corporate bodies and was of the view that
278 S. A. Haider, Islami Nazriati Council Irtqai Safar aur Karkardagi (Islamabad: Dost Publications, 2006).p. 
121
279 Malik, Colonialization o f  Islam.p. 86, p. 114 fn 11. Liaqat Ali was assasinated on 16th Oct 1951 and was 
succeeded by Khawaja Nazimuddin
280 Ibid. p. 86
281 Nazir, Zakat Law.p. 24
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zakat should be collected on all these assets.282 The Committee made the following 
recommendations:
a) Zakat would be collected on a voluntary basis through the sale of zakat coupons at 
government treasuries and post offices.
b) The sale proceeds would be credited to a special fund called the ‘Zakat Fund’.
c) A board of trustees would be set up by the central and provincial governments, 
which would administer the funds so collected.
d) The funds would to be spent on specified purposes, such as setting up orphanages 
and widow houses.
e) Payment of zakat would not provide any relief from other government taxes.
This system of zakat was clearly a half-hearted attempt on the government’s part. It was a 
voluntary zakat system on an experimental basis. The Committee expected Rs. 200 million 
to be raised, but in 1954 the voluntary zakat raised was no more than Rs. 10,000.284
It seems that Liaqat Ali or the governments after him were not too keen on a formal 
institutionalisation of zakat as such a move might have ignited sectarian conflicts in the 
new country, so zakat was introduced on a voluntary basis. This meant that none of the 
Muslim sects were to feel that their religious beliefs were being suffocated by the 
antagonism of the other, yet it also neatly responded to the religious demands of the Ulema. 
This was a convenient way for the government to show its commitment to Islam and also 
tackle the clerics without having to commit more fully to Islamisation.
282 Ibid. p. 25
283 Ibid. p. 26
284 Clark, "Pakistan's Zakat and Ushr System".p. 135
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Perhaps zakat was not an important part of the strategy of the Liaqat Ali government as the 
pattern of economic expenditure during his office was such that poverty alleviation and 
social spending were at the lower end of the state’s development priorities. This was 
reflected in the economic strategy of the Planning Commission of Pakistan. Even after 
Liaqat Ali’s assassination one can detect the pattern of development expenditure in the First 
Five-Year Plan of 1955-60 (the public sector outlays), where table 3.1 and 3.2 below reveal 
that the total development expenditure was 6% of the GDP, with social spending at about 
only 6.7% of total development expenditure. Additionally, social welfare was the smallest 
heading within social spending.
In Pakistan, the first phase of economic development started with import-substituting 
industrialisation. As can be observed from table 3.2, the third highest priority of 
government spending was industry, with 15.3% of total expenditure for 1955-60. This was 
because large-scale industry was in effect non-existent in the areas that made up Pakistan. 
These territories had mostly performed an auxiliary function in the economy of united 
India, supplying raw materials to the industries located in the pre-Partition Indian 
territories. After Partition the industrial sector of the economy was boosted by providing 
heavy tariff protection and tax exemptions for infant industries. The government neglected 
the agriculture sector. This sector was to provide cheap raw material for the industrial 
sector and subsidised food for the urban consumer. Perpetual mistreatment of the 
agricultural sector led to its stagnation while the government’s intense ambition to 
industrialise started having counter-effects on the economy by the 1960s. Such ambitious 
industrial policies also had negative impact on the welfare of the masses, in the face of the 
low level of resources reserved for social welfare. Additionally, the post-Partition situation
285 O. Noman, The Political Economy o f  Pakistan 1947-85 (London: KPI, 1988).p. 16
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was such that resources were stretched to the limit as the government had to tend to the 
constant influx of millions of refugees from India. The government had to build economic 
and physical infrastructure from scratch in the majority of cases. This is reflected in table
3.2 and graph 3.1, which show that most of the government’s development spending was 
reserved for economic and physical infrastructure.
Table 3.1
Development Expenditure Public Sector Outlays (Millions Rupees)
Sector
First Plan 
(1955-60)
Second Plan 
(1960-65)
Third Plan 
(1965-70)
*Non-Plan Period 
(1970-75)
Fifth Plan 
(1978-83)
Agriculture 461 902 1377 6492 14860
Water 969 4597 4513 12810 15770
Energy 607 1273 1760 13841 38830
Industry 742 478 786 11294 25400
Minerals 124 94 271 492 400
Transport and Communications 1080 1595 2521 15653 35210
Physical planning and housing 505 957 698 5687 9000
Social Spending 327 702 1054 6783 11030
Education and manpower 232 463 563 3442 5640
Health 76 174 281 2381 4580
Population welfare programmeA 0 9 145 820 600
Social Welfare# 19 56 65 140 210
Others 48 8 224 2492 2110
TOTAL Development expenditures 4863 10606 13204 75544 152610
% of GDP 5.9 8.2 6.5 10.8 12.6
Source: Second Five Year Plan 1960-65, Third Five Year Plan 1965-70, Sixth Five Year Plan 1983-88
* The Fourth Five-Year Plan (1970-75) was abandoned during the time when East Pakistan became Bangladesh.
AFamily Welfare Centre, Reproductive Health Services & Family Health Manpower Development Projects, Training of non-clinica! staff & related 
population education.
# Rehabilitation, Women and Child Welfare Services, Promotion of Voluntary Welfare Services & Miscellaneous Social Services
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Table 3.2
Structure of Development Expenditure (in percentage terms)
Sector
First Plan 
1955-60
Second Plan 
1960-65
Third Plan 
1965-70
Non-Plan Period 
1970-75
Fifth Plan 
1978-83
Agriculture 9.5 8.5 10.4 8.6 9.7
Water 19.9 43.3 34.2 17.0 10.3
Energy 12.5 12.0 13.3 18.3 25.4
Industry 15.3 4.5 6.0 15.0 16.6
Minerals 2.5 0.9 2.1 0.7 0.3
Transport and Communications 22.2 15.0 19.1 20.7 23.1
Physical planning and housing 10.4 9.0 5.3 7.5 5.9
Social Spending 6.7 6.6 8.0 9.0 7.2
Education and manpower 4.8 4 .4 4 .3 4.6 3.7
Health 1.6 1.6 2.1 3.2 3.0
Population welfare programme - 0.1 1.1 1.1 0.4
Social Welfare 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.1
Others 1.0 0.1 1.7 3.3 1.4
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Author’s own calculations derived from table 3.1
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Graph 3.1
Development expenditure (% of total)
90
80
70
-S o c ia l  Spending
-  Physical infrastructure
-  R-oduction programme
50
40
30
20
10 -
Third Ran 1965- Non-Ran Period Fifth Ran 1978- 
70 1970-75 83
Rrst Ran 1955- Second  Ran 
60 1960-65
Source: Derived from table 3.2. Agriculture, industry and minerals are clustered together into production 
programmes, and transport and communication, physical housing and planning, water and energy into 
physical infrastructure.
Graph 3.2
%
Development expenditures: Social spending (%
of Total)
Education and manpow er 
Health
6.0 - — x — Population w elf are programme
5.0 . . . Social Welfare
4.0 J '  '  -  .
3.0 J
2.0 -
^ .....♦  ♦
1.0 -
♦ —
..X -----------------------* -----------
0.0 - ------- X ------------ -
Rrst Ran 1955-
----—X.---------------,------------,------------ 1------------ ,
S econ d  Ran Third Ran 1965- Non-Ran Period Fifth Ran 1978-
60 1960-65 70 1970-75 83
Source: Derived from table 3.2.
The government under the economic circumstances described above did not possess the 
resources to create an elaborate system of zakat collection and disbursement, as the entire
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economy was still in its formative years. So even if the clerics had pressured Liaqat Ali’s 
government to set up this institution fundamental to Islam, he had good reasons for not 
heeding the Ulema's demands.
Zakat and the First Constitution o f Pakistan
By 1956 Pakistan had its first constitution. The controversy surrounding the nature of Islam 
in Pakistan, and the struggle between Ulema from Jamaat-i-Islami and Jamiat-i-Ulema-i- 
Islam on the one hand and the modernists on the other still persisted. The Objectives 
Resolution was kept as a preamble to the constitution with its Islamic connotations. The 
Islamic provisions of the constitution were contained in the Directives Principles of the 
State Policy and not enforceable in courts. The state was to endeavour:
a) To provide facilities to the Muslims to enable them to understand the meaning of 
life according to the holy Quran and Sunnah
b) To promote unity and observance of Islamic moral standards and to secure the 
proper organisation of zakat.
The question of zakat was transferred from the Federal to the Provincial governments and 
remained dormant there for some time. This transfer meant that in a highly centralised 
polity, zakat was not important enough to occupy a niche at the federal level. Article 21 of 
the constitution provided that no person should be compelled to pay any special tax, the 
proceeds of which were to be spent for the propagation of any religion other than his 
own.286 This appeared to mean that no single interpretation of Islam was to be enforced 
upon the Muslims of Pakistan. Islam was not to be enforced as the state religion of Pakistan
286 Iqbal, Islamisation o f  Pakistan .p. 69
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and the constitution did little to settle the issue of a desirable role for Islam in a modem 
state.287
Therefore, even though the modernists did not possess a patent non-religious agenda for 
Pakistan, they very much kept Pakistan’s government and society secular, free of any single 
interpretation of the Shariah, and in doing so managed to keep Islamisation of Pakistan’s 
polity and economy dormant.
Islam and Zakat under the First Martial Law
On 7 October 1958, Iskandar Mirza (a retired Major-General from the army who was the 
fourth Head of State and the first President under the 1956 Constitution)288 imposed Martial 
Law and appointed General Mohammad Ayub Khan as the Chief Martial Law 
Administrator and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.289 Just three weeks after his 
appointment, Ayub Khan dismissed Iskandar Mirza in a military coup and assumed the 
Presidency of the country.
Ayub Khan’s regime was admittedly secular however, he was not able to alienate Islam 
from Pakistan and had to accept its mass-mobilising appeal. His government thus sought to
287 Fazal-ur-Rehman, "Islam and the Constitutional Problem o f Pakistan," Studia Islamica Vol. XXXII, no. 4 
(1970).pp. 275-287. Also see G. W. Choudhury, Constitutional Development in Pakistan (London-Harlow: 
Longman Group Ltd., 1969). pp. 103-4. After the assassination o f  Liaqat Ali Khan in 1951, the civil service 
and military had emerged as the dominant coalition in power till 1958. These institutions were thoroughly 
secular, reflecting the colonial attitudes o f governance.
288 Choudhury, Constitutional Development in Pakistan. Under the 1956 Constitution the post o f the Governor 
General had been dissolved and the presidency was created. Like Liaqat Ali, Iskandar Mirza was also an 
avowed secularist who poured water over the hopes o f the Ulema by saying that ‘we cannot run wild on 
Islam’, p. 105.
289 Pakistan’s first general elections were to be held in March 1959. Iskandar Mirza became increasingly 
agitated and worried about his own power as elections meant universal adult franchise, which would bring not 
only a whole new generation o f  politicians into power but would most probably empower East Pakistan’s 
Awami League and its leader Husseyn Suhrawardy; A. Salim, Iskandar Mirza: Rise and Fall o f  a President 
(Lahore: Gora Publishers, 1997). Also see, R. V. Weekes, Pakistan: Birth and Growth o f  a Muslim Nation 
(Toronto: D. Van Nostrand, 1964).
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channel Islamic power in the service of the state to meet his ambitions of economic, 
development on capitalist lines rather than through the economic ideals of Islam.290
During his rule the State procured the right of interpreting Islam from the Jamaat-i-Islami 
(led by Mawdudi, see Chapter One) who claimed to be the flag-bearers of what Islam is and 
how it should be followed. Ayub established the Institute of Islamic Research in 1960 and 
the Advisory Council for Islamic Ideology in 1962. These institutions were supposed to 
reinterpret Islam according to modernist lines and were meant to justify Ayub’s policies. 
The conservative clerics, mostly from the politically active Jamaat-i-Islami and Jamiat-i- 
Ulema-i-Islam, were excluded from this Council. The two parties protested against the 
composition of the Council as they felt that their views were not represented. The pressure 
from these factions reached such heights that some of the modernist elements in the 
Council had to resign.291
In pursuing its control over Islam’s manifestation in Pakistan, the government took over the 
endowments of mosques and shrines, which provided social services to and thus affected 
the lives of the lower economic echelon of society. Ayub’s government portrayed Islam as 
a progressive influence for the labour force and used Islam’s positive ethics of work and 
economic wellbeing to launch Pakistan into its industrial development era. By harnessing 
Islam and reinterpreting it to match his economic and political ambition Ayub extended 
state power and prolonged his political longevity. However, he made no effort to Islamise 
Pakistan’s economy and society along orthodox lines.292
290 Nasr, Islamic Leviathan.p. 61. Also see M. H. Khan, "The Political Economy o f Industrial Policy in 
Pakistan 1947-71," in Department o f  Economics Working Paper (London: SOAS, 1999). p. 21
291 Malik, Colonialization oflslam .p. 35
292 Nasr, Islamic Leviathan.pp. 61-63
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Ayub abrogated the 1956 Constitution and introduced a new one in May 1962 to reinforce 
his authority in the absence of martial law. His constitution omitted the word ‘Islamic’ from 
the name of the state. There were, however, references in the Directive Principles to the 
Quran and Sunnah and the Islamic way of life, but the responsibility of giving effect to 
laws relating to the Islamic way of life was taken up by the government, whose authority 
was to be indisputable.293
The conservatives created an outcry for the restitution of Islamic features of the 1956 
Constitution.294 It seems that Ayub realised that removing Islam as the basis of the state 
contradicted the declared purpose of the creation of Pakistan, and he became increasingly 
aware of the dangers of abandoning Islam as a state religion. He thus restored the Islamic 
provisions in 1963 through constitutional amendments. Even then, it appears that the idea 
of imposing one version of religion on the rest of the country (considering the divergence in 
the Islamic sects), did not appeal to Ayub. Therefore, like the 1956 Constitution, the 1962 
Constitution also did not make Islam the state religion of Pakistan and left the interpretation 
of the Quran and Sunnah to the respective Islamic sects.
In 1959, zakat again received the attention of the Federal Government. It decided that zakat 
was to be collected at the provincial and local level by the Union Councils295 on a voluntary
293 Ibid. See also Government o f  Pakistan, The Constitution o f  the Republic o f  Pakistan (Karachi: Manager o f  
Publications, Government o f Pakistan Press, 1962).
294 L. D. Hayes, Politics in Pakistan The Struggle fo r  Legitimacy (Boulder: W estview Press, Inc., 1984).p. 70
295 In 1959 Ayub Khan introduced the concept o f basic democracy under the Basic Democracies Order. This 
was an attempt to initiate a grass-roots level democratic system. The system o f  Basic Democracies was 
initially a five-tier arrangement. They were: (i) union councils (rural areas), town and union committees 
(urban areas); (ii) thana councils (East Pakistan), tehsil councils (West Pakistan); (iii) district councils; (iv) 
divisional councils; (v) provincial development advisory council. At the base o f  the system was the union 
council, which consisted o f  one chairman and usually about 15 members. It had both elected and nominated
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basis, and 90% of the collection was to be spent in the local area. There was no elaborate 
body for collection and disbursement. In 1961 the Federal Government created a cell in the 
Finance Ministry to organise zakat activities. A proposal was presented to Ayub’s cabinet 
to set up a small organisation at the central level for policy-making and the publicising of 
zakat, but the idea was rejected.
Interestingly, the 1962 Constitution still held that the proper organisation of zakat should be 
ensured. However, the government shifted most of the responsibility for monitoring zakat 
collections from the provincial governments to the district authorities. In 1966 the 
conservative factions of the Advisory Council of the Islamic Ideology again started pushing 
for the Islamisation of the fiscal system, i.e. the imposition of zakat. This pressure was 
eased when the modernists, whom Ayub had put in charge of the Council, got into a 
disagreement with the orthodox over the incidence of zakat and the zakat rate. The 
orthodox found the views of Fazlur Rahman (a modernist Islamist and Ayub’s Islamic 
Advisor) so upsetting that they distanced themselves from the Council.297 As a result of this 
internal strife, Ayub managed to avoid a role for zakat at the national level. However, in 
1969, the Council of Islamic Ideology again proposed the establishment of a separate 
ministry for the collection and distribution of zakat. Once again a proposal forwarding the
A Q O
formalisation of zakat was ignored by the central government.
members. Two-thirds o f  the members were elected representatives and one-third consisted o f non-official 
members nominated by the government. The members o f the council were elected by the people from their 
respective unions on the basis o f  universal adult franchise. The chairman o f the council was elected by the 
members from amongst themselves. The elected representatives o f  the union council were called basic 
democrats. See, L. Ziring, Pakistan in the Twentieth Century A Political History (Karachi: Oxford University 
Press, 1997).pp. 256-7
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Ayub’s era saw sharp industrial progress. However, the 1958-68 ‘development decade’ 
went down in history essentially as a decade of exploitation and deliberate promotion of 
inequality between classes and regions, with just 22 big industrial families amassing most 
of the wealth.299 Statistically, Pakistan’s Second Five-Year Plan (1960-1965), which was 
implemented during Ayub’s regime, showed significant success, but the human quality 
index suffered as a result.300 This was demonstrated by the fact that the government’s 
development spending was only 8.2% of GDP (see table 3.1). The doctrine underlying 
Ayub’s industrialisation policy was that of ‘functional inequality’, which meant the 
toleration of ‘some initial growth in income inequalities to reach high levels of saving and
'1 A |
investment’. Social spending remained more or less the same as during the previous 
Five-Year Plan of 1955-60, at 6.6% of total development expenditure (see table 3.1 and 
3.2).
Due to the growing awareness of a government policy that had led to a decline in real 
wages and industrial concentration among urban groups, Ayub’s regime faced urban 
militancy. In spite of rapid growth, Pakistan continued to be one of the poorest and most 
illiterate societies. The Planning Commission failed to admit that its strategy implied that 
because growth was a more important policy goal than income distribution, the poor had to 
remain poor for a long time so that growth might continue at an accelerating pace.302
299 Ghazali, "llusions and Reality."Chapter IV, p. 2
300 L. Ziring, Pakistan : The Enigma o f  Political Development (Canon House Folkestone Kent WmDawson & 
Sons Ltd., 1980).p. 93
301 M.H. Khan, "The Political Economy o f Industrial Policy in Pakistan 1947-71."p. 23
302 K.B. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan: the nature and direction o f  change (New York: Praeger Publishers, 
1980).p. 61
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Ayub used Islamic language to justify his economic plans,303 but his Islam was just a garb 
to clothe a capitalist form of economic development. The inequality created by his policies 
led to mass unrest, which paved the way for Islamists to march against him. Due to Ayub’s 
affirmed secular stance on policies and issues of governance, he made no effort to 
institutionalise any Islamic precept at any level, including the formalisation of zakat, even 
in the face of increasing inequality.
Following this civil and political unrest, Zulficar Ali Bhutto304 rallied the distressed masses 
and fostered their support during the 1970 elections. Bhutto’s Pakistan People's Party won a 
landslide victory, especially in areas most affected by Ayub’s policies, as he offered a new 
ideology: an ideology of Islamic Socialism or ‘Musaawaf (equality).
Islam and the Bhutto Regime
In terms of zakat, Bhutto’s regime has nothing to boast about, but his attempts to exploit 
Islam were not different from those of his predecessors. He came to power in 1970, raising 
the slogan of ‘roti, kapra aur makaan’ (food, shelter and housing) for all. The ringing 
declaration of his party was: ‘Islam is our faith; democracy is our polity; socialism is our 
economy; all power to the people. ’ Bhutto was a secular politician like Ayub Khan, but 
unlike Ayub’s commitment to capitalism, his stance was socialism. Bhutto was also aware 
that in order to introduce any kind of political or economic order, it would have to be 
clothed in Islam. Thus, he termed his socialism ‘Islamic Socialism’. It is not clear whether
303 Ibid.p. 62
304 In 1958 Bhutto joined the cabinet o f President Iskandar Mirza. He emerged on the world stage as leader of 
Pakistan’s delegation to the UN in 1959. He was appointed Foreign Minister in 1963 and remained at that 
post until his resignation in June 1966. In 1967 he formed the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) to oppose 
President Ayub Khan's regime. Bhutto launched a nationwide tour o f agitation against the military 
dictatorship.
305 Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan, p. 86
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Bhutto used this term to draw parallels with Jinnah, who had used it in his political 
campaign for the movement for Pakistan decades earlier, as Jinnah did not live long enough 
to elaborate on what he meant by his Islamic socialist ideas. Bhutto’s alliance with Islam 
did not end there. In 1973 he introduced another constitution. This constitution included all 
the Islamic provisions of the previous constitutions of 1954 and 1962 and in addition, he 
took a bold step and declared Islam the state religion of Pakistan and reinvigorated the CII 
(Council of Islamic Ideology). For Bhutto this was a way of making the politically 
powerful mainstream Sunni religious right feel that Islam was their domain. The 1973 
Constitution, with its socialist slant and emphasis on economic justice, included the 
provision for the collection of zakat.
In 1974 the CII ordered a questionnaire prepared by A. I. Qureshi (a former government 
minister) regarding zakat’s levy, nisab and expenditure. The questionnaire was sent to an 
undisclosed number of religious scholars specifically asking if it was the responsibility of 
the government to collect zakat and whether the government should compel the people to 
pay it. It also enquired about the sort of wealth that should be made liable to zakat. 
Responses to the questionnaire were poor (whether in terms of quality or quantity is not 
known) and therefore the government did not publish a report based on its results. So, for
306many years zakat languished as a concept occasionally discussed by the CII.
Bhutto’s economic reforms were populist and favoured the nationalisation of industrial 
enterprises. The previous wave of capitalism had done much harm to the socio-economic 
fabric of the country, and thus, Bhutto’s nationalisation policy was geared towards 
capitalising on the wave of sentiment for economic and social reforms. Initially, state
306 Clark, "Pakistan's Zakat and Ushr System".p. 138
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intervention was motivated by distributional concerns but the second wave of state 
intervention was conducted on a more ad hoc basis and intervention became a mechanism 
through which political and economic patronage was distributed.307 As a result, his 
nationalisation programme fell short of expectations.
Bhutto also undertook reforms in the agrarian sector by introducing land reforms. The 
People’s Party had played on the symbolism of land reforms as evidence of the party's 
commitment to ‘socialism’. It appears that these reforms were not geared towards altering 
the character of the agrarian system of Pakistan, as the legislation did not change the rural 
distribution o f power and privilege. The measures reduced the ceiling on ownership by 
50%, i.e. down from 500 acres to 250 acres in irrigated areas and from 1000 acres to 500 
acres in non-irrigated areas.308 However, the limits were fixed in terms of the individual 
rather than families, with the result that many landlords who had already anticipated these 
reforms managed to get around the limitations on ceilings by transferring land to relatives 
or trusted tenants.309 Another reform introduced by Bhutto was security of tenancy, which 
was once again anticipated by the landlords. Consequently in apprehension, many landlords 
accelerated tenant evictions, which led to a chaotic situation not foreseen by the
A
government. This reform was of limited practical significance as it lacked an effective 
enforcement mechanism and was of importance mainly to those tenants already conscious 
enough and strong enough to question landlords’ prerogatives 311 The reforms proved to be 
erratic and uncertainty over them led to short-term production losses, which together with
307 Noman, The Political Economy o f  Pakistan.p. 96
308 N. Qasir, An Investigation into the Political Economy, 1948-1988 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 
1991).p. 90
309 Ghazali, "llusions and Reality."Chapter VII, p. 2
310 Qasir, Political Economy, 1948-1988.p. 90
311 Ghazali, "llusions and Reality." Chapter VII, p. 2
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bad weather for two years out of five during Bhutto’s rule led to a decline in per capita 
agricultural output.
Bhutto’s populist strategy, which had provided his party with raised expectations from the 
masses, also included a promise of jobs for all, but the government’s policy of mostly 
capital-intensive investments prevented this promise from being honoured. An additional 
problem was the need to absorb a growing labour force that was driven by rapid population 
growth. In order to keep up employment, the government did set up various labour- 
intensive industrial projects in rural areas, but due to the shortage of financial resources and 
inadequate coverage their result was marginal. The lack of funds for popular 
programmes robbed the Bhutto Government of popular support and it started losing its 
credibility among the masses it had mobilised against Ayub.
At first glace it seemed that Bhutto’s socialist policies made a substantial improvement in 
development expenditures of the Five-Year Plans, which rose from 6.5 % of GDP in 1965- 
70 to almost 11% between 1970-75 (see table 3.1). Also, table 3.2 shows that the 
percentage of social spending went up from 8% to 9%. But if one takes a closer look at the 
spending pattern, one observes that the share of social welfare in total development 
expenditure actually went down from 0.5% in the previous years to 0.2% in 1970-75.
Bhutto’s appeal to Islam had been designed to win popularity, and like his predecessor he 
made little effort to implement Islamic policies, or embed Islamic ideology in the policy­
making process, and concentrated instead on symbolic measures that were designed to
312 Qasir, Political Economy, 1948-1988.p. 91
313 Noman, The Political Economy o f  Pakistan.^. 96
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placate Islamists.314 His socialist policies had no place for serious religious institutionalism. 
The Islamic apparel of the 1973 Constitution through ‘Islamic Socialism’ could not keep 
the major political Islamic factions such as the Jamaat-i-Islami, Nizam-i-Islam and Jamiat- 
i-Ulema-i-Islam calm for too long. They became frustrated with the Islamic provisions in 
the constitution as they deemed these to be cosmetic, They started condemning Bhutto’s 
Islamic socialism On the grounds that it had no deep roots in the Quran and Sunnah. Owing 
to political events (which are beyond the scope of this thesis and hence will not be 
discussed here), in addition to Bhutto’s blatant manipulation of Islam, an opposition 
grouping of nine parties called the PNA (Pakistan National Alliance), which included the 
religious parties such as the Jamaat-i-Islami and Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam, produced a 
collective outcry against Islamic socialism. Their slogan was Nizam-e-Mustafa instead, i.e. 
they wanted to impose Islam through following the personality of the Prophet. In 1977, 
Bhutto called for national elections, which he hoped to win. He did win, but the opposition 
accused him of rigging the vote. Thus in the same year, Bhutto was overthrown in a 
military coup by his own Chief of Army Staff, General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq: a man 
from the junior ranks of the army whom Bhutto had chosen for his lack of political 
ambition.315
Thus until 1977, none of the governments which came to power seriously carried out the 
‘Islamic Provisions’ of the constitution. The following analysis elucidates upon the 
rationale of Zia’s pursuance of Islamisation. The section also explicates how Zia engaged in 
his agenda of Islamisation, as a consequence of which zakat was introduced.
314 Nasr, Islamic Leviathan. During the last days o f his government, in order to appease the political alliance 
opposing him, he banned various activities such as the consumption o f alcohol, gambling, nightclubs, and 
introduced a holiday on Friday instead o f  Sunday; p. 80.
315 K. M. Arif, "Working with Zia: Pakistan's Power Politics 1977-88," Dawn, 23rd April 1995.
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3.2 Islamisation under Zia:
Formation o f  Z ia ’s Government and the Passing o f  the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance 
In July 1977 Zia assumed power, imposed martial law and assured the people of Pakistan 
that his takeover was a ‘90-day operation’ and that he had no political ambitions. He also 
stated that, ‘the primary aim before the interim regime was the restoration of democracy in 
the country.’ However, four months later he introduced a religious slant to his statement 
and changed it to, ‘Allah had granted him and his colleagues an opportunity to keep law 
and order in the country and to cleanse the political body of the country, and unless this 
task was accomplished it would be futile to hold elections.’ In view of this, a Martial Law 
Order was issued on 28 February 1978 debarring all politicians from political activities, and 
Pakistan witnessed the end of party politics and democratic debate during Zia’s era.316
In the meantime, in September 1977 Zia revived the Council o f Islamic Ideology (CII), the 
purpose of which was to formulate recommendations for the structure of an Islamic 
governmental system in strict conformity with the Shariah. The Council was enthusiastic to 
the cause of Islamisation and was, for the most part, instrumental in Zia’s Islamisation 
process. Most of its members belonged to the Jamaat-i-Islami and represented Islam’s 
extreme orthodox viewpoints317 (there will be a detailed account of the CII later in this 
chapter). In November of that year Zia ordered the CII to conduct detailed research and 
make recommendations regarding the imposition of zakat in Pakistan. With this view the 
CII selected a technocratic panel of 15 economists and bankers to make recommendations 
and honour Zia’s keen desire to impose zakat. On 5 March 1978, the panel submitted a
316 Ghazali, "llusions and Reality."Chapter VIII, p. 1
317 K. Siddiqui, Issues in the Islamic Movement (London: The Open Press Limited, 1982).p. 50
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report on zakat to the CII, which forwarded the report to Zia after making additional 
recommendations.
This report began by considering the historical aspects of the introduction and working of 
zakat during the time of the Prophet and his four successors, i.e. the Pious Caliphs. It then 
considered the prospective incidence of zakat in relation to the social and economic 
scenario of Pakistan, the administrative implications of collection and disbursement of 
zakat and lastly, it assessed the financial implications for the government in introducing 
zakat.31* The report produced two major outcomes: one was the need to create a skeleton 
organisational structure for zakat collection and disbursement and the other was the need to 
restructure the income tax and the land revenue system so that the introduction of zakat 
would not overburden the taxpayers.319 This report was to form the basis of the 
institutionalisation of zakat.
Additionally, Zia invited Professor Khursheed Ahmed, a well-known Islamic economist, to 
head the Planning Commission.320 Khursheed Ahmed belonged to the Jamaat-i-Islami and 
was a keen supporter of Islamisation. Khursheed Ahmed joined Zia’s cabinet on 30 August 
1978. The Planning Commission, in co-operation with the Ministry of Religious Affairs 
and the CII, prepared the entire groundwork for the introduction of the zakat.
318 islami nazriati council, "islami nazriati council ki salana report," ed. islami nazriati council (Islamabad: 
huqumat-e-pakistan, 1977-78).p. 159
3,9 Ibid.p. 160. Apparently nobody knows the whereabouts o f  this report. Where Zia pursued the 
institutionalisation o f  zakat, the recommendation for the reforms o f income tax and land revenue were not 
implemented.
320 A. Hussain, Elite Politics in an Ideological State: the case o f  Pakistan (Kent: Wm Dawson & Sons Ltd, 
1979).p. 170. In June 1953 the government o f Pakistan set up a Planning Board, which later gained the status 
o f the National Planning Commission and became the highest planning authority in Pakistan. The aim o f the 
Commission was to prepare the Five-Year Plans for every sector in the country. See S Rehmatullah, Social 
Welfare in Pakistan  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002).
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The Planning Commission formed a sub-committee headed by its secretary, H. U. Beg; the 
sub-committee also included the head of the CII, Azhar Cheema, and another of its 
members, Maulana Taqi Usmani. This sub-committee produced a draft of the zakat policy, 
which was finalised by the Planning Commission after review. Their finalised draft was 
sent to the Law Ministry for vetting and was eventually sent to the Finance Ministry for 
approval. The Ministry of Religious Affairs played the role of coordinating zakat-related 
activities among the various government departments involved.321
Meanwhile, in 1978, the PNA (Pakistan National Alliance), including the Jamaat-i-Islami, 
agreed to join Zia’s ‘civilian cabinet’.322 Zia did not include anyone from the military in his 
cabinet so as not to give the impression that it was a militarised regime, although behind 
closed doors ultimate power still remained with the military.323 Thus, on 22 August 1978, 
the swearing in of Zia’s Federal Cabinet took place. The cabinet consisted of:
321 K. Ahmed, Interview, 19th April 2003. Khursheed Ahmed resigned in 1979 when he realised that Zia’s 
Islamisation was merely a way to keep power and increase authority and that he was not truly committed to 
the cause o f Islamisation.
322 Crescent International, "Zia Reins Ulama Behind 'Islamisation' Farce," Crescent International (1980).p. 
50. Also, Crescent International, "Zia Secularism Includes Islam," Crescent International (1981). The Jamaat 
pulled out soon after the execution o f Zulficar Ali Bhutto in April 1979.
23 Hussain, Politics in an Ideological State.p. 170. On 5 July 1978 the first Federal Cabinet was formed. In 
addition to containing the bureaucratic, landowning, professional and the industrial elite, it had also included 
four members o f  the military elite. However, the cabinet that was formed on 22 August 1978 included no 
military personnel but did include five members o f the religious elite; pp. 169-71.
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Zia's Federa Cabinet
Elite Group
Number 
of People
Landowning
Elite 7
Professional
Elite 5
Industrial Elite 3
Religious Elite 3
Bureaucratic
Elite 1
Source: Hussain, Elite Politics, 1979. This structure excludes Ministers o f  State.
The following is a simple diagram of Zia’s Government’s structure:
Figure 3.1
Zia’s G overnm ent’s Structure:
Planning Commission: 
comprising 
technocrats, some 
fro m Jamaat-i-Is lami.
Council o f  Islamic 
Ideology (including 
a Shia  cleric) from  
main religious 
parties.
Zia-ul-Haq
Majlis-e-Shura 
(Parliament) Formed 
in 1982. Comprising 
elite from all social 
groups.
Cabinet: 
Highest 
ranking elite 
& technocrats
Source: Author
Although Zia had not as yet declared his government to be representing an Islamic state, the
religious allusion that he introduced in his speech quoted earlier revealed his intentions, on
the basis of which he was able to delay elections. His religious slant also granted him the
ease and the legitimacy he thought he needed to choose the members of his cabinet, who,
for their part, readily allied with him to ‘cleanse the political body of the country’. Zia had
to rely on an alliance with the powerful elite to gain the support of what they represented,
i.e. the political strength of the landowning elite to counteract political opposition, the
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economic strength of the industrial elite, the technocratic skills of the professional elite, the 
administrative skills of the bureaucratic elite and finally the support of the religious elite, 
not only for their religious expertise in Islamising Pakistan, but also to counter the threat of 
the socialist ideology of the Pakistan People’s Party. The religious elite also benefited from 
Zia’s takeover in the shape of the economic power that was bestowed upon them via 
important economic posts, for example appointments in the Planning Commission.324
The structure of Zia’s government introduced another era of oligarchic rule, which was to 
strengthen under the umbrella of the Islamic polity with its process of Islamisation. Some 
maintain that the religious and the feudal elite of the Muslim societies attempted to 
maintain the status quo of semi-feudal and neo-colonial structures through the political 
strategies of Islamisation schemes.
On 2 December 1978, Zia announced the formal enforcement of the Islamic system in 
Pakistan. In a nationwide address, Zia accused politicians of exploiting the name of Islam 
and declared that the present government was loyal to its public commitment to enforce 
‘Nizam-e-Islam ' (Islamic system). Zia had replaced a popularly elected government; and 
Islamisation was an attempt to fill the political vacuum that Zia himself had created. Islam 
was needed to strengthen his claim to political legitimacy and fortify political power 
through the Islamic political structure. Importantly, Islam was the raison d'etre of Pakistan 
and the move of adopting the religious rhetoric of Islamising Pakistan served to reinforce 
the legitimacy of his undemocratic and unrepresentative regime.
324 Ibid.p. 170
325 Z. Haque, "Islam and Economics in Pakistan: Critical Perspective," The Pakistan Development Review  34, 
no. 4 Part II (1995).p. 835
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All this time the spirit to impose the zakat was in full force, and on 10 February 1979, a 
Draft Zakat and Ushr Order was issued with Zia’s approval and with the joint effort of the 
Planning Commission, Ministry of Law, Ministry of Religious Affairs, the CII and Ministry 
o f Finance, to gather the opinion of the general public. The public were to submit their 
opinions to the Ministry of Finance by 13 April 1979. It would have been interesting to 
assess the legitimacy of this poll, but due to lack of sources, it is not possible to know how 
the poll was conducted or what responses were obtained. The Ministry of Finance made a 
report based on its interpretation of the poll and sent a copy to the CII for its perusal.
In the meantime, the Ministry of Finance, with orders from Zia, formed a committee that 
drafted a temporary Zakat Ordinance. This was published on 24 June 1979 as the Zakat and 
Ushr (Organisation) Ordinance. Under this (Organisation) Ordinance the Central Zakat 
Council (CZC) and the Provincial Zakat Council (PZC) were established.
The interesting aspect of this situation was that the CII, the organisation revived for the 
Islamisation of the country, found itself totally excluded from the zakat policy-making 
process in the final stages of the promulgation of the Zakat Ordinance. Zia was to discuss 
this Ordinance in his cabinet on 30 June 1979. The CII received this draft only two days 
before the cabinet meeting and therefore had no opportunity to comment on it. Apparently, 
the Ministry of Finance, with Zia’s approval, had drafted the Zakat and Ushr 
(Organisational) Ordinance with substantial differences to the Draft Zakat and Ushr Order
326 islami nazriati council, "islami nazriati council ki salana report," ed. islami nazriati council (Islamabad: 
huqumat-e-pakistan, 1978-79).p. 102
327 This report is not available.
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that had been approved by the CII.328 Finally, on 20 June 1980, the Zakat and Ushr 
Ordinance No. XVIII was passed 329
Chapter Two showed that the Islamic state wields immense political and economic power 
under the Islamic political ideology. So it was definitely in Zia’s interest to want to adhere 
to this ideology, considering that it was an integral part of Pakistan’s ideology as well. Thus 
in March 1981, Zia promulgated a ‘Provisional Constitutional Order’, which granted him 
unfettered arbitrary power. Zia’s Law Advisor stated clearly that from the coup onwards, 
Zia’s main concern was to introduce the Islamic system. Zia’s opinion on the matter of 
dictatorship versus democracy was that ‘Muslims believed in one God, one Prophet and one 
Book, and their mentality is that they should be ruled by one man’.331 By the promulgation 
of this ‘Provisional Constitutional Order’, Zia secured his constitutional position as Ameer- 
ul-Momeneen (defender of the Islamic faith).
Then, on 19 December 1984, to secure a seal of popular consent for his rule, a referendum 
was held. This referendum was to popularise the Islamisation policies of Zia’s regime. Zia 
held that if people responded in the affirmative to his Islamisation process he would 
consider it as an endorsement of his rule for the next five years. The question posed was: 
‘Do you endorse the process initiated by General Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq, the President of 
Pakistan, for bringing the laws of Pakistan into conformity with the injunctions of Islam as 
laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him), and for
328 islami nazriati council, "islami nazriati council ki salana report (1978-79)."p. 102
329 Directorate o f  Films and Publications, "Zakat and Ushr by Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq," (Islamabad 
Government o f Pakistan: 1980). Zakat and Ushr (Organisational) Ordinance was repealed. Nazir, Zakat 
Law.p. 58
330 E. Mortimer, Faith and Power: The Politics o f  Islam (London: Faber, 1982).p. 222
331 W. L. Ritcher, "The Political Dynamics o f Islamic Resurgence in Pakistan," Asian Survey 19, no. 6 
(1979).pp. 555-556
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the preservation of the Islamic Ideology of Pakistan, the continuation and consolidation of 
that process, and for smooth and orderly transfer of power to the elected representatives of 
the people?’332 It was a cleverly articulated question, offering the people of Pakistan a 
tough choice. The people could not deny Islam and refute the Prophet’s message, but at the 
same time, they had no desire to participate in a sham referendum. The turnout was very 
low, indicating the popular apathy towards the Zia Government. The official results put the 
turnout at 62% (even the national election had not seen such a high turnout) while 
opponents and sceptics claimed that it was barely 5%. It was not as if the people’s 
decision to restrain from participating in the referendum had any bearing on Zia’s practices 
and policies, as he had not gained power by popular consent in any case.
The referendum endorsed Zia’s rule for another five years. He had a clear agenda ahead of 
him: Pakistan was going to be an Islamic state as perceived and interpreted by the 
hardliners and orthodox Islamic elements, and Zia was going to be the Amir of the state and 
amass the political power that came with the title (See Chapter Two for the power of the 
Islamic State).
It seems that Zia’s primary concern after seizing power was to endorse himself as the 
Islamic ruler of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (considering the political advantage that 
could be secured through the Islamic political authority). It can be supposed that he felt 
obliged to pursue the goals (or at least the rhetoric) of providing justice, welfare and 
eradicating poverty from Pakistani society (this being the foremost duty of the Islamic
332 Ghazali, "llusions and Reality." Chapter VIII, p. 2
333 1. N. Ali, "HOWZZAT! "With the referendum around the comer, how is Pakistan's President Musharraf 
faring?"" Probe News Magazine (2002).See also R. A. Syed, Pakistan on R oad to Islamic Democracy 
Referendum 1984 (Islamabad: Historical Research Institute, 1985).p. 129
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state), thus the introduction of zakat. Some believe that he paraded the Zakat Ordinance as 
proof of his regime’s commitment to Islam.334 However, the imposition of zakat had 
potentially huge financial implications for the poor (where 31% of poor households were 
living below the poverty line in 1979),335 and thus had the apparent potential of winning the 
approval of the poor. Introducing zakat was a way for the state to manifest to the public its 
deliberate intervention to reallocate resources in favour of the poor and to magnify its 
welfare objectives. It had the potential of being extremely important in terms of winning 
political support for Zia’s regime, where the poor gained from the disbursements and the 
wealthy lost little due to the exemptions.
Zakat Administration
An elaborate hierarchical structure was created for zakat’s administration forming a whole 
new order of organisations with a vast network of officials 336 The Federal Government 
(after the declaration of the Zakat Ordinance) established a Central Zakat Council (CZC), 
the duty of which was to provide policy guidelines, superintendence and control over 
matters relating to zakat and the Zakat Fund. It did not, however, decide theological issues 
relating to the zakat as they were under the domain of the CII.
334 Crescent International, "Zia Reins Ulama Behind 'Islamisation' Farce."p. 51
335 A. R. Kemal, "Poverty in Pakistan: Trends and Causes," in Towards Pro-Poor Growth Policies in Pakistan 
(Islamabad: United Nations System in Pakistan, 2003).p. 37
336 Tanzil-ur-Rehman, "Introduction o f  Zakat in Pakistan", p. 42
337 Clark, "Pakistan's Zakat and Ushr System" .pp. 172-3
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Structure of Zakat Administration
Zakat Administration
Secretary Govt, of Pakistan
Administrator General C e n tra l  Z a k a t  C o u n c i l Ministry of Religious Affairs
Chairman O ne m em ber from each province 4 m em bers nominated by the President Chief Administrator Secretary Govt, of Pakistan
(Judge of the Suprem e Court) (nominated by the President) (includin g 3 U lem a) (from each province) Ministry of Finance
1t
Provincial Zakat Council
Chief Administrator (for each  4 prov inces)
Chairman 5 persons nominated by Secretary of the Provincial Government Secretary of the Provincial Government Secretary of the Provincial Government
(Judge of the High Court) the Governor Department of Finance Local Government De[jartm ent Social W elfare Department
District Zakat Com m ittee
(for each  District)
Chairman
(elected by the Deputy Commissioner 5 m em bers
Provincial Zakat Council) of the district (1 from each sub-division)
▼
Sub-Divisional Zakat C om m ittee
(for each  sub-div ision)
Chairman 6 m em bers (elected by the chairmen
(elected by the Zakat Sub-Divisional of the Local Zakat Committees
Committee m em bers) Assistant Commissioner within a  sub-division)
Local Zakat Com m ittee
Chairman (elected by the m em bers 7 m em bers (elected or selected by
of the Local Zakat Committee)
Source: Author
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The Council consisted of 16 members, eight of whom were non-official members and eight 
were official members.
a) The Council was chaired by a Judge of the Supreme Court of Pakistan (whose job 
was to appoint committees and to control their agenda) nominated by the President 
in consultation with the Chief Justice of Pakistan.
b) The Council also included four members, including three Ulema (non-official) to be 
nominated by the President in consultation with the CII.
c) Additionally, there was the Secretary of Ministry o f Finance (official).
d) Secretary of the Ministry of Religious Affairs (official).
e) Administrator General of Zakat (also appointed by the President). The 
Administrator General Zakat was to serve as a Secretary to the CZC as an official 
member.
f) Four Chief Zakat Administrators from the four Provinces (official). The Chief 
Administrators of the provinces were selected by the Governor of the respective 
Provinces who were themselves again appointed by the President.
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g) One person from each Province to be appointed by the President.
The CZC members were to hold office for a period of three years after which they were
    A i A
eligible for re-appointment. The CZC is a voluntary organisation.
338 Ibid.p. 172 & Tanzil-ur-Rehman, "Introduction o f Zakat in Pakistan", p. 42. Butt, "Institutional Framework 
of Zakah."p. 380. Nazir, Zakat Law.p. 168. On 30 June 1990, the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance was amended to 
include two female members at all the zakat tiers i.e. in the CZC, the PZCs, DZCs and the LZCs.
339 Zakat and Ushr Ordinance No. XVIII o f 1980, No. XVTII, (20th June).p. 19
340 Clark, "Pakistan's Zakat and Ushr System" .p. 193
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Interestingly, on 30 June 1989, a year after the death of Zia and after democratic rule was 
restored in Pakistan, the Zakat Ordinance was amended. The amendment fiercely curtailed 
the powers of the CZC (Section 4.3 in Chapter Four will comment on the political backdrop 
in which these amendments took place). The zakat system was federalised, i.e. the 
administrative expenditure of the CZC and CZA, PZC and PZA, the DZC and the TZC was 
made the sole responsibility of the Federal Government. In the original law the 
administrative expenditure of the provincial, district and sub-district tiers of the zakat 
administration were the responsibility o f the respective provincial governments. 
Additionally, the CZC now had to seek prior approval from the Federal Government for 
releases from the Central Zakat Fund (CZF) or to make changes to the zakat rules. 
Previously, the CZC had the power to make rules without recourse to the Federal 
Government.341
Connected to the CZC was the Central Zakat Administration (CZA) with its professional 
staff, headed by the Administrator General who was selected by the President and whose 
duty was to serve as a secretary to the CZC. He was assisted in his job by 13 professional 
staff. It was the duty of the Administrator General to disseminate policy and to monitor its 
implementation and co-ordinate between the zakat system and other ministries at the 
national level.342
341 Nazir, Zakat Law.However, these amendments were annulled in June 1991 only to be reinstated in 1994, 
and annulled again in 1997, pp. 162-3.
342 Clark, "Pakistan's Zakat and Ushr System".p. 192
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The Provincial Zakat Councils (PZC) consisted of 10 members. They followed the policies 
set forth by the CZC and disbursed zakat Funds to the Local Zakat Committees and 
monitored the affairs of the District, Sub-Divisional and Local Zakat Committees.343 
The Council had:
a) Chairman who was a judge of the respective Provincial High Court. He was 
appointed by the Governor of the Province in consultation with the Chief Justice of 
the High Court
b) Five more members selected by the Governor, three of whom had to be Islamic 
scholars
c) Secretary to the Provincial Government in the Finance Department (official)
d) Secretary to the Local Government Department (official) *
e) Secretary to the Social Welfare Department (official)
f) Chief Administrator who was also the Secretary to the Council (official),344 and also 
a member of the CZC.
The PZC members were to hold office for a period of three years after which they were 
eligible for re-appointment.345 Like the CZC, the PZC was also a voluntary organisation. 
Associated with the PZC was the Provincial Zakat Administration (PZA), headed by the
343 As mentioned before, in June 1989 the zakat system was federalised and the financing o f  the system 
became the sole responsibility o f  the Federal Government. However, the move was annulled in June 1991. 
Later, the system was again federalised and the operation was taken over by the Federal Government, but this 
time the Provincial Zakat Council and Funds were abolished. In 1995, through the eleventh amendment, the 
Provincial Zakat Administration was abolished. However, in July 1997 the amendments made in 1994 and 
after were repealed and the Provincial Zakat tier was revived again. Nazir, Zakat Law. pp. 162, 168, 170, 172, 
175. Imtiazi, "Management o f Zakah Collection and Disbursement".p. 3
344 Tanzil-ur-Rehman, "Introduction o f  Zakat in Pakistan", p. 43
345 Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980.p. 21
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Chief Administrator with his professional staff. Its function was to disseminate and monitor 
policy at the provincial level and prepare reports for the PZC and the CZC.346
Below the PZC there were the District Zakat Committees (DZC) in each district consisting 
of 7 members. These committees consisted of a chairman (non-official), Deputy 
Commissioner of the district, 5 more non-official members, one from every sub-division in 
the district nominated by the PZCs in consultation with the chairman and the Deputy 
Commissioner.347 These Committees oversaw the functioning of the Sub-divisional 
Committees and helped compile accounts of the Local Zakat Funds, and assisted in the 
distribution and utilisation of the zakat money. These also helped the LZCs in the 
assessment and collection of ushr.348
The Sub-Divisional Committee in each Sub-Division consisted of 7 members as well. 
There was a chairman who was non-official, the Assistant Commissioner of the sub­
division and five non-official members all of whom were chairmen of the Local Zakat 
Committees. For the formation of these committees, all the chairmen of the Local Zakat 
Committees in the sub-division would constitute an electoral college to elect, from amongst 
themselves, 6 members for the Sub-Division Zakat Committee. These six members along 
with the Assistant Commissioner of the sub-division would then elect from among 
themselves the chairman of the Sub-Divisional Committee.349 The Committees oversaw the 
distribution o f zakat, compiled accounts and aggregated reports. These also heard appeals
346 Clark, "Pakistan's Zakat and Ushr System" .pp. 192-193
347 Butt, "Institutional Framework o f Zakah."p. 381
348 Tanzil-ur-Rehman, "Introduction o f Zakat in Pakistan", pp. 44-5
349 Butt, "Institutional Framework o f Zakah." p. 381
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from the Local Zakat Committees about the denial of benefits and the assessment of ushr. 
Their primary function was to support the Local Zakat Committees.350
Finally, there were the Local Zakat Committees (LZC) in each locality (such as a village 
with a population of about 3000), which also consisted of seven members, including a 
chairman. All members of the LZCs were non-official. They were selected or elected by the 
Muslims of the locality in a meeting organised by the DZC. The zakat system at the 
‘committee’ level worked on a voluntary basis, unlike the CZA and the PZAs. However, 
the LZCs were able to hire a remunerated secretary and an ushr collector who were not 
members of the committees.351 The major function of the LZCs was to identify the needy, 
verify the need, determine the amount and the frequency of the grant, document their 
receipts and prepare reports. An additional function of the LZC was to help the individuals 
with their rehabilitation.352
By 1983 there were a total of 37,025 zakat councils and committees and the zakat 
administration involved more than 259,196 people. There was one CZC, four PZCs, 72 
District Zakat and Ushr Committees, and 292 Tehsil/Taluqa/Sub-Divisional Zakat and Ushr 
Committees. There were 23,193 Local Zakat and Ushr Committees in the Punjab, 6822 in 
Sind, 4008 in NWFP, 2484 in Balauchistan and 149 in Capital Territory.353 The expenses 
incurred by the activities of the CZC and the administrative organisation of the 
Administrator General were to be met by the Federal Government, that of the PZCs, the 
administrative organisation of the Chief Administrator and that of the District and the Sub-
350 Clark, "Pakistan's Zakat and Ushr System" .pp. 176-7
351 Ibid. p. 192
352 Ibid. pp. 177-9
353 Ibid.p. 171
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divisional Committees were to be met by the Provincial Government. However the 
expenses of the LZCs were to be met from the Local Zakat Fund, up to a limit of 10% of 
the receipts in that fund during that year.354
The Zakat Fund: Collection and Disbursement
With the passing of the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance a Zakat Fund worth Rs.2250 million was 
created. The Zakat Fund was created at three tiers, i.e. the Local, Provincial and Central 
levels. It consisted o f a Local Account that held zakat collected at the local level in a village 
or a locality. This account then transferred 25% of its collection to the Provincial Account 
(this transfer takes place surplus to the needs of LZCs). The Central Account, kept with the 
State Bank of Pakistan, held funds from zakat levied on assets of Pakistani Muslims with 
banks and other financial institutions from where they were distributed to the Provincial 
accounts which then transferred funds to institutions and LZC accounts.
354 Tanzil-ur-Rehman, "Introduction o f  Zakat in Pakistan", p. 39
355 Directorate o f  Films and Publication, "Introduction o f Islamic System in Pakistan: Address to the Nation, 
President General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq," (Islamabad-Pakistan: 1979). p. 14. Additionally, a Zakat 
Foundation was set up in 1981 with a grant o f 100 million from the Federal Government. Pakistani zakat law 
follows Hanafi tradition, which requires zakat ownership by the poor. This implies that zakat revenue cannot 
be spent on infrastructure that is necessary for rehabilitation. To overcome this problem the government set up 
this Fund. The Zakat Foundation does not use the zakat funds but is funded from the general revenue. Butt, 
"Institutional Framework o f  Zakah." p. 391. Clark, "Pakistan's Zakat and Ushr System", pp. 201-2
356 Tanzil-ur-Rehman, "Introduction o f  Zakat in Pakistan", p. 38
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Figure 3.3
ZAKAT  COLLECTION AND DISBURSEMENT
Zakat deduced at 
source
Zakat paid in 
voluntarily
Zakat funds 
transferred from  
provincial accounts
Central Zakat Fund
Zakat paid in 
voluntarily
Zakat paid in 
voluntarily
Transfer from local 
Zakat Funds
Local Zakat Fund
(for each Local 
Committee)
Provincial Zakat 
Fund
(for each 4 provinces)
Institutions (medicare, 
religious schools, 
educational institutions, 
social welfare institutions)
Orphans, disabled, for subsistence and rehabilitation, 
vocational education centre and hospitals, etc.
Source: Author
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The Local Account was managed by Local Committees in every village. The funds were to 
be utilised for the poor, widows, orphans and the handicapped eligible for zakat for their 
subsistence or rehabilitation. Additionally, at the local level, the funds were used to cover 
the expenses of the collection, disbursement and administration of zakat and ushr.351
Charging Zakat
Zakat was deducted on a compulsory basis on savings held in banks or other financial 
institutions the value of which was equivalent to 612.32 grams of silver, at the rate of 2.5% 
from the accounts of the Muslim citizens and private companies, corporations and 
enterprises of Pakistan of which the majority shareholders were Muslims (excluding 
religious schools, mosques and orphanages)358 on the first of Ramadan (the ninth month of 
the Islamic calendar).359 In Pakistan, the assets subject to the compulsory levy of zakat were 
categorised in two schedules, the First and the Second. Schedule I included assets held by 
financial institutions on which zakat was deducted on a compulsory basis and Schedule II 
included assets on which zakat was levied but its payment was left to the discretion of the 
individual holding the asset.
In case of Schedule I, the deducting agencies were to be the institutions holding the 
accounts. The deduction date was to be specified by the Administrator General of zakat for 
the zakat year360 as the valuation date for all assets was to be the 1 of Ramadan. Apart from 
the savings accounts, the deduction date was different from the valuation date, because the
357 Ibid.p. 39
358 Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980.
359 Clark, "Pakistan's Zakat and Ushr System", p. 159
360 Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980. pp. 36-9
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deduction date is the date on which zakat is actually deducted from the asset, and it can be 
different for various assets depending on the first return, redemption, encashment or the 
surrender date of the asset. Under the First Schedule the assets subject to zakat for credit to 
the Central Zakat Fund were:361
1) Saving Bank Accounts with banks operating in Pakistan
2) Notice Deposit Receipts and Accounts
3) Fixed Deposit Receipts
4) Savings Deposit Certificates, e.g. Defence Savings Certificates, National Deposit 
Certificates
5) Units of National Investments. The deducting agency in this instance was the 
Trustee of the National Investment Trust or its authorised agent paying the return on 
the value of the Units
6) ICP (Investment Corporation of Pakistan) Mutual Funds Certificates, with 2.5% of 
the face value or the market value based on the closing rate at the Karachi Stock 
Exchange, whichever would be lower, on the valuation date in each zakat year. In 
this case the deducting agency was the Investment Corporation of Pakistan
7) Government Securities (other than prize bonds and certificates mentioned in points 
3 and 4)
8) Securities including shares and debentures of statutory companies or corporations 
excluding those mentioned in points 5, 6 and 7
9) Annuities
10) Life Insurance Policies. The deduction date would be the date of payment of value 
on maturity or of survival benefit or of surrender value.
11) Provident Funds
361 Ibid.pp. 36-9
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In June 1987 during Zia’s regime, the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance was amended to empower 
the Federal Government to exempt any types of bond or certificate issued by the Federal 
Government or a statutory corporation or a company owned by the government or a local 
authority by a notification in the official Gazette.362
In the Second Schedule the assets subject to the levy of zakat included:363 
Gold and silver items at 2.5% of the market value on the Valuation Date, cash at 2.5% of 
the amount on the Valuation Date, prize bonds at 2.5% of the face value as on the 
Valuation Date. The schedule also included, current and foreign currency accounts, 
certificates, Units of National Investment Trust, ICP Mutual fund Certificates, Government 
Securities, annuities, life insurance policies and Provident Funds where zakat was to be 
payable at the rate of 2.5% of the value of the asset on the Valuation Date.
The above exposition highlights the zakat policy as imposed in Pakistan constituted in the 
Zakat and Ushr Ordinance. The following segment examines the final shape that the zakat 
policy assumed. It aims to uncover Zia’s hidden preferences regarding zakat and tries to 
achieve this by assessing the zakat policy in light of the proposals forwarded by the Council 
of Islamic Ideology. It is interesting to compare the Council of Islamic Ideology’s 
recommendations regarding the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance with the actual Ordinance as it 
will reveal (on an empirical level) how Zia’s Islamic state utilised the zakat policy, through 
the power granted to it by the Shariah, to pursue its agenda of affirming power instead of 
creating distributive justice in Pakistan. This section will reveal that the body of Islamists,
362 Nazir, Zakat Law. p. 158
363 Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980.pp. 41-44
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which was formed to counsel matters pertaining to Shariah aspects of Islamisation and help 
in creating a socially acceptable and workable system of zakat, found itself conveniently 
disconnected from the final stages of the imposition of the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance. 
Before the chapter undertakes these analyses it explores the history and character of the 
CII.
The Council o f  Islamic Ideolo2V
In March 1949, two years after the birth of Pakistan, the Constituent Assembly under the 
leadership of Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan setup a Basic Principles Committee. One of 
the aims of this Committee was to advise the government on the Islamic principles of the 
future constitution of Pakistan.364 In 1956 Pakistan got its first constitution under Prime 
Minister Mohammad Ali. Article 198 of this constitution held that within one year of its 
promulgation, the President would form a commission that would work to bring the 
existing laws into conformity with Islam. However, when General Ayub Khan imposed
365martial law and abrogated the constitution in 1958 these plans could not be realised.
It was only with Article 199 of the new 1962 Constitution that the idea of forming an 
Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology for the purpose of Islamising laws was realised under 
President Ayub Khan.366 The rationale of this Council was embedded in the rhetoric of the 
raison d ’etre of Pakistan. This meant that the Council was to advise the government on 
bringing all the existing laws in the country in conformity with the Shariah. Additionally, it
364 Haider, Islami Nazriati Council Irtqai Safar aur Karkardagi.p. 121
365 Ibid. p. 53
366 Ibid. p. 54
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was to assist the government in shaping laws that would enable Muslims to lead their lives 
according to the teachings of the Quran and Sunnah.
The Council was to consist of a minimum of five members and a maximum of twelve, and 
these were appointed for a period of three years. The appointment of the Council’s 
chairman and the members was to be at the discretion of the president. The members were 
to possess profound knowledge of Islam and erudition regarding the economic, political, 
legal and administrative challenges facing Pakistan. The proceedings of the Council were to 
take place according to rules and regulations, which were to be formed with the approval of 
the president. As mentioned earlier the Council was supposed to reinterpret Islam 
according to modernist lines and was to justify Ayub’s policies.
The duty of the Council was to propose to the provincial and federal government ideas that 
would enable the Muslims of Pakistan to order their lives according to Islamic philosophy. 
The CII was to deliver solutions to queries from the parliament, president or governor 
regarding Islamic issues related to a law. If the Council could not provide an answer within 
seven days to any query regarding a law that, for the benefit of the general public, had to be 
formed without delay, then the government could form the law without the input from the 
Council.369
In 1973 Zulficar Ali Bhutto became the Prime Minister and in the same year the new 
constitution came into effect, declaring Pakistan to be an Islamic Republic with Islam as the 
state religion. Article 228 of the new constitution laid out that the government was to form
367 Ibid. p. 591
368 Ibid. p. 130
369 Ibid. pp. 128-30
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an Islamic Ideology Council within nine days of its formation. The differences between the 
1962 and the 1973 Councils were that Bhutto’s constitution removed the word ‘Advisory’ 
and allocated additional duties to the new Council amplifying its influence. Its members 
were increased from a minimum of five to eight and from a maximum of twelve to twenty. 
Two of the Council members were to be judges of either the supreme or of the high court. 
Four members were to possess at least fifteen years’ experience in imparting Islamic 
knowledge. One Council member was to be a woman in addition to representatives from
^7 0different schools of thought. The Council’s duties not only included advising the 
parliament, president and the governor but the time period allocated to the Council for 
query consideration was extended from seven to fifteen days. Additionally, the assembly, 
president or the governor would have to reconsider a law before passing it if the CII, after 
being asked for their opinion on that specific law, considered it to be repugnant to the 
teachings of Islam.371
After coming to power General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq resuscitated the Council on the 29 
September 1977 and retained the Council’s character under the 1973 Constitution. Zia 
donated a sum of 10 million rupees under the heading of ‘emergency help’ to the Council. 
The Council, in its fervour for Zia’s Islamic stance and for its own empowered status (as 
assured by Zia), adopted a framework for its activities based on the Quranic verse, which 
translates as follows:
‘These are the people that if we grant them power on this earth they will organise prayers, 
give zakat, will order preaching and discourage disillusionment and Allah controls all 
outcomes’.
370 Ibid. pp. 133-36
371 Ibid. p. 135
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Most of the inaugural members of the Council from 26 September 1977 until 25 September 
1980 were from the Islamic right-wing parties such as the Jamaat-i-Islami and Nizam-e- 
Islam. The Council consisted of a chairman and the rest were members to be appointed by 
President Zia. There were two judges from the Pakistan Supreme Court, one serving and 
the other retired. Then there were two advocates, nine Muslim clerics (one Shia), the 
Secretary of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and two academics, one of whom was a
372woman.
As time passed some members of the Council became dissatisfied with the Islamisation 
process in Pakistan. The shape and procedure of the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance was a real 
bone of contention. Consequently, by the promulgation of the Ordinance prominent Islamic 
cleric members such as Maulana Taqi Usmani, Mufti Siah-ul-din Kakakhail and Mufti 
Mohammad Hussain Naeemi resigned in June 1980.373 This is a noteworthy point that 
shows that those who were dissatisfied by the process and shape of the zakat policy 
consequently did not want to be part of the design and had no choice but to resign from the 
government.
Objectives o f  Zakat Shape o f Zakat Policy and Z ia’s Hidden Preferences 
The CII’s annual report for 1978-79 stated clearly that it was the utmost priority of the 
government to turn Pakistan into an Islamic welfare state and for this reason the experts 
were set to work on the creation of the zakat and ushr system.374 In the same year, in his 
address to the nation on 10 February 1979, General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq pointed out that 
many Pakistani Muslims had turned their backs on Islam and had forgotten their duty
372 Ibid. pp. 765-766
373 Ibid. p. 767
374 islami nazriati council, "islami nazriati council ki salana report (1978-79)."pp. 95-7
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towards social welfare, justice and fair play.375 He asserted that Islam is a welfare-oriented 
religion that protects the poor and the weak rather than the rich and the strong and protects 
the right of the human being in all spheres.376
He added that his government was using zakat to initiate the Islamisation process of 
Pakistan because zakat is one of the most important pillars of Islam and related to the 
‘economic and welfare aspects of the society’. He emphasised that it was obligatory on the 
government of the day to organise the collection of zakat from ‘those Muslims whose 
financial position warranted payment of zakat\ 377 He stressed that, ‘To narrow the gap 
between the rich and the poor and to look after the indigent and the destitute are important 
principles of an Islamic society and are also the cornerstones of the policy of the present 
Government. The system of Zakat and Ushr would make available to us resources which, if 
spent properly, would open up possibilities for the welfare of the poor people’.378 
According to the zakat law in Pakistan, the preferential beneficiaries of zakat expenditure 
were to be widows, orphans, the disabled and students o f religious schools.379
The above are the objectives of the zakat policy as formally stated by President Zia himself 
and the CII. The following section examines whether the structure of zakat was designed in 
a way that would facilitate the achievement of these objectives.
375 Directorate o f  Films and Publication, "Introduction o f Islamic System in Pakistan: Address to the Nation, 
President General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq (1979)."p. 2
376 Ibid.p. 5
377 Ibid.p. 7
378 Ibid.p. 12
379 markazi zakat council, "markazi zakat council ki kargardagi report," ed. makazi zakat intizamia 
(Islamabad: vizarat-e-khazana, 1980-81).p. 19. markazi zakat council, "markazi zakat council ki karkardagi 
report," ed. markazi zakat intizamia (Islamabad: vizarat-e-khazana, 1981-82).p. 39
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Chapter Two discussed how the Shariah allows the Islamic state to have immense political 
and economic power and authority, the objective of which is to ensure justice in society and 
to guarantee welfare to all its members. The Islamic state exercises its power via an elected 
or selected Amir who is the vicegerent of Allah and is the locus of power between Allah via 
the Shariah and the Muslim people (making the Islamic state a theocracy). Chapter Two 
also discussed how the decisions of the shura are not binding on the Amir, and that the 
system of Islamic polity has the potential to allow the shura and the Amir to easily form an 
oligarchy to support each other’s interests and to avoid confrontation. Keeping this view 
under consideration, this section seeks to examine how the Islamic state exercised its 
Shariah power in the formation of zakat policy and how this influenced the shape of the 
zakat policy in Pakistan. The immense leverage granted to the Islamic state under the 
political structure can give rise to a situation where the Islamic governing body may take 
advantage of the power and pursue its own vested interests in the name of justice for all. 
Chapter One highlighted how Shariah’s norms regarding notions of welfare and justice are 
not always clear. It is important to point out that in areas where the Shariah's position is 
irresolute the Islamic state can effortlessly manoeuvre clauses regarding those areas and 
remodel them in its own interests. Hence, this section investigates the obscure points 
regarding zakat’s nature that allowed for manipulation by the state for its own purposes 
which consequently affected zakat policy formation. The implications of such manipulation 
on zakat’s performance in Pakistan will become apparent in Chapters Four and Five.
The following section evaluates the Council of Islamic Ideology’s proposals concerning the 
Zakat and Ushr Ordinance with the imposed policy. The rationale is to reveal how Zia’s 
Islamic state exploited the zakat policy, as a means to securing power instead of creating 
distributive justice in Pakistan.
196
Nisab of Zakat
A very important aspect of the imposition of Zakat and Ushr Ordinance that had been the 
subject of constant debate at CII meetings and repeatedly brought to the notice of Zia and 
the Ministry of Finance was the issue of nisab (which is the minimum amount of wealth 
liable to zakat, see Chapter Two). The level is not stated clearly in the Shariah but is 
inferred from it. Islamic jurists differ on the point as to whether paper currency, which is 
the medium through which zakat is usually given in modem times, should be equated with
•>O A
gold or silver. The orthodox view is that the nisab of zakat should be defined in silver. 
However, there are those who hold that nisab should be equated to gold because in recent 
times the price of gold has adjusted to a higher degree of inflation than silver. The pegging 
of nisab to silver or gold is a contentious matter especially in the case of Pakistan. The CII 
held that the nisab for zakat should be pegged to gold as gold had retained its cash value,
^ 0 1
whereas silver had deteriorated in value relative to gold over the years.
According to the Pakistan Zakat Ordinance, nisab was pegged to the value of silver. This 
meant that if an individual or company had money lying in the financial institutions, the 
aggregate value of which was equivalent to 612.32 grams, then zakat was liable on that 
money. The procedure of fixing the nisab was that on the 1 of Ramadan of each year, the 
Federal Government declared the monetary equivalent of 612.32 grams of silver through an 
SRO (Statutory Notice of the Government of Pakistan). When the promulgation of the 
Ordinance took place in 1980, the value of 612.32 grams of silver as notified by the SRO
380 Nazir, Zakat Law. p. 114
381 islami nazriati council, "islami nazriati council ki salana report (1977-78)."p. 167
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was Rs.2780,382 which was $280.80. The second column of table 3.3 below shows the 
monetary equivalent of nisab as declared over the years. An interesting exercise would be 
to compare nisab to a basic consumption basket of goods over time. For this purpose the 
1984 annual poverty line of Rs. 2568 is used. This poverty line is projected across the entire 
period using the CPI (Consumer Price Index) as given in column three.
Table 3.3
Nature of Nisa b in Pakistan
Year
Nisab (Amount 
notified as Rs. 
equal to 612.32 
grams of silver)*
Poverty Line 
expressed 
Rs. Annually
% Gap (Nisab 
divided by 
Poverty Line)
Pakistan's 
Consumer 
Price Index
Inflation 
Adjusted 
Nisab (in 
1980 prices- 
Rs.)
1980 2780 1921 44.7 20.9 2780
1981 2000 2149 -6.9 23.4 1788
1982 2000 • 2275 -12.1 24.8 1689
1983 3000 2420 24.0 26.4 2381
1984 2500 2568 -2.6 28.0 1870
1985 2200 2712 -18.9 29.6 1558
1986 2200 2807 -21.6 30.6 1506
1987 2500 2939 -14.9 32.0 1634
1988 3200 3198 0.1 34.8 1922
1989 3400 3449 -1.4 37.6 1894
1990 3200 3761 -14.9 41.0 1634
1991 3300 4195 -21.3 45.7 1511
1992 3000 4605 -34.8 50.2 1252
1993 3000 5063 -40.8 55.2 1138
1994 3600 5690 -36.7 62.0 1215
* This amount is notified by the SRO= Statutory Notification issued by the Government of Pakistan 
Source: Second column: Nazir, K. (2002). The Zakat Law. Islamabad, Ammar Publications, p. 118. Poverty 
line Havinga, I. C., Haanappel, F. W., Louter, A. S., van den Andel, W. A. "Poverty in Pakistan 1984-85." 
The Pakistan Development Review 28, no. 4 Part II (1989): 851-869, Consumer Price Index 
www.datastream.net. and Author’s own calculations.
According to the fourth column, apart from the first year when nisab stood around 45% 
above the poverty line and in 1983 when nisab again rose above the poverty line, nisab was 
significantly below the poverty line by 1985. After narrowing somewhat in the late 1980s,
382 Nazir, Zakat Law. p. 118
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the gap between nisab and the poverty line continued to widen in the 1990s, registering a 
record low of -40% in 1993. This downward trend was a reflection of the decline of the 
relative price of silver compared to inflation in Pakistan. This meant that the levy of zakat 
was geared increasingly towards the poor over time. Even if one keeps in mind that nisab is 
related to accumulated wealth whereas the poverty line measures relate to annual income 
the fact that nisab was losing value in real terms constantly over the years (as seen in the 
last column), reasserts the claim that the burden of zakat was increasingly falling on the 
poorer sections of the society i.e. over time people with less wealth became liable for the 
payment of zakat.
On the contrary, if the nisab of zakat had been pegged to gold in the Zakat Ordinance, then 
according to the last column of table 3.4 below, nisab would have been more positively 
directed towards the financially better-off in Pakistani society as nisab would have been on 
average a multiple (5 to 6 times) of the poverty line (see column 3 below).
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Table 3.4
Gold Pegged Nisab
Year
Price of 
gold (Rs. 
Per fine 
ounce)
Nisab of 
gold in Rs. 
(87.48 
grams)
Poverty Line 
Rs. Annually 
(1984)
% Gap (Nisab 
divided by 
Poverty Line)
1980 5974.7 18293 1921 852.3
1981 4451.7 13630 2149 534.4
1982 4483.4 13727 2275 503.3
1983 5475.8 16766 2420 592.7
1984 5027.2 15392 2568 499.4
1985 5100.6 15617 2712 475.8
1986 6125.1 18754 2807 568.2
1987 7829.1 23971 2939 715.7
1988 7787.7 23844 3198 645.7
1989 7799.8 23881 3449 592.4
1990 8301.8 25418 3761 575.8
1991 8554.2 26191 4195 524.3
1992 8609.9 26362 4605 472.5
1993 10227.6 31315 5063 518.4
1994 11763.5 36018 5690 533.0
* The price of gold may be expressed in 'per fine ounce'. The fineness of gold is the 
proportion of gold that is pure, distinct from alloy. 1000 fine or fineness of 1 denotes pure 
gold.
1 ounce = 28.35 grams 1 gram = 0.035 ounces
Source: www.eh.net and authors own calculations. Poverty line I. C. Havinga, Haanappel, 
F. W., Louter, A. S., van den Andel, W. A., "Poverty in Pakistan 1984-85," The Pakistan 
Development Review 28, no. 4 Part II (1989).
By observing prices of gold and silver over time one can only assume that the 
government’s rationale for pegging nisab to silver could have been that more people would 
be liable to pay zakat and it would raise more revenue. However, the fact that the price of 
silver has not kept pace with inflation makes it an inappropriate base for the assessment of 
zakat as the low value of nisab pegged to silver undermines the goals of equality, justice 
and welfare. The ambiguity in the Shariah regarding whether nisab should be pegged to 
gold or silver gave an easy option to the policy-making body to characterize zakat in a way 
that would appease the financially better-off in society.
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In 1990, a case filed at the Federal Shariat Court, Dr. Mehmood-ur-Rehman vs. 
Government of Pakistan, Shariat Petition No. 24/1, raised concern over the rate of nisab. In 
1990 the rate of nisab was Rs.3200, but if it had been pegged to gold, the price of 87.48 
grams of gold would have been around Rs.25400. Mehmood-ur-Rehman accused the Zakat 
Ordinance of being repugnant to the injunctions of Islam and that the zakat system was 
working against the ideals of justice by making those people pay zakat who were liable to 
receive it. The judgment given by the Chief Justice, Tanzil-ur-Rehman who interestingly 
had been the chairman of the CII from May 1980 to May 1984,384 was that Zakat and Us hr 
Ordinance falls within the definition of Muslim Personal Law and thus does not come 
under the jurisdiction of the Federal Shariat Court. Thus the petition was dismissed.385
The manner in which nisab was utilised in the Zakat Ordinance suggests that there was no 
true attempt by the Islamic polity (through Zia and his ruling elite) to redistribute resources 
in the favour of the poor. Indeed, the low relative value of nisab makes it likely that 
redistribution was taking place from the poor to the poor (an issue pursued further in 
Chapters 4 and 5). It seems that the Zia Government took full advantage of the obscurity in 
the Shariah regarding nisab of zakat and established the level of nisab so that the majority 
of the population would be liable to pay it regardless of the impact this might have on their 
living standards.
383 Dr. Mehmood-ur-Rehman vs. Government o f  Pakistan, Shariat Petition No. 24/1 (1990).
384 Haider, Islami Nazriati Council Irtqai Safar aur Karkardagi.p. 756
385 Dr. Mehmood-ur-Rehman vs. Government o f  Pakistan. Zakat and Ushr Ordinance falls within the 
definition o f  Muslim Personal Law and thus does not come under the jurisdiction o f the Federal Shariat Court. 
Federal Shariat Court was created in 1980 with significant restrictions on its jurisdiction under Article 203B 
o f the Constitution, including a lack o f  jurisdiction in matters pertaining to Muslim personal law, fiscal laws, 
taxation, banking, and insurance for a period o f  10 years.
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Years later, in 1990 when Nawaz Sharif became the Prime Minister the Islamic Shariah 
law was incorporated into the legal code. This time could have been ripe to reform zakat, 
however, even during his time no attempt was made to modify nisab. It seems that the 
successive governments also turned a blind eye to the unjust nature of the zakat law.
Mass representation in the Central Zakat Council
It was recommended in the report of the panel of bankers and economists (submitted to the 
CII in March 1978), endorsed by the CII and communicated to Zia’s Cabinet and 
bureaucrats, that the CZC membership should include four representatives of the general 
masses in addition to the original 16 members. One of these additional members would be 
from minority sects, another from the Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industries, 
one to represent the labour unions and the fourth to represent the agricultural sector.387 
However, this suggestion of representation of different religious sects and various walks of 
life was dropped by the government, i.e. the Ministry of Finance and was not included in 
the Ordinance.
This proposal for broader representation might have resulted in a more just and better 
targeted zakat programme, and it might have had a positive effect on the efficiency of 
zakat''s administration. For example, accepting a representative from the agricultural sector 
might have helped to highlight issues regarding ushr’s calculation {zakat on agriculture), 
and any logistical problems that were incumbent in the rural areas (due to poor 
infrastructure). However, it appears that Zia was content with the endorsement that the
386 In 1993 President Ishaq Khan and Prime Minister Sharif both resigned under pressure from the military. 
The general elections brought Benazir Bhutto back to power. However, in 1996 President Leghari dismissed 
the Bhutto government amid corruption allegations.
387 islami nazriati council, "islami nazriati council ki salana report (1977-78)."pp. 175-6
388 islami nazriati council, "islami nazriati council ki salana report (1978-79)."p. 112
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stamp of an Islamic state provided as he did not seem to be looking for alliances with the 
poor working classes and did not need their input on matters pertaining to zakat policy and 
imposition.
Zakat Assets
As mentioned above, the assets on which zakat was imposed were divided into two 
schedules. Schedule I included assets held by financial institutions on which zakat was 
deducted on a compulsory basis and Schedule II included assets on which zakat was levied 
but its payment was left to the discretion of the individual holding the asset. Islamists who 
hold that the state is authorised to deduct zakat clarify that according to the Shariah the 
Islamic state can intervene and deduct zakat on apparent wealth, while its role is silent on 
non-apparent wealth, therefore respecting the individual’s privacy. In the classical concepts 
of apparent and non-apparent wealth, apparent wealth generally meant domestic animals, 
agricultural produce and articles of trade, while non-apparent wealth was thought to imply 
gold, silver and articles of trade that had not become apparent by passing them through 
customs.389 In modem times apparent wealth would be assets kept in banks and other 
financial houses and non-apparent wealth would be kept at home or in bank vaults. In the 
report of the panel of bankers, there was no mention of dividing zakat assets into schedules, 
and only assets on which zakat was to be deducted were named and the rest of the assets on 
which payment of zakat was required by the Shariah were left to individuals’ conscience.390
On 31 July 1980, a year after the passing of the Ordinance, the CII proposed that the two 
schedules, differentiating between apparent assets and non-apparent assets, should be
389 Zayaz, Law  and Philosophy o f  Zakat p .  297
390 islami nazriati council, "islami nazriati council ki salana report (1977-78)."p. 165
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codified by law. At this juncture the ministers of various bureaux communicated to the CII 
that the reason behind dividing these assets into two schedules was not to strike similarity 
with the Shariah injunctions of apparent and non-apparent wealth, and for this reason it was 
absolutely unnecessary to codify these assets as doing so would cause undue complications 
in the Ordinance. It was their concern that linking these schedules to the Shariah would 
trigger a huge debate as to which assets could be defined as apparent and which as non-
^Q1
apparent wealth.
Interestingly, the conclusion one can draw from this point is that in the absence of 
codification of these assets and of their formal endorsement as apparent and non-apparent 
wealth, the government was free to shift these assets from one schedule to the other and 
thus keep the reins of zakat policy at its disposal. The lack of a Shariah yardstick for the 
exact identification of apparent and non-apparent wealth provided an opportunity for the 
State to manipulate the details of zakat policy to placate key interest groups.
Another blow to the CII came on 7 October 1984 when the Ordinance was amended to give 
the government wide-ranging powers regarding the exemption of private or government- 
issued bonds and certificates from the levy of zakat. Previously, the government was 
required to consult the CII before granting exemptions to any kind of person or asset, 
however, this amendment terminated the requirement o f CII’s approval. This action was 
entirely against the Shariah as it prohibited arbitrary restrictions on assets that were 
compulsorily liable to zakat.
391 islami nazriati council, "islami nazriati council ki salana report," ed. islami nazriati council (Islamabad: 
vizarat-e-khazana, huqumat-e-pakistan, 1980-8 l).p. 88
392 Nazir, Zakat Law. pp. 158-9
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Zakat and current accounts
The report of the panel of bankers recommended that current accounts should be liable to 
zakat. The CII had held that the industrialists and businessmen tend to maintain current 
accounts for ease in business transactions, and so in order to extract zakat from their 
money, it would be feasible to impose zakat on current accounts as well and bring them
' I Q ' l
under Schedule I. But when the Ordinance was passed this clause had been dropped and 
current accounts became part of Schedule II. However, savings accounts were made part of 
Schedule I, which meant the compulsory deduction of zakat on this asset. Interestingly, 
these savings accounts generally belonged to the middle or lower income echelons. One 
national newspaper noted that the partiality of the government to favour the affluent is 
apparent because the zakat law affects the savings of the middle classes.394 This meant that 
it was not possible to tap the wealth of the elite under this policy and that the incidence of 
zakat would not fall on the wealthy but on the not-so wealthy and even poorer sections of 
the society. The CII’s suggestion to impose zakat on current accounts was never met, as it 
would have had negative repercussions on the business of the elite and the bourgeoisie 
consequeltly unsettling their support for Zia. As corporate taxes are not easy to raise in 
Pakistan, imposing zakat on current accounts of the companies would have been one way 
of tapping the resources of the rich, as the withholding nature of zakat deduction would 
have made it administratively easier to manage.
Zakat and stock-in-trade
Another asset that had become an issue and a source of debate within government circles 
was stock-in-trade (of commercial undertakings, industrial undertakings, precious metals
393 islami nazriati council, "islami naziati council ki salana report," ed. islami nazriati council (Islamabad: 
vizarat-e-khazana, huqumat-e-pakistan, 1981-82).pp. 235-6
394 Staff Reporter, "Evading Zakat," The Muslim, 11th March 1987.
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and stones, fish and other catches from the sea). When the Draft Zakat and Us hr Order was 
issued in February 1979 to assess public opinion (as mentioned earlier in this chapter) for 
the purpose of imposing zakat, the public was given an option of expressing their views on 
a clause stipulating that zakat would be levied on a compulsory self-assessment basis on 
stock-in-trade worth more than Rs. 10,000 ($1010 according to the 1979 exchange rate). 
The public responses are not available, but the report of the panel of bankers favoured 
levying the zakat on stock-in-trade, and Zia’s Federal Cabinet had also initially approved 
this clause.395
When the Ordinance was promulgated, stock-in-trade was part of Schedule II following a 
decision by the Ministry of Finance. The reason given for this change was that it was due to 
the administrative limitations of zakat collection.396 One is bound to be sceptical of this 
reason, given that the panel of bankers in their report estimated that zakat collection from 
stock-in-trade would total Rs. 264 million ($26.4 million) for the first year, which appeared 
to be a tantalising sum for a government wanting to establish redistributive justice, and 
would have increased zakat revenues by 31% for the first year.397 Additionally, it is 
surprising that the government was willing to forgo such a large amount of revenue for the 
sake of administrative ease, given that tax officials could have also collected zakat while 
collecting income tax from companies or could have worked in collaboration with zakat 
personnel by providing them with information on company revenue. Another reason for 
placing stock-in-trade under Schedule II could have been that Zia’s Islamisation policies 
enjoyed heavy support from the urban petit bourgeoisie who were part of the trading
395 islami nazriati council, "islami nazriati council ki salana report (1978-79)."pp. 126-8
396 Ibid.p. 128
397 Ibid.p. 127
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classes. These people had been rallied by the Jamaat-i-Islami against Bhutto and were 
encouraged by it to back Zia’s Islamisation programme.398
By analysing the differences between the suggestions made by the CII and the final Zakat 
and Ushr Ordinance as it was imposed, the above analysis has revealed how zakat policy 
was manoeuvred in a way that could potentially compromise its revenue and thus run 
counter to zakat’s raison d'etre (that of creating redistributive justice). The following point 
is an exercise in reiterating that Zia’s Islamic state controlled any Islamic legal stance 
regarding zakat that it thought would go against its political security in the country.
Zakat and the Shia question
As stated in Chapter Two, not all Sunni schools of law agree on the authority of the Islamic 
state to collect zakat. Some Sunni minority Islamic jurists hold that zakat is not a tax 
imposed by the state, and thus, is not dependent on it for its function. Similarly, Shia law 
does not empower the state to collect zakat either and entrusts the individual to pay it as 
he/she pleases. Thus, when Zia imposed zakat, its imposition did not go unchallenged by 
the country’s Shias, who constituted 15% of the population. The imposition o f zakat at the 
national level meant the Zia Government’s advocacy of one religious position to the 
exclusion of others regarding the Islamic laws. The Shia leaders were concerned over the 
fact that Islamisation of certain laws was being conducted in a way that ignored the 
principles of the Shia school of law.399 Differences in laws affecting the levying of zakat 
are more volatile than other laws as they have financial consequences for both the zakat 
payer and the beneficiary. The government met stiff resistance from the Shia community,
398 Noman, The Political Economy o f  Pakistan .p. 150
399 M. A. Khan, Pakistan: The Barren Years: The Viewpoint Editorials and Columns o f  Mazhar Ali Khan 
1975-1992 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998).p. 374
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which numbers between 15-25 percent of the population. They refused to pay zakat to a 
Sunni government. Their agitations forced the government to exempt them from 
compulsory zakat deductions. In the process the Shia community was politicized and Zia’s 
allies among the Sunni Islamic activists had developed an anti-Shia posture. State policy 
therefore intensified sectarian conflict.400
The government amended the Ordinance within four months of imposition and on 29 
October 1980 conceded the Shia demand that zakat should not be deducted from them by 
the state.401 Although there was a Shia member in the CII at the time (Jafar Hussein, who 
bore the Shia literary title of Mujtahid), selected by Zia,402 it did not prevent sectarian 
tensions in the country as the cleric was not seen as a true representative of the Shia 
community.
Shias could claim exemption through the submission of an attested copy of form CZ-20 to a 
zakat deduction office. This form stated that the individual is a Shia and that his/her 
sectarian beliefs grant him/her immunity from paying zakat to the state. The form had to be 
filed within three months preceding the valuation date.403 The fact that this form was to be 
filed every year created new controversy, as people generally did not change their sectarian 
affiliations frequently. Shias found that in the course of delays to the submission of the CZ- 
20 their assets were being subjected to the levy of zakat. They blamed the government for
400 V. Nasr, "Islamization, the State and Development," in Islamization and the Pakistani Economy, ed. R.M. 
Hathaway and L. Wilson (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2004).p. 
1971
401 A. Iqbal, Islamisation o f  Pakistan (Dehli: Idarah-i-Adabiyat-i-Delli, 1984). p. 108
402 Haider, Islami Nazriati Council Irtqai Safar aur Karkardagi.p. 765
403 This period was reduced to thirty days through an amendment in the Ordinance passed on 29 October 
1983. Nazir, Zakat Law. p. 155
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making the procedure tiresome and also claimed that the government did not advertise the 
deadline for the form’s submission with sufficient thoroughness.404
Thus another amendment was made in the Ordinance by inserting a proviso stating that no 
zakat shall be charged from a person who files a declaration that he or she is a Muslim and 
follower of one of the recognised fiqh (which he or she will specify in the declaration) and 
the said fiqh  does not oblige him or her to pay zakat in a manner prescribed in the 
Ordinance. This declaration remained valid till the asset remained in the custody of the 
deducting agency.405
It seems that the Islamic state had hoped to generate higher zakat revenues without 
consideration for the beliefs of the minority Muslim sects or assessing the sensitivity of 
imposing zakat at the national level. Consequently, zakat exemptions thus given made it 
potentially counterproductive to raising high revenues.
An interesting point to note in the Ordinance is that no particular fiqh  was named to justify 
exemption from zakat, only the words ‘recognised fiq h ’ were used and no definition of a 
recognised fiqh  was provided.406 This seems peculiar when one takes a look at an official 
paper of the Islamic Shariat Court, which indicates that on the suggestion of the CII, a 
similar provision to the one that exempted Shias from paying zakat was also made 
applicable to the followers oiHanafi law, i.e. the Sunnis. However, these exemptions were
404 Mayer, "Islamisation and Taxation in Pakistan."p. 73
405 Nazir, Zakat Law. p. 145. However, this exemption did not bar deserving Shias from receiving zakat from 
the Zakat Fund.
406 Ibid. p. 145
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not made public at the time and were kept as confidential administrative orders.407 It is not 
clear why this provision was hidden from public knowledge at the time. However, in 1999 
this decision was made public and the followers of the Hanafi sect have since been able to 
claim exemption from zakat payment as well.408
This singular situation indicates that although the Zia Government acknowledged the legal 
differences within the Sunni schools of law, it did not want to fan these differences as doing 
so might not only have turned the zakat system on its head but brought into question the 
establishment of the Islamic system. It seems that in keeping zakat exemptions made to the 
Sunnis confidential, Zia’s Islamic state wanted to boost the collection of zakat revenues in 
order to demonstrate the success of the Islamisation programme. It was one of the CII’s 
greatest anxieties that zakat revenue would fall if it became common practice for Sunnis to 
claim exemption from payment.409 It would be fair to assert that notwithstanding the 
differences in sectarian laws the absence of a formal structure of organised religion even 
within the Sunni legal tradition made it difficult for Zia to organise social cohesion 
regarding zakat410
It seems that Zia could employ various tactics to manipulate and influence zakat policy, as 
it was rendered vulnerable to political manipulation by the structure of the Islamic polity. 
• The interventionist and dominating economic and political powers granted to the Islamic
407 F. I. Qazi, in Islamic Shariat Court (Islamabad: 2001).See also, islami nazriati council, "islami nazriati 
council ki salana report (1980-81)."pp. 85-7
408 Staff Reporter, "Fiqh Hanafi valoon kuo bhi Zakat ki katauti sae choot," Jang , 10 March 1999.pp. 1 & 7
409 islami nazriati council, "islami nazriati council ki salana report (1977-78)."p. 122
410 M. H. Khan, "Social Justice and sustainable development in Muslim Countries," in Economic and Social 
Policies and Wealth Redistribution in Muslim Countries (Cambridge: Trinity College, University, 2005). p. 3. 
Khan highlights the institutional fragmentation o f religion in Muslim countries in general to argue that Islamic 
or indigenous notions o f  justice and legitimacy ought to be considered before perspectives o f  good 
governance and free market to achieve economic development as features o f  the institutional and political 
organization o f  religion may also make developmental transformation more difficult.
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state certainly empowered Zia and fitted very well with the political situation that he was 
facing. The orthodox ideology represented the rhetoric that Zia needed to gain control over 
Pakistani society, and the introduction of a welfare policy such as zakat provided a befitting 
opportunity to Zia to show the people his commitment to their welfare. He undertook this 
task by instrumentalising Pakistan’s Islamic Ideology.
Additionally, the obscurity of the Shariah law regarding many aspects of zakat law 
provided an opportunity for the State to offer concessions to various interest groups within 
the economic and political elite, thereby placating them and maintaining the political and 
economic status quo. It seems that policy-makers steered zakat policy in a way that had the 
potential of putting the burden on the poorer sections of the society; this practice went 
grossly against the dictates of Islamic welfare and undermined the purpose of zakat. It 
appears that Zia’s motives behind introducing zakat were to cement and justify his rule.
General Zia-ul-Haq headed a weak state characterised by a lack of political legitimacy, as 
he had no justification for staying in power. He had staged a coup replacing the 
democratically elected Bhutto Government and thereafter had continuously assured the 
public that he had come to deliver fair democracy. He did not deliver his promise and 
instead appropriated the demands of the Pakistan National Alliance for the ‘imposition of 
Nizam-e-Mustafa in Pakistan’ (system of the Prophet).411 Zia needed political support to 
give his regime a sound basis to turn his state into a legitimate one.
Conclusion
411 Wilder, "Islam and Political Legitimacy."p. 58
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The aim of this chapter was to accentuate the point that the purity of zakat, originating from 
its religious nature, would not prevent it from being politicised when imposed as a policy 
via an omnipresent political authority. The financial implications of the zakat are enticing 
for a polity (Islamic or otherwise) to steer zakat policy in a manner (considering the 
economic and political leverage granted to the Islamic state by the Shariah and considering 
the unclear injunctions of the Shariah regarding zakat) that would advance its political 
ends.
It seems that Zia introduced Islamisation and employed ideological and religious rhetoric to 
empower his government and secure political legitimacy. The ideological rhetoric meant 
going back to the raison d ’etre of Pakistan and thus imposing Islamic laws. The religious 
rhetoric helped to cement his claim to power on the grounds that his was an Islamic state 
and that he was shaping the society of Pakistan according to the norms of the Shariah.
The introduction of zakat was meant to increase Zia’s power and authority over the people 
that he ruled, as zakat was a powerful instrument to gain the confidence of the masses. 
Zakat’s financial appeal for the masses further helped Zia to win the sympathy of the 
poorer masses of the country that had been downtrodden since the creation of Pakistan 
owing to the economic policies of successive regimes. However, it appears that zakat 
policy helped to potentially uphold the economic divisions of the society, and reflected the 
vulnerable politico-economic position of the poor as compared to the rich.
Furthermore, Zia appeared to be active in various ways to influence and control zakat
policy. The vagueness of the Shariah concerning many aspects of zakat enabled the Islamic
state to shape zakat policy to suit its broader political interests. What comes to the forefront
212
from this chapter is that while forming zakat policy the state appeared to have sacrificed 
zakat revenue to appease political allies and to safeguard its interests under the garb of 
providing welfare and justice to the poor. This process negatively influenced the ideals of 
welfare, equity and justice in Pakistan, which, according to the Islamists, is better provided 
under an Islamic economic system than any other.
It is not difficult to conclude that under such circumstances the ability of zakat to promote 
equality and realize welfare and justice in the society might be hindered. However, this 
chapter has only undertaken a theoretical analysis of the zakat Ordinance, which says 
nothing about the performance of zakat on empirical grounds, especially when one is 
interested in the way zakat operated at the grass-roots level. Empirical analyses of zakat at 
its operational stage might still reveal a positive scenario for welfare and justice depending 
on the commitment of the Islamic state and the zakat personnel. The next two chapters 
examine the revenue and expenditure of zakat, and its overall impact on income distribution 
and the reduction of poverty and income inequality. The significance of zakat as a channel 
of welfare to the poor cannot yet be dismissed entirely.
213
Chapter Four 
Analysis of Zakat Revenue
Introduction
This chapter deals with the revenue side of zakat, which is one of the key elements in 
answering the basic question of the thesis about the effectiveness of zakat in delivering its 
objectives of welfare and justice. The chapter enquires whether zakat raises significant 
revenue and taps the wealth of the rich. It also examines the importance of the Islamic 
state’s commitment to make the zakat policy effective.
By posing these questions the chapter attempts not only to test the Islamists’ assertions 
about the capabilities of zakat (as stated in Chapter Two), when imposed as a policy, but it 
also proceeds to show that the imposition of a religious obligation such as zakat would not 
automatically command obedience and compliance from the citizens, unless the state 
creates trust via positive reputational effects (as stated in Chapter Two) through honouring 
commitments and demonstrating itself to be fair. The presence of universal concepts and 
values such as that of trust are vital for underpinning the relationship between the state and 
the individual that would strengthen and compliment the interaction between the two, 
leading to a smooth policy operation and thus a more effective outcome. Additionally, this 
chapter unfolds the consequences of the shape of the zakat policy as analysed in Chapter 
Three which showed how the state seemed to have forgo potential zakat revenue to keep 
calm its allies and to preserve its political interests.
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This chapter is divided into three sections. Section one conducts an historical investigation 
on the kind of governments that came to power in Pakistan after its establishment and their 
ability to demonstrate credible commitment to their declared objectives to the people of 
Pakistan, and how this affected the development of trust between the state and individuals 
in Pakistan.
The analysis in section two unfold at the national aggregate level and then proceed to the 
household level. This section answers questions such as who was paying zakat and how 
much. It presents the implications of the presence or absence of trust between the state and 
the individual for zakat. It shows how it affected the claims of the Islamic economists who 
insist that zakat has an immense capability for marshalling resources. They are resolute that 
due to the religious nature of zakat, people will be more willing to pay it than its secular 
counterpart, as zakat will bring the pleasure of Allah, which will remove greed from Islamic 
society. They add that because the zakat rate is so low as compared to the heavy burden of 
income tax, the incentive to evade zakat will be very low. Islamists also believe strongly 
that the incidence of zakat should fall on the richer members of an Islamic society because 
zakat is said to be the right of the poor to the wealth of the rich, the payment of which will 
result in equality among the masses. Additionally, the chapter also examines compliance 
issues. In other words, it examines the resource mobilisation capability of zakat.
As mentioned in Chapter Two, it is in the interest of the state to take steps to demonstrate to 
the public its commitment to a policy and in the process create trust, which would have 
positive results for the smooth operation of that policy. Thus, section three examines the 
behaviour of the Islamic state regarding its commitment to zakat and how it carried out its
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duty of pursuing Islamic ideals of justice and welfare. The idea is to show how the level of 
commitment of the Islamic state towards zakat affected its performance.
4.1 Historical Analysis of the State/Individual Relationship in Pakistan:
This section seeks to draw on Pakistan’s history to assess the level of trust between the state 
and the individual (based on the parameters of trust as defined in Chapter Two), which 
would have important repercussions for the future of zakat policy with regard to its 
performance collection patterns and levels. For this purpose, this section examines political 
aspects such as military coups, the denial of democracy and self-determination; problems 
with constitution formation; the repeated abrogation of constitutions; and finally the role of 
the bureaucracy in Pakistan. All these factors demonstrate the stance of the Pakistani state 
towards a credible commitment that (as has been stated earlier) would create the basis of 
trust between the state and the individual. The long-term and cumulative affect of these 
aspects would be significant for the zakat policy.
History o f  the Machiavellian State in Pakistan
The history of Pakistan tells the story that almost every regime that came to power in the 
country after its creation had an agenda other than that of putting public interests first. 
Collectively these regimes not only failed in fulfilling their foremost duties of delivering a 
constitution to the newly bom nation, but they also displayed considerable contempt for the 
laws that they finally gave to the country by abrogating one constitution after another. The 
interplay of the ruling oligarchies was such that the only democratically elected government 
(that of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto), which came to power 25 years after Pakistan’s creation, was 
never given a chance to complete its tenure.
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The path to constitution-making was often tortuous and accompanied by successive 
upheavals in the nation's political life. The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan was formed 
on 10 August 1947 to draw up the country’s constitution and serve as its first parliament. 
The years between 1947 and 1958 were marked by political instability and by a failure of 
the Assembly to perform the task of a federal legislator. The members were insensitive to 
public opinion and fussed more about minor issues. The business of the Assembly was 
seldom conducted according to schedule as session programmes were not drawn up in 
advance, and bills were rushed through during the last days of the session.412
However, the Assembly managed to deliver the Objectives Resolution in March 1949, 
which defined the basic principles of the new state. Seven years of debate, however, failed 
to produce agreement on fundamental issues such as regional representation or the structure 
of a constitution. Apparently, it was this impasse that prompted Governor General Ghulam 
Mohammad to dismiss the Prime Minister and the Constituent Assembly in 1954.413 This 
dismissal of the sovereign Constituent Assembly and the Prime Minister Khawaja 
Nazimuddin was seen to be arbitrary and undemocratic, as Nazimuddin had enjoyed the 
confidence of the legislature. Although the Governor General’s action was not unlawful, it 
was a palpable infringement of parliamentary conventions.
The move demonstrated downright disregard for the legislative body, which had the sole 
authority to undertake such an action. Interestingly, the event also underlined the lack of
412 A. Husain, Politics and Peoples' Representation in Pakistan (Lahore: Ferozsons Ltd., 1972).p. 40
4,3 www.country-data.com, Pakistan Early Constitution Building 1947- 58  (Federal Research Division 
Library o f  Congress, 1994 [cited April). Some sources say that Ghulam Mohammad committed this act when 
he discovered that the Assembly had passed a bill that made the Governor General (the Head o f State) 
subservient to the powers o f  the Prime Minister. M. A. Rahim et al., Alien Rule and the Rise o f  Muslim 
Nationalism, ed. I. H. Qureshi, 4 vols., vol. 4, A Short History o f  Pakistan (Karachi: University o f Karachi, 
1967).
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cohesion in the political parties of that time, mainly the Muslim League, as they raised no 
serious objections. The move established a trend of such behaviour among politicians, 
marked by a lack of loyalty to the democratic institutions they the politicians were to form, 
guard and strengthen, and an absolute indifference to the rights and privileges of the 
Pakistani public. The Muslim League’s betrayal of their party leader to the Governor 
General demonstrated that all activities were inspired by individual self-interest and the 
quest to stay in power.414 It would not be incorrect to declare that the ultimate militarisation 
of Pakistan's political system had its beginnings in this incident. Thus the scene was set for 
the beginning of the erosion of trust between the leaders and the people. This lack of 
commitment to traditional parliamentary principles that were to usher in democratic 
institutions and thus uphold the supremacy of the people of Pakistan plagued the country’s 
formative years. This incident was the beginning of a series of events which were to show 
the people of Pakistan that those in power were incapable of giving them stable leadership 
and that their commitment to democratic causes was contingent on their own self-interested 
political ambition.
The Second Constituent Assembly, inaugurated in July 1955, presented a draft constitution 
in January 1956. This draft was finally adopted on 29 February 1956 and implemented on 
23 March 1956.415 After nine years of effort, Pakistan finally had a constitution.
However, two and half years after its imposition, President Iskandar Mirza, who had 
succeeded Ghulam Mohammad as the Head of the State in September 1955, illegally 
abrogated the Constitution on 7 October 1958, following a military coup and imposed
414 Husain, Politics and Peoples' Representation.^. 35
415 Choudhury, Constitutional Development in Pakistan.pp. 95-102
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martial law. The purported rationale for this action was the corruption of ideals on which 
Pakistan was founded. The government claimed that due to the political corruption of the 
parliamentary leaders and the economic and political chaos in the country, there had to be a 
complete elimination of the existing political order.416 However, it seems that the real 
rationale was that Pakistan’s first general elections were going to be held in 1959, and 
Mirza could foresee power sliding out of his hands because it was likely that the elections 
would have brought politicians from East Pakistan’s Awami League into power.417
The Avubian Leviathan
Against the political backdrop described above, Iskander Mirza declared martial law and 
appointed General Mohammad Ayub Khan the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces 
and the Chief Martial Law Administrator. Just three weeks later, Ayub dismissed Mirza and 
assumed the Presidency of Pakistan. This action formalised the militarisation of the 
political system in Pakistan.
When Ayub came to power, he declared that his ultimate aim was to restore democracy in 
the country.418 However, he never delivered this promise and after three and half years of 
martial law rule he went on to introduce a new constitution in May 1962. This was to 
reinforce his authority in the absence of martial law,419 as it not only provided for a 
Presidential form of government but the President was the Head of the Executive as well as 
of the State. Although the Constitution Commission set up by Ayub clearly stated that 
Pakistan needed a form of government headed by one person but with an independent
4,6 Weekes, Birth and Growth o f  a Muslim Nation.p. 107
417 Salim, Iskandar Mirza.pp. 255-69
418 Weekes, Birth and Growth o f  a Muslim Nation.p. I l l
419 Ghazali, "llusions and Reality."Chapter IV, p. 1
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legislature exerting a real check, this legislature was not to have the power to meddle with 
the ‘administration of the country’.420 Therefore, Ayub’s constitution did not really allow 
the most important institution in the country, the legislature (which represents the 
supremacy of law) to interfere with Ayub’s activities. Also, Ayub’s economic policies did 
little to elevate him as a leader in the eyes of the Pakistani public (see section 3.1 in 
Chapter Three for analysis of Ayub’s economic policies).
Ayub Khan relinquished power in the face of civil unrest. He abrogated his own 
constitution and, instead of handing power over to the Speaker of the National Assembly, 
as the constitution demanded, he once again defied the law and imposed martial law on 25 
March 1969. He passed power over to the Army Commander-in-Chief, General Agha 
Mohammad Yahya Khan.421 His actions defied the law of the land and demonstrated open 
disregard for the liberties of the Pakistani people. Additionally, by not holding elections 
when promised, he denied the right of choice to the public.
Bhutto’s Leviathan
It was under General Yahya Khan that Pakistan’s first general elections were held in 1970. 
These were to be a turning point in the history of Pakistan. The Pakistan People's Party 
under the leadership of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto won a majority o f seats in West Pakistan, and
420 A. Edgar and K. R. Schuler, Public Opinion and Constitution Making in Pakistan 1958-1962 (Michigan: 
Michigan State University Press, 1967).p. 183
421 N. C. Sahni, Political Struggle in Pakistan (Jullunder City: New Academic Publishing Co., 1969).p. 105. 
Also, General Yahya Khan had led Ayub to believe that the army would put down the agitation, eliminate his 
political opponents and put him back in power in about three months. However, Yahya Khan did not keep his 
promise to Ayub and held elections in 1970. See, A. Gauhar, Ayub Khan: Pakistan's First M ilitary Ruler, 3rd 
ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).pp. 319-20
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the Awami League, under the leadership of Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman in East Pakistan (now 
Bangladesh) won all but 2 seats, i.e. 160, allotted for East Pakistan.422
As a consequence of the Federal Government’s economic policies towards East Pakistan 
and the continuous political marginalisation of East Pakistanis (Bengalis), Mujib-ur- 
Rehman had wanted maximum political autonomy for the provinces, thereby creating 
greater independence for East Pakistan. Bhutto on the other hand wanted power, even at the 
cost of a united Pakistan, as he had realised that in a united Pakistan, his chances of 
acquiring power as Prime Minister were remote.423
The perception of the Bengalis was that Yahya Khan (also from West Pakistan) was going 
to deny the people of East Pakistan the fruits of their electoral victory. This led to an 
outbreak of violence in East Pakistan, and the Awami League launched a non-cooperation 
movement throughout the entire province. Due to the civil unrest in East Pakistan, the army 
took control of the situation on 26 March 1971. This unrest later developed into a full- 
fledged civil war supported by the Indian army. On 16 December 1971, Pakistani forces 
surrendered and East Pakistan became independent as Bangladesh.424
It would not be wrong to state that the blame for the disintegration of Pakistan lay at the 
door of the politicians and the army, and that the ruling elite failed to honour the Islamic 
Ideology of Pakistan as a cohesive force for the Muslims of Pakistan.
422 Hussain, Politics in an Ideological State.p. 141
423 G. W. Choudhury, The Last D ays o f  United Pakistan (London: Hurst, 1974).pp. 146-7
424 Ghazali, "llusions and Reality."Chapter V, p. 1
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Bhutto assumed power as the President and the Chief Martial Law Administrator in the new 
Pakistan on 20 December 1971. He stayed in power for five years on the basis of the 1970 
elections. In 1973, he introduced a new constitution and this time it was his turn to acquire 
maximum possible power. His constitution combined the powers of both the Executive and 
the Legislature within the office of the Prime Minister.425 This combined power made him 
almost akin to a civilian dictator under the garb of a democratic leader.
Bhutto’s economic policies have been discussed in section 3.1 in Chapter Three. His 
policies based on the rhetoric of Islamic Socialism were seen increasingly to be channels 
through which political patronage could be distributed. Moreover, as mentioned in Chapter 
Three, Bhutto was losing favour with the Ulema. Bhutto’s ‘un-Islamic personal character’ 
concerned some of the top army officials as well 426 These were strong political opponents 
to have and persistent political pressure from them forced Bhutto to hold elections. On 7 
January 1977, he announced a schedule for holding elections on a national basis. Although 
his party won, he was accused of rigging by the opposition and on 4 July 1977, he was 
overthrown by his own Army Chief of Staff, Zia-ul-Haq. On 3 September 1977, Bhutto was 
arrested in connection with the murder of Nawab Mohammad Ahmed Khan (the father of 
Ahmad Raza Qasuri, a party worker and a bitter critic of Bhutto), which had taken place in 
1974. This case became the cause of the subsequent Bhutto murder trial and on 18 March 
1978, the Lahore High Court, in a controversial judgment, sentenced Bhutto to death by 
hanging.427 Former U.S. attorney general Ramsey Clarke, who attended the trial, wrote:
"The prosecution's case was based entirely on several witnesses who were detained until 
they confessed, who changed and expanded their confessions and testimony with each
425 Ziring, The Enigma o f  Political Development.p. 121
426 Ibid.p. 131
427 Ghazali, "Uusions and Reality."Chapter VII, p. 2
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reiteration, who contradicted themselves and each other, who, except fo r  Masood 
Mahmood were relating what others said, whose testimony led to four different theories o f 
what happened, absolutely uncorroborated by an eyewitness, direct evidence, or physical 
evidence.1,428
So far there is evidence of foul play in the short history of Pakistan: of one political actor 
against another and of one institution trying to outdo the other in a bid to acquire power. 
Regardless of the fact that Bhutto’s Government could not deliver the promises of his 
economic policies, and that as a result he had lost the confidence of the public, the fact still 
remained that he was the democratically elected choice of the Pakistani public (at least of 
West Pakistan): a fact that the subsequent regime and political opposition did not respect. 
The hanging of a popularly elected leader is an extremely rare phenomenon in the histories 
of democracies in the world.
Chapter Three showed how Zia-ul-Haq came to power, how he broke his promise to restore 
democracy within 90 days of his take over, and how he went back on his word and seven 
months later imposed martial law, debarring all political activities and parties. Suffice to 
say that Zia’s actions once again deprived the people of Pakistan of their basic civil rights. 
The execution of a democratic leader and the imposition of martial law did not lay a 
trustworthy ground for Zia’s future rule over Pakistan.
The successive regimes, such as that of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, did not manage 
to hold on to the office for long. Bhutto was twice dismissed amid charges of incompetence 
and corruption, once in 1990 after she had come to power in 1988 after winning the general
428 R. Clarke, "The Trial o f Ali Bhutto and the Future o f Pakistan," The Nation, August 19-26 1978.
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elections, and the second time in 1996, after coming to power in 1993 (after she was 
allowed to run for office). The government of Nawaz Sharif, which came to power in 1990 
and 1997 after winning the general elections, was overthrown amid charges of hijacking 
and terrorism in a military coup led by General Pervez Musharraf in 1999.
Such actions of corruption, dismissals and coups did not demonstrate that the ruling elite 
possessed any commitment to establish democracy which would empower the people. It 
would be fair to say that in Pakistan the extent of corruption has led to a wider concern 
regarding poor governance, which in turn is responsible for poor economic performance, 
persistent poverty and subversion of democracy.429 Amid the fact that political corruption is 
widely recognised in Pakistan it would be safe to assume that such an environment would 
mostly breed distrust between the ruler and the ruled.430 As a consequence even if a policy 
invokes philosophies held sacred by the intended followers, it would not be entirely 
unexpected for such a policy to be met with scepticism or resistance.
The Bureaucratic Leviathan
Apart from the military and political institutions in Pakistan, another institution that played 
an important role in breaking or creating public trust was the bureaucracy. Due to the 
enduring absence of democracy, the bureaucracy has been and still is one of the most 
significant institutions in Pakistan.
429 M. H. Khan, "Corruption and Governance in South Asia, Review written for Europa's South Asia 2006 
Handbook," (Europa Publications, 2006).p. 5. Khan refers to the South Asian countries in general.
430 M. H. Khan, "Bureaucratic and Political Corruption in Pakistan", December, 2001, World Bank, p. 1
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Each welfare system develops a welfare bureaucracy: government departments with 
thousands of staff and frameworks of rules and laws to regulate the work. The bureaucracy 
has been known to be akin to a political institution, comprising pressure groups, authority
i
centres, social elites and decision intermediaries, and Pakistan is no exception. These 
characteristics of the bureaucracy give it a strategic role in shaping public perceptions of 
welfare policy. It is thus important that the citizen perceives the bureaucracy to be honest 
for it to be a positive influence on a policy.
In Pakistan, the bureaucracy does not enjoy a clean record as this group has played its part 
in contributing to the distrust that the public had in successive governments.431 After the 
creation of Pakistan, the army and the bureaucracy continued to decide the boundaries 
within which economic and political reforms would be attempted. From early on after 
Pakistan’s creation, the bureaucracy was being criticised for the way appointments were 
made and for elitism. By the Ayubian decade of the 1960s, charges of corruption, nepotism 
and lack of transparency were being laid at its door. The Ayubian decade epitomised the 
power of the bureaucracy. It had a central position in the oligarchic structure of the 
government as its practices were channelled towards serving the interests of the elite rather 
than the nation.432 A decade later, Bhutto perceived this power to be threatening and tried to 
reform the bureaucratic system to restrict its authority. However, Bhutto soon learned to 
utilise the power of the bureaucracy as appointments were made in order to secure 
dispersion of support and allegiance to the regime. Thus the system continued to be 
politicised and infested with discrimination and favouritism.433
______________________________________________________________  4
431 S. Mahmood, Bureaucracy in Pakistan: An Historical Analysis (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1990).pp.
1 & 41
432 Ibid.pp. 42, 45 & 53
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When Zia came to power, he initiated the militarisation of the administration by appointing 
army officers to higher civil posts.434 Over the years, the entire Pakistani bureaucracy was 
shaped largely according to the ideals and whims of just one individual, i.e. Zia, whose 
dictates had the status of unchallengeable law in the country.435 The situation did not really 
change during the successive governments, i.e. from Benazir Bhutto in the late eighties and 
the early nineties436 to Nawaz Sharif, who remained in power till 1999.
So far the historical evidence leads to the conclusion that trust between the individual and 
the state in Pakistan since its creation has been severely undermined. Successive regimes 
repeatedly made a mockery of those political institutions that were intended to guarantee 
commitment to democratic governance and exhibited disregard for the pledges that they 
made regarding the welfare of the Pakistani public. The actions of those in power clearly 
confirmed that they were not guided by considerations that would be beneficial to the 
masses but rather were engrossed in their own quest for power. Contingent upon these 
circumstances, one could predict a general lack of popular consent to abide by state laws 
and policies.
4.2a Effects of the State/Individual Relationship on Zakati
This section explores how distrust in the political process and the bureaucracy as examined 
above affected the revenue performance of the zakat. It assesses how this affected the 
claims of the Islamic economists who are resolute that zakat has immense potential to
434 F. Heady, Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective (New York: Marcel Dekker Inc., 1984).p.
333
435 Mahmood, Bureaucracy in Pakistan .p. 76
436 Jones, "Pakistan: A Civil Service."p. 343
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mobilise resources and that zakat will invoke voluntary obligation that the secular taxes, i.e. 
the Income and Wealth Tax cannot match, as zakat, being one of the five fundamentals of 
Islam, will bestow the blessing of Allah upon those who pay. They claim that incentives to 
pay zakat would be strengthened by its low rate. This section tries to test these claims of the 
Islamists not only against the backdrop of Pakistan’s political history, which highlighted 
the process of the development of the state/individual relationship but equally importantly 
as a consequence of the shape of the zakat policy as examined in Chapter Three.
The State o f  General Taxation in Pakistan
Zakat policy is akin to a tax policy as both involve the state extracting money from the 
public, and both have financial repercussions for individuals. Due to the conceptual 
similarity of zakat (excluding zakat’s spiritual rhetoric) with secular taxes such as Income 
and Wealth Taxes, it will be beneficial to offer a portrayal of the public attitude towards 
taxes and tax policies in general in Pakistan since its independence, before the section 
embarks on an analysis of the zakat. Tax policies are also a way for the individual to 
demonstrate his/her trust and confidence in the state that his/her money will be spent in an 
efficient and trustworthy manner, or to show his/her resistance to a regime in case of 
distrust. Hence, this exercise is important, as it will provide a benchmark to assess peoples’ 
attitude towards zakat.
The analysis of Pakistan’s taxation system for the first part of this section will not include 
zakat, as zakat is a parallel system of taxation and thus is not part of the secular taxation 
system and thus not part of the federal budget either.
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The historical analysis o f Pakistan’s tax structure reveals the typical traits of a developing 
country. Overall fiscal effort has been low and the entire system can be described as 
cumbersome and outdated, a fact duly acknowledged by Zia himself in an address to the 
nation.437
The state of affairs is reflected in graph 4.1 above, which shows the tax and total revenues 
as a percentage of GDP. The historical pattern of total revenue shows that total receipts rose 
on trend across the period from 1950 to 1994. In nominal terms, total revenues rose from
1.1 billion rupees (an estimated 8% of GDP) in 1953 to 324 billion rupees (roughly 20% of
Km
GDP) in 1994. This corresponds to an average annual growth rate o f 14.4%.
The graph demonstrates that tax/GDP ratio also rose during the period between 1953 and 
1994. In nominal terms, tax revenues rose from 0.827 billion rupees (an estimated 6% of
437 Directorate o f  F ilm s and Publication, "Introduction o f  Islam ic System  in Pakistan: Address to the Nation, 
President General M oham m ad Zia-ul-H aq (1979)."
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GDP) in 1953 to 246 billion rupees (about 16% of GDP) in 1994, corresponding to an 
average annual growth rate of about 14.5%. Considering the average annual growth rate of 
total revenues, the total tax growth rate is significant. However, if  nominal tax revenues are 
adjusted by the GDP deflator (base 1990), the average annual growth rate of tax revenues 
comes down to 6.9% (see graph 4.2 below). This percentage is still considerable and shows 
the tax structure to be buoyant as the real average GDP growth rate for the same period was 
only 4.5%. However, this phenomenon could be contextualised easily by stating that in the 
first years of Pakistan’s independence, the tax system was of rudimentary nature, therefore 
the very low level starting point created an impressive sense of tax revenue growth.438
438 The partition o f India and the creation o f Pakistan in 1947 left Pakistan with very low revenues. Most 
direct and indirect taxes were generated in what is now India. Most o f  the industrial ports where customs 
duties were collected went to India, and excise duties were collected at places o f  manufacture, which were 
also in present-day India. Pakistan had an acute lack o f economic and industrial infrastructure with the 
capacity to bear taxes. The important taxes in the newly created Pakistan were income tax, corporation tax, 
customs duties, central excise duties and the sales tax. From 1948 to 1977 no new taxes were introduced. See 
Planning Commission, "The First Five Year Plan 1955-60," ed. Government o f  Pakistan National Planning 
Board (The Manager o f  Publications, Karachi, 1957). pp. 8-12
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The country’s tax system did not tap the wealth o f rich individuals and companies, as it was 
heavily weighted towards indirect taxes. Indirect taxes (customs duties, sales tax and excise 
duties) represented the lion’s share of tax revenue, while direct taxes (income tax, wealth 
tax, corporate tax and capital value tax) represented 16% of the total taxes on average (see 
graph 4.3 below).
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Direct tax bases were narrow due to wide-ranging exemptions and concessions. A major 
example of this would be the exclusion of the agricultural sector from any levy of tax. For 
example, in 1986 there were an estimated 3 million households in the agricultural sector 
whose incomes were above the then current income tax exemption limit o f Rs.24000,439 but 
these households could not be taxed due to these exemptions. The result of such 
exemptions was that the tax rates had to be pitched at high levels, which in turn created a 
vicious circle of further tax base erosion and higher tax rates.440
Tax administration in Pakistan also typified a developing country, i.e. it was archaic, the tax 
administration personnel did not possess the appropriate skills and there was widespread 
dependence on manual rather than automated functioning. Procedures of assessment and
439 Report o f  a W orking Group, "Tax System  in Pakistan: A  Critical Evaluation and R ecom m endations for 
Change", M ay/June, 1986, Institute o f  P olicy  Studies, Islam abad p. 9. A lso , tax holidays w ere provided to 
new industrial undertakings ranging from five to seven  years. There w ere other exem ptions, for exam ple, on  
salaries o f  Pakistanis em ployed  by foreign governm ents, foreign em ployees o f  educational institutions, casual 
receipts, the incom e o f  writers, sportsm en, sch oo ls and hospitals and doctors in rural areas. A lso  see, A . Khan, 
"National R esource Scenario: A n O verview", 20th N ovem ber, 1996, p. 7
440 H. A . Pasha, "Political E conom y o f  Tax Reform : The Pakistan Experience," P akistan  Journal o f  A p p lied  
E conom ics  11, no. 1&2 (1995).p . 129
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collection of taxes have been both inconvenient and time-consuming. Furthermore, tax laws 
have been very complicated with provisos, stipulations and exemptions marked by 
ambiguities and irrationalities. Pakistan lacked several factors that were necessary to make 
a tax system credible and effective, such as commercial accounting and proper record­
keeping. Furthermore, the presence of a large number of .small traders and self-employed 
persons created additional challenges for the fiscal authorities.441 The fact that most 
businesses were run by families in Pakistan gave these businesses an easy way to 
manipulate the accounts and dodge taxes.442
A major reason for the non-payment of taxes to the state was the public perception that the 
tax bureaucracy was corrupt, i.e. that they were complicit in the abuse of public office and 
that they held private gain or the benefit of a group with which they might identify above 
their duty to the public (a sentiment that confirms our earlier comments of Pakistan’s 
bureaucracy). According to a survey carried out by the Task Force on the Reform of Tax in 
2001, on a scale of 1-5, taxpayers worried about corruption at an average of 4.2. The public 
seemed to think that 82% of the Government organisations were corrupt and regarded the 
Income Tax Department as the fourth most corrupt institution.443 8 9% of the respondents of 
the survey considered that all previous initiatives to reduce corruption were complete 
failures.444 There has been widespread concern among the public over the lack of 
accountability regarding the quality of work and the conduct of the officials.445 This public
441 A. Khan, "Reform Issues in Tax Policy and Tax Administration for Self-reliant Development," The 
Pakistan Development Review  37, no. 4 Part II (1998).pp. 1105-1114
442 Mayer, "Islamisation and Taxation in Pakistan."p. 66
443 The Task Force on Reform o f  Tax Administration, "Reform o f Tax Administration in Pakistan", 14 April, 
2001, pp. 163-5. The Police came first in the survey, followed by the Lower Courts and the Water and Power 
Developmental Authority.
444 Ibid.p. 166
445 Tax Reforms Commission, "Resource Mobilization and Tax Reforms Commission", August, 1994, 
Government o f  Pakistan, p. 83
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perception of the conduct of the tax departments has raised negative individual attitudes 
towards taxation and increased suspicion that the public derives little benefit from the taxes 
paid, which did little for trust in the country’s tax system.446
The state did try to reform the taxation structure in the face of stagnant policies and low 
levels of compliance. In 1975, the government sought to improve the taxation system and 
introduced several structural changes. A critical re-examination of rebates and relief and 
revision of tax rates was conducted and a systematic approach to enlist new taxpayers was 
introduced.447 The method adopted was to enhance the quality and the effectiveness of tax 
enforcement procedures, and increase the statutory obligations of the taxpayers. This was in 
turn exercised via externally and internally geared survey operations. Income tax inspectors 
went from door to door with surveys to identify new taxpayers, and internally geared tax 
surveys uncovered false declarations by existing taxpayers.448 The introduction and 
development of self-assessment in 1979 contributed substantially to the rapid growth of 
income tax revenues. Income tax receipts surged from Rs.2946 million in 1977-78 to 
Rs. 13407 million in 1988 at current prices449 (which is Rs.3443.91 million for 1977-78 and 
Rs.7754.57 million for 1988 at 1980 prices). Furthermore, a significant broadening of the 
income tax base had occurred in the years 1979-88. Also, many pending assessments were 
being completed.450
446 A. Sultan et al., "Final Report", 31st December, 1986, National Tax Reform Commission, Karachi p. 11
447 Planning Commission, "The Sixth Five Year Plan 1983-88," ed. Government o f  Pakistan Planning 
Commission (The Manager o f Publications, Karachi, 1983).p. 53
448 Sultan et al., "National Tax Reform Commission", p. 124
449 Statistics Division, "50 Years o f Pakistan in Statistics 1947-1997," ed. Federal Bureau o f Statistics 
(Islamabad: Government o f  Pakistan, 1997).
450 Central Board o f  Revenue, "Central Board o f Revenue Year Book", 1987-88, Government o f Pakistan, 
Islamabad p. 18
233
However, despite increased efforts the tax system remained inadequate throughout the 
entire period of analysis. Modest spurts of reform and enforcement did little for the basis of 
trust between the state and the individual, as can be assessed by the survey conducted in 
2001 (mentioned earlier) which shows that the popular public attitude was one of distrust 
towards the bureaucrats, who were perceived to be corrupt and inefficient in conducting 
their duties. Such a situation was conducive to rampant tax evasion and a lack of support 
for state policies. The situation of taxation in Pakistan presented here provides a point of 
reference for the comparison with the performance of zakat in Pakistan.
Zakat Revenue in Pakistan
This section evaluates the pattern of zakat revenue in Pakistan from the time of its 
imposition in 1980 to 1994. According to table 4.1 and graph 4.4 below, zakat revenue as a 
percentage of GDP had been quite low, lingering at an average of 0.3%. This implies that 
zakat’s contribution for resource mobilisation in the economy was not very promising, in 
contradiction to the aspirations of the Islamists.
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Table 4.1
Total Zakat Collected (Rs. M illion)
(Rs. M illion)
Total Zakat 
C ollected  
(current prices) Deflator (1980)
At constant prices  
(zakat
co llected /deflator) % of GDP
1980 8 4 4 .3 1 .0 0 8 4 4 .3 0 .4
1981 9 0 2 .4 1 .11 8 1 2 .8 0 .3
1982 1 0 2 7 .0 1 .21 8 4 5 .7 0 .3
1983 1 4 9 0 .0 1 .2 8 1 1 6 5 .5 0 .4
1984 1 3 3 4 .8 1 .4 0 9 5 2 .2 0 .3
1985 1 5 2 1 .0 1 .4 7 1 0 3 8 .0 0 .3
1986 1 6 5 8 .9 1 .51 1 0 9 6 .0 0 .3
1987 2 0 6 9 .5 1 .5 8 1 3 0 8 .2 0 .4
1988 2 2 7 9 .4 1 .7 3 1 3 1 4 .5 0 .3
1989 2 5 7 3 .2 1 .8 8 1 3 6 6 .6 0 .3
1990 2 7 9 2 .0 2 .0 0 1 3 9 2 .9 0 .3
1991 2 7 7 0 .0 2 .2 7 1 2 2 2 .3 0 .3
1992 2 6 5 8 .4 2 .4 9 1 0 6 5 .6 0 .2
1993 2 8 8 4 .4 2 .7 1 1 0 6 4 .0 0 .2
1994 3 0 7 3 .2 3 .0 6 1 0 0 4 .5 0 .2
Source: www.datastrearri.net. State Bank o f  Pakistan Annual Reports 1980  to 1995 and A uthor’s ow n  
calculations.
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The above table and graph demonstrate that zakat revenue was on the increase if one looks 
at these numbers in current prices. This pattern is replicated for constant prices as well, but
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only till 1990, as after that one observes a trend of decrease in zakat revenue. Whereas the 
increase in zakat collection in constant prices from 1980 to 1990 had been 6% on average, 
the decrease from 1990 to 1994 was an average 7.5%. The following analysis evaluates 
zakat collection by type of asset.
Zakat Collection by Type of Asset
Table 4.2 and graph 4.5 and table 4.3 and graph 4.6 below reveal that zakat revenue 
receipts from savings accounts had been most significant as compared to other assets for 
the entire period. However, these receipts from the savings accounts plunged from a high of 
77.9% in 1983-84 to 55.8% in 1987-88 and to just 49.2% in 1990-91 of the total zakat 
collected.
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Table 4.2
Zakat Revenues (1980-1994) by Assets (Rs. Million)
Type of Asset 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94
Saving Bank Account 618.2 658.0 752.0 1162.0 869.0 937.0 1022.1 1156.0 1178.7 1273.2 1376.3 1496.3 1567.5 1767.4
Notice Deposit Receipts 70.9 39.0 23.0 22.0 24.0 22.8 12.3 17.3 14.4 17.1 9.5 12.2 14.0 9.8
Fixed Deposit Receipts and 
Certificate 76.1 112.0 151.0 170.0 279.0 379.7 452.7 674.7 776.9 963.6 1068.7 834.7 606.8 527.0
Saving Deposit Certificate 22.9 30.0 36.0 62.0 79.0 82.7 - 63.8 97.3 138.5 134.8 118.1 152.6 161.8 191.5
NIT Units 19.6 20.0 14.0 19.0 22.0 25.9 25.2 27.3 43.5 2.6 65.9 99.4 93.5 98.8
ICP Mutual Funds 1.9 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.9 1.7 3.0 2.9 3.2 3.5 2.9
Government Securities 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.6 1.3 1.0 1.0 0.6 0.4 1.0 1.9 1.0
Shares and Debentures 25.2 25.0 30.0 35.0 36.0 40.7 47.9 53.6 75.1 84.5 100.4 114.0 142.6 164.5
Annuities 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2
Life insurance Policies 3.0 5.0 5.0 6.0 6.0 8.6 8.1 9.2 10.8 12.2 13.9 15.6 18.9 21.0
Provident Funds 5.6 11.0 11.0 11.0 14.0 19.1 22.5 30.1 38.7 81.6 35.9 41.2 47.6 60.1
Total Zakat deducted at 
source 844.3 902.0 1026.0 1491.0 1333.0 1521.0 1658.9 2069.6 2279.4 2573.2 279Z0 2770.2 2658.4 2844.2
Voluntarily Paid Zakat 1.6 2 1 1 2 1.7 1.4 2.4 3.5 3.5 5.6 8.3 7.7 7.4
Other Receipts 0.3 1.8 0.8 0.6 0.2 1.7 1804.1
Total Zakat 845.9 904.0 1027.0 1492.0 1335.0 1522.7 1660.3 2072.3 2284.7 2577.5 2798.2 2778.7 2667.8 4655.7
... Negligible
Source: State Bank o f Pakistan, Annual Reports, 1980 to 1995, Karachi.
Other receipts: This account is to be credited with all other receipts which on account o f their nature cannot be directly credited to any o f the above 
specified accounts. Central Zakat Administration June 1982, The Zakat Manual, p. 102, Ministry o f  Finance, Government o f Pakistan, Islamabad.
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Table 4.3
Percentage of Total Zakat Revenues by Assets (1980-1994)
Type of Asset 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94
Saving Bank Account 73.1 72.8 73.2 77.9 65.1 61.5 61.6 55.8 51.6 49.4 49.2 53.8 58.8 38.0
Notice Deposit Receipts 8.4 4.3 2.2 1.5 1.8 1.5 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.2
Fixed Deposit Receipts and 
Certificate 9.0 12.4 14.7 11.4 20.9 24.9 27.3 32.6 34.0 37.4 38.2 30.0 22.7 11.3
Saving Deposit Certificate 2.7 3.3 3.5 4.2 5.9 5.4 3.8 4.7 6.1 5.2 4.2 5.5 6.1 4.1
NIT Units 2.3 2.2 1.4 1.3 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.9 0.1 2.4 3.6 3.5 2.1
ICR Mutual Funds 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Government Securities 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Shares and Debentures 3.0 2.8 2.9 2.3 2.7 2.7 2.9 2.6 3.3 3.3 3.6 4.1 5.3 3.5
Annuities 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Life insurance Policies 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.5
Provident Funds 0.7 1.2 1.1 0.7 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.7 3.2 1.3 1.5 1.8 1.3
Total Zakat deducted at 
source 99.8 99.8 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.8 99.8 99.8 99.7 99.6 61.1
Voluntarily Paid Zakat 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2
Other Receipts 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 38.8
Total Zakat 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Derived from table 4.2.
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The reason for such a performance was the exemption clauses that people used to avoid 
paying zakat. These included transferring funds from their savings accounts to current 
accounts (as zakat is not deducted from current accounts) a few days before the first of 
Ramadan, the day when zakat was to be deducted by the account-holding institutions. 
According to one national newspaper, in 1995 bank account balances had lowered by 1,200 
per cent on the eve of Ramadan.451 Additionally, it was common practice to submit an 
affidavit that declared the individuals to be followers of a religious faction such as Fiqh 
Jafferia (Shias), which made them exempt from the payment of zakat. Non-Shias saw this 
concession to the Shias as a loophole in the law, so Sunnis also declared themselves as 
Shias to avoid zakat.452 Unfortunately, data on the number of declarations filed and the 
number of transfers is impossible to obtain. According to a newspaper source, the 
exemption from compulsory deduction of zakat on the basis of faith and fiqh  has been 
extensively abused.453 This source reported that the bureaucrats were no exception to this 
malpractice as they were also guilty of filing bogus affidavits declaring themselves as 
belonging to Fiqh Jafferia in order to evade zakat.454
The World Bank prepared a rough estimate of the amount of zakat revenue that appeared to 
be due, based on balances reported by the State Bank of Pakistan as of the end of December 
1993. They took the two main categories of assets subject to zakat, i.e. savings accounts 
(personal) and fixed deposits (personal) and applied the 2.5 percent zakat rate to these 
balances, and came up with expected yields of Rs.3,494 million and Rs. 1,268 million 
respectively. The corresponding amounts actually collected in 1993/94 were Rs. 1,767
451 Staff Reporter, The Muslim, 5 February 1995.
452 The researcher’s own experience at the Societe Generale Bank, Lahore, during 1993-96 confirms this 
point. Also, World Bank, "Pakistan Poverty Assessment", 25th September, 1995, World Bank Group, p. 36
453 Staff Reporter, "Evading Zakat."
454 Staff Reporter, "Top Bureaucrats Trying to Evade Zakat Deduction," News, 1st February 1995.
241
million and Rs.527 million respectively (see table 4.2), i.e. less than 50% of the expected 
yields, suggesting that the proportion of people who withdrew deposits or declared 
themselves exempt was considerable.455
The situation with the Notice Deposit Receipts indicated that they had been on a constant 
decline for the entire period. They started with 8.4% of total zakat revenue in 1980-81 but 
then declined, becoming a negligible share of total zakat revenue by the late 1980s. 
Receipts of zakat from this asset fell by an average 6.1% per annum in nominal terms.
Zakat revenue from Fixed Deposit Receipts and Certificates were the second largest source 
of zakat revenues, and were increasing during 1980-91. They rose from a share of 9.0% in 
1980 to a peak of 38.2% in 1990-91, but these too gradually started to decline, falling to 
only 11.3% in 1993-4. The liberalisation of foreign exchange policy has been seen to be a 
potential cause of this decline from 1991-93. Apparently, this measure encouraged people 
to convert their savings into foreign currency, as foreign currency accounts are exempt 
from the payment of zakat under the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance.456 Zakat receipts from 
Saving Deposit Certificates had been showing a gentle rising trend with their share of total 
zakat receipts climbing from 2.7% in 1980 to 6.1% in 1988-89, but then started to dwindle 
till the end of the period in 1993-94.
Zakat yield from NIT Units (National Investment Trust Units) had also mostly been on the 
increase with the exception of 1989-90, when its share fell to 0.1% from 1.9% in 1988-89. 
From 1990-91 onwards the increase in NIT Units had been pretty impressive unlike other
455 World Bank, "Pakistan Poverty Assessment", p. 36
456 Shirazi, System o f  Zakat in Pakistan .p. 34
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government-issued debt. Zakat receipts from ICP (Investment Corporation of Pakistan) 
Mutual Funds and also Government Securities together lingered at around 0.1% of total 
zakat receipts on average for the entire period. The increase in zakat receipts for shares and 
debentures of private and public companies was quite impressive, as they increased at the 
rate of almost 40% annually. There were no receipts for zakat from annuities for most of 
the years, and for the years in which this asset did manage to raise some zakat, the revenue 
was insignificant.
Yields from Life Insurance policies and Provident Funds grew by 18 million rupees and 
almost 56 million respectively from 1980-81 to 1993-94. However, their relevance was 
never significant as together their share of total zakat revenue was 1.9% on average for the 
entire period.
During these years, zakat receipts from reported voluntary sources had been negligible, 
averaging around 0.2%. The government was aware of the importance of collecting 
voluntary zakat as it represented the consent of the people in paying it, thus demonstrating 
its acceptance as a state imposition. For this purpose, in 1982 the government raised its 
concern in making the voluntary zakat payment system more effective.457 However, it 
seems that it did not make a concerted effort towards raising voluntary zakat as its payment 
averaged at 4.4% of total zakat revenues. Mohammad, in his 1988 study of zakat in 
Pakistan, held that very few LZCs collected any voluntary zakat.45*
457 markazi zakat council, "nizam-e-zakat ki kargardagi aur ushr ka nifaaz, markazi aur suba-i-counsilon ka 
mushtarrika ijlaas, khitaab sadar general mohammad zia-ul-haq, reportain, sifarishaat aur faisale," ed. markazi 
zakat intizamia (Islamabad: vizarat-e-khazana, 1982).p. 25
458 Mohammad, "Evaluation o f  nizam-e-zakat and ushr in Pakistan", p. 31
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In January 1992, a high-ranking Committee was set up to review the zakat system. The 
Committee’s report openly admitted the lack of public trust in zakat policy,459 and it 
expressed apprehension regarding the trivial amounts of voluntary zakat collection. For this 
purpose it proposed the creation of credibility in the system by projecting, with greater 
vigour, the activities of the Central and Provincial Zakat Administration, a move that was 
supposed to motivate zakat donation 460 (The last section of this chapter will deal with the 
attitude and the commitment of the state with regards to promotion of zakat policy in 
detail). The fact that such an action was deemed necessary twelve years after the imposition 
of zakat indicated that individual trust in the state’s administration of zakat was low, the 
evidence of which reflected in the lethargic condition of zakat voluntary payment to the 
Government.
However, there was sharp rise in zakat deposits under the category of other receipts in 
1993-94. This category represents receipts that cannot be categorised under any of the 11 
asset classes or even as voluntary zakat and represents grants and donations from charitable 
organisations or foreign governments. The year 1993-94 had recorded a one-off sum of 
Rs.1804 million (equivalent to 63% of compulsory zakat revenues), which was a huge 
upward shift from its usual pattern of almost zero receipts. The Economic and Business 
Review detailed this as follows:
‘No official explanation was given for this sudden jump but according to State Bank’s 
Annual Report the major component was ‘Other Receipts’. Zakat collection under this 
particular head had remained very nominal in the past, and was a paltry Rs.1.7 million in
459 Finance Division & Central Zakat Administration, "Report o f the Committee Appointed by the Prime 
Minister to Review the Existing System o f Zakat and Ushr," (Islamabad: Finance Division & Central Zakat 
Administration, 1992).p. 8
460 Ibid.p. 10
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1992-93. However, during 1994-94, collection under the head ‘Other Receipts’ shot up to 
Rs. 1804.1 million which was nearly 40 percent of the total collection of Rs.4.6 billion.’461
Considering that zakat on these assets was deducted at source and not collected via self- 
assessment, the negative scenario reveals the pro-activeness of the individual in avoiding 
the payment of zakat. Deducting zakat at source on the chosen eleven assets was supposed 
to provide an easy form of tax collection for the Government. It was intended to ensure 
easy monitoring and control over zakat payments for the authorities and a high level of 
compliance. It was the easy way for the Government to make people comply with zakat 
payment.462 However, the above analysis revealed the eagerness of the individuals to avoid 
zakat via loopholes in the zakat law, which is a clear indication of not only a lack of 
popular commitment to the zakat system but also demonstrates the suspicion of the 
individual towards the Islamic State.
The above study indicates the level of co-operation and compliance by the individual in the 
payment of zakat to the state. The analyses also showed the unimpressive performance of 
zakat in relation to resource mobilisation. This state of affairs is in direct contradiction to 
the ideals of Islamic economists who, as noted in Chapter Two, had declared that not only 
zakat would be a major source of resource mobilisation, but also that the incentive to evade 
zakat would be very low due to its low rate.
461 I. H. Bumey, "Zakat collection doubles over the previous year," Economic and Business Review, October 
29 1994.
462 Withholding tax was introduced in Pakistan in 1979 and has since been an important tool for Pakistan’s 
taxation revenue as it is used to extend the coverage o f income tax to various forms o f capital. Tax Reforms 
Commission, "Resource Mobilization and Tax Reforms", p. 52. See also, Central Board o f Revenue, "Central 
Board o f  Revenue Year Book", 1995-96, Government o f Pakistan, Islamabad p. 54
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Another assertion of the Islamists, stated in the beginning of this section, was that zakat, 
being one of the five fundamentals of Islam, will bestow the blessing of Allah upon those 
who pay it and thus its religious character will invoke a voluntary obligation that secular - 
taxes such as Income and Wealth Tax cannot match. The following analyses undertake to 
assess the accuracy of this assertion.
Zakat. Income and Wealth Tax
Public attitudes towards taxation in general have already been commented upon. It is 
nonetheless interesting to compare zakat with secular taxation to test the assertions of the 
Islamists who insist that due to the religious nature of zakat, people would be more willing 
to pay it than its secular counterpart (i.e. Income and Wealth Tax), as zakat will bring the 
pleasure of Allah. Although a detailed comparison of zakat with Income Tax is not feasible 
due to the differences in their nature and the diversity of their tax base,463 exemptions and 
rates, it would be interesting to place zakat’s fiscal effort next to that of its secular 
counterparts to assess this claim.
It is appropriate to start with the comparison of zakat revenue with that of Wealth Tax as 
these are more akin to each other, in the sense that both are levied on stock of wealth, they 
share the same rate of levy i.e. 2.5%, and their base is somewhat similar.464 The 2.5% rate
463 Income tax is levied on salaries, interest on securities, income from residential property, profits and gains 
o f business or profession or vocation, capital gains and income from other sources o f individuals, companies 
and partnership firms. Central Board o f Revenue, "CBR Year Book (1987-88)", p. 12
464 The Wealth Tax had been a part o f the country’s tax structure since 1963. Wealth Tax rates were 
progressive, ranging from 0.24% to 2.5%. It was levied on immovable property such as commercial property 
and more than one residential property, while movable assets included jewellery and vehicles. This tax was 
actually meant to supplement the incomplete coverage o f capital income under income tax. It was imposed on 
the net worth o f an individual. This net worth meant the amount by which the aggregate value o f all the assets 
belonging to a taxpayer exceeded all the debts owned by him on the valuation date, which was generally June 
30 each year. Private limited companies and registered firms paid it on non-agricultural immovable properties 
at a similar rate o f 2.5% held for the purpose o f sale or letting. Ibid.p. 15. Exemptions from Wealth Tax 
included, one self-occupied residential house, assets created out o f  foreign remittances, foreign exchange
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of the Wealth Tax is an interesting coincidence with the rate of zakat, but it is not clear 
from where this rate was derived.
According to table 4.4 and graph 4.7 below, zakat is definitely outperforming the Wealth 
Tax, as zakat is raising 0.2 percentage points more than Wealth Tax on average. However, 
judgement in favour o f zakat should be cautionary. The reason being according to the Zakat 
Ordinance, ‘Under the Wealth Tax Act, 1963 (XV of 1963), his assets in respect of which 
zakat or contribution in lieu thereof has been deducted at source during the year relevant to 
that assessment year, shall be excluded from his taxable wealth’.465 An individual was to 
provide a receipt to the taxing agencies as a proof of his payment of zakat to be able to get 
exempted from the payment of the Wealth Tax. This implied that resources from the 
Wealth Tax were being directed to zakat.
deposits, furniture, other household goods and utensils, wearing apparel intended for personal or household 
use, necessary tools and instruments for the profession. Sultan et al., "National Tax Reform Commission", p. 
31. Exemptions were also made on drawings/paintings/works o f  art or scientific collections o f national, 
scientific or historic interest, copyrights/patents and immovable property held in trust for charitable purposes, 
chambers o f  commerce and wealth owned by diplomats. Central Board o f  Revenue, "CBR Year Book (1995- 
96)", p. 91
465 Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980.p. 34
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Table 4.4
Comparison of Zakat, Wealth and Income Taxes
Total Zakat Deducted 
at Source
Wealth and Welfare 
Tax
Income and 
Corporate Tax
Years
current
prices % of GDP
current
prices % of GDP
current
prices % of GDP
1975 - - 0 0.0 509 0.5
1976 - - 0 0.0 662 0.5
1977 - - 61 0.0 2946 2.0
1978 - - 66 0.0 3340 1.9
1979 - - 97 0.0 5225 2.7
1980 844 0.4 145 0.1 7028 3.0
1981 902 0.3 188 0.1 8250 3.0
1982 1027 0.3 180 0.1 8751 2.7
1983 1490 0.4 205 0.1 8621 2.4
1984 1335 0.3 230 0.1 9071 2.2
1985 1521 0.3 190 0.0 9592 2.0
1986 1659 0.3 187 0.0 10200 2.0
1987 2070 0.4 235 0.0 11500 2.0
1988 2279 0.3 327 0.0 13407 2.0
1989 2573 0.3 391 0.1 14337 1.9
1990 2792 0.3 600 0.1 19211 2.2
1991 2770 0.3 628 0.1 27913 2.7
1992 2658 0.2 1744 0.1 35018 2.9
1993 2884 0.2 1565 0.1 41466 3.1
1994 3073 0.2 2850 0.2 54300 3.5
Source: State Bank o f  Pakistan Annual Reports 1980 to 1995 & Statistics Division, "50 Years o f Pakistan in 
Statistics 1947-1997."Government o f Pakistan, 1997.
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Additionally, unlike zakat, the Wealth Tax was not deducted at source; it was to be self­
assessed and declared by the payer, which made it difficult for the government to tap it. The 
implication of this was that the Wealth Tax was limited primarily to immovable property. 
But even tax on immovable property could be avoided in several ways via loopholes in the 
tax law (as the rich in any country generally prefer to conceal the amount of real estate they 
have in their possession). As a result, the revenue from the Wealth Tax suffered negatively 
and it was abolished in 2003.466 This difference between deduction at source and self- 
assessment is crucial in explaining the disparity between the revenues from the two taxes. 
The poor performance of the Wealth Tax relative to zakat was very much a consequence of 
the nature of the Wealth’s Tax and had little or nothing to do with the religious nature of 
zakat, as was claimed by the Islamic economists. Thus it does not follow that zakat raises 
more revenue than its secular counterpart because of its religious nature.
466 Gazette o f Pakistan Extraordinary, "Annual Tax Decision Finance Act 2003," Pakistan Law Journal II 
(2003).p. 391
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The comparison between zakat and Income Tax is not a valid one, as zakat is levied on a 
stock of wealth and Income Tax is levied on an annual flow. However, a few following 
points should be able to determine whether the claim of the Islamists mentioned above is 
appropriate.
According to table 4.4 and graph 4.7 above, over the period 1980-94 zakat revenues 
averaged about 11% of Income Tax revenues. This was remarkable considering that zakat’s 
tax base is narrower than the Income Tax base and 2.5% zakat rate is considerably lower 
than the personal Income Tax’s maximum marginal tax rate, which stood at 60% in 1979- 
80.467 However, before one makes any positive judgement (putting aside, for the moment, 
the diverse nature of the two taxes) in favour of zakat based on the above table and graph, it 
would be vital to point out that according to the Zakat Ordinance, ‘Under the Income Tax 
Ordinance, 1979 (XXXI of 1979), his total income shall be reduced by the amount paid by 
him to a zakat fund, during the income year relevant to that assessment year’.468 An 
individual was to provide a receipt to the taxing agencies as a proof of his payment of zakat 
to be able to get reduction in the payment of Income Tax. An example of the Income Tax 
reduction on salaries is given below:
467 Tax Reforms Commission, "Resource Mobilization and Tax Reforms", p. 19
468 Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980.p. 34. Also see, Central Board o f  Revenue, "CBR Year Book (1995-96)", 
p. 55. Income Tax was not levied on the assets liable to zakat p e r  se, but on the income generated from them. 
In the case o f  withholding income tax, it was levied on the income from the assets. This was done so that 
interest earned on the asset became liable to income tax and once 10% Income Tax had been deducted from 
that income the resulting asset would then be liable for zakat.
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Table 4.5
Calculation of Tax Liability
For Persons with Income up to Rs. 100000
Without Zakat 
Deduction
With Zakat 
Deduction
Salary Income 95000 95000
Less Zakat 
Paid on Assets 600
Balance
Income 95000 94400
Income Tax 
@10% 9500 9440
Less Basic Tax 
Credit 5000 5000
Income Tax 
Payable 4500 4440
Source: CBR Year Book 1995-96, Central Board o f  Revenue, Government o f  Pakistan, Islamabad, p. 37 and 
Author’s own calculations.
Table 4.5 reveals that the government’s secular revenue would decrease slightly because of 
deductions made with respect to zakat. According to the above example, one finds that the 
decline in Income Tax payable from column two to column three would be 1.3%. This 
estimate shows that some resources from Income Tax were channelled into zakat revenue, 
which further decreased the Income Tax revenue that was already averaging around 2.3% 
of GDP (see table 4.4).
Furthermore, the mode of deduction of the two taxes was different enough to tilt the 
revenue pattern in favour of zakat. Income Tax in Pakistan is mostly collected on a self- 
assessed basis whereas as pointed out before, zakat is entirely of a withholding nature. 
Withholding makes it difficult to evade taxes, whereas self-assessment gives an individual 
or a company more scope for avoidance. It was in the face of this trend of Income Tax 
evasion and avoidance, that in 1979 the government introduced a 10% withholding tax on
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salaries, annuities and pensions. Although this step tapped a relatively small segment of the 
economy, it was from here that most of the revenues of Income Tax would come.469 
Additionally, as pointed out earlier, the Income Tax base in Pakistan has been narrow 
because of exemptions ranging from all agricultural income to all sorts of industrial 
undertakings.
Thus, in the case of Pakistan, the positive state of affairs for zakat as compared to Income 
Tax would seem to be not due to the religious fervour of the individuals to pay zakat (as the 
Islamists claim, believing that the religious nature of zakat would prompt individuals to pay 
more zakat than its secular counterpart), but because the policies have been shaped in such 
a way as to bias against the payment of Income Tax.
The present enquiry has partially confronted some of the claims of the Islamists. The 
decision of the Government to impose zakat via automatic deductions in order to raise more 
zakat revenue did not seem to have produced great results, as is evident from the 
zakat/GDP ratio and from the asset-specific collection pattern. At this point it is fair to 
assert that in the context of Pakistan, the level of zakat payment has been unimpressive and 
perhaps not what the Islamists had anticipated. Moreover, the individual has been shown to 
be far from positively inclined towards paying zakat as demonstrated by the evidence on 
zakat avoidance presented above. It was shown that individuals found various ways to 
avoid payment via fallacious affidavits, the transfer of funds and conversion into foreign 
currencies. Additionally, another claim of the Islamists can be challenged (on practical
469 Report o f  a Working Group, "Tax System in Pakistan", p. 2. Withholding was extended in 1982 to 
securities and 1991 to savings deposits and certificates. Thus, it was used as an important tool for Pakistan’s 
taxation system as it is used to extend the coverage o f Income Tax to various forms o f  capital. Also see, Tax 
Reforms Commission, "Resource Mobilization and Tax Reforms", p. 52
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terms if not numerically) by the above analysis. This is the claim that paying zakat will 
bring the pleasure of Allah, and so individuals will pay it willingly, unlike secular taxation, 
for example Income and Wealth Tax. What became clear was the discriminatory treatment 
of Wealth and Income Tax actually favoured the payment of zakat, and that the withholding 
mode of zakat made it better suited to raise revenue than the secular taxes. Even though the 
zakat did raise significant revenue when compared to Income or Wealth Tax, this was 
mainly the result of the design of the respective tax structure and collection systems rather 
than the religious nature of zakat.
This section supports the hypothesis undertaken in Chapter Two that the scepticism and 
distrust of the individual towards the state and its government cannot necessarily be 
overcome by invoking divine ideologies, that the imposition of policies invoked on 
religious grounds, such as zakat based on the Islamic economic philosophy, even when this 
philosophy defines the raison d ’etre of a nation such as Pakistan, would not automatically 
create the atmosphere o f brotherhood between the ruler and the ruled and thus conformity 
and compliance with the imposed policy. The section also reveals the consequences of the 
shape of the zakat policy working from the revenue collection dimension at the national 
aggregate level.
The following sub-section further assesses the Islamists’ claims about the nature of zakat 
by analysing the system in Pakistan at the household-level. This micro-level analysis is 
essential to obtain a vivid picture of the operation of zakat at the grass-roots level. It 
answers the questions of whether zakat taps the wealth of the richer segments of the society 
who Islamists say are required to give to the poor, in other words, who pays and how much. 
It also addresses the question of whether the rich actually comply with the zakat policy.
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4.2b Micro-Analvses of the Zakat System in Pakistan
The aim of the current investigation is to present empirical evidence about the incidence of 
zakat at the household level for six separate years between 1985-86 and 1993-94. While the 
cross-sectional analysis o f zakat incidence has been documented in the past by other 
authors, such as Jehle for the year 1987-88470 and Shirazi for the year 1990-91471 (see the 
literature survey in the Introduction), the present analyses extend the time horizon of the 
above authors to include four more years for the investigation, covering two decades: the 
1980s and 1990s.
Data
The data used for these analyses are taken from the Household Income and Expenditure 
Survey (HIES) for the 1980s and the Household Integrated Economic Survey (HIES) for 
the 1990s.472 These surveys have been conducted irregularly by the Federal Bureau of 
Statistics of Pakistan since 1963. Surveys were conducted annually from 1963-64 to 1971- 
72, but were suspended for most of the seventies, re-commencing in 1979 473
The HIES is considered to be a comprehensive and reliable statistical survey of household 
income and expenditure and reports statistics for households in different income groups in 
both rural and urban areas in the four provinces of Pakistan. The present analyses have 
utilised the raw data (on which the surveys are based) acquired from the Federal Bureau of 
Statistics during the researcher’s fieldwork in Islamabad in between 2003 and 2004. Data
470 Jehle, "Zakat and Inequality."
471 Shirazi, System o f  Zakat in Pakistan.
472 The surveys were initially called the Household Income and Expenditure Survey however, in the 1990s 
their name was changed to Household Integrated Economic Survey.
473 S. Howes and S. Zaidi, "Notes on Some Household Surveys from Pakistan in the Eighties and Nineties", 
1994, STICERD (London School o f Economics) & PRDPH (World Bank), p. 3
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for the years from 1985-86 to 1987-88 and for 1990-91, 1992-93 and 1993-94 will be used. 
The sizes of the different surveys are as follows:
Years
Number of 
Households 
per HIES
1985-86 16536
1986-87 17183
1987-88 18144
1990-91 6393
1992-93 14594
1993-94 14669
Source: HIES, Government o f  Pakistan, 1985-86, 1986-87, 1987-88, 1990-91, 1992-93 and 1993-94.
The Federal Bureau claims these sample sizes to be large enough to be representative of the 
population. This study focuses on a subset of variables taken from the HIES database. The 
subset includes household income, zakat given and received, household composition in 
terms of number of earners, and ages of the household members. Detailed explanations of 
these variables will be given after laying out the limitations of the data.
Limitations of the Data
The limitations of the 1980s data are that households that depended entirely on charity were 
excluded from the scope of the surveys. Illiteracy of the population in general and 
particularly in rural areas is another issue that hampers the quality of the survey. Household 
income and expenditure accounts are not kept by the households and there is a wide 
variation in the mode of the purchase of consumption goods from area to area, even from 
household to household. Additionally, many statements of expenditure may be incorrect
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because of memory bias due to the long reference period for certain items.474 This set of
■ i
limitations is so general that one can assume that although they were not listed explicitly 
for the 1990s surveys, these may very well be features of these surveys as well.
STICERD at the London School of Economics conducted a study that compares the HIES 
for the 1980s and the 1990s with the Pakistan Integrated Household Survey (PIHS). 
Although the main aim of this study was to compare the HIES and the PIHS, it also 
highlighted the differences between the earlier 1980s HIES and the 1990s HIES. It claims 
that the organisation, coding and the content of the 1990-91 HIES questionnaire is 
somewhat different to that of the earlier HIES. It asserts that the 1990-91 HIES was devised 
to update national accounts and the CPI weighting systems and is more detailed and 
disaggregated.475 However, the study concludes that the various HIES can be used for time 
series analyses and are comparable476 and the 1990-91 HIES questionnaire follows the 
same broad structure as the 1980s HIES.477 Issues with variables are described below.
Zakat. Gifts and Assistance
There are two issues with this variable. The first is that the zakat recorded in the HIES 
includes centralised compulsory zakat payments made to the state through financial 
institutions to be credited to the CZA, in addition to the centralised voluntary zakat 
payments made to the government offices to be credited also to the CZA. Finally, the HIES 
zakat variable includes the inter-personal zakat payments (i.e. from one individual to the 
other) reported in the HIES. This last category is not reported at the national aggregate level
474 Federal Bureau o f Statistics, "Household Income and Expenditure Survey (1987-88)," ed. Federal Bureau 
o f  Statistics, Household Income and Expenditure Survey (1987-88) (Karachi: The Manager o f  Publications, 
1987-88).p. viii
475 Howes and Zaidi, "Notes on Some Household Surveys from Pakistan", p. 7
476 Ibid.p. 25
477 Ibid.p. 7
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data reports of the CZA and thus is not reflected in the government accounts. This implies 
that conducting an accounting exercise of the zakat payments made to the government only 
is an unachievable task. This in turn means that results based on the HIES data are not an 
exclusive reflection of the institutionalised system of zakat in Pakistan, but are also a 
reflection of the public’s attitude towards zakat in general. This makes it somewhat difficult 
to attribute the results entirely to Pakistan’s formal zakat policy. The question arises as to 
what implications can such a situation have for the present research.
To answer this question the aim of this section should be considered, which is to examine 
the incidence of zakat, i.e. who was bearing the burden of zakat: the poor or the rich? 
Considering that two out of three recordings in the HIES are potentially related to 
centralised zakat payments (compulsory and voluntary) it makes it possible to infer from 
the results the implications of the formal zakat policy for an individual especially if the 
results emulate zakat at the national aggregate level and the qualitative evidence presented 
throughout this chapter. Already, the analyses regarding the national aggregate levels of 
zakat have revealed that compulsory zakat payments made to the government were 
unimpressive at about 0.3% of the GDP. Additionally, the voluntary zakat payments made 
to the government were of little consequence as table 4.3 indicates that voluntary zakat 
never raised more than 0.2% on average of total zakat revenues from 1980 to 1995.
The second issue with the data is that in the 1980s questionnaire zakat payments are 
recorded with other charity payments, i.e. with gifts, and other forms of assistance. In this 
questionnaire zakat payments were registered under the code number 5299,478 and included
478 Federal Bureau o f Statistics, "The Questionnaire Household Income and Expenditure Survey 1987-88,," 
ed. Federal Bureau o f  Statistics (Karachi: The Manager o f the Publications, 1988).p. 560
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‘zakat, gifts and assistance, ushr, nazrana (charity), and philanthropy’. In the 1990s, 
however, zakat payments included nazrana, zakat, ushr, assistance, inheritance, and gifts, 
and these were registered under the code number 50111.479
The first difference between the two decades is that where zakat given is concerned, the 
1980s data includes philanthropy, which is missing in the 1990s questionnaire, whereas the 
1990s includes inheritance, which is absent from the 1980s questionnaire. Considering that 
‘inheritance’ can only influence the results of zakat received and that the variable of 
philanthropy is absent in the 1990s zakat data, this implies that the definition of zakat given 
for the 1990s is narrower. This could lead one to speculate that the values of zakat given for 
the 1990s might be low compared to the 1980s.
However, there is a second reason why the zakat given values for the 1990s might be low 
compared to the 1980s. This is due to the fact that there is an additional question in the 
1990s questionnaire that records ‘other remittances, assistance and gifts’ given, which does 
not appear separately in the 1980s questionnaire480 and which consequently may be 
assumed to be part of the zakat variable for the 1980s.
Income
In the absence of a comprehensive measure of wealth, on which zakat is levied, the analysis 
utilises income to assess the performance of zakat. To the extent that income and wealth are
479 Federal Bureau o f Statistics, "Form HIES-1 3/90 Household Integrated Economic Survey," ed. Federal 
Bureau o f Statistics (Islamabad: The Manager o f Publications, 1990).p. 33
480 Federal Bureau o f Statistics, "The Questionnaire Household Income and Expenditure Survey 1987-88,."p. 
560. Federal Bureau o f Statistics, "Form HIES-1 3/90 Household Integrated Economic Survey."p. 33
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positively correlated the thesis uses income as an approximate indicator of the wealth 
distribution of the population.
The definition of household income includes material returns in cash or in kind in exchange 
for goods and services by household earners other than boarders, lodgers and servants. This 
includes wages and salaries, pensions, contributions made by boarders, lodgers and 
professional fees. These are considered to be monthly sources of income. In addition to 
these, the income definition also includes yearly entries, such as interest and dividends, 
earnings from agricultural activities, business, industrial and commercial undertakings, land 
and property rents, gifts {nazrana, i.e. also charity), assistance {zakat) and relief in cash or 
in kind, bonuses, and social insurance benefits. It also includes remittances from other 
family members who are permanently absent.481 All income used in this analyses is net of 
taxes.
Methodology
The analysis will look at measures of the zakat burden, defined as zakat payments as a 
proportion of monthly income. Thus calculating zakat incidence as zakat divided by income 
multiplied by hundred.
zakatl income* 100
Given that the data are recorded at household level, calculating zakat incidence for each 
household is straightforward. However, this is not very meaningful since the households’
481 Federal Bureau o f Statistics, "Household Income and Expenditure Survey (1987-88)."p. vi & vii. Also, 
Federal Bureau o f  Statistics, "Household Integrated Economic Survey," ed. Federal Bureau o f Statistics 
Economic Affairs & Statistics Division (Karachi: The Manager o f Publications, 1990-91).pp. 8-11
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composition in terms of members and earners vary greatly within the survey. Therefore the 
household income distribution has been transformed into an adult equivalent distribution. 
Equivalent scales are defined as ratios of cost functions between demographically different 
households.482 They provide a single number to account for individuals of various types, 
which in turn simplifies the measurement and testing of expenditure behaviour.483
The choice of equivalent scales used here is the one used by Jehle,484 i.e. the Wasey (1997) 
and Havinga (1989) scale, which is also recommended by the Government of Pakistan. 
This scale assigns the weight of 1 to the earning adult of the household represented by xj, 
0.8 to non-earning adults represented by X2 , and 0.7 to children under 10 years represented 
by X3 . The application of this scale is as follows:
AE=xi+0.8* X2 +0 . 7* X3
It is believed by the creators of this scale that it has to be used with due caution because the 
intra-household gender differences are not considered, there are no economies of scale 
included and a coefficient of 0.7 for children under ten could be high.485 Notwithstanding 
these limitations of the Wasey and Havinga scale, the present analysis utilises it due to the 
unavailability of the variables that would allow the employment of the ‘calorific’ scale, 
which take into account gender differences and economies of scale. Additionally, the 
Wasey and Havinga scale is the only scale that has been used to analyse zakat performance
482 R. Blundell and A. Lewbel, "The Information Content o f Equivalence Scales," Journal o f  Econometrics, 
no. 50 (1991).p. 49
483 R. C. Buse and L. E. Salathe, "Adult equivalent Scales: An Alternative Approach," American Journal o f  
Agricultural Economics 60, no. 3 (1978).p. 460
484 Jehle, "Zakat and Inequality."
485 1. C. Havinga, Haanappel, F. W., Louter, A. S., van den Andel, W. A., "Poverty in Pakistan 1984-85," The 
Pakistan Development Review  28, no. 4 Part II (1989).p. 853
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in Pakistan by Jehle, making it attractive for the present investigation. However, Jehle used 
this scale only to study the zakat performance for the year 1987-88,486 whereas this enquiry 
will be using the same scale to extend the time period of his analysis.
This section will present descriptive statistics for households giving zakat within income 
groups using the Wasey and Havinga adult equivalent scale to create an income distribution 
ranging from income brackets of <200 to >2000 with intervals of 200 over ten income 
groups over a period of six years ranging from 1985-94. These income brackets are similar 
to the ones used by Jehle.
Due to data availability limitations regarding HIES, analyses will be based on 1985-1988 
and 1990-91 and 1992-94. The analysis will examine the percentage number of zakat givers 
across income groups. It will examine the average and median size of zakat given. Finally, 
it will examine the proportion of adult equivalised income paid in zakat across income 
groups in average and median terms. These three steps will further the understanding of the 
pattern of zakat payment in the 1980s and 1990s. The rationale is to test the assertions of 
the Islamists, i.e. to determine whether zakat was being given by the rich and how much i.e. 
who was giving zakat.
Pakistan’s Household Income Distribution
486 Jehle, "Zakat and Inequality." pp. 6-9. See also, Centre for Research on Poverty Reduction and Income 
Distribution, "Issues in Measuring Poverty in Pakistan", January, 2002, Planning Commission, Islamabad 
Pakistan’s Planning Commission recommends seven other scales. Most o f  these recommended scales are not 
very different from each other. However, there are two rather sophisticated scales, which are: the calorific 
scale, i.e. calorific requirements by age and sex per capita/day which also use household gender differences 
and the ‘OECD Scale’ (1979) which uses economies o f  scale. Then there are additional scales such as those 
used by FBS 1984-85, Jafri 1995 &1999, Ahmad (1993), World Bank 1995/Gazder et. al. (1994), Glewwe & 
Gagg (1988), and Kruijk (1989). These scales assign different weights to individuals according to his/her 
position within the household.
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In order to carry out the above-mentioned analyses, this section describes the income 
distribution of Pakistan during the 1980s and the 1990s. This will help to contextualise zakat 
payments and receipts. According to Jehle, income distribution in Pakistan is typical of a 
less developed country.487 It is confirmed by other authors such as Kazi and Sathar that the 
findings on income distribution for Pakistan generally are in consonance with those for 
other Third World countries where certain characteristics are undeniably associated with 
poverty.488
The income distribution reported in table 4.6 below reveals a reduction in inequality from 
the early 1960s to 1970-71, shown by a Gini Coefficient that declined from 0.386 in 1963- 
64 to 0.330 in 1970-71. However, inequality increased during the 1970s, with the Gini 
Coefficient rising to 0.373 in 1979. The trend again reversed during the 1980s due to the 
large inflow of workers’ remittances from the Middle East. Pakistan witnessed a high 
growth rate of about 6.8 % per annum on average during 1984-88, which improved the 
income distribution, lowered the incidence of poverty and reduced income inequality. 
However, in the 1990s, income inequality increased with the Gini-Coefficient varying 
between 0.40 and 0.41 (see table below).489
487 Jehle, "Zakat and Inequality."p. 207
488 S. Kazi and Z. A. Sathar, "Differences in Household Characteristics by Income Distribution in Pakistan," 
Pakistan Development Review  24, no. 3-4 (1985).
489 Finance Division, "Economic Survey", 2003-04, Ministry o f  Finance and Revenue, Government o f  
Pakistan, Islamabad Chapter 4
262
Table 4.6
Pakistan Income Inequality
Year Household
Gini
Coefficient
1963-64 0.3S6
1966-67 0.353
1963-69 0.336
1969-70 0.336
1970-71 0.330
1971-72 0.345
1979 0.373
19S4-&5 0.369
19S5-S6 0-355
19S6-S7 0.346
19S7-S8 0.345
1990-91 0.407
1992-93 0.410
1993-94 0.400
1996-97 0.400
199S-99 0.410*
* Economic Advisor’s Wing
Source: Finance Division. "Economic Survey." Islamabad: Ministry o f  Finance and Revenue, Government of 
Pakistan, 2002-03.
For the 1980s and the 1990s the adult equivalised income distribution for households based 
on the HIES are presented in table 4.7 and graph 4.8 below:
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Table 4.7
HIES Adult Equivalised Household Income Distribution for 1980s and 1990s
1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1990-91 1992-93 1993-94
AE Income % % % % % %
Groups Households Households Households Households Households Households
<200 14.08 10.00 7.24 4.63 3.68 2.31
200-400 50.51 51.13 49.35 29.27 21.17 16.68
400-600 19.53 21.07 24.24 27.50 26.87 27.11
600-800 7.27 8.13 9.10 15.58 17.94 18.55
800-1000 3.34 3.58 3.78 7.89 10.42 11.80
1000-1200 1.73 1.81 1.96 4.39 6.04 6.04
1200-1400 1.07 1.37 1.20 2.42 3.78 4.17
1400-1600 0.63 0.75 0.81 1.77 2.29 2.92
1600-1800 0.41 0.52 0.50 1.55 1.41 2.14
1800-2000 0.30 0.35 0.35 0.88 1.14 1.56
>2000 1.14 1.28 1.48 4.11 5.27 6.71
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: D erived from H ousehold  Incom e and Expenditure Surveys 1985-86 , 1986-87 , 1987-88 and 
H ousehold  Integrated E conom ic Surveys 1990-1991 , 1992-93 and 1993-94 , Federal Bureau o f  Statistics, 
Statistics D iv ision , G overnm ent o f  Pakistan.
Graph 4.8
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Source: D erived from table 4 .7 .
From the graph above, one can detect a pattern of income distribution where the 1980s 
income distribution is decidedly different from that of the 1990s. The chart seems to 
suggest that in the 1990s there was migration of lower income households towards higher 
income groups. It must be pointed out that in the 1990s Pakistan experienced persistent 
high inflation, which is likely to have inflated nominal incomes, and hence shifted the 
lower household incomes to higher income groups, therefore causing a purely monetary 
effect rather than a real improvement in Pakistan’s income distribution. Table 4.8 below 
seems to underpin this claim:
Table 4.8
Deflator Application to Income 
brackets
HIES
Years
GDP
Deflator
Adjustment
Ratio
1985 1.47
1986 1.51 1.03
1987 1.58 1.08
1990 2.00 1.37
1992 2.49 1.70
1993 2.71 1.85
Source: www.datastream.net and Author’s own calculations.
Indeed, during the 1980s, inflation as measured by the GDP deflator was relatively 
moderate, as opposed to the 1990s when price levels rose significantly: it was 
approximately 50% higher than its average in the 1980s (see column 3 of table 4.8). Given 
that most of the zakat analysis will be based on comparison of quantities between different 
income groups, the placement of households in correct income groups is important. 
Therefore, to overcome this monetary effect the income brackets of the 1980s and the 
1990s have been adjusted to the 1985 GDP annual deflator (1985 being the first year in the 
HIES data used) using the 1980 base year (see column three of table 4.1 for the deflator
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series). The adult equivalised income brackets in table 4.7 have been multiplied by the 
adjustment ratios (given in the above table) of their respective years thus projecting the 
1985 income brackets according to the recorded inflation. The new income brackets for the 
1980s and the 1990s are as follows:
Table 4.9
Inflation Adjusted Monthly Adult Equivalised Income 
Brackets (rupees)
Years
1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1990-91 11992-93 1993-94
Income Brackets
200 206 215 274 341 370
400 412 430 548 682 739
600 618 645 823 1023 1109
800 824 861 1097 1364 1479
1000 1030 1076 1371 1705 1848
1200 1236 1291 1645 2045 2218
1400 1442 1506 1920 2386 2588
1600 1648 1721 2194 2727 2958
1800 1855 1936 2468 3068 3327
2000 2061 2152 2742 3409 3697
Source: Author’s own calculations based on table 4.8.
These newly created income brackets for the 1980s and the 1990s give the following adult 
equivalised household income distribution:
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Table 4.10
Inflation Adjusted Adult Equivalised Household Income Distribution for the 1980s and
1990s
1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1990-91 1992-93 1993-94
AE
Income % % % % % %
Groups Households Households Households Households Households Households
1 14.08 11.33 10.14 12.95 16.05 15.01
2 50.51 51.77 51.95 42.77 44.40 44 .98
3 19.53 20.22 21.62 22.35 20.39 20 .23
4 7.27 7.49 7.62 9.23 8.32 7 .56
5 3.34 3.40 3.22 4.06 3.78 4 .35
6 1.73 1.75 1.72 2.46 1.98 2.31
7 1.07 1.36 1.02 1.84 1.23 1.51
8 0.63 0.66 0.73 1.02 0.84 0.91
9 0.41 0.47 0.44 0.86 0.53 0.59
10 0.30 0.39 0.29 0.55 0.43 0.53
11 1.14 1.16 1.25 1.91 2.04 2.00
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: B ased on H IESs, table 4 .9  and Author’s ow n calculations.
Graph 4.9
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Source: D erived from table 4 .10.
As the graph above shows, the deflated adult equivalised household income distribution for 
the 1990s has become more comparable to the income distribution of the 1980s. Therefore 
it seems that in general there was no substantial change in the income distribution of the
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Pakistani people opposed to what is shown in graph 4.8. The rest of the analyses will be 
using this inflation-adjusted adult equivalised household income distribution.
As analysed in Chapter Two, the rationale of zakat is the attainment of welfare in terms of 
poverty reduction (among inequality). Therefore, it is important to relate the new income 
brackets to poverty line to orientate the analysis in terms o f who paid zakat. The following 
table 4.1 la  indicates the income brackets which fall entirely or partially under the poverty 
line.
Table 4.11a
Income Brackets Falling Entirely or Partially Under the Poverty Line
1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1990-91 1992-93 1993-94
income
groups
poverty
line
income
groups
poverty
line
income
groups
poverty
line
income
groups
poverty
line
income
groups
poverty
line
income
groups
poverty
line
200 226 206.06 233.9 215.15 244.9 274.24 313.4 340.91 383.7 369.70 422
400 412.12 430.30 548.48 681.82 739.39
Source: Based on the HIESs and derived from table 4.9.
According to the above table, for all the six years the first income group falls below the 
poverty line, whereas the poverty line covers the second income group only partially.
Someone living below a poverty line (which is defined in terms of the monetary income 
sufficient to attain a minimal standard of living) is considered poor. This approach to 
measure poverty is called the monetary approach.490 This approach deals with the concept 
of absolute poverty, which characterises poverty in Pakistan.491 The poverty line used in 
this thesis is based on the calorific intake approach. A Havinga et al adult equivalised
490 United Nations, "Asia Pacific Economies: Sustaining Growth and Tackling Poverty", 2004, United 
Nations, New York p. 242
491 Shirazi, System o f  Zakat in Pakistan, p. 81
268
poverty line of Rs.214 per month has been used and has been inflation adjusted using the 
Consumer Price Index for the six years under consideration (see table 4.11b below).492 
Rs.214 is the monthly expenditure at 1984-85 prices just adequate to acquire a simple diet 
providing a daily calorific intake of 1,500 to 2,000 calories per day per AE. This poverty 
line is based on the calorie intake of households (standardized to household equivalents) on 
the basis of actual consumption of food. For the calculation of calorie intake per household 
Havinga has utilized a detailed conversion table provided by the Government of Pakistan to 
convert the quantities of the actual food consumed into calories.493 The household calorie 
intake thus obtained is then converted into calories intake per household equivalent 
according to the Wasey and Havinga equivalent scale.494 The reasons for utilizing this 
poverty line are two; firstly, a methodology that is accepted by the Government of Pakistan 
is used in determining this poverty line, secondly, the poverty line has been equivalised 
using the same Wasey and Havinga scale which has been used to equivalise household 
incomes to correct for differences in household size and composition for zakat analyses as 
well.
The table below details the inflation adjusted poverty lines for the six years analysed and 
also presents the percentage of households with equivalised income below poverty line 
according to the HIESs.
492 Although there remains considerable debate on the consistency, measurement and methodology o f  poverty 
indicators in Pakistan, as Pakistan does not have an official and well recognized poverty line which can be 
comparable for analysis over time and space. Policy Wing Poverty Reduction Cell, "Interim Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper", November, 2001, Finance Division & Planning Commission Government o f  
Pakistan, p. 9. However it is also recognized by the researchers at the Pakistan Institute o f  Development 
Economics that the correct procedure to update the poverty lines is to adjust them by the Consumer Price 
Index S. K. Qureshi and G. M. Arif, "Profile o f  Poverty in Pakistan 1998-99", January, 2001, Pakistan 
Institute o f  Development Economics, Islamabad p. 14
493 Havinga, "Poverty in Pakistan."p. 853
494 Ibid. p. 857
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Table 4.11b
Pakistan Poverty Statistics Based on the HIESs
Poverty Line 
(rupees- 
hundred)
Households with 
Adult Equivalent 
income below the 
Poverty Line (%)
1985-86 226 .0 20 .9
1986-87 233.9 18.8
1987-88 244.9 17.1
1990-91 313.4 19.0
1992-93 383.7 22 .3
1993-94 422 .0 21 .9
Source: Havinga, I. C., Haanappel, F. W., Louter, A. S., van den Andel, W. A. "Poverty in Pakistan 1984-85." 
The Pakistan Development Review 28, no. 4 Part II (1989): 851-869, www.datastream.net. HIESs and 
Author’s own calculations.
From the table above it can be seen that for the 1980s there was a decrease in the trend of 
households with equivalised income below the poverty line. In 1985-86 the percentage was 
almost 21%, in 1986-87 it was around 19% and in 1987-88 it was just above 17%. In 1990- 
91 the trend was reversed, i.e. the percentage number o f households with equivalised 
income below the poverty line increased with the years. In 1990-91 the percentage was 
19%, above 22% in 1992-93 and nearly 22% in 1993-94.
Considering the above state of affairs, the analyses regarding zakat givers in Pakistan 
should begin by showing the share o f the population involved in zakat payment. The 
following table 4.12 and graphs 4.10a, b, and c for the 1980s and table 4.13 and graphs 
4.1 la, b and c for the 1990s indicate the percentage o f zakat givers (G) along with those 
who were non-participants (N-P) across income groups.
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Table 4.12
Percentage Households Giving and Non-Participating in Zakat Policy
1985-86 1986-87 1987-88
Income
Groups % G % NP % G % NP % G % NP
1 14.2 85.6 16.6 74.6 13.2 80.5
2 20.1 78.8 19.5 74.3 19.5 75.4
3 24.0 74.0 22.9 69.8 22.4 71.6
4 26.2 69.1 19.7 72.3 22.5 70.9
5 25.8 69.3 18.6 74.0 21.0 71.3
6 24.1 70.3 22.3 68.3 18.6 75.2
7 23.5 70.9 24.5 68.4 22.6 70.5
8 15.9 77.6 20.3 67.8 20.3 72.9
9 11.9 85.1 23.2 65.9 21.2 71.8
10 13.7 78.4 15.7 68.6 21.8 70.9
11 27.6 69.3 20.9 70.9 21.4 70.9
Total % 20.8 77.4 20.0 72.9 19.8 74.5
Source: HIESs and Author’s own calculations.
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Cross-sectional analyses of the 1980s suggest that the proportion of people in the highest 
income groups who paid zakat was not very different from the lowest income groups, i.e. 
the gap was not very wide. To the extent that income is correlated with wealth (and thus 
used as a proxy measure to determine the wealth of an individual) the result is in 
contradiction to the aspirations of the Islamists and principals of zakat, which state that 
zakat is the right of the poor in the wealth of the rich and that it is the rich who should be 
paying it.
For example, in 1985-86 the average proportion of zakat givers in the four lowest income 
groups was 21.1%, compared to the average proportion of zakat givers in the four highest 
income groups, which was 17.3%. For 1986-87 it was almost the same for the highest and 
the lowest four income groups, and for 1987-88 it was 19.59% and 21.2% respectively. 
Especially for the first two years, the percentage of households paying zakat in the tenth 
highest income group was not very different from the lowest income group which fell 
below the poverty line.
The above table and the graphs reveal another phenomenon in Pakistan’s zakat policy, that
o f the surprisingly high number of non-participants in the zakat system for the highest four
income groups for all the three years of the 1980s. The percentage of N-Ps for the highest
four income groups averaged around 74.7% as compared to 72.5% for the lowest four
income groupsfor all the years o f the 1980s. In the case o f higher income groups, this
picture revealed the high level of zakat non-compliance, which was indicative o f the fact
that these relatively wealthy individuals did not bear the obligation of giving zakat, and
zakat’s religious nature did not oblige them to do so. This situation reveals that zakat was
struggling to raise resources to meet its objectives. The claim of one of the national
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newspapers further supports the view that the rich were not paying their due share of zakat. 
In 1987 a member of the National Zakat Review Committee told the press that every year 
the rich evade payment of zakat, with the sums involved amounting to millions.495 It is not 
clear whom they regard as ‘rich’ but the fact that this statement came from within the zakat 
review committee suggests that it must be based on real concerns within the zakat 
authority.
Table 4.13
Percentage Households Giving and Non-Participating in Zakat Policy
1990-91 1992-93 1993-94
Income
Groups % G % NP % G % NP % G % NP
1 23.5 70.2 30.0 65.1 33.1 63.3
2 33.3 63.3 33.1 64.2 37.4 60.7
3 39.7 59.0 36.1 62.2 42.3 56.5
4 41.3 56.7 38.1 60.4 43.4 55.3
5 48.3 51.0 39.9 58.7 45.5 52.8
6 47.5 51.3 47.8 51.6 45.3 53.2
7 51.3 47.9 46.1 53.9 56.1 43.5
8 47.7 52.3 42.3 55.3 44.8 52.2
9 50.9 49.1 49.4 50.6 51.7 48.3
10 60.0 40.0 52.4 44.4 50.0 47.4
11 57.4 42.6 52.5 46.8 47.6 51.0
Total % 36.4 60.8 35.0 62.5 39.4 58.6
Source: HIESs and Author’s own calculations.
495 Staff Reporter, "Evading Zakat."
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For the 1990s, at first glance table 4.13 and graphs 4.11a, b and c reveal a significant 
increase in the percentage of zakat givers, from a total average of 20.2% in the 1980s for 
the rich to almost 37% in the 90s for all income groups and NP became for both decades. 
However more rich paid in the 1990’s.
Cross-sectional data for 1990-91 reveal that the average percentage of zakat givers was 
34.4% for the lowest four income groups and 54% for the highest income groups, for 1992- 
93 it was 34.3% and 49.1%, and for 1993-94 it was 39% and 48.5% respectively.
These statistics reveal that for the 1990s, unlike the 1980s, households in the relatively rich 
income groups were more likely to pay zakat than the poorer ones. The average for three 
years of the 1990s shows that about 50.6% of the highest four income groups paid zakat 
compared to an average of almost 36% in the four lowest groups, while it has been shown 
that during the 1980s there was no significant difference between the rich and the poor for 
the proportion of households giving zakat.
The 1990s revealed that the non-payers in the highest four income groups averaged around 
48.3%, as compared to an average of 61.4% for the lowest four income groups. This was an 
improvement compared to the 1980s where percentage of non-payers in the lowest and the 
highest income groups was almost similar. Thus during the 1990s the gap in the percentage 
of non-payers in the lowest and the highest income groups was widening. Nonetheless, 
despite this decrease in the number of non-payers, a significant proportion of wealthier 
households were still avoiding the zakat.
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The increased number o f zakat givers, and the reduced number of non-payers in high- 
income groups in the 1990s are only partial indications of policy effectiveness, because the 
overall number of givers is no indication of the size of zakat given or of its burden across 
income groups. A small payment of zakat by a former non-participant in the upper income 
groups does not imply fulfilment of his/her obligation towards zakat if the payment is not 
according to the prescription of Shariah, i.e. 2.5% of their assessable wealth.
Table 4.14 and graphs 4.12a, b and c below present the average size of zakat given per 
adult equivalent across income groups during the 1980s and 1990s in rupees per month in 
current prices.
The current analysis examines the two decades of the 1980s and the 1990s together to 
explain the downward jump of the zakat size between the two decades.
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Table 4.14
Average Size of Zakat Given per Adult Equivalent 
(rupees-current prices)
1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1990-91 1992-93 1993-94
Average Average Average Average Average Average
Size of Size of Size of Size of Size of Size of
Income Zakat Zakat Zakat Zakat Zakat Zakat
Groups Given Given Given Given Given Given
1 8.5 9.6 9.8 4.3 5.7 4.1
2 12.6 13.6 13.1 5.3 6.3 5.7
3 18.7 17.1 17.6 10.5 10.1 9.5
4 23.0 21.5 19.4 13.9 13.9 13.8
5 26.6 26.1 30.0 17.5 17.8 23.5
6 29.5 29.3 30.0 18.9 22.6 36.1
7 36.7 50.5 27.3 30.4 30.1 28.7
8 27.0 33.9 30.2 26.9 38.5 21.8
9 40.8 36.2 27.2 38.0 46.6 63.5
10 36.4 30.3 26.9 30.4 27.8 53.4
11 77.7 135.7 60.5 74.4 50.5 65.4
Overall
Average 17.0 17.8 16.5 12.1 11.1 11.6
Source: HIESs and Author’s own calculations.
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The above tables and graphs show a downward leap of zakat size between the two decades. 
The average size of zakat given across income groups falls from around 17 rupees per adult 
equivalent in the 1980s, to around 11 rupees per adult equivalent in the 1990s. As shown in 
table 4.8, the GDP deflator rose from 1.47 in 1985 to 2.71 in 1993, registering an increase 
o f around 85% during the period of our analysis. This would imply that the average size of 
zakat payment per adult equivalent fell by more than 60% in real terms from 1985 to 1993 
(see table below).
Deflating Average Si: 
Adult Ec|
ze of Zakat Given per 
uivalent
Years
Current
Prices
(Rupees)
GDP
Deflator
Constant
Prices
(1985)
1985-86 16.97 1.47 16.97
1986-87 17.78 1.51 17.21
1987-88 16.46 1.58 15.25
1990-91 12.12 2.00 8.86
1992-93 11.14 2.49 6.54
1993-94 11.57 2.71 6.25
Source: wvm.datastream.net, HIESs and Author’s own calculations.
This decline may be explained through the changes in the structure of the questionnaire for 
the 1990s (as mentioned earlier in this section). Since in the 1990s questionnaire there is a 
separate entry for ‘other remittances, assistance and gifts’, which does not appear for the 
1980s, the 1990s zakat given variable is combined with this separate entry in the last 
column of table 4.15 below to see if the average size o f zakat given can be reconciled 
across the two decades. This column shows that even after taking gifts given in the 1990s 
under consideration, people in this decade were still paying less charity {zakat and gifts) on 
average than in the 1980s.
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Table 4.15
Reconciliation of Average Size of Zakat Given per Adult Equivalent with & without 
Weights and with Zakat plus Gifts Given
Units: Rupees (current prices
Average Size of Zakat 
Given per Adult 
Equivalent for all 
Income Groups 
(without HIES weights)
Average Size of 
Zakat Given per 
Adult Equivalent for 
all Income Groups 
(with HIES weights)
Average Size of Zakat 
and Gifts Given per 
Adult Equivalent for 
all Income Groups 
(1990s)
1985-86 16.97 16.07 -
1986-87 17.78 16.91 -
1987-88 16.46 16.06 -
1990-91 12.12 9.77 12.62
1992-93 11.14 10.13 11.61
1993-94 11.57 11.04 11.66
Source: HIESs and Author’s own calculations.
This decline should also be tested for potential measurement errors in the collection or 
processing of the data or for the presence o f bias in sampling methods regarding under- or 
over-representation. Thus, when the data sets are re-weighted according to the weights 
provided in the HIES, there appears some difference with the previous results and the 
decline becomes more significant in the average size of zakat given between the 1980s and 
the 1990s (see the third column in table 4.15).
(To fortify this point, appendix A presents the weighted and the un-weighted figures for the 
average zakat incidence for the 1980s and 1990s. It also shows that the incidence dropped 
from the 1980s to the 1990s (more than twice) and that even with the application of the 
weights the proportion of the drop of incidence between the two decades remained 
unchanged.)
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Interestingly, this sharp decline appears to be almost consistent with the CZA figures (as 
shown in table 4.1), which show a decrease in total zakat collection in nominal (to some 
extent) and real terms from 1990 onwards. It also appears to be consistent with the decline 
in the ushr collection in the 1990s recorded in the Introduction. The decline of the average 
zakat size given in the 1990s also concurs with the analyses o f the nisab of zakat presented 
in table 3.3 in Chapter Three which showed that due to the deterioration o f the value of 
nisab over time, the levy of zakat steered increasingly towards the poor and that by the end 
of 1994 (the period analysed), people with half the income relative to 1980 were liable to 
pay zakat, the consequence of which might be that the average size of zakat given would 
probably fall. In fact, if one looks at table 4.14 it appears that from the 1980s to the 1990s it 
is within the lowest four income groups that this fall in the average size of zakat given is 
more apparent.
Looking at each single year for the two decades in table 4.14, it appears that there is a 
general upward trend in the average size o f zakat given across income groups, suggesting 
that richer people tend to pay larger amounts than poor people in absolute terms. In all 
years, the size of zakat given by the highest income groups was several multiples higher 
than the size of zakat given by the lowest income groups. However, one must be cautious in 
drawing final conclusions from these averages as they may be dominated by some outliers, 
as in the case o f group 11 in the 1986-87 and 1990-91 analyses. Therefore, it would be 
beneficial to look at the median zakat size given for these decades.
The following table 4.16 and graphs 4.13a, b and c give the median size of zakat given per 
adult equivalent in rupees in current prices for the 1980s and the 1990s.
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Table 4.16
Median Size of Zakat Given per Adult Equivalent (rupees-current prices)
1985*86 1986-87 1987-88 1990-91 1992-93 1993-94
Income
Groups
Median Size of 
Zakat Given per 
Adult 
Equivalent
Median Size of 
Zakat Given per 
Adult Equivalent
Median Size of 
Zakat Given per 
Adult 
Equivalent
Median Size of 
Zakat Given per 
Adult 
Equivalent
Median Size of 
Zakat Given per 
Adult 
Equivalent
Median Size of 
Zakat Given per 
Adult Equivalent
1 6.15 6.86 6.43 2.0 2.6 2.5
2 9.00 9.73 8.96 3.3 3.6 3.6
3 13.33 12.31 12.00 5.8 5.5 5.4
4 13.85 14.63 12.31 8.3 7.8 6.9
5 18.35 18.46 18.80 11.1 9.9 10.0
6 19.20 18.75 16.00 9.3 12.5 14.1
7 15.00 24.62 15.48 18.0 12.8 13.9
8 10.43 20.77 15.48 14.9 23.1 11.6
9 32.31 13.13 25.53 22.2 22.7 16.0
10 16.67 19.20 20.95 17.0 16.7 23.8
11 33.23 25.26 29.57 31.3 27.8 28.4
Source: HIESs and Author’s own calculations.
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From the table and graphs presented above, one can stipulate that for both the 1980s and 
the 1990s, the median size of zakat payments was smaller for the lower income groups and 
larger for the higher income groups, showing no change in the picture emerging from table 
4.14 (the average size of zakat given per adult equivalent). However, the gap in the size of 
zakat given between the lowest income groups and the highest income groups has 
narrowed. In 1985 for example, the median zakat paid in the highest income group (higher 
than 2000 rupees) was 33.23 rupees, compared to the median zakat payment of 6.15 rupees 
for the lowest income group (lower than 200 rupees and falling below the poverty line). 
This seems to suggest that zakat payment was growing less than proportionally to income. 
For 1987-88, Jehle’s results show that both the mean and the median amounts given for 
zakat were low.496 This again indicates not only that the onus of giving zakat was not fully 
undertaken by the rich but also that the disparity of the zakat size given between the highest 
and the lowest income groups for both the decades was not big enough to generate 
significant equity.
Analyses of zakat incidence would highlight this point more emphatically, as the burden of 
zakat can be calculated better as a proportion of income across income groups.
Thus table 4.17 and graphs 4.14a, b and c report the burden of zakat across income groups 
per household as proportion of income during the 1980s. The table gives information 
regarding the percentage of income given towards zakat. Zakat incidence with respect to 
individual or household wealth would provide a more direct test, but as pointed out earlier, 
in the absence of data on household wealth, current income has to be used as a plausible
496 Jehle, "Zakat and Inequality." p. 209
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proxy measure. Thus, a significant economic test of the effectiveness of zakat in giving the 
poor a claim on the wealth of the rich would be to analyse zakat incidence with respect to 
current income.
Table 4.17
Average Zakat Incidence for Givers (as a proportion of Household
Income)
1985-86 1986-87 1987-88
Average Zakat Average Zakat Average Zakat
Incidence for Incidence for Incidence for
AE Income Givers per Givers per Givers per
Groups Household Household Household
1 5.2 5.6 5.4
2 4.3 4.5 4.1
3 3.9 3.5 3.4
4 3.4 3.0 2.6
5 3.0 2.8 3.1
6 2.7 2.6 2.5
7 2.8 3.8 2.0
8 1.8 2.2 1.9
9 2.5 2.1 1.5
10 1.9 1.6 1.3
11 2.5 4.3 1.8
Total
Incidence 4.1 4.1 3.7
Source: HIESs and Author’s own calculations.
286
Graphs 4.14 a, b & c
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For the 1980s, the average zakat incidence falls almost linearly with rising income. Jehle’s 
findings almost coincide with the present results except for the lowest income group for 
1987-88. He demonstrated that the percentage of income given by those who give zakat 
reaches its peak in the second lowest income group then drops off steadily with higher 
income groups.497
Additionally, according to the present analysis, in 1985-86 and 1987-88 the incidence of 
zakat for the lowest income group that is below the poverty line is 2 to 3 times higher than 
the incidence recorded for the highest income group. The average burden of zakat across 
the highest four income groups is just 2% on average. This scenario seems to concur with 
Jehle’s assertion when he says that those on whom the Islamic injunction to give zakat is 
greatest (those with high incomes) seem to put much less of their weight into the overall 
effort towards reducing inequality than those much poorer than themselves.498
Interestingly, the total zakat incidences for the three years of the 1980s given above do not 
at first sight seem to reconcile with the aggregate statistics of the same years, as shown in 
table 4.1. In table 4.1, calculations of zakat collected as percentage of the GDP are 0.3% as 
opposed to the average o f 4% of household income given towards zakat for the three years 
of the 1980s. This is because the GDP value includes those who give and receive zakat as 
well as those who do not participate in the system (thus the entire population), whereas the 
average zakat incidence of 4% given in the table above reflects only the incidence of the 
givers of zakat who represent a small portion of all households. To give an illustration, the 
following table shows average zakat incidence for the six years o f the 1980s and the 1990s
497 Ibid. p. 209
498 Ibid. p. 209
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calculated over the entire HIES samples, i.e. including givers, receivers and non­
participants.
Zakat Incidence for Overall sample of HIES
(including Givers, Receivers & Non-Participants)
1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1990-91 1992-93 1993-94
0.846187 0.847581 0.825314 0.528933 0.517943 0.50959
Source: HIES and Author’s own calculations.
The above averages still do not reconcile fully with the zakat to GDP ratio (although the 
gap has been narrowed). This is because, as mentioned earlier in this section, zakat 
recorded by the CZA only accounts for official zakat given (via institutions and voluntary) 
whereas the HIES surveys include official as well as the inter-personal zakat. Moreover, as 
pointed out in the Introduction, the ushr receipts are not calculated at the national level 
whereas these are part of the HIES surveys.
With regards to the 1990s (see table 4.18 and graphs 4.15a, b and c below) what is striking 
is the low proportion of zakat given across income groups in each year. The total zakat 
incidence is less than half of what is recorded for the 1980s. This is not a surprise, given 
that the size of zakat given also went down for this decade, which has been explained 
partially by the narrowing of the definition of zakat in the 1990s questionnaire and partly as 
the result of an actual decrease in the zakat given.
Unlike the 1980s, the average zakat incidence for the 1990s did not fall with the increase in 
income. Additionally, for 1993-94 zakat incidence reached its peak in the ninth income 
group, but this peak is only 0.2 percentage points higher than the zakat incidence in the 
lowest income group for that year.
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However, for the first two years of the 1990s the trend regarding the zakat incidence for the 
lowest income group is the same as the 1980s, i.e. the zakat incidence reached its peak in 
the lowest income group (lower than the poverty line) rather noticeably. This peak seems 
more prominent when one observes that the average incidence o f zakat for the highest 
income group with incomes of more than Rs.2500 was about 1.2% as compared to 2.7% for 
the lowest income group for the first two years of the 1990s. This point concurs with 
Shirazi’s study of zakat in Pakistan during 1990-91, in which he shows that the contribution 
of richer households towards zakat was small.499
Table 4.18
Average Zakat Incidence for Givers (as a proportion of 
Household Income)
1990-91 1992-93 1993-94
Average Zakat Average Zakat Average Zakat
Incidence for Incidence for Incidence for
AE Income Givers per Givers per Givers per
Groups Household Household Household
1 2.6 2.8 1.8
2 1.3 1.3 • 1.0
3 1.6 1.2 1.1
4 1.5 1.2 1.1
5 1.4 1.2 1.5
6 1.2 1.2 1.8
7 1.7 1.4 1.2
8 1.3 1.5 0.8
9 1.6 1.6 2.0
10 1.2 0.9 1.5
11 1.4 0.9 1.1
Total
Incidence 1.5 1.4 1.2
Source: HIES and Author’s own calculations.
499 Shirazi, System o f Zakat in Pakistan, p. 75
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The commonality between the two decades is that there appears to be high percentage of 
zakat incidence in the lowest income group. This should be viewed with caution as for both 
decades there are some outliers in these income groups who pay more than 20% of their 
income in zakat. Due to the nature of average values, which can be biased due to the 
presence of outliers in the data, any judgement of analyses based upon them will suffer 
from this shortcoming. Therefore, it is appropriate to look at the median zakat incidence, 
because the median would make the analyses more robust and remove this vulnerability.
Table 4.19 and graphs 4.16a, b and c below present the median zakat incidence per 
household for givers in rupees in current prices for the 1980s.
Table 4.19
Median Zakat Incidence for Givers
1985-86 1986-87 1987-88
Median Zakat Median Zakat Median Zakat
incidence for incidence for incidence for
Income Givers per Givers per Givers per
Groups Household Household Household
1 3.55 3.96 3.46
2 3.03 3.14 2.77
3 2.68 2.49 2.27
4 2.04 2.07 1.66
5 1.98 2.05 1.99
6 1.72 1.66 1.28
7 1.21 1.77 1.14
8 0.72 1.33 0.97
9 1.96 0.78 1.39
10 0.85 1.02 1.01
11 1.23 0.87 0.92
Source: Based on HIESs and Author’s own calculation.
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Graphs 4.16a, b & c
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For the 1980s one observes that the trend of high values of median zakat incidence for 
givers in the lowest income group as compared to the highest income groups still holds true 
and as such there is no difference in the trend compared to the average zakat incidence. 
This confirms the finding that the lowest income groups bore higher burden of zakat than 
the four richest groups.
For the 1990s (see table 4.20 and graphs 4.17a, b and c below), the median zakat incidence 
for the second two years is still highest in the lowest income groups. However, for 1990-91 
it is the seventh income group in which the median reaches its peak. However, this peak is 
modest, when compared to the median zakat incidence in the lowest income as it is only
0.03 percentage points higher then the zakat median in the lowest income group.
Table 4.20
Median Zakat Incidence for Givers
1990-91 1992-93 1993-94
Median Zakat Median Zakat Median Zakat
incidence for incidence for incidence for
Income Givers per Givers per Givers per
Groups Household Household Household
1 0.95 1.04 0.86
2 0.85 0.74 0.68
3 0.88 0.68 0.61
4 0.86 0.67 0.53
5 0.92 0.66 0.60
6 0.60 0.67 0.72
7 0.98 0.58 0.57
8 0.72 0.86 0.43
9 0.95 0.80 0.51
10 0.67 0.53 0.70
11 0.64 0.48 0.53
Source: Based on HIESs and Author’s own calculation.
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Thus during both decades, the lowest income groups not only tended to pay a high mean 
and median percentage of their income in zakat but in most years their mean and median 
zakat incidence was higher than that of other income groups.
One could accept the above results at face value, but one reason for the high values of mean 
zakat incidence in the lowest income groups could be that the HIES datasets included 
observations in which households in the lowest income groups paid substantially more 
zakat than they earned. This should not nullify the fact that the mean and median zakat 
incidence o f the higher income groups was in fact lower than that of the lower income 
groups, and even when the mean and median zakat incidence of the higher income groups 
did surpass that of the lower income groups it remained unimpressive.
What this analysis shows is the clearly regressive nature o f zakat policy over the two 
decades. There was a heavier proportionate burden on the poor than the rich, and thus zakat 
practice appeared to contravene the commands of the Shariah.
This section has revealed that the Islamists’ expectations regarding zakat did not come to 
fruition. The above analyses have shown that the rich individuals, who, according to the 
Shariah, were obliged to pay the zakat, were not fulfilling their duty, i.e. the number of 
non-payers was quite high in high-income groups, and those who did contribute in the 
highest four income groups did not contribute more than 2 .1% of their income on average 
in the 1980s and 1.3% in the 1990s.
The micro-level analyses of zakat show some of the effects of the shape of the zakat policy
as evaluated in Chapter Three, i.e. the burden of zakat was falling on the poorer households
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rather than the rich. It can be seen that where attitudes towards zakat-giving were 
concerned the Islamists’ ideals that the zakat would tap the wealth of the rich did not 
translate into reality in Pakistan.
The section also revealed that the fulfilment of the Islamists’ aspirations regarding zakat 
revenue was dampened due to Pakistan’s political and economic historical trajectory. Given 
the lack of trust between the state and the individual, even the religious nature of zakat 
could not muster the allegiance hoped for by the Islamists.
The next section shows that apart from the above-mentioned reasons for the limited success 
of zakat in raising revenue, there is a third reason to explain the zakat performance as 
reflected in the macro- and micro-level analyses. The reason is given in Chapter Two, 
which states that it is in the interest of the state to take steps to demonstrate to the public its 
commitment towards a policy and in the process create trust that would have positive 
results for that policy. Keeping this in view, the next section aims to show that the lack of 
effort, the casual attitude and rather lax commitment of not only Zia’s government but also 
successive Pakistani governments to establishing positive reputational effects (as defined in 
Chapter Two) regarding the zakat had a negative effect on the Pakistani population’s regard 
for the zakat policy. This aspect also led to a revenue pattern that went against the 
injunctions of zakat as prescribed by the Shariah.
4.3 The State’s Commitment to Zakat and its Effect:
Zakat after Zia
Chapter Three highlighted the stance of Zia’s government on zakat. His government covers
most of the period of the present thesis because it was his rule that institutionalised zakat,
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from its initiation to policy formulation to the creation of the zakat infrastructure and finally 
to its implementation until 1988.
The successive regimes that came to power had little time to show active interest in the 
workings of the zakat. There could be many reasons for this; the first could be that from 
1988 (after Zia’s death in a plane crash) to 1996 Pakistan experienced three changes of 
governments, alternating between Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and Prime Minister 
Nawaz Sharif.500
After 1988 one observes the erosion of the authority and prestige o f the zakat system, at 
least under Bhutto’s government. During this time the zakat system was federalised and de- 
federalised three times. The federalisation took place during the government o f Benazir 
Bhutto, who was opposed to the ‘anti-female’ bias incumbent in Zia’s Islamisation 
programmes and hence not too keen on Islamic policies.501 However, the de-federalisation 
took place during the rule of Sharif, who not only had been a political ally of Zia but also a 
supporter of his Islamisation policies (see Introduction).
The first federalisation took place on 30 June 1989. This implied that zakat collection and 
disbursement was to come under the supervision and control of the federal government. It 
curtailed the powers of the Central Zakat Council to approve releases from the Central
500 After Zia’s death elections were held in 1988 and Benazir Bhutto was sworn in as the first woman prime 
minister o f  a Muslim nation. However, in 1990 Benazir Bhutto’s government was dismissed on charges o f  
incompetence and corruption. The 1990 national elections saw Bhutto's Pakistan People’s Party losing to a 
coalition o f  rightist parties led by Nawaz Sharif, who was elected prime minister. In 1993 general elections 
were held once again in the wake o f  Sharif s resignation following pressure from military on charges o f  
corruption. The elections brought Bhutto back to power as Prime Minister, but her government was dismissed 
once again in 1996 following charges o f  corruption and nepotism. Charles H. Kennedy, "Repugnancy to 
Islam: Who Decides? Islam and Legal Reform in Pakistan," The International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 41, no. 4 (1992).
501 Ibid. p. 778
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Zakat Fund and its authority to make rules, thus subordinating it to require the prior 
approval of the Federal Government. Additionally, it was no longer held necessary for the 
chairman of the Central Zakat Council to be a judge of the Supreme Court o f Pakistan, as 
any advocate with sufficient experience to become a judge of the Supreme Court could hold 
the position. The process was reversed in June 1991, however, the system was again 
federalised in June 1994.502 In June 1994, the Federal Government not only acquired the 
power to approve the annual budget of the Central Zakat Fund but also obtained the 
authority to reconstitute the Central Zakat Council any time before the expiry of the three- 
year term of office prescribed in the Ordinance. Additionally, it was no longer necessary for 
the Ulema to be member of the Central Zakat Council.503 The rest of this section will 
proceed to a more focused evaluation of the state’s commitment to zakat.
Design and Scope o f  Zakat
Chapter Three provided a glimpse into the government’s commitment to the zakat in terms 
of its design and scope. The policy was far from just as it appeared to target the poor more 
that the well off. The analyses o f the nisab of zakat revealed that its levy was quite 
burdensome for the poor but meagre for the rich. This made the zakat policy antithetical to 
the injunctions of Islam; it worked against the ideals of justice and equity by making people 
who were qualified to receive zakat pay it. Additionally, the exemption of stock-in-trade 
from zakat, against public opinion, revealed the government’s partiality in favour of the 
affluent. Furthermore, the scope of the zakat was also manipulated via the creation of two 
schedules in the zakat Ordinance (for apparent and non-apparent wealth), the implication of 
which was that the government was free to form, switch and strengthen alliances for
502 Nazir, Zakat Law. pp. 162-168
503 Ibid. pp. 162-9
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political bargaining, and to carve a way to appease the interest groups. Also, the policy­
making process revealed high-handedness and elitism on part of Zia and his cabinet. It was 
not difficult to see why the public would be cynical towards zakat policy.
The Zakat Bureaucracy
It was stated in section two of Chapter Two that the state should ensure that the citizen 
realises that the recruitment and promotion of the state bureaucracy takes place on grounds 
of competence and that they should have faith in the bureaucracy. This aspect is extremely 
important for the smooth operation of zakat as well as the bureaucracy is in the forefront of 
policy implementation.
As mentioned in the first section of this chapter, the Pakistani public regarded 82% of 
government organisations as corrupt and was highly sceptical about the accountability of 
these institutions. The bureaucracy, which is responsible for the management and execution 
of the government’s plans and policies, was perceived to be part of the elite running the 
country and infected with nepotism. Interestingly, this public perception of the bureaucracy 
did not alter vis-a-vis the zakat bureaucracy (even though they were supposed to be pious 
men carrying out the work of Allah) as is evident from the number of zakat non-givers, 
from the size of zakat given and the very small amount of zakat given voluntarily as shown 
in the previous section.
The nature of the zakat bureaucracy makes it rather unique as it is voluntary. This makes it 
cost-effective, as only 10% of zakat collection is to be spent on administrative costs
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incurred by the LZCs.504 Even the financial institutions responsible for zakat deductions do 
so voluntarily. As mentioned in Chapter Three, after the promulgation of the Zakat and 
Ushr Ordinance in 1980 an elaborate hierarchical structure was created for the zakat 
administration, forming a whole new order of organisations with a vast network of officials. 
There was the Central Zakat Council and the Provincial Zakat Council, which were 
voluntary organisations. Connected to them were the Central Zakat Fund and the Provincial 
Zakat Fund, the expenses of which were to be bom by their respective Federal and 
Provincial governments. Then there were the District Zakat Committees and the Sub- 
District Zakat Committees; also of a voluntary nature and unlike the councils at the Federal 
and the Provincial level, these committees were not backed by any support staff whose 
expenses would be bom by the respective provincial governments. Finally and most 
important of all, there were the Local Zakat Committees, which were also voluntary. 
However, they were allowed to spend 10% of their funds on administration costs such as a 
hired typist, travel expenses other zakat-related activities. The voluntary nature of the LZCs 
implied that for their officials zakat activities were not their priority as they naturally had 
more pressing familial and professional duties to fulfil. The effect o f this was that the zakat 
system at this crucial level was not only inefficient but consequently ineffective. Shirazi 
also admits that the voluntary nature of the system jeopardises the dedication to zakat.505 
The non-remuneration of the zakat system, especially at the LZC level, played its part in 
forming the nature of the zakat bureaucracy as there was little incentive to perform duties 
that would normally be undertaken as a full-time job.
504 Shirazi, System o f  Zakat in Pakistan, p. 108
505 Ibid. p. 109
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The credibility and confidence in the zakat system rests largely on the conduct and 
performance of the LZCs as these are the backbone of the entire system. They are in direct 
contact with the people, with those who receive and sometimes with those who give zakat. 
Throughout the analysed period, the performance of the LZCs has been a cause for concern 
for the government as their performance has been rather ‘unsatisfactory’.506 The term 
‘unsatisfactory’ implies many things, including the politicisation of the committees, lack of 
supervision of the zakat funds, and the misappropriation, mismanagement, misapplication 
and non-disbursement of zakat funds (targeting will be addressed in the next chapter).
One example of the negligent behaviour o f the LZCs is the slack manner in which they 
maintained the LZ-20 forms. The LZ-20 forms were devised to consolidate all the receipts 
and disbursements made to or from the LZC every six months.507 The CZC was concerned 
by the performance of the LZCs in this regard.508 They recommended a ‘Training Kit’ to 
educate the chairmen of the LZCs and their members about zakat operations.509 It seems 
that over the years, the training of the zakat staff was not prioritised as almost a decade later 
concern regarding the untrained and ignorant zakat personnel re-emerged. This is evident 
from the call for the training of the LZCs personnel to maintain precise accounts for the 
sake of accountability and efficiency.510 A solid example of the lax conduct of the LZCs is 
recorded in the audit reports for the years 1991-1993 and 1994-95, which point to the non­
maintenance of the mustahiqeen (deserving persons) register, payment without supporting
506 markazi zakat council, "markazi zakat council ki karkardagi report (1981-82)."p. 54. Finance Division & 
Central Zakat Administration, "Report o f  the Committee Appointed by the Prime Minister."p. 15
507 Central Zakat Administration, The Zakat Manual (Islamabad: Ministry o f  Finance, Government o f  
Pakistan, 1982).p. 182
508 markazi zakat council, "markazi zakat council ki karkardagi report (1981-82)."p. 15. See also, markazi 
zakat council, "markazi zakat council ki karkardagi report," ed. markazi zakat intizamia (Islamabad: vizarat-e- 
khazana, 1983-84).p. 16
509 markazi zakat council, "markazi zakat council ki karkardagi report (1981-82)."p. 15. See also, markazi 
zakat council, "markazi zakat council ki karkardagi report (1983-84)."p. 83
510 Finance Division & Central Zakat Administration, "Report o f  the Committee Appointed by the Prime 
Minister." (1992) pp. 22 & 24
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vouchers, the non-accountable disbursement of zakat funds and unacknowledged 
payments.511
There were many other additional problems with the LZCs. They were supposed to meet 
monthly,512 but in the formative years o f the zakat policy, when the bureaucracy of the 
system should have adhered strictly to the rules, the LZCs were lax in their organisation. It 
seems that only one third of the LZCs met monthly in 1984, some met bi-monthly, some 
quarterly and some once in four months. About one quarter o f the LZCs met only when the 
PZC disbursed funds into their accounts, which could imply meeting only once in six to 
even eight months 513
Another major problem with the LZCs was the lack of clarity regarding their role. Many 
committee members expressed confusion about the lack of specifics as to how they should 
carry out their duties, which had the potential of creating the duplication of tasks.514 In 
order to keep the LZCs up to date with the news of committees’ accomplishments, statutes, 
laws of the system, inspirational articles and the activities of the higher zakat administrative 
tiers, the CZC started the publication of a magazine called ‘ Al-Zakaf in 1980. However, 
the effectiveness of this mode of information had major limitations due to the high levels of
511 Auditor General o f  Pakistan, "Audit Reports on the Accounts o f  Zakat Funds (Disbursements)( 18-03-91- 
06-03-1992 and 07-03-1992-22-02-1993)," ed. Zakat and Ushr Division (Islamabad: 1995). paragraphs 9 ,1 0 , 
11 & 16. See also, Auditor General o f  Pakistan, "Audit Report o f  Zakat Funds (Disbursements) and Revenue 
Budget o f  Zakat & Ushr Division 1994-95," ed. Zakat and Ushr Division (Islamabad: 1998). paragraphs 3-01 
&3-02
512 Central Zakat Administration, The Zakat Manual.
513 Clark, "Pakistan's Zakat and Ushr System".p. 179
514 Ibid. pp. 209-10
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illiteracy among the members of the LZCs.515 This problem remained until the end of the 
period of the analysis.516
The members of the LZCs gained much prestige from their membership in addition to 
advantages in the form of not only political patronage but also influence. The politicisation 
o f the zakat bureaucracy had seeped to the LZCs, from its very inception. Usually 
politicisation was evident in the elections to the LZCs, where political bargaining and 
partisanship were commonplace. The government did show concern over this development, 
and Zia himself seemed to be concerned by this.517 The CZC stressed that the people should 
elect only individuals without political affiliations.518 On 26 February 1983, the Ordinance 
was amended to formalise the prohibition on individuals who were serving in the local 
government bodies from becoming members of the LZCs.519 However, the prohibition 
could not stop them from wielding indirect influence on the elections through their 
extended network.520 Such circumstances could only magnify the scale of favouritism and 
partiality in this institution and contribute to the worsening public perception of the zakat 
bureaucracy.
In addition to the politicisation of the zakat bureaucracy, the national newspapers had been 
quick to publicise corruption and malpractices within the zakat administration.521 The press 
reiterated that for some local zakat personnel the knowledge of embezzlement of zakat
515 Ibid. p. 199
516 Central Zakat Administration, "Zakat and Ushr System in Pakistan (1994)."p. 7
517 markazi zakat council, "nizam-e-zakat ki kargardagi aur ushr ka nifaaz (1982)."p. 8
518 markazi zakat council, "markazi zakat council ki karkardagi report," ed. markazi zakat intizamia 
(Islamabad: vizarat-e-khazana, 1982-83).p. 77
519 Nazir, Zakat Law. p. 151
520 Finance Division & Central Zakat Administration, "Report o f  the Committee Appointed by the Prime 
Minister."p. 22
521 Staff Reporter, The Muslim, 22nd March 1987.
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funds is not a novelty,522 implying that such practices were known but ignored. The 
adherents of zakat in Pakistan could potentially defend the system on the basis that such 
declarations by newspapers are potentially tainted with political partisanship and thus are 
not worthy of serious consideration. However, even if the information published in the 
newspapers was partially correct, it betrays serious flaws and shortcomings in the 
government’s commitment to zakat. Moreover, Zia’s own hand-picked Zakat Administrator 
General also acknowledged the existence of embezzlement of zakat funds in his address to 
Zia at a high-level government zakat forum. Mishandling and malpractices within the 
zakat system were still a problem towards the end of the period under review in this thesis,
i.e. the early 1990s. This is supported by the acknowledgement of the Prime Minister’s 
Committee, appointed in 1992 to review the then existing system of zakat, when it 
acknowledged the existence of malpractices, embezzlement and misappropriation of zakat 
funds.524 To curb this problem, at least at the local level, the Ordinance was amended in 
June 1994 to restrict the role of the LZCs to the identification of deserving persons. They 
lost the power to disburse funds, which were to be channelled through banks, post offices 
and other financial institutions.
The question arises as to how such findings influenced the workings of zakat. One only 
needs to glance at the state of the zakat audit to get the answer. The organisation of 
administrative and financial audits at the local level can be described as inadequate. Given 
that conducting audits is a way to examine the quality, condition and efficiency of an 
organisation, the CZC should have been more proficient and forceful in getting the LZCs
522 Staff Reporter, "The Zakat System," The Muslim , Thursday, 26th November 1987.
523 markazi zakat council, "nizam-e-zakat ki kargardagi aur ushr ka nifaaz (1982)."p. 42
524 Finance Division & Central Zakat Administration, "Report o f  the Committee Appointed by the Prime 
Minister."p. 23. The report was addressing issues concerning Local Zakat Committees.
525 Nazir, Zakat Law. p. 169
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audited. However, it seems that the audits of the first, second and third years, i.e. from 1980 
to 1983, were not completed for the LZCs until 1985. For the province of Sindh, the audit 
report for the first three years of the zakat was delayed due to the fact that records for 52 
LZCs were lost and these had to be reconstructed for audit purposes.526 This of course was 
the official version. In general there was a lag of about two to three years before the audit 
reports were compiled. It seems that though the CZC was aware that LZCs would be the 
main actors in the functioning of zakat policy, the CZC lacked the determination to 
inculcate accountability in the zakat bureaucracy, especially in the formative years of the 
policy when its performance would have left a lasting impression on the minds of the 
public.
The Punishment Structure o f  Zakat
Another important way of endorsing a policy in the eyes of the public and maintaining 
public confidence in the policy is to have clear punishment laws in case of non-compliant 
behaviour, mismanagement and malpractices. How did the government treat abuse of zakat 
to create credibility in the system? What was the government attitude to punishing the 
violators of this important Islamic duty?
There did not seem to be any well-defined and clear punishment structure for 
mismanagement and malpractices in the zakat system in general. In case of 
mismanagement of the disbursement of zakat funds by zakat officials, the punishment was 
somewhat vague. In his address to a high-level forum on zakat in Pakistan, the 
Administrator General stated that apart from ‘various legal proceedings’ (the nature of
526 markazi zakat council, "markazi zakat council ki panchvien salana karkardagi report," ed. markazi zakat 
intizamia (Islamabad: vizarat-e-khazana, 1984-85).pp. 28-9
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which has not been specified in any of the main official reports or publications), wrongly 
targeted money was to be ‘ordered back’ (but how this was to be accomplished was not 
specified either). Additionally, the responsible chairman or member of the committee was 
to be dismissed and a new one to be appointed via elections.527 The Administrator 
General’s ultimate position on the matter implied that the fear of God on the part of the 
zakat officials was to be the ultimate guarantee against the corrupt elements in the zakat 
system.528 In other words, the omnipresence of God was to be the assurance against any 
abuse of the zakat system.
The ‘Report of the Committee Appointed by the Prime Minister to Review the Existing 
System of Zakat and Ushr’ from 1992 seems to be the only comprehensive report of its 
time that highlighted and acknowledged the shortcomings of the zakat system. With regard 
to the punishment structure of the system, the Committee expressed the view that ‘it is 
essential to have a comprehensive procedure to respond and take action against such 
Committees as are indulging in malpractices or faltering grossly in the performance of their 
functions’. The report stressed that there was ‘no provision for taking action against 
misappropriation, defalcation, misuse and misapplication of zakat funds on the part of the 
chairmen and members of zakat committees’, and suggested amending the Ordinance ‘to 
incorporate penal clauses for such offences and the recovery of misappropriated funds’ 529 
It is quite obvious that the zakat Ordinance had no penal clauses for dealing with the 
misappropriation of zakat funds. It seems that the government did not take this essential 
step to improve the public’s attitude to the zakat and make it credible in their eyes. Perhaps
527 markazi zakat council, "nizam-e-zakat ki kargardagi aur ushr ka nifaaz (1982)."pp. 42-3
528 Ibid.p. 42
529 Finance Division & Central Zakat Administration, "Report o f  the Committee Appointed by the Prime 
Minister."pp. 16 & 23
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it was in response to this report that the tenth amendment to the Ordinance (June 1994) 
declared the misappropriation of zakat funds to be a criminal act.530
If the sanctioning of lawbreakers in cases of misappropriation and malpractices by zakat 
officials seemed murky, there were certainly no specific arrangements in case of non- 
compliance by the zakat payers. In the words of the Zakat Administrator General, ‘Payment 
of zakat due was left to the conscience of the person from whom it was due’.531 Even if one 
decides not to judge the government harshly for its lack of coercion of the disobedient to 
display its commitment to the system, one still feels hard pressed to enquire at least about 
the government’s attitude concerning enforcement in the zakat system because enforcement 
would be one way of weeding out and intimidating the would be non-compliant.
Where the authorities could not take action against people exploiting the ambiguities in the 
zakat system in order to avoid it (as analysed earlier in this chapter), they could certainly 
amend the system over time to check against the abuses. One good example of the laxity of 
the zakat officials towards the enforcement strategy concerned the ‘honour system’ 
operated by the banks in Pakistan. In the previous section on declining zakat revenue from 
savings accounts, it was declared that the reason for this decline was an increasing number 
of affidavits submitted by people declaring themselves to be Shias in order to get an 
exemption from the zakat. It seems that such declarations were never investigated by the 
banks or by the Central Zakat Administration as there seemed to be an ‘honour system’
530 Nazir, Zakat Law. p. 170
5311.A. Imtiazi, Interview on Zakat, 26 November 2002. To which he added, ‘for non-payment o f  Ushr due it 
was made recoverable as arrears o f  land revenue’, responding to a question posed by the researcher, ‘How  
was the punishment structure o f  Zakat and Ushr considered? How severe were the consequences o f  non­
payment?’ Mr. I. A. Imtiazi was the first Zakat Administrator General from 1980-85. The researcher 
corresponded with him via fax.
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operating between the client and the bank.532 In many instances the zakat-deducting 
agencies would turn a blind eye to false declarations of faith.
On the part of the zakat officials, there seemed a certain degree of complacency about zakat 
revenue. One explanation is that in the zakat system’s initial years they believed that the 
system had exceeded their expectations.533 Delving into the official zakat reports for the 
purpose of investigating attitudes to enforcement, one notices that the CZC’s annual reports 
never tired of mentioning that the Council always kept close accounts of increases or 
decreases in zakat revenue. They asserted that when they perceived the zakat revenues to be 
falling they probed into the reason for this decrease.534 However, a close study of the 
standard official zakat documents, such as annual reports of the CZC, reveals that the zakat 
officials rarely conducted any investigations into the enforcement of the system.535
Considering that enforcement is a channel to daunt the ‘would be’ non-compliant, so far 
there is little evidence to show the earnestness of the zakat officials in enforcing zakat and 
pushing its frontiers of collection to the maximum. Thus, in addition to the lack of a 
punishment structure in the face of non-compliant behaviour, mismanagement and 
malpractices in the zakat system, the government’s half-hearted commitment also revealed 
itself through the of absence of a zakat policy enforcement strategy. However, similar 
attitudes regarding non-compliance in secular taxation could be observed in Pakistan, but
532 World Bank, "Pakistan Poverty Assessment", p. 36
533 markazi zakat council, "nizam-e-zakat ki kargardagi aur ushr ka nifaaz (1982)."p. 6
534 markazi zakat council, "markazi zakat council ki kargardagi report." (1980-81) p. 17. See also, markazi 
zakat council, "markazi zakat council ki karkardagi report (1983-84)."p. 36. markazi zakat council, "markazi 
zakat council ki karkardagi report (1982-83)." markazi zakat council, "markazi zakat council ki aathvain 
salana kargardagi report," ed. makazi zakat intizamia (Islamabad: vizarat-e-khazana, 1987-88). p. 18
535 Also the financial reports o f  national institutions such as the State Bank o f  Pakistan, Economic Surveys o f  
the Finance Ministry and the Five Year Plans o f  the Planning Commission fail to comment upon the reasons 
for the decline in zakat revenues. The CZC also failed to mention any government strategy to revamp the 
revenues or enforce zakat.
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the difference was that the government in this instance introduced measures of enforcement 
to rectify the situation (see the first half of section 4.2), something that was not done in the 
case of the zakat.
Conclusion
This chapter showed that in the first instance historically the relationship between the state 
and the individual was affected adversely by lack of trust due to the political events and the 
economic policies of the regimes that came into power after the creation of Pakistan. This 
lack of trust set a shaky ground on which zakat policy was to operate. Of greater 
importance, the chapter revealed that the hallowed zakat could not muster the individual’s 
allegiance due to the fact that the Islamic state’s commitment to zakat policy was far from 
intense. It failed to create the reputational effects which failed to create trust between the 
state and the individual limited the zakat’s performance as a resource mobilising agent. 
Additionally, the consequences of the shape of the zakat policy analysed in Chapter Three 
became apparent. Thus, so far, some assertions of the Islamists remain unfulfilled.
The chapter showed that zakat was not immensely beneficial in raising revenue as was 
evident from what it raised as a percentage of GDP. Moreover, zakat incidence appeared to 
be regressive, i.e. it failed to tap the resources of the rich but burdened the poor. Zakat only 
appeared to raise more revenue compared to secular taxation as the secular taxation policies 
were skewed to benefit zakat.
For 1987-88, Jehle concurs with the results o f this chapter and holds that the higher income
groups contributed to reducing poverty and inequality at a rate substantially lower than the
least wealthy section o f the population. He asserts that those on whom the Islamic
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injunction to give zakat is greatest seem to put much less of their weight into giving zakat 
than those much poorer than themselves. Shirazi’s 1990-91 analyses on zakat also concur 
with the results of the HIES data for the same year and show that the contribution of the 
rich households to zakat was small, which he said implied that they were either not paying 
or not paying according to the prescribed rates. He was also struck by the oddity of the 
finding that the low-income groups were paying zakat.
The next pressing enquiry is regarding the benefits of zakat. Important questions of whether 
zakat succeeded in lessening inequality or reducing the poverty gap still remain to be 
answered. So far the thesis has shown that the zakat policy was geared towards burdening 
the poorer segments of the society (see Chapter Three), which has become clear by the 
analyses of the workings of its revenue side in this chapter. The thesis has made this point 
not only by placing zakat's ability to marshal resources within the general political and 
economic history trajectory of Pakistan but importantly through the level of the state’s 
commitment to zakat. Nonetheless, these analyses still do nothing for our understanding of 
zakat's effectiveness regarding its disbursements. In other words one cannot make a 
confident statement regarding zakat’s ability to reduce poverty and inequality. It would not 
be wrong to state that efficiency in targeting and level of disbursements can still play an 
active role in meeting the objectives of the policy and thus contributing to its effectiveness.
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Chapter Five 
The Effects of Zakat
Introduction
This chapter examines the benefit side of zakat in Pakistan. Enthusiasts of zakat argue that 
it has major potential to reduce poverty and income inequality. In addition, as stated in 
Chapter Three, the official objective o f zakat was to narrow the gap between the rich and 
the poor, and this chapter thus assesses this ability of zakat to meet these objectives.
Chapter Three showed that zakat, as a religious welfare instrument, was not immune to 
politicisation, which consequently had the potential to divert it from its theological and 
ideological objectives. Subsequently, Chapter Four showed the effects of such politicisation 
on zakat’s revenue structure and pattern, which showed that zakat's incidence fell 
disproportionately on the poorer segments of the society, its structure was regressive, there 
were many who were not complying with the zakat law and finally, those who were 
fulfilling this religious obligation were not giving very much. So far the divine nature of 
zakat does not seem to have the positive effect it was supposed to. This situation was 
exacerbated by the state’s far from impressive commitment to the zakat i.e. the failure of 
the state to establish reputational effects.
The analyses undertaken in the preceding chapters provide little idea as to how zakat might 
perform regarding disbursement. These chapters do not provide an insight into the 
significance o f zakat for its target population. Consequently, these do not address the 
practical outcome of zakat's rationale, i.e. its ability to reduce poverty and inequality. Thus
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it would be pertinent to analyse these issues for a comprehensive understanding of the 
working of zakat policy in Pakistan because regardless of the conclusions reached in the 
preceding chapters, the zakat policy may still prove to be promising where its objectives are 
concerned. These analyses of zakat disbursement will not only provide an insight into 
whether zakat met its official objectives and stood up to its religious rhetoric of creating 
equality and alleviating poverty, but will also consequently shed further light on the Islamic 
state’s commitment to the zakat policy.
In order to address this issue section 5.1 looks at the historical evolution of social welfare in 
Pakistan since its creation in 1947 with the purpose of presenting its condition before the 
introduction of zakat. The aim is to place zakat within a historical contextualisation of 
social welfare in Pakistan. Section 5.2 traces the disbursement trajectory of zakat at the 
national aggregate level to get an overall assessment of the disbursement policy. Section
5.3 delves into the micro-level assessment of zakat by examining the disbursement pattern 
at the household level through the HIES. This section determines who received zakat and 
how much for the six years from 1985-88 to 1990-91 and 1992-94. Finally, section 5.4 
analyses the effects of zakat on the level of poverty through the head count and poverty gap 
approach, and on income inequality through the Sen-Kohl-Atkinson index.
5.1 An outline of the History of Social Welfare in Pakistan
The principle of social justice is deeply rooted in the Islamic faith, and given that Pakistan
is the only country in the Islamic world to be founded in the name of Islam, it would be
surprising if this principle were not also deeply embedded in state structures. On 12 March
1949, when Pakistan’s first law-making body, the Constituent Assembly, passed the
Objectives Resolution, it laid down the principles of assuring full provision of social justice
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to the people of Pakistan. Subsequent constitutions also duly attended to this subject. The 
principles regarding social welfare were incorporated in Articles 28 and 29 of the 1956 
Constitution under the Directives Principles of the State Policy536 and Article 8 under 
Principles of Policy of the 1962 Constitution.537 Additionally, the 1973 Constitution also 
reiterated similar principles in Articles 37 and 38 under Principles of Policy.
After the Partition and the subsequent creation of Pakistan in 1947, Pakistan was facing 
challenges on many fronts. Not only did it need to establish a system of governance and 
strengthen its defences, it had also to cater to the social welfare needs of millions of 
refugees migrating from India into cities such as Lahore and Karachi. In Karachi alone, 
refugees had swelled the population from 300,000 before 1947 to 1,300,000 by 1951.539 
Pakistan did not have the resources to manage such an assault as its public services were 
not equipped for such a situation and the cities’ capacities were exhausted.
It was in 1952 that the Government took the first step in seeking a formal solution to the 
social welfare problems in Pakistan. For this purpose, it sought the assistance of the United 
Nations Technical Assistance Administration to study the existing facilities and resources 
in Pakistan for the elaboration of the social welfare programme.540 Consequently a group of 
UN Social Welfare Consultants arrived in Karachi in the same year, marking the beginning 
of planned social work in Pakistan.
536 Ministry o f  Law, The Constitution o f  the Islamic Republic o f  Pakistan (Karachi: Department o f  
Advertising, Films and Publications, Government o f  Pakistan, 1956).
537 Government o f  Pakistan, Constitution o f  Pakistan 1962.
538 National Assembly o f  Pakistan, The Constitution o f  the Islamic Republic o f  Pakistan (Karachi: Manager o f  
Publications, 1973).
539 Rehmatullah, Social Welfare in Pakistan.pp. 1-2
540 S. A. Quddus, Social Change in Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1990).p. 187
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On 2 April 1953, 65 social workers trained and sponsored by the government and the 
United Nations Technical Assistance Administration took the Oath of Dedication. This was 
a significant landmark in the history of social welfare in Pakistan as it formalised the 
objectives of social work and transformed it from a charity-oriented voluntary activity into 
a modem and professional process. These trainees were to contribute to the promotion of 
social welfare activities in the government and the private sector.541
Later that year, in June 1953 the government set up a Planning Board (which later gained 
the status of the National Planning Commission and became the highest planning authority 
in Pakistan), the aim of which was to prepare the First Five Year Plan for the period 1955- 
60 (for every sector).542 It is important to point out here that the Planning Board with its 
Five Year Plan was not set up to deal directly with the social welfare issues of the country 
or to find ways o f funding education and health programmes, but rather its rationale was to 
outline the most effective and balanced utilisation of national resources. This was done with 
the acknowledgment that the young country did not have the means to finance its 
programmes of education, health and social development. The implication of this belief was 
that the ‘Social Welfare’ heading was not to be included in the First Five Year Plan. It was 
only due to the efforts o f the UN team of experts, which lobbied the government officials 
and experts in the Planning Board, that the ‘Social Welfare’ head was made part of the First 
Five Year Plan.543 Under this Plan, a Social Welfare section was created as a permanent 
part o f the Planning Board dealing specifically with social welfare programmes. These 
programmes were carried out by the Departments of Health, Labour, Education and
541 Rehmatullah, Social Welfare in P akistan .^ . 1 & 10
542 M. Khalid, Welfare State A Case Study o f  Pakistan (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1968).pp. 273-4
543 Rehmatullah, Social Welfare in Pakistan .p. 73
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Housing, while the Social Welfare Section of the Planning Commission executed planning 
and co-ordination.544
The above narrative has provided a quick glance at the history of the establishment of 
social welfare structures in Pakistan; the following account will examine the practical 
results.
Under the First Five Year Plan in the Social Welfare domain, community development 
programmes were to be given priority, including the training of social workers, the payment 
of grants in aid to voluntary agencies for remedial and curative work and the undertaking of 
research into a scientific approach to social welfare development.545 Direct poverty relief 
was not a priority. Although this would have had an immediate affect on the welfare of the 
population, it would have had limited long-term benefit, and besides the government did 
not have the funds for such superficial relief.546 The government did not reach its targets 
under this plan. It took only limited action on social welfare, reflecting the greater 
importance attached to areas such as industry and agriculture. Also, there was no specified 
department to prioritise social welfare activities.547 Crucially, funding for social welfare 
was inadequate. Although Pakistan was to be a welfare state from its inception,548 the 
funding did not reflect these ambitions. As seen in Chapter Three, social spending under the 
First Five Year Plan was a mere 6.7% of total development expenditure (see table 3.2 and 
graph 3.2) and social welfare and population welfare were the lowest (see table 3.2 and
544 Khalid, Welfare State A Case Study o f  Pakistan .pp. 273-4. Until 1955 matters pertaining to social welfare 
were handled by a department o f  the Ministry o f  Works.
545 Planning Commission, "The Second Five Year Plan 1960-65," ed. Government o f  Pakistan Planning 
Commission (The Manager o f  Publications, Karachi, 1960).p. 382
546 Rehmatullah, Social Welfare in Pakistan.p. 89
547 Planning Commission, "The Second Five Year Plan 1960-65."p. 382
548 Khalid, Welfare State A Case Study o f  P akistan .^ . 229-237
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graph 3.2). This was aggravated by the fact that for the First Plan, only 25% of total 
allocations were spent.549
The situation for the rest of the four Five Year Plans did not alter significantly in terms of 
social welfare. Not only were the allocations to social welfare minimal (see Chapter Three 
tables 3.1 & 3.2), but there were also problems with utilising the funds for most of the Five 
Year Plans. There were several reasons for this: firstly, the whole system of social work 
was new to the country, and there had to be substantial learning by doing. Responsibility 
for social services was too closely centralised in the government departments and did not 
extend to the local bodies for the first two Five Year Plans. Because of these shortfalls, it 
was not possible to establish a nucleus of social welfare services for future development.550 
In certain cases, such as the Fourth Five Year Plan, social welfare programmes had to be 
abandoned due to financial stringency on account of the Indo-Pakistan War.551
Secondly, the goals and targets of the Plans were not well defined with the result that the 
Central and the Provincial Governments were unable to formulate clear-cut strategies for 
social welfare. Also, things drifted according to the personal idiosyncrasies of authorities 
responsible for social welfare from time to time, thus leading to conflicting decisions. 
Moreover, there was a lack of legal provisions covering activities that retarded 
implementation. For example, when welfare homes were set up to accommodate beggars, it 
was found that the law enabling the authorities to round up the beggars did not exist.
549 Plan Publicity Cell, "Social Welfare in Pakistan", 1973, Planning Commission, Islamabad pp. 22-3
550 Ibid. p. 23
551 S. K. Hak, Towards Welfare State-Pakistan (Lahore: Child Welfare & In-Service Training Institute, 
1971).p. 65
552 Ibid. p. 37
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The brief narrative of the evolution and the state of secular social welfare in Pakistan 
presented above introduces a backdrop for undertaking an analysis of zakat as a distributive 
element. It should help to place zakat within a historical contextualisation of social welfare 
in Pakistan. The next section considers zakat disbursements and transfers at the aggregate 
national level.
5.2 Analyses of Aggregate Zakat Disbursement
According to the zakat policy in Pakistan, the Central Zakat Council (CZC) controls 
allocations from the Central Zakat Fund. A certain amount is retained by the Central Zakat 
Administration (CZA) to be disbursed directly to institutions operating at the national 
level.553 The sum or percentage retained by the Central Zakat Administration is decided 
arbitrarily and is not mentioned in the Zakat Manual or any other primary or secondary 
source. The sources mention only that the CZA retains ‘a certain amount before transferring 
funds to the provinces and the capital city’. The national institutions that received zakat 
from the CZA are the Fauji Foundation, the Fatimid Foundation, the Al-Shifa Eye Trust 
Hospital, the Pakistan Institute of Medical Sciences, Nuclear Medicine Oncology and 
Radiotherapy Institute Hospital, the Layton Rehmatullah Benevolent Trust and the Marie 
Adelaide Leprosy Centre. Additionally, the CZA is to disburse funds to the provinces for 
calamities, and for this purpose there exists a revolving fund of rupees hundred million at 
the CZA level.554 However, the major proportion o f the money is transferred to the four 
Provincial Zakat Funds in two instalments each year. The proportion of funds transferred to
553 Kahf, "Zakah Management in Muslim Societies."p. 27. Central Zakat Administration, "Zakat and Ushr 
System in Pakistan (1994)." p. 6. In 1987 the CZC launched a revolving fund o f  Rs.100 million for natural 
disasters and also started disbursing funds to start a housing scheme for the deserving and funds to set up 
almshouses for beggars. In 1992 Pakistan Bait-ul-Maal was founded to provide assistance to those in need 
who were not covered by zakat. It is financed by the Federal Government, but it also receives small grants 
from the CZF. Central Zakat Administration, "Zakat and Ushr System in Pakistan (1991)."p. 107
554 Central Zakat Administration, "Zakat and Ushr System in Pakistan (1991)." p. 15
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each province roughly equals that province’s share of Pakistan’s population.555 This share 
is as follows:
Province’s Share of Pakistan’s Population
Punjab 59%
Sindh 20%
NWFP 14%
Balauchistan 6%
Islamabad Capital Territory 1%
Source: Central Zakat Administration, Zakat and Ushr System in Pakistan, Ministry o f  Finance, Government 
o f  Pakistan, November 1991, p. 10.
As stated in Chapter Three the Pakistani zakat law permits funds to be utilised for the poor, 
widows, orphans and the handicapped eligible to receive zakat for their subsistence or 
rehabilitation, directly or indirectly through educational institutions, hospitals or clinics in 
the area connected with the local Zakat Fund. Rehabilitation requires providing for 
education, training, skill formation, medical treatment, and the provision of artificial limbs, 
production tools and initial capital for small businesses. Pakistan’s zakat law requires that 
the rehabilitation beneficiary be helped in kind rather than cash.556 The rationale is that in 
the long run, the deserving should become self-sufficient and should not be dependant on 
zakat.557
555 Clark, "Pakistan's Zakat and Ushr System".p. 233
556 M. A. Khan, "An Evaluation o f  Zakah Control System in Pakistan," Islamic Studies 32, no. 4 (1993). p.
249
557 Imtiazi, "Zakah: The Pakistan Model and Experience", p. 171
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Figure 5.1 below shows the route of the zakat disbursement from the CZA to the Provincial 
Zakat Funds, which in turn distribute money to the Local Zakat Funds and the 
institutions.558
Figure 5.1
Flow of Zakat Disbursement |
Central Zakat Administration
Provincial Zakat Administration
Institutions: 
MedicareA 
Education 
Religious Schools 
Social Welfare
Subsistence 
Rehabilitation 
Administrative Costs
Local Zakat Funds:
Source: Central Zakat Administration, Zakat and Ushr System in Pakistan, Ministry o f  Finance, Government 
o f  Pakistan, November 1991.
* Disbursements made out to national level institutions and calamity fund.
A Medicare is the name given to a health provision programme falling under one o f  the heads for zakat 
expenditure administered by the government o f  Pakistan.
The proportions of transfers from the Provincial Zakat Funds to the Local Zakat Funds and 
institutions have changed over the years. The allocations to the different heads of zakat 
expenditure have not remained constant either. It appears that before 1983, the zakat 
transfer and disbursement proportions were not formally allocated by the CZA, which 
implied that these were carried out rather arbitrarily. However in 1984, the CZC adopted 
guidelines for the precise proportions of zakat funds to be distributed from the provinces to
558 Central Zakat Administration, "Zakat and Ushr System in Pakistan (1991)."p. 15
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the institutions and the LZC. For this purpose the CZC instructed the PZC to make lists of 
institutions for zakat disbursements.559 Table 5.1 below shows the proportions of zakat 
transfers as formally prescribed by the CZC, from the Provincial Zakat Funds to the LZCs 
and to the institutions. The table also shows the changes in these proportions over the years.
Table 5.1
Change in the Proportions of Zakat Transfers & Disbursements 
from PZFs to LZCs & Institutions and from LZCs for 
Rehabilitation and Subsistence
1984-86 1986-88 1988-91 1991-1995
Via Local Zakat 
Committees to 
Individuals 50% 50% 60% 60%
subsistence 65% 45% 45% 45%
rehabilitation 30% 45% 45% 45%
administration 10% 10% 10%
primary school 
scholarships 5%
Via PZF to 
Institutions 50% 50% 40% 40%
scholarships/ stipends 50% 50% 40% 50%
religious schools 20% 20% 20% 20%
social welfare 10% 10% 20% 10%
health 10% 10% 20% 10%
other* 10% 10% ~ 10%
Sources:
1984-86= CZC Annual Report 1983-84, Central Zakat Administration, Ministry of 
Finance, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, December 1984, pp.44-45
1986-88= CZC Annual Report 1986-87, Central Zakat Administration, Ministry of 
Finance, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, pp. 13 & 23. Also, CZC Minutes of 
Meetings, 1988, p. 4
1988-91= Zakat and Ush System in Pakistan, November, 1991, p. 15
1991-95= Report of the Committee Appointed by the Prime Minister to Review the 
Existing System of Zakat and Ushr, January 1992, p. 12
other*= It is to be preferably utilised for education. Report of the Committee Appointed 
by the Prime Minister to Review the Existing System of Zakat and Ushr, January 1992,
p. 12
559 Clark, "Pakistan's Zakat and Ushr System", p. 236
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The reason for formalising the proportions of zakat transfers was that after the first two 
years of the zakat system, the CZC felt that a large amount of zakat money was being 
disbursed for subsistence and that more effort should be laid on the rehabilitation of the 
recipients. In the first year of the system, i.e. 1980-81, around 85% of the zakat money 
transferred to the LZCs was spent on subsistence and only 15% on rehabilitation. However, 
for 1981-82 the proportion spent on rehabilitation was doubled to 30%.560 In 1984 the CZC 
proposed that disbursements for rehabilitation should be increased. From 1986 onwards, the 
proportions of zakat expenditure on subsistence and rehabilitation were equalised, as can be 
seen from the table above. On the other hand, as more and more stress was laid upon 
rehabilitation and direct subsistence to the recipients, the proportion between zakat 
disbursements to these heads and institutions changed from an equal proportion to 60% for 
the rehabilitation and subsistence and 40% for the institutions.561
The following table 5.2 shows the zakat disbursements from 1980 to 1994 as percentages of 
GDP and in current and constant prices.
560 markazi zakat council, "markazi zakat council ki karkardagi report (1981-82)."pp. 7 ,1 4  & 40. markazi 
zakat council, "markazi zakat council ki karkardagi report (1982-83)."pp. 56 & 68
561 markazi zakat council, "markazi zakat council ki aathvain salana kargardagi report." (1987-88) pp. 37-8. 
Central Zakat Administration, "Zakat and Ushr System in Pakistan (1991)." p. 3
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Table 5.2
Total Zakat Disbursements from the Central Zakat Administration 
(current & constant prices & as % of GDP)
_________  (Rs. Millions) __________________
Years
Zakat
Disbursements 
(current prices) % of GDP
Zakat Disbursements 
(constant prices- 
rebased to 1980 
deflator)
1980-81 750.0 0.3 750.0
1981-82 500.0 0.2 450.3
1982-83 751.4 0.2 618.8
1983-84 751.5 0.2 587.9
1984-85 1007.2 0.2 718.6
1985-86 1105.8 0.2 754.7
1986-87 1215.6 0.2 803.1
1987-88 1448.2 0.3 915.4
1988-89 1175.7 0.2 678 .0
1989-90 981.9 0.1 521.5
1990-91 1304.3 0.2 650 .7
1991-92 2 183 .7 0.2 963.6
1992-93 3349 .9 0.3 1342.8
1993-94 2 688 .28 0.2 991.62
Source: Nusratullah Khan (Joint Secretary, Z akat and U shr W ing), Presentation on System  o f  Z akat in 
Pakistan, (2 0 0 2 ) International Training Sem inar on Zakah  M anagem ent, p. 24. w w w .datastream .net and 
A uthor’s ow n calculations.
Graph 5.1
Zakat D isbursem ents (Current and C onstant Prices)
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years
Source: Derived from table 5.2.
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The above table and graph reveal that zakat disbursements have generally been on the 
increase till 1987-88 in current and constant prices, but plummeted for two years from 
1988-89 to 1989-90 only to resume their climb until 1993. There was a 16% increase in the 
zakat disbursements in current prices from 1986-87 to 1987-88 because the CZA decided to 
augment disbursements due to natural calamities. From 1991-92 onwards, there seemed 
to be a positive effort on part of the CZC to disburse larger amounts of zakat. This is again 
due to disbursements for natural calamities especially during 1992-93 which not only 
increased zakat disbursements by 54% in current prices but also by almost 40% in real 
terms.
Table 5.2 above also shows that the current zakat disbursements lingered at around 0.2% of 
GDP on average. When compared with the zakat collection for similar years, it reveals that 
zakat collection (though only 0.3% of the GDP on average and assessed as unimpressive in 
Chapter Four) was performing relatively better than zakat disbursements by 0.1% on 
average. To get a better visualisation of the comparison of zakat collection and 
disbursement, table 5.3 and graph 5.2 below present zakat collection and disbursement at 
nominal prices from 1980 to 1994.
562 Central Zakat Administration, "Zakat and Ushr System in Pakistan (1991)." pp. 12 & 15. Butt, 
"Institutional Framework o f  Zakah." p. 389.
Table 5.3
Total Zakat Collection & Disbursement 
(current prices Rs. In Millions)
Years Zakat Collection
Zakat
Disbursement
1980-81 844.3 750
1981-82 902.4 500
1982-83 1027.0 751.4
1983-84 1490.0 751.5
1984-85 1334.8 1007.2
1985-86 1521.0 1105.8
1986-87 1658.9 1215.6
1987-88 2069 .5 1448.2
1988-89 2279 .4 1175.7
1989-90 2573 .2 981.9
1990-91 2792 .0 1304.3
1991-92 2770 .0 2183 .7
1992-93 2658.4 3349.9
1993-94 3073.2 2688 .0
Source: Z akat C ollection=  State Bank o f  Pakistan 1981-1995, Zakat D isbursem ent Nusratullah Khan (Joint 
Secretary, Z akat and U shr W ing), Presentation on System  o f  Z akat in Pakistan, (2 002).
Graph 5.2
Zakat Collection & Disbursement (current prices-Rs. Millions)
4000.0
■  Zakat Collection
■  Zakat Disbursement
1980- 1981- 1982- 1983- 1984- 1985- 1986- 1987- 1988- 1989- 1990- 1991- 1992- 1993- 
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years
Source: D erived from table 5 .3.
The excess of collections over total disbursements perhaps reveals a certain inclination 
towards uncertainty and insecurity on the part of the CZC. It appears that this attitude had
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its roots in the CZC’s failure to prepare financial plans, lay down its operational targets and 
form detailed zakat budgets. The consequence pf this was that it was unable to achieve 
efficiency and effectiveness in its operations.563 The lack of planning was an institutional 
phenomenon, as a study of the Zakat Ordinance reveals that planning was not even 
mentioned in the Zakat Ordinance.564 Going back to the argument about the state 
commitment to a policy, here is another dynamic that shows the shaky commitment of the 
state to the zakat policy.
Table 5.4 below shows estimated cash balances and estimated cumulated cash balances, 
defined as the difference between zakat collection and disbursements from 1980-94.
Table 5.4
Estimated Cash Balances with the Central Zakat Fund
(current prices- Rs. Million)
Years Cash Balances
Estimated Cumulated 
Cash Balances
1980-81 94.3 94.3
1981-82 402.4 496.7
1982-83 275.56 772.26
1983-84 738.48 1510.74
1984-85 327.56 1838.3
1985-86 415.18 2253.48
1986-87 443.31 2696.79
1987-88 621.32 3318.11
1988-89 1103.72 4421.83
1989-90 1591.29 6013.12
1990-91 1487.74 7500.86
1991-92 586.34 8087.2
1992-93 -691.46 7395.74
1993-94 385.20 7780.94
Source: Derived from table 5.3.
563 Khan, "Zakah Control System in Pakistan."pp. 428-9
564 Kahf, "Zakah Management in Muslim Societies."p. 29 Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980.
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The above table reveals that the CZA in any year has been unable to disburse all the zakat 
funds collected, as a consequence of which it has large cash balances. Kahf and Shirazi 
concur on this point.565 It shows that at the end of 1992 almost 30% of the zakat collections 
that should have been spent for the betterment of the zakat recipients were unspent and 
sitting in the Central Zakat Funds, with the exception of 1992-93 and 1993-94, when it 
seems that the accumulated balances from the previous years were finally being spent, 
which concurs with graph 5.2. Kahf calculates the unspent amount accumulated at the 
central, provincial and local committees to be more than 40% of the local zakat received.566
There are many reasons for the slack performance of zakat disbursement. The first was that 
there are no controls against the retention of idle zakat funds with the State Bank of 
Pakistan.567 Additionally, the CZC was cautious with the disbursements and concerned 
about the embezzlement of zakat funds at the local level. Although, the poor levels of 
disbursements continued in later years due to indifference on part of the zakat 
administration.568 It had been noticed that the zakat funds lying in the State Bank of 
Pakistan have been used for budgetary support rather than for the benefit of the zakat 
recipients.569 The limitations of the zakat administration as a whole have been discussed in 
detail in Chapter Four.
The situation of low disbursements was aggrevated by slow disbursements on part of the 
PZA. There were occasions in the early 1980s when some PZAs would hold on to money in
565 Kahf, "Zakah Management in Muslim Societies."p. 29. Shirazi, System o f  Zakat in Pakistan, p. 50
566 Kahf, "Zakah Management in Muslim Societies."p. 30
567 M. A. Khan, "Zakah Control System in Pakistan."p. 428
568 Imtiazi. Interview 26th November 2002. The question posed by the Researcher was: ‘Why, according to 
you, have zakat funds accumulated in the Central Zakat Fund Account kept by the State Bank o f Pakistan?’
Mr Imtiazi's reply was: ‘In the beginning, due to caution; later, on account o f  indifference.’
569 Imtiazi, "Management o f  Zakah Collection and Disbursement" .p. 25
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order to collect interest on it.570 The Zakat Ordinance does not assess the legality of this 
practise however it is safe to assert that it goes completely against the humanitarian spirit of 
zakat and against the dictates of Islam. Furthermore, it demonstrates the lack o f true state 
commitment to the religious ideals of zakat. It appears that the practice of investing zakat 
money in profit and loss sharing schemes had been encouraged in the mid-1990s.571 it 
seems that the PZAs’ practice of not disbursing zakat funds promptly carried on till the late 
1990s and early 2000.572
It is interesting to note that in June 1994, an amendment to the Ordinance allowed for the 
investment of zakat funds in instruments that were not interest-bearing.573 Therefore, in 
1995 the CZC approved the investment of Rs.500 million from the zakat fund in 
Investment Corporation of Pakistan Certificates and National Investment Trust Units574 (see 
glossary for definition). This zakat money became unavailable to the beneficiaries, as the 
NIT Units could not be cashed in because of liquidity problems.575 It is not clear whether 
such investments were supposed to finance other government activities, or to increase the 
zakat stock so as to improve the system in terms of collection, disbursement and 
administration. However, considering the unspent cash balances with the CZF (as seen 
from table 5.4), the latter seems unlikely.
570 Clark, "Pakistan's Zakat and Ushr System", pp.236-37
571 Shirazi, System o f  Zakat in Pakistan, p. 50
572 Imtiazi, "Management o f  Zakah Collection and Disbursement", p. 36
573 Nazir, Zakat Law.p. 169
574 Ministry o f  Religious Affairs Zakat and Ushr and Minorities Affairs, "Minutes o f  the Meetings o f  the 
Central Zakat Council 12th Volume (65th to 75th Meetings)", November, 1999, Ministry o f  Religious Affairs 
(Zakat and Ushr Wing), Islamabad p. 11
575 Imtiazi. Interview 26th November 2002. The researcher's question was: ‘What were the practical 
implications o f  the zakat money being invested? To which Mr. Imtiazi replied, ‘Zakat monies (and 
consequently the legitimate interests o f  the Mustahiqeen) were put at undue risk and that too quite 
unnecessarily. It is my impression that the NIT Units in which enormous sums o f  money were invested cannot 
now be cashed in due to NIT’s liquidity problems. If so, virtually the money invested is not available for the 
benefit o f  the mustaheqeen-e-zakat. That amounts to a breach o f  trust.’ The researcher asked, ‘Was the money 
lost? To which Mr. Imtiazi replied, ‘In a manner o f  speaking, yes’.
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It will be pertinent to get a disaggregated picture of the zakat disbursements behind table
5.2 above, which will demonstrate the proportions in which the funds were being spent on 
different headings of zakat expenditure. The following table 5.5 and graph 5.3 below 
present zakat disbursements from 1980-92 in nominal terms. Many o f the following 
analyses end in 1992 this is because of the unavailibility o f data after this year. (The 
problem with the data have been explained in the Introduction).
The following analysis proceeds by firstly examining institutions to which zakat was 
disbursed and then proceeds to show whether this disbursements was according to the 
proportions set out in table 5.1. This should give an insight into the workings of the zakat 
policy at a practical level. To start with, the following table shows zakat disbursements to 
different heads in nominal prices.
Table 5.5
Zakat Disbursements for Different Zakat Heads (nominal terms - Rs. million)
Years Medicare
Religious
Schools
Institutions
(Scholarships/
Stipends)
Social Welfare 
Institutions Subsistence Rehabilitation
Natural
Calamities Total
1980 1.38 13.87 0.04 7.94 438.44 2.56 - 464.23
1981 2.27 22.63 3.4 12.6 528.5 16.09 - 585.49
1982 0.65 39.11 3.04 4.27 279.34 82.03 - 408.44
1983 4.65 23.45 26.73 13.96 769.09 145.04 - 982.92
1984 33.36 82.97 72.09 31.25 533.93 96.24 - 849.84
1985 21.52 88.45 82.149 19.52 186.83 158.75 - 557.219
1986 24.27 126.96 114.08 8.36 462.92 427.04 - 1163.63
1987 44.13 131.32 148.46 16.78 349.27 453.05 147.5 1290.51
1988 20.49 54.4 61.12 18.82 320.22 436.82 17.98 929.85
1989 64.19 148.62 58.53 21.02 278.67 251.61 - 822.64
1990 25.83 107.65 96.34 15.99 465.63 406.04 156.88 1274.36
1991 77.83 169.98 151.52 35.53 1120.52 353.69 12.8 1921.87
1992 76.44 158.97 134.15 27.42 708.62 587.79 2109.15 3802.54
Source: Central Zakat Administration, 1994 Zakat and Ushr System in Pakistan, Ministry o f  Finance.
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Apart from providing the official numbers of zakat disbursement for different heads the 
above table does not give any insight for further analysis. The following graph will present 
a clearer picture of zakat disbusements to institutions.
Graph 5.3
U)cq
1
Source: D erived from table 5 .5.
Graph 5.3 reveals that religious institutions ranked the highest among the recipients of 
zakat funds. This is consistent with the policy of the CZC.576 Since the imposition of zakat 
in Pakistan had major support from the religious groups, the CZC determined that religious 
schools ought to receive considerable support via zakat policy. Furthermore, voluntary 
donations to religious schools decreased dramatically after the formal imposition of zakat in 
the country, and the religious factions petitioned the Government to increase the proportion 
of zakat spent on religious schools. Thus in 1984 when zakat disbursement proportions 
were being formalised, it was recommended by the CZC that zakat disbursements to the
576 markazi zakat council, "markazi zakat council ki kargardagi report." (1 9 8 0 -8 1 ) p. 25 . markazi zakat 
council, "markazi zakat council ki saatveen salana karkardagi report," ed. m akazi zakat intizam ia (vizarat-e- 
khazana, 1986-87).p . 38
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religious schools should be doubled.577 However, by the early 1990s after Zia’s death the 
government had started showing concern over the large amount of zakat given to the 
religious schools, as it was felt that many of these institutions had the tendency to propagate 
sectarian differences resulting in sectarian discord.578
The CZC had from the inception of the zakat policy been keen on spending zakat money 
for primary school education, and scholarships for higher education, which is also 
apparent from the proportions allocated for scholarships and stipends as shown in table 5.1. 
However, as graph 5.3 shows, for most years the religious schools received greater sums. 
Medicare stood in the second last place with social welfare faring the worst among the four 
institutions. It may perhaps be the case that the reason medicare received relatively less 
zakat money than religious schools and education was because as mentioned previously, 
the CZC retained a certain amount from the collected zakat funds to be disbursed to the 
national medical institutions.
Graph 5.3 above shows a marked increase in zakat disbursements for all institutions from 
1984 till 1987. This is due to the formalisation of the allocation shares in 1984, which 
perhaps provided a renewed impetus to the zakat authorities to spend the funds. However, 
in 1988 there was a dramatic fall in the awards of zakat funds to institutions. It was 
particularly steep for religious schools and other educational purposes. Interestingly, this 
happens to coincide with Zia’s death in a plane crash on 17 August 1988. It appears that the
577 Clark, "Pakistan's Zakat and Ushr System", pp. 153 & 237
578 Finance Division & Central Zakat Administration, "Report o f  the Committee Appointed by the Prime 
Minister."p. 13
579 markazi zakat council, "markazi zakat council ki kargardagi report." (1980-81) pp. 25-6. markazi zakat 
council, "markazi zakat council ki karkardagi report (1983-84)."pp. 51-55. markazi zakat council, "markazi 
zakat council ki aathvain salana kargardagi report." (1987-88) p. 37. Central Zakat Administration, "Zakat and 
Ushr System in Pakistan (1994)." p. 6
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zakat system suffered a shock that year. Zia had taken an intimate interest in the working of 
the zakat system (reflected in the fact that high-level zakat personnel were chosen by him 
and were directly answerable to him, as seen in Chapter Three).
Another point of significance is that zakat disbursements to institutions were not made 
according to the dictates of the policy established by the CZC as laid out in table 5.1 above. 
Table 5.6 below presents the differences in the notional and actual zakat disbursements 
made to the institutions.
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Table 5.6
Notional (based on the proportions set out in table 5.1) & Actual Disbursements as % of Zakat Disbursements to Institutions
Years
Notional Medicare 
Disbursement (%)
Actual Medicare 
Disbursement 
(%)
Notional
Religious
School
Disbursement
(%)
Actual Religious 
School 
Disbursement (%)
Notional
Educational
Institutions
Disbursement
(%)
Actual
Educational
Institutions
Disbursement
<%)
Notional Social 
Welfare 
Institutions 
Disbursement 
(%)
Actual Social 
Welfare 
Institutions 
Disbursement 
(%)
1984 10% (out of 50%) 15 20% (out of 50%) 38 50% (out of 50%) 33 10% (out of 50%) 14
1985 10% (out of 50%) 10 20% (out of 50%) 42 50% (out of 50%) 39 10% (out of 50%) 9
1986 10% (out of 50%) 9 20% (out of 50%) 46 50% (out of 50%) 42 10% (out of 50%) 3
1987 10% (out of 50%) 13 20% (out of 50%) 39 50% (out of 50%) 44 10% (out of 50%) 5
1988 20% (out of 40%) 13 20% (out of 40%) 35 40% (out of 40%) 39 20% (out of 40%) 12
1989 20% (out of 40%) 22 20% (out of 40%) 51 40% (out of 40%) 20 20% (out of 40%) 7
1990 20% (out of 40%) 11 20% (out of 40%) 44 40% (out of 40%) 39 20% (out of 40%) 7
1991 20% (out of 40%) 18 20% (out of 40%) 39 40% (out of 40%) 35 20% (out of 40%) 8
1992 10% (out of 40%) 19 20% (out of 40%) 40 50% (out of 40%) 34 10% (out of 40%) 7
Source: Derived from tables 5.1 and 5.5.
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What is clear from table 5.6 is that actual zakat disbursements to institutions were generally 
below the notional allocation, with the exception of religious schools, which generally 
received more funds than they were proportionally entitled to receive (as explained earlier 
in this section).
The following graph presents the zakat disbursements for rehabilitation and subsistence.
Graph 5.4
Zakat Disbursements for Subsistence & Rehabilitation 
1980-92 (nominal terms)
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Source: Derived from table 5.5.
The above graph shows that for most of the years under scrutiny, the major portion of zakat 
money was spent on subsistence. As mentioned before, the CZA had felt that too little zakat 
was being disbursed on rehabilitation and thus proposed the sums should be increased. In 
April 1984, the CZC formalised the proportion of zakat disbursements to be given for 
rehabilitation and subsistence (see table 5.1).
In the light of this resolution it seems that not only did zakat disbursements for 
rehabilitation went up but that subsistence went down for 1985. In 1987-88 it appears that
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the CZC’s continuous attempts to boost disbursements on rehabilitation had finally been 
successful, but subsequently subsistence soon overtook rehabilitation once again.
The reason for the initial bias against rehabilitation was that the government perceived that 
a permanent rehabilitation programme at the grass-roots level involved a long-term 
commitment to the recipients, requiring monitoring and support from the LZCs while the 
recipients received training and began new careers.580 Regarding commitment, Chapter 
Four has already indicated the less than satisfactory situation of the zakat councils.and
committees. The consequence was that even when the CZC made a concerted effort to
/
spend zakat funds on rehabilitation in subsequent years, it could not maintain this effort for 
long and therefore zakat funds were being generally diverted to subsistence.581 It was 
generally admitted by the government that in spite of the continuous flow of substantial 
funds for rehabilitation, the results were disappointing due to the lack of effective 
supervision and monitoring of the affairs of the lower zakat administrative tiers. 
Additionally, most of the time, the recipients of zakat for rehabilitation would have had no 
solid idea about the nature and purpose of the scheme. Another reason for this practice 
could perhaps be traced to the idea that direct help to the deserving and needy is important 
in zakaf s ideology, and perhaps that the effects of direct relief are immediate.
As with the zakat disbursements to institutions where disbursements were not made 
according to the dictates of the policy established by the CZC, zakat spending between
580 Clark, "Pakistan's Zakat and Ushr System", p. 353
581 Central Zakat Administration, "Zakat and Ushr System in Pakistan (1991)." p. 3
582 Ibid. p. 3
583 Mohammad, "Evaluation o f  nizam-e-zakat and ushr in Pakistan", p. 102
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subsistence and rehabilitation was also not spent according to the dictates of the policy as 
laid out in table 5.1. Table 5.7 below makes this point.
Table 5.7
Notional (based on proportions set out in table 5.1) & Actual Disbursements as % 
of Zakat Disbursements for Susbistence & Rehabilitation
Years
Notional
Subsistence
Disbursement
(%)
Actual
Subsistence
Disbursement
(%)
Notional 
Rehabilitation 
Disbursement (%)
Actual
Rehabilitation
Disbursement
(%)
1984 65% (out of 50%) 85 30% (out of 50%) 15
1985 65% (out of 50%) 54 30% (out of 50%) 46
1986 45% (out of 50%) 52 45% (out of 50%) 48
1987 45% (out of 50%) 44 45% (out of 50%) 56
1988 45% (out of 60%) 42 45% (out of 60%) 58
1989 45% (out of 60%) 53 45% (out of 60%) 47
1990 45% (out of 60%) 53 45% (out of 60%) 47
1991 45% (out of 60%) 76 45% (out of 60%) 24
1992 45% (out of 60%) 55 45% (out of 60%) 45
Source: Derived from tables 5.1 and 5.5.
The above table reveals that zakat money spent for subsistence was mostly more than its 
allocated percentage share compared to rehabilitation compared in percentage average 
terms. The reasons for this bias against rehabilitation have been recorded above.
The next question concerns the coverage of zakat at the national aggregate level, i.e. how 
many people were receiving zakat and in what proportions. However, before dealing with 
this question it is important to describe the manner in which zakat disbursements take 
place.
As mentioned in Chapter Four, the Local Zakat Committees are the most important actors 
in the disbursement process. It is the duty of the LZCs to identify the ‘needy’ and
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‘deserving’ of zakat for subsistence, and to support the rehabilitation of recipients.584 The 
credibility and confidence in the zakat system rests largely on the conduct and performance 
of the LZCs, as these are the backbone o f the entire system because these committees are in 
direct contact with the people, with those who receive and also sometimes with those who 
give zakat.
For zakat disbursements directly to individuals, the committees identified the mustahiqeen 
according to priority and then verified their needs.585 The LZCs had to maintain registers 
containing information on the mustahiqeen who ordinarily resided within its jurisdiction 586 
At first, the LZCs could disburse zakat in cash,587 from the LZF operating at the nearest 
branch of the Commercial Bank or post offices, directly to the mustahiq for subsistence and 
rehabilitation.588 The LZCs could also pay the mustahiqeen via cheques stating the heading 
of the disbursement and signed by the chairman of the committee and another member.589 
However, the tenth amendment in the Zakat Ordinance in June 1994 restricted the role of 
the Local Zakat Committee to the identification of the needy as zakat was to be disbursed 
through banks, post offices and other financial institutions.590 This decision was taken 
because of delays to zakat disbursements due to complaints of malpractices.591
Zakat benefits to individuals through institutions occurred following a reference from the 
mustahiq’s respective LZC. The institutions sometimes received zakat not only from the
584 Central Zakat Administration, The Zakat Manual, p. 84
585 markazi zakat council, "markazi zakat council ki kargardagi report." (1980-81) p. 19
586 Central Zakat Administration, The Zakat Manual, p. 84
587 Ibid. p. 147
588 markazi zakat council, "markazi zakat council ki karkardagi report (1981-82)."p. 40
589 Central Zakat Administration, The Zakat Manual, p. 137
590 Nazir, Zakat Law. p. 169
591 Central Zakat Administration, "Zakat and Ushr System in Pakistan (1994)." p. 7
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Provincial Zakat Councils but some also received zakat from the LZCs in whose 
jurisdiction these were.592
Table 5.8 and 5.9 and graph 5.5 below present the number and percentage of beneficiaries 
at the national level for all the six headings of zakat disbursements.
592 Central Zakat Administration, The Zakat Manual. Register A p. 85 and LZ-24 p. 186. Also see Clark, 
"Pakistan’s Zakat and Ushr System", p. 257
Table 5.8
Number of Beneficiaries from Institutions (Medicare, Religious Schools, Education, Social Welfare)
Subsistence & Rehabilitation
Years Medicare
Religious
Schools
Educational
Institutions
Social Welfare 
Institutions Subsistence Rehabilitation Total
1980 10012 67201 59 46522 1289489 1931 1415214
1981 13846 57545 1210 31943 1287207 9214 1400965
1982 12242 86876 2476 7602 1175067 46753 1331016
1983 48859 38740 21108 13517 1215055 62983 1400262
1984 174459 96569 60580 30275 953016 15703 1330602
1985 153552 117924 59995 17627 509627 113091 971816
1986 126097 159147 64672 7863 856289 291261 1505329
1987 98705 152444 95234 7441 1262129 310577 1926530
1988 47432 62991 44747 9700 926101 177312 1268283
1989 112829 101448 28126 11950 671273 96348 1021974
1990 35111 106061 67919 43935 779003 204177 1236206
1991 40069 123947 56441 279097 1103745 107717 1711016
1992 244377 92010 29348 70052 1532612 205622 2174021
Source: Central Zakat Administration, 1991 Zakat and Ushr System in Pakistan, Ministry o f  Finance and Shirazi 1996 System o f Zakat in Pakistan: An 
Appraisal. Islamabad, International Institute o f  Islamic Economics.
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Table 5.9
% Beneficiaries for Institutions (Medicare, Religi
Re
ous Schools, Education, Social Welfare), Subsistence & 
labilitation
Years
%
Medicare
%
Religious
Schools
%
Educational
Institutions
% Social 
Welfare 
Institutions
%
Subsistence
%
Rehabilitation Total
1980 0.7 4.7 0.0 3.3 91.1 0.1 100
1981 1.0 4.1 0.1 2.3 91.9 0.7 100
1982 0.9 6.5 0.2 0.6 88.3 3.5 100
1983 3.5 2.8 1.5 1.0 86.8 4.5 100
1984 13.1 7.3 4.6 2.3 71.6 1.2 100
1985 15.8 12.1 6.2 1.8 52.4 11.6 100
1986 8.4 10.6 4.3 0.5 56.9 19.3 100
1987 5.1 7.9 4.9 0.4 65.5 16.1 100
1988 3.7 5.0 3.5 0.8 73.0 14.0 100
1989 11.0 9.9 2.8 1.2 65.7 9.4 100
1990 2.8 8.6 5.5 3.6 63.0 16.5 100
1991 2.3 7.2 3.3 16.3 64.5 6.3 100
1992 11.2 4.2 1.3 3.2 70.5 9.5 100
Average 6.0 6.8 2.8 3.1 72.5 8.8 100
Source: Derived from table 5.8.
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From the average given in table 5.9 and as the graph shows, it is apparent that zakat 
beneficiaries for subsistence were the highest. However, the numbers declined over the 
years which, was in accordance with the CZC policy of devoting fewer zakat resources to 
subsistence (as mentioned above). Well behind in numerical terms were rehabilitation 
recipients and the religious schools. According to Mohammad’s survey, until 1988, only 
5% o f mustahiqeen received zakat for rehabilitation,593 which is slightly lower than the 
percentage average of 7.9% for the same years according to the table above. Surprisingly, 
the beneficiaries for religious schools do not appear to be significantly numerous compared 
to those falling under the other headings, considering the high totals of zakat received by 
these institutions. However, their numbers do increase over the years. The beneficiaries for 
educational institutions seem to be faring badly considering the CZC emphasis on 
disbursing zakat for educational purposes.
Mohammad’s survey reports that all four types of institutions receiving zakat complained 
about the difficulties of receiving zakat and the delays (sometimes of more than a year) in 
the case of medicare.594 Such delays naturally made it difficult for the zakat to reach its 
beneficiaries and fulfil its objective and be true to its rhetoric. The CZC did not perform 
any assessment of the target groups for zakat payments, and thus lacked an official 
benchmark to assess the system’s coverage. However, one can assess the coverage of the 
system and gauge zakat beneficiaries as a percentage of Pakistan’s total population.
593 Mohammad, "Evaluation o f  nizam-e-zakat and ushr in Pakistan", p. 101
594 Ibid.pp. 178-180
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Table 5.10
Coverage of the Zakat System at the National Aggregate Level
Years
Total Zakat 
Beneficiaries
Total Population 
Pakistan
Number of 
Beneficiaries 
Receiving Zakat as 
% of Pakistan's 
Population
1980 1 4 1 5 2 1 4 7 9 2 9 7 3 9 0 1 .8
1981 1 4 0 0 9 6 5 8 2 0 5 7 7 9 0 1 .7
1982 1 3 3 1 0 1 6 8 5 0 1 6 3 0 0 1 .6
1983 1 4 0 0 2 6 2 8 8 1 4 2 0 9 0 1 .6
1984 1 3 3 0 6 0 2 9 1 3 9 0 0 9 0 1 .5
1985 9 7 1 8 1 6 9 4 7 1 9 3 9 0 1 .0
1986 1 5 0 5 3 2 9 9 8 1 3 2 6 9 0 1 .5
1987 1 9 2 6 5 3 0 1 0 1 6 1 6 9 9 0 1 .9
1988 1 2 6 8 2 8 3 1 0 5 0 9 7 9 9 0 1 .2
1989 1 0 2 1 9 7 4 1 0 8 4 7 8 9 9 0 0 .9
1990 1 2 3 6 2 0 6 1 1 1 6 9 8 0 0 0 1.1
1991 1 7 1 1 0 1 6 1 1 4 7 1 1 0 0 0 1 .5
1992 2 1 7 4 0 2 1 1 1 7 5 4 3 0 0 0 1 .8
Source: w w w .datastream .net, Central Z akat Adm inistration 1991 Z akat and U shr System  in Pakistan, 
M inistry o f  Finance and Shirazi 1996 System  o f  Zakat in Pakistan: An Appraisal and Author’s ow n  
calculations.
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The above table and graph reveal that the coverage of the zakat system was 1.5% on 
average, which seems rather unimpressive in a country where an average of around 23% of 
the population lived below the poverty line during the same period.595 In addition to this, 
the above numbers could be overestimating the situation due to the problem of double 
counting: individuals receiving official zakat from one source would be counted twice if 
they were also receiving zakat from another official source. This would imply that the 
number of beneficiaries presented in table 5.8 could actually mean ‘instances of benefits’ 
received by an individual rather than ‘number of beneficiaries’. Additionally, considering 
that not all those earmarked to receive zakat actually receive it596 casts a murkier shade on 
those numbers.
There are many reasons for this scanty coverage. To start with, Pakistani law does not 
specify the parameters of the target group, i.e. the ‘needy’ and ‘deserving’. This problem of 
definition raises questions about the eligibility of the zakat recipients; the vague and 
flexible criteria mean there are no clear yardsticks to determine need. It seems that during 
the planning of the zakat policy it was considered that the LZCs were the best placed to 
know who in their community would be most in need of zakat, and for this reason the 
eligibility criteria were not defined clearly.
Once an LZC identifies the mustahiqeen and records their need, it prioritises among them at 
a formal meeting.597 It has been found that the LZCs vary in the way they understand 
eligibility, and that eligibility is relative to each village and depends upon what is
595 Kemal, "Poverty in Pakistan."p. 37
596 Clark, "Pakistan's Zakat and Ushr System".p. 299. N. Khan, "A Presentation on System o f  Zakat in 
Pakistan" (paper presented at the International Training Seminar on Zakah Management, Islamabad, May 20- 
23 2002).p. 5.
597 Clark, "Pakistan's Zakat and Ushr System", pp. 152 -248
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customary in each village. Persons considered eligible in one village may not be considered 
eligible in another. Most of the time recipients are determined by LZCs members who 
know the situation of the people in their area or obtain information from home visits. 
Officials have acknowledged there are problems in making appropriate identification of 
‘needy’ and ‘deserving’ beneficiaries, as there have been complaints against the zakat 
system over the years relating to the inclusion of ineligible people.598 This gives the LZCs 
broad discretionary powers. It seems that a person is eligible to receive zakat if the LZCs 
say that he is, and the only way to prove his/her ineligibility is if he/she does not fall under 
the headings specified by the Shariah. On many occasions wealthy widows have been 
known to receive zakat, just because they are widows and fall under the heading of zakat
recipients according to the Shariah. Additionally, the LZCs have also been known to
include divorced and deserted women in this category, as the law is silent regarding these 
categories. Such variability in the eligibility criteria introduces the possibility of arbitrary 
and prejudiced decisions or even of the abuse of power by the LZCs. The problem of 
incorrect targeting is still prevalent in the system.599
Table 5.11 and graph 5.7 below show per capita zakat received.
598 Central Zakat Administration, "Zakat and Ushr System in Pakistan (1994)." p. 7
599 N. Khan, "Presentation on System o f  Zakat in Pakistan".p. 5
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Table 5.11
Per Capita Zakat Received
Years
Total Zakat 
Received
Total Zakat 
Beneficiaries
Per Beneficiary 
Zakat Received 
(rupees-current 
prices)
1980 464230000 1415214 328.0
1981 585490000 1400965 417.9
1982 408440000 1331016 306.9
1983 982920000 1400262 702.0
1984 849840000 1330602 638.7
1985 557219000 971816 573.4
1986 1163630000 1505329 773.0
1987 1143010000 1926530 593.3
1988 911870000 1268283 719.0
1989 822640000 1021974 805.0
1990 1117480000 1236206 904.0
1991 1909070000 1711016 1115.8
1992 1693390000 2174021 778.9
Source: Central Zakat Administration, 1994, Zakat and Ushr System in Pakistan, Ministry o f  Finance, derived 
from table 5.10 and Author’s own calculations.
Graph 5.7
Per Capita Zakat Received (rupees-current prices)
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Source: Derived from table 5.11.
The above table and graph show that the average per capita zakat disbursed was Rs.665 per 
year in current prices. This number does not indicate anything about its adequacy for
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sustenance. One way of assessing this would be to compare the average annual 
disbursement with the annual poverty line for the same years. The following table 5.12 
presents a year-wise picture of the adequacy of zakat disbursed at the national aggregate 
level. As stated in Chapter Four, the 1984 poverty line has been deflated using the CPI 
(Consumer Price Index) for 1984 prices.
Table 5.12
Adequacy of Zakat Disbursement
Per Capita Zakat Annual Poverty
Per Capita Zakat 
Received % of
Received (rupees Line (1984 Annual Poverty
Years current prices) prices) Line
1980 3 2 8 . 0 1 9 2 1 .0 17.1
1981 4 1 7 . 9 2 1 4 8 . 6 1 9 .5
1982 3 0 6 . 9 2 2 7 5 . 2 1 3 .5
1983 7 0 2 . 0 2 4 2 0 . 2 2 9 . 0
1984 6 3 8 . 7 2 5 6 8 . 0 2 4 . 9
1985 5 7 3 . 4 2 7 1 2 .1 2 1 .1
1986 7 7 3 . 0 2 8 0 6 . 6 2 7 . 5
1987 5 9 3 . 3 2 9 3 8 . 8 2 0 . 2
1988 7 1 9 . 0 3 1 9 7 . 6 2 2 . 5
1989 8 0 5 . 0 3 4 4 9 .1 2 3 . 3
1990 9 0 4 . 0 3 7 6 1 .1 2 4 . 0
1991 1 1 1 5 . 8 4 1 9 5 . 3 2 6 . 6
1992 7 7 8 . 9 4 6 0 4 . 6 1 6 .9
Source: www.datastream.net. Author and derived from table 5.11.
The table shows that apart from 1983, 1986 and 1991, the annual zakat disbursement did 
not manage to reach even a quarter of the poverty line, which is sufficient to provide a 
person with only the basic amount of calories.
When zakat policy was introduced the maximum benefit was set at Rs.40 per month due to 
the uncertainty regarding not only the collection of zakat but also the number of 
beneficiaries. However, following an inspection tour, in 1983 the Deputy Administrator
347
General advised the CZC that the zakat disbursed was inadequate. Therefore in 1984 the 
amount given was increased to a minimum of Rs.lOO per month.600 The increase is 
reflected in the second column of the above table. However, it also shows that the increase 
was still not large enough, bringing the payment up to just 29% of the poverty line. In the 
following year it fell to 21%, which suggests that not only the adequacy of the grants 
deteriorated but also that the revised rates of zakat disbursements were not kept up.
The inadequacy of the disbursements is just one aspect o f the shortcomings of the zakat 
policy, as the frequency of the meagre awards was also irregular. The LZCs determine the 
frequency of zakat grants as well. There was no single pattern of disbursement as some 
LZCs disbursed zakat money monthly, some every quarter and some even once in nine 
months. The rest disbursed money somewhere in between these extremes or whenever they 
received an instalment from the PZC.601 Mohammad observed that until 1988 there was 
much irregularity rather than a set pattern of disbursement frequency.602 The erratic patterns 
of disbursement continued till the end of the period under review.603
This section has thus far revealed that zakat transfers from the CZA were unimpressive for 
the entire period analysed, lingering around 0.2% of the GDP on average. Zakat collections 
were always higher than the disbursements due to the lack of financial and budgetary 
planning and a failure to plan for targets. Consequently, the zakat account with the State 
Bank of Pakistan held huge cash balances. The tardiness in zakat money transfers ran 
throughout the system, as the PZFs and the LZCs were also slack in this regard.
600 Clark, "Pakistan's Zakat and Ushr System", pp. 249-250
601 Ibid. p. 249
602 Mohammad, "Evaluation o f  nizam-e-zakat and ushr in Pakistan", p. 97
603 N. Khan, "Presentation on System o f  Zakat in Pakistan".pp. 8 & 12
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Additionally, transfers did not take place according to set guidelines and even when 
guidelines were imposed these were never followed. This has been shown through the 
disbursement patterns between institutions and between subsistence and rehabilitation. Of 
the institutions it was the religious schools that received the most zakat. Furthermore, the 
rehabilitation that is supposed to remedy the long-term economic dependence of the 
individual was sacrificed in favour of handouts for subsistence. This was due to the lack of 
long-term commitment, monitoring and support on the part o f the zakat management as a 
whole.
Due to the vague eligibility criteria the number of beneficiaries was not only low but the 
disbursements were inadequate and failed to reach even 22% of the poverty line. The lack 
of clarity regarding the zakat’s eligibility criteria and the vagueness of the terms ‘needy’ 
and ‘deserving’ augmented the power of the LZCs whose duty it was to determine 
entitlement, which led in many instances to malpractices within the LZCs. There existed 
not only an irregular pattern of zakat disbursements to the individual, but delays in the 
disbursement of zakat to individuals persisted over time.
The state of affairs does not seem very effective. However, the above analyses have been
undertaken using aggregate data which does not offer the exact impact of the zakat
regarding who actually received and how much i.e its effects on households. Thus there is
much to be assessed with regards to the coverage, adequacy and the targeting of the system
using micro-level household data. The following analysis deals with these issues at the
household level and tries to answer the questions of who received zakat, by how much did
zakat augment the income of the recipient. In the process this section gives some idea of
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whether zakat was true to its official and religious rhetoric of creating welfare and 
prosperity in society and looking after its indigent and destitute.
5.3 Micro-Analyses of Zakat Beneficiaries
For analyses of this section the micro-level data come from the same source i.e. the 
Household Integrated Economic Survey (HIES) as used in Chapter Four, and will be used 
to conduct an analysis of zakat received by the beneficiaries as reported for the years 1985- 
86, 1986-87,1987-88, 1990-91, 1992-93 and 1993-94.
Before embarking upon the micro-level analyses of zakat disbursements, it is important to 
recall the differences in the zakat questionnaires for the 1980s and the 1990s however, from 
the perspective of zakat received. In the 1990s questionnaire, zakat received was recorded 
under the entry code 50021, which included zakat and ushr only, whereas for the 1980s the 
variable of zakat received was recorded under the codes 6206 (cash) and 6303 (kind) and 
included ‘zakat, gifts and assistance, ushr, nazrana (charity), and philanthropy’. The 
definition of zakat in the 1990s questionnaire is therefore narrow and more specific than in 
the 1980s questionnaire. There is another difference in the questionnaires, (also mentioned 
in Chapter Four, though regarding zakat given). In the 1990s there is an additional entry 
(code 50061) regarding ‘gifts or assistance/benefits such as educational grants, alimony, 
trust funds or other grants, inheritance, lottery winnings (in cash), etc.’, which does not 
appear in the 1980s questionnaire. The consequence of this could be that some o f the gifts 
and assistance recorded under codes 6206 and 6303 in the 1980s might have been
350
subsequently recorded under code 50061 in the 1990s.604 This again implies that the 
definition of zakat is narrower in the 1990s.
This creates a potential problem of comparability of zakat received in the 1980s and the 
1990s. Therefore in the analyses that follow the results of the two decades will be presented 
separately.
Before beginning the analysis, it would be helpful to present the income threshold for the 
11 sub-groups for the six years under consideration in real terms as presented previously in 
Chapter Four. Table 5.13 provides these thresholds.
Table 5.13
Inflation Adjusted Monthly Adult Equivalised Income 
Brackets (rupees)
Years
1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1990-91 11992-93 11993-94
Income Brackets
200 206 215 274 341 370
400 412 430 548 682 739
600 618 645 823 1023 1109
800 824 861 1097 1364 1479
1000 1030 1076 1371 1705 1848
1200 1236 1291 1645 2045 2218
1400 1442 1506 1920 2386 2588
1600 1648 1721 2194 2727 2958
1800 1855 1936 2468 3068 3327
2000 2061 2152 2742 3409 3697
Source: Author’s own calculations.
The above income thresholds yield the following adult equivalised household income 
distribution pattern for the 1980s and 1990s presented in table 5.14 and graph 5.8. This
604 Federal Bureau o f Statistics, "The Questionnaire Household Income and Expenditure Survey 1987-88,."p. 
566. Federal Bureau o f  Statistics, "Form HIES-1 3/90 Household Integrated Economic Survey."p. 33
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income distribution is slightly different from the distribution shown in Chapter Four in 
table 4.10, because the following table displays income distribution net of zakat. All 
subsequent calculations will be based on this income distribution.
Table 5.14
Adult Equivalised Household Income Distribution net of Zakat
1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1990-91 1992-93 1993-94
AE
Income % % % % % %
Groups Households Households Households Households Households Households
1 1 3 .9 11 .9 10 .6 13.1 1 6 .3 15 .2
2 5 0 .6 5 1 .7 5 1 .9 4 2 .7 4 4 .3 4 4 .9
3 1 9 .6 2 0 .0 2 1 .4 2 2 .3 2 0 .3 2 0 .2
4 7 .3 7 .3 7 .5 9 .2 8 .3 7 .5
5 3 .2 3 .3 3 .2 4.1 3 .8 4 .3
6 1.8 1.7 1.7 2 .4 2 .0 2 .3
7 1.1 1.3 1.0 1.8 1.2 1.5
8 0 .6 0 .7 0 .7 1.0 0 .8 0 .9
9 0 .4 0 .5 0 .4 0 .9 0 .5 0 .6
10 0 .3 0 .4 0 .3 0 .5 0 .4 0 .5
11 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.9 2 .0 2 .0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Based on the HIESs and Author’s ow n  calculations.
Graph 5.8
Adult Equivalised Household Income Distribution Net of Zakat
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It will be beneficial to repeat here that for all the six years o f analysis the first income group 
falls below the poverty line, whereas the second income group only partially falls under the 
poverty line (see table 4.1 la). This reminder should help to orientate the analysis in terms 
of who received zakat.
Using the income brackets and income distribution presented in table 5.13 and 5.14 above, 
the analysis begins by looking at the pattern of zakat targeting. Tables 5.15a and 5.15b and 
graphs 5.9a, 5.9b and 5.9c below show the number and percentage of households receiving 
zakat in each income group for the 1980s according to the HIESs.
Table 5.15a
Number of Households Receiving Zakat 
per Income Group
Income
Groups 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88
1 11 269 199
2 117 542 479
3 62 221 207
4 46 80 75
5 28 33 37
6 13 27 16
7 10 14 13
8 4 13 9
9 5 11 5
10 1 7 3
11 5 14 11
Total 302 1231 1054
Source: Based on the HIESs and Author’s own calculations.
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Table 5.15b
Households Receiving Zakat per income group as
% of Tota Recipients
1985-86 1986-87 1987-88
% % %
Households Households Households
Income Receiving Receiving Receiving
Groups Zakat Zakat Zakat
1 ‘ 3.6 21.9 18.9
2 38.7 44.0 45.4
3 20.5 18.0 19.6
4 15.2 6.5 7.1
5 9.3 2.7 3.5
6 4.3 2.2 1.5
7 3.3 1.1 1.2
8 1.3 1.1 0.9
9 1.7 0.9 0.5
10 0.3 0.6 0.3
11 1.7 1.1 1.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Based on the HIESs and Author’s own calculations.
Graphs 5.9a, b & c
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According to this distribution of the zakat recipients, most are in the three lowest income 
groups (77% on average) with almost 63% in 1985-86 and 84% in 1986-87 and 1987-88. 
Using the adult equivalised poverty lines for the 1980s, i.e. Rs.226, Rs.233.8 and Rs.244.9 
respectively (see table 4.11a in Chapter Four for income groups falling below the poverty 
lines), it is estimated that for 1985-86 around 8% of households in receipt of zakat 
payments had adult equivalised incomes (net of zakat receipts) below the poverty line; for 
1986-87 this proportion rose to almost 30%, and for the year 1987-88 it was almost 26%.605 
This shows that although the majority of households receiving zakat payments were mostly 
in the three lowest income groups, LZCs do not always appear to have awarded the zakat 
payments to households with equivalised incomes below the poverty lines. For 1987-88 
Jehle reports that when compared to the poverty line, the median incomes o f zakat receivers 
show that over half of those who receive zakat were not among the poorest members of 
society.606 Jehle’s statement does not seem to contradict the pattern of zakat received 
according to the table above.
For the 1990s, tables 5.16a and 5.16b and graphs 5.10a, 5.10b and 5.10c below display the 
number and percentage o f households receiving zakat per income group according to the 
HIESs.
605 For the usage o f  the poverty line, see Chapter Four, table 4.1 la  & b.
606 Jehle, "Zakat and Inequality." p. 208
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Table 5.16a
Number of Households Receiving Zakat 
per Income Group
Income
Groups 1990-91 1992-94 1993-95
1 64 148 111
2 86 155 119
3 14 47 30
4 11 11 6
5 2 6 9
6 1 2 4
7 1 - 2
8 - 3 3
9 - 1 -
10 - - 1
11 - 2 -
Total 179 375 285
Source: Based on the HIESs and Author’s own calculations.
Table 5.16b
Households Receiving Zakat per income group as
% of Total Recipients
1990-91 1992-93 1993-94
% % %
Households Households Households
Income Receiving Receiving Receiving
Groups Zakat Zakat Zakat
1 35.8 39.5 38.9
2 48.0 41.3 41.8
3 7.8 12.5 10.5
4 6.1 2.9 2.1
5 1.1 1.6 3.2
6 0.6 0.5 1.4
7 0.6 - 0.7
8 - 0.8 1.1
9 -  . 0.3 -
10 - - 0.4
11 - 0.5 -
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Based on the HIESs and Author’s own calculations.
Graphs 5.10a, b & c
Households Receiving Zakat as % of Total Recipients 
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Table 5.16b shows that for all the three years of the 1990s, on average 92% of the 
households receiving zakat belonged to the lowest three income brackets (with 91% in 
1990-91, 93% in 1992-93 and 91% in 1993-94). Zakat targeting for the 1990s appears to 
have improved relative to the 1980s. The proportion of households in receipt of zakat with 
equivalised incomes below the relevant annual poverty line was 48.6% for 1990-91 
(poverty line Rs.313.4), 48.5% for 1992-93 (poverty line Rs.383.7) and 47.3% for 1993-94 
(poverty line Rs.421.9) (see table 4.1 la  for comparison of income brackets with the poverty 
lines). As in the 1980s, although the zakat payments were concentrated on the lowest 
income groups, these were not always the poorest group i.e. falling below the poverty line.
On the whole, however, for both the 1980s and the 1990s zakat seemed to be well targeted, 
with most of the receivers falling in the lowest income groups within the income 
distribution. In particular in the 1990s the very high concentration of recipients in the very 
low income groups is very significant, considering that in the 1990s questionnaire, as 
already noted, the variable of zakat received refers exclusively to zakat. Shirazi’s study of 
zakat in Pakistan in 1990-91, conducted on a household income basis, also shows that most 
of the zakat recipients belonged to the lowest income deciles.607
However, tables 5.15a and 5.15b and 5.16a and 5.16b with their corresponding graphs 
suggest that there was some incorrect targeting in the two decades. In particular in 1985-86, 
the percentage of zakat recipients falling into the five highest income groups was above 
8%. This percentage, however, fell in the following years to below 4% in 1987-88, and
607 Shirazi, System o f  Zakat in Pakistan, p. 71
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below 3% in the 1990s. This concurs with Mohammad’s study, which also suggests some 
poor targeting of zakat disbursements.608
The misallocation of zakat funds sheds light on the state’s commitment to the zakat policy 
in terms of standardisation of the provision of services by a reputable bureaucracy. As 
suggested in Chapter Two, standardisation in the provision of a policy is also reflective of 
the state’s fairness and commitment to the policy.
Nonetheless, the above results seem to suggest that the government was to some extent 
successful in establishing consistency with its objectives of targeting the poor via zakat.
In countries such as Pakistan, where poverty is widespread, any policy geared to reduce 
poverty not only has to target the right groups but also to provide poverty relief to a high 
percentage of the poor. Therefore, the next question that comes to mind is the proportion of 
zakat receivers in each income bracket as a percentage of the total population. The 
programme coverage is one of the key criteria for the evaluation of safety net programmes 
such as zakat.609
However, a note of caution needs to be inserted here. As seen in table 5.16a, the number of 
recipients in the highest income groups for the 1990s is six or less. This implies that the 
averages and median values based on such low counts will not be representative of the
608 Mohammad, "Evaluation o f  nizam-e-zakat and ushr in Pakistan", p. 26
609 Social Policy and Development Centre, Social Development in Pakistan: annual review  (Karachi: Social 
Policy and Development Centre; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999-2000). pp. 92-115. Social Policy 
Development Centre, "Social Development in Pakistan: annual Review", 1999, Social Policy and 
Development Centre, Karachi p. 105
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situation. Therefore, for the 1990s the following analysis will not give a visual presentation 
of income groups with less than six recipient households.
The following table and graphs present zakat receivers as a percentage of the total sample 
(givers, receivers and non-participants) by income groups. According to the HIESs for 
1985-86, table 5.17 and graphs 5.11a, 5.11b and 5.11c below show that on average only 
1.3% of households in the lowest three income groups were actually benefiting from zakat, 
with only 0.5% in the poorest group. The situation did improve over the following two 
years: in 1986-87, an average 8.4% of the first three income groups received the zakat> 
falling to 6.8% in 1987-88. There is a significant rise in the percentage of receivers in the 
lowest income group between 1985-86 and the two following years.
Table 5.17
Households Receiving Zakat as 
Percentage of Total Number of 
Households (receivers, givers & non­
participants)
Income
Groups 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88
1 0.5 12.9 10.2
2 1.4 6.0 5.0
3 1.9 6.3 5.2
4 3.8 6.2 5.4
5 5.1 5.6 6.3
6 4.3 8.9 5.2
7 5.5 6.0 6.8
8 3.9 11.2 6.6
9 7.2 12.9 6.2
10 1.9 10.8 5.6
11 2.6 6.9 4.9
Total 1.8 7.1 5.7
Source: Based on the HIESs and Author’s own calculations.
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Graphs 5.11a, b & c
Households Receiving Zakat as % of Total Number of 
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As a percentage of the total population, zakat recipients rose from only 1.8% in 1985-86, to 
7.1% in 1986-87 and 5.7% in 1987-88. The percentage for 1987-88 is almost consistent 
with Jehle’s findings that about 6% of the population were benefiting from zakat.610 Note 
that the higher income groups in the table above tend to show a larger proportion of 
recipients. This is not because there are more recipients in these groups, as has been shown 
in the distribution charts in tables 5.15a and 5.15b, but because these groups contain few 
households. For the 1980s on the whole the coverage seems unimpressive especially 
regarding the percentage o f the recipients in the lowest income groups considering that this 
group falls below the poverty line.
The percentages of zakat recipients shown in the above table suggest a similar scenario as 
at the national level presented in table 5.10 in the previous section, i.e. the zakat system’s 
coverage was rather thin. However, the numbers at the two levels do not reconcile: the 
percentages based on the HIES, as shown in the above table for 1986-87 and 1987-88, are 
notably higher than the national aggregate numbers presented in table 5.10. There are many 
reasons for the differences in these numbers: the first one is that calculations in table 5.17 
include those who receive zakat at the interpersonal level, and these are missing in the 
national aggregate numbers; secondly, the HIES zakat definition for the 1980s is broader, 
whereas at the national aggregate level only zakat disbursements are recorded. 
Additionally, as mentioned in the Introduction, the ushr receipts are not calculated at the 
national level whereas these are part of the HIES surveys.
A very similar picture emerges for the 1990s, i.e. the recipients represent only a small 
proportion of the population in all the income groups (see table 5.18 and graphs 5.12a,
610 Jehle, "Zakat and Inequality."p. 207
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5.12b and 5.12c below). For example, in 1990-91 it was only 2.8%, 2.6% in 1992-93 and 
1.9% in 1993-94. Although, most recipients were in the lowest income groups for all three 
years of the 1990s, the percentage of recipients for the lowest income group is still low 
considering this group falls below poverty line.
Table 5.18
Households Receiving Zakat as 
Percentage of Total Number of 
Households (receivers, givers & non­
participants)
Income
Groups 1990-91 1992-93 1993-94
1 7.6 6.2 5.0
2 3.2 2.4 1.8
3 1.0 1.6 1.0
4 1.9 0.9 0.5
5 0.8 1.1 1.4
6 - - -
7 - - -
8 - - -
9 - - -
10 - - -
11 - - -
Total 2.8 2.6 1.9
Source: Based on the HIESs and Author’s own calculations.
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Graphs 5.12a, b & c
Households Receiving Zakat as % of Total Number of 
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It is worth mentioning that reconciliation of the data presented in table 5.18, based on the 
HIES for the 1990s, with the national level presented in table 5.10 is possible for only two 
years due to the lack of aggregate data at the national level. Nonetheless for these two years 
it can be asserted that both sets of numbers are much closer than in the 1980s. The reason 
for the relative proximity of these numbers is that for the 1990s the HIES zakat definition is 
similar to the national aggregate data definition of zakat disbursements. However, there still 
appears some difference. This again probably has roots in the fact that the calculations 
based on the HIES data include interpersonal zakat received, unlike the national aggregate 
data. Moreover, as with the 1980s the national aggregate data does not include ushr.
From the assessment of the zakat received so far, one can assert that the targeting of the 
zakat programme might be impressive but it seems that for the entire period under 
consideration, the coverage was very low. This confirms Shirazi’s findings that the 
coverage in 1990-91 was only 2.7% of the total households.611
Even if the coverage of the programme was inadequate it is important to know the size of 
zakat received by the recipients, as this will indicate whether the zakat disbursements are 
likely to have met the needs of the recipients. Table 5.19 and graphs 5.13a, 5.13b and 5.13c 
below report the value of the average zakat received (in rupees current price) per adult 
equivalent in each income group.
611 Shirazi, System o f  Zakat in Pakistan, p. 72
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Table 5.19
Average Size of Zakat Received per Adult Equivalent (rupees-
current prices)
Income
Groups 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88
1 18.0 61.9 70.8
2 29.4 41.8 37.0
3 50.4 48.5 61.6
4 58.9 61.7 67.7
5 67.9 70.9 79.0
6 102.6 90.2 233.3
7 96.8 24.7 73.5
8 120.7 77.2 317.4
9 176.4 59.7 195.2
10 247.5 34.7 30.5
11 114.8 103.4 204.0
Overall
Average 52.5 51.5 60.1
Source: Based on HIESs and Author’s own calculations.
Graphs 5.13 a, b & c
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Source: Derived from table 5.19.
The above table and the graphs reveal that for the 1980s the size of zakat received per adult 
equivalent across income groups has remained fairly stable: in 1985-86 and 1986-87 it was 
around Rs.52 per month, rising to Rs.60 in 1987-88. However, a noteworthy point is that 
the lowest three income groups received only Rs.46.6 on average, compared to almost 
Rs.129 for the highest three income brackets. This seems to imply not only poor targeting 
but also misjudgements in the payment of zakat. This also seems to concur with the 
problem of the lack of planning regarding zakat disbursements pointed out in the previous 
section. However, as shown in tables 5.14a and 5.14b, fewer recipients fell into the highest 
income groups. Thus the high averages in the highest income groups may be misleading 
due to the very small numbers of observations in those groups.
A more interesting point is to compare the amount of zakat received with the poverty line, 
i.e. to assess the adequacy of the size of zakat received. One finds that zakat received per 
adult equivalent in the lowest income bracket for 1985-86 was only about 8% of the 
poverty line. For 1986-87 it was 26.4% and for 1987-88 it increased to almost 29%. Thus 
zakat receipts were income supplements and far from sufficient to provide any substantial 
support. Jehle also asserts that the average beneficiary of zakat within each of the income 
classes could hardly depend on the sums involved.612 Mohammad also stresses that zakat 
receipts were insufficient to meet the basic needs of the recipients.613
This point corresponds with the national aggregate numbers presented in table 5.11 earlier 
for the same years, which also show that zakat disbursements were inadequate. The 
difference in the numbers depicting the average size of zakat received in tables 5.11 and
612 Jehle, "Zakat and Inequality." p. 208
613 Mohammad, "Evaluation o f  nizam-e-zakat and ushr in Pakistan", p. 28
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5.19 above refers to the fact that the figures in table 5.19 are on a monthly basis whereas 
the figures in table 5.11 are on a yearly basis.
In the 1990s the average size of zakat received per adult equivalent appears to have 
increased substantially for the latter two years, rising from 34.4 rupees per adult equivalent 
in 1990-91 to 168.6 rupees in 1993-94. (See table 5.20 and graphs 5.14 a, 5.14b and 5.14c 
below). This seems to be partly related to the effect of very large amounts of zakat received 
by a few households (outliers across income groups) rather than a genuine improvement in 
the overall distribution o f zakat. And even for the 1990s one can sense some poor targeting. 
However, as with the 1980s, the average in the highest income group may be distorted due 
to the small number of recipients in these income brackets.
Table 5.20
Average Size of Zakat Received per Adult Equivalent (rupees
current prices)
Income
Groups 1990-91 1992-93 1993-94
1 41.7 65.1 116.7
2 27.3 48.1 118.0
3 34.9 57.4 376.8
4 31.1 84.3 96.7
5 - 66.2 185.9
6 - - -
7 - - -
8 - - -
9 - - -
10 - - -
11 - - -
Overall
Average 34.4 67.9 168.6
Source: Based on HIESs and Author’s own calculations.
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Graphs 5.14a, b & c
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Source: Derived from table 5.20.
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Nonetheless it is important to point out that the audit reports of the zakat funds for the 
1990s contain specific examples that highlighted instances where zakat money was paid out 
in a suspicious manner, the authenticity of which could not be established. These audit 
reports also contain references to non-verifiable payments made from the zakat funds.614 
The report of Prime Minister’s Special Committee also revealed political considerations in 
the disbursement of zakat,615
As during the 1980s, the zakat seemed to offer little in terms of poverty eradication 
especially in the early 1990s. In 1990-91 the zakat received per adult equivalent in the 
lowest income bracket was only 13.3% of the poverty line, though in 1992-93 it improved 
to almost 17% and in 1993-94 it rose to 27.6%. Thus zakat payments were still not 
adequate to (for example) sustain an adult’s nutritional needs. Imtiazi also acknowledged 
the sums paid out did not take inflation into consideration.616
In order to overcome the limitations incumbent in average measures, particularly the 
distortion of data representation due to extreme values, table 5.21 and graphs 5.15a, 5.15b 
and 5.15c below give the median zakat size received for the 1980s to correct for the 
presence of outliers.
614 Auditor General o f  Pakistan, "Audit Reports on the Accounts o f  Zakat Funds (Disbursements)."paragraph 
numbers 7, 9 , 1 0 , 1 1 , 1 6  and 18.
615 Finance Division & Central Zakat Administration, "Report o f  the Committee Appointed by the Prime 
Minister."pp. 15 & 32
616 Imtiazi. Interview 26th November 2002. The question asked was, ‘What was the criterion o f  disbursing 
money according to the Ordinance? Was Inflation taken into account? Mr. Imtiazi replied as follows: ‘Not per 
se, except that the Central Zakat Council periodically reviewed and increased the rate o f  disbursement for 
various categories o f  mushtahiqeen’.
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Table 5.21
Median Zakat Size Received per Adult Equivalent per Income 
Group (rupees-current prices)
1985-86 1986-87 1987-88
Median Zakat Median Zakat Median Zakat
Size Received Size Received Size Received
Income per Adult per Adult per Adult
Groups Equivalent Equivalent Equivalent
1 13.6 19.0 32.1
2 24.4 14.2 14.0
3 43.5 17.0 12.8
4 52.4 27.9 18.8
5 64.2 33.3 19.0
6 96.0 33.8 70.9
7 108.3 24.0 26.3
8 92.8 46.3 41.5
9 150.0 50.0 27.0
10 247.5 30.5 28.4
11 96.2 38.5 72.9
Overall
Median 38.8 17.9 16.2
Source: Based on HIESs and Author’s own calculations.
Graphs 5.15a, b & c
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Source: Derived from table 5.21.
For the 1980s, the median size of adult equivalised zakat received seemed to have corrected 
the distortions present in the averages due to outliers, as is visible from the low values of 
median as compared to the averages. However, the fall is more evident for the lower 
income groups than the relatively highest income groups. Thus in terms of the median, the 
gap between the higher and lower income groups does not seem to be narrowing. For 1985- 
86 the lowest income group seems to have received the median zakat as compared to the 
tenth highest income group, whose median was 18 times higher. However, this was due to 
the fact that there was only one observation in this income group (see tables 5.15a). 
Nonetheless, considering that there were only eleven household recipients in the lowest 
income group in this year, the observation in the tenth income group seems somewhat 
relevant.
Table 5.22 and graphs 5.16a, 5.16b and 5.16c below present the median size of zakat 
received per adult equivalent per income group for the 1990s.
375
Table 5.22
Median Zakat Size Rec< 
Income Grou
sived per Adult Equivalent per 
) (rupees-current prices)
1990-91 1992-93 1993-94
Income
Groups
Median Zakat 
Size Received 
per Adult 
Equivalent
Median Zakat 
Size Received 
per Adult 
Equivalent
Median Zakat 
Size Received 
per Adult 
Equivalent
1 9.7 16.5 29.1
2 9.6 9.6 20.8
3 10.4 23.1 62.5
4 20.8 13.9 29.4
5 - 37.5 36.2
6 - - -
7 - - -
8 - - -
9 - -
10 - - -
11 - - -
Overall
Median 10.2 13.9 26.9
Source: Based on the HIESs and Author’s own calculations.
Graphs 5.16a, b & c
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One detects a substantial decline from the overall averages to the overall median size of 
zakat received in the 1990s. It seems that the median values are not so affected by the 
distortion created by the outliers across income groups, which were so noticeable in the 
averages. Again, the median values of the zakat received have fallen substantially from the 
average values for the lowest income group.
Also, comparing the overall median size o f zakat received for the two decades, one can 
notice a general decline from the 1980s to the 1990s though in 1993-94 there is a 
significant increase of the median to 26.9 rupees per adult equivalent from 13.9 in 1992-93. 
This decline is consistent with the changes in the HIES structure o f the questionnaire for 
the 1990s, where the zakat received variable was narrowed to include zakat and ushr only 
(as mentioned in Chapter Four and earlier in this section).
As was done in Chapter Four this decline should be tested for the change in the 
questionnaire. As mentioned earlier, in the 1990s HIES questionnaire there is a separate 
entry for ‘gifts or assistance/benefits such as educational grants, alimony, trust funds or 
other grants, inheritance, lottery winning (in cash) etc.’, received which does not appear for 
the 1980s. The 1990s zakat received variable is combined with this separate entry in the last 
column of the table below to see if the median size of zakat received can be reconciled 
across the two decades.
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Table 5.23
Median Zakat & Median Zakat + Gift Size Received per Adult Equivalent
Median Zakat Size 
Received per Adult 
Equivalent (rupees- 
current prices)
Median Size of Zakat & 
Gifts Received per 
Adult Equivalent 
(rupees-current prices)
1985-86 38.8 -
1986-87 17.9 -
1987-88 16.2 -
1990-91 10.2 13.9
1992-93 13.9 16.5
1993-94 26.9 32.9
Source: Based on HIESs and Author’s own calculations.
The last column shows that in the 1990s, even after taking gifts into consideration, people 
were generally still receiving comparatively less charity than in the 1980s. Thus, it seems 
that the nominal size of zakat received fell for the 1990s.
Average or median zakat size received does not shed light on the impact of zakat on the 
income of the recipients. It is important to know the percentage increase in the disposable 
income of the recipient to get an idea of the significance of zakat. For this purpose, table 
5.24 and graphs 5.17a, 5.17b, and 5.17c below present the average zakat received as a 
percentage of average household income net of zakat receipts for the 1980s.
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Table 5.24
Average Zakat Received as a Percentage of Adult Equivalised 
Household Income net of Zakat Receipts
Income
Groups 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88
1 12.3 88.2 77.3
2 10.0 14.6 12.4
3 10.4 9.9 11.6
4 8.7 8.8 8.9
5 7.7 7.7 8.0
6 9.6 8.3 20.4
7 7.5 1.9 5.5
8 8.1 4.9 19.9
9 10.5 3.4 10.2
10 13.7 1.8 1.5
11 4.9 2.9 3.7
Overall
Average 9.6 28.6 24.1
Source: Based on HIESs and Author’s own calculations.
Graphs 5.17a, b & c
Average Zakat Received as Percentage of Income Net of 
Zakat Receipts (1985-86)
15
oj 10 -O)03
I
«  5  4
5  6  7
income groups
10 11
Average Zakat Received as Percentage of Income Net of 
Zakat Receipts (1986-87)
100 -i
on
—
ou - 
fin -D U  
AC) -
9 n -
0 .  □  _ □  □  J H  - U .  i n  =  .
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  11
income groups
Average Zakat Received as Percentage of Income Net of 
Zakat Receipts (1987-88)
100.0
8 0 .0
|  6 0 .0  
<D
>  4 0 .0
20.0 
0.0 JZL
5  6  7
income groups
10 11
Source: Derived from table 5.24.
The above table and graphs present a somewhat favourable image of zakat disbursements, 
with relatively high averages for the lowest income brackets except 1985-86. As mentioned 
before, for 1985-86 the peak in the tenth income group is due to one observation in that 
group. For the last two years of the 1980s, zakat seems to be performing true to its 
theological intentions.
However, as mentioned earlier, these averages have to be viewed with caution. The height 
of the bar in the lowest income group can be misleading because many observations in the 
HIES dataset have incomes close to zero when calculated net of zakat. Consequently, the 
zakat’s contribution to the income of such households appears very high.
Graph 5.17d below presents a breakdown of the relationship between zakat recipients in the 
first income bracket and the percentage of zakat they received as a boost to their income. It 
shows for example that in 1986-87 around 13% of households in the first income group 
received more than 95% of their income as zakat payments.
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Graph 5.17d
Lowest Income Group: Distribution of Households According
to Proportions of Zakat in their Income (1986-87)
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The observations where the proportion of zakat in income is 95% or above should be 
considered as outliers, as such observations distort the underlying picture significantly. 
Graph 5.17e below shows the percentage of recipients who received more than 95% of their 
income as zakat payments in 1987-88.
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Graph 5.17e
Lowest Income Group: Distribution of Households According
to the Proportion of Zakat in their Income (1987-88)
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The above graph shows that around 16.5% of households received more than 95% of their 
income as zakat payments in 1987-88.
Table 5.25 and graphs 5.18a, 5.18b and 5.18c below plot zakat received as a percentage of 
household income net of zakat for the 1990s.
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Table 5.25
Average Zakat Received as a Percentage of Adult Equivalised 
Household Income net of Zakat Receipts
Income
Groups 1990-91 1992-93 1993-94
1 24.2 48.4 73.3
2 7.1 10.8 23.8
3 4.9 7.2 40.0
4 3.2 7.4 7.5
5 - 4.5 11.0
6 - - -
7 - - -
8 - - -
9 - - -
10 - - -
11 - - -
Overall
Average 12.8 25.1 44.2
Source: Based on HIESs and Author’s own calculations.
Graphs 5.18a, b & c
Average Zakat Received as Percentage of Income Net of Zakat 
Receipts (1990-91)
30.0 —
25.0
20.0  -
15.0
10.0  - 
5.0
0.0 —
a)
CD
CD<U
>
CD
1 2 3 54
income groups
Average Zakat Received as Percentage of Income Net of 
Zakat Receipts (1992-93)
60
50
ACI
-ou
1 nI u 
0 n 11i ■  ■  —
1 2 3 4 5
income groups
Average Zakat Received as Percentage of Income Net of 
Zakat Receipts (1993-94)
60<u
0 5| 40-
CD
20 -
1 2 3 4 5
income groups
Source: Derived from table 5.25.
386
As in the 1980s, the lowest income groups appear to benefit proportionally more from the 
zakat payments i.e. the percentage by which zakat augmented the income of the households 
in the lowest income bracket is impressively high. For 1990-91 Shirazi also shows that the 
zakat’s most significant contribution was to the lowest income decile.617 However, the next 
exercise will show that as with the 1980s this high percentage has to be viewed with 
caution, as such high averages can be attributed to certain observations in the HIES dataset 
that have incomes close to zero and consequently experience considerable increases in their 
income due to zakat. Therefore such observations can be considered as outliers. The 
following three graphs break down the first income group to reveal the details behind the 
height of the first bar for the three years of the 1990s.
Graph 5.18d
Lowest Income Group: Distribution o f Households According  
to the Proportion of Zakat in the ir Income (1990-91)
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617 Shirazi, S ystem  o f  Z akat in P akistan , p. 74
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Graph 5.18e
Lowest Income Group: Distribution of Households According
to the Proportion of Zakat in their Income (1992-93)
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Graph 5.18f
Lowest Income Group: Distribution of Households According 
to the Proportion of Zakat in their Income (1993-94)
45 1
CO 40 \
2o 35 ].c
CD 30
CO3 25O
s z 20 -
Cl)CT) 15
CO
s? 105
0 n
0-5 5-15 15-25 25-35 35-45 45-55 55-65 65-75 75-85 85-95 95-
above
zakat as % income
Source: Based on the 1993-94 HIES.
The above graphs show that in 1990-91 around 4.6% of the households received more than 
95% of their income as zakat payments, as did 12% in 1992-93 and 19% in 1993-94. It 
seems that over the period of the 1990s, zakat had started to reach a greater share of 
destitute households.
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However, the above analyses reveal that the mean value of zakat receipts as a percentage of 
income reported for the 1980s and the 1990s does not represent the actual impact of zakat 
on the income of the recipient due to some outliers. This therefore requires looking at the 
median zakat received as a percentage of income net o f zakat. Thus table 5.26 and graphs 
5.19a, 5.19b and 5.19c below present the scenario.
Table 5.26
Median Zakat Received as Percentage of Adult 
Equivalised Household Income net of Zakat
Income
Groups 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88
1 7.3 12.9 18.5
2 8.7 4.8 4.3
3 8.2 3.3 2.5
4 7.7 4.0 2.8
5 7.3 4.0 2.0
6 9.0 3.2 6.3
7 8.5 1.9 1.9
8 6.6 3.1 2.7
9 8.7 3.0 1.5
10 13.7 1.5 1.4
11 4.2 1.8 1.5
Overall
Median 8.1 4.7 4.2
Source: Based on the HIESs and Author’s own calculations.
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Graphs 5.19a, b & c
Median Zakat Received as % of Adult Equivalised 
Household Income Net of Zakat (1985-86)
15 - 
c  1 0
CO 
1
£  5 -
0 - n
5 6 7
income groups
10 11
Median Zakat Received as % of Adult Equivalised 
Household Income Net of Zakat (1986-87)
14
12
c  1 0  
.2 8U|  6 
4 
2 
0
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 11
income groups
Median Zakat Received as % of Adult Equivalised 
Household Income Net of Zakat (1987-88)
20 
15
c
CO
S 10
E
5
j
_
In □  . Q  □ D -----1=1-----J=L---- C L
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 11
income groups
Source: Derived from table 5.26.
For the decade of the 1980s the median value of zakat received as a proportion of income 
net of zakat is significantly lower than the mean value. This was expected, since the 
presence of outliers in the first income group was significant, as noted earlier. The median 
supplementation from zakat in 1985-86 seems to have been fairly constant across the 
income groups suggesting somewhat poor targeting. The fall from the mean to the median 
values is not considerable either. However, for 1986-87 and 1987-88 the fall from mean to 
median values is significant, especially in the lower income groups. For 1987-88 the 
median values have also fallen considerably from the mean for the higher income groups. 
What emerges is that for 1986-87 and 1987-88 the households in the lowest income group 
received proportionally more zakat than the households in the higher income groups. 
Indeed both in 1986-87 and 1987-88 the median increase of income due to zakat in the first 
income group is almost three to four times as much as in the second income group and four 
to five times that of the rest of the income groups. This indicates that in these two years 
zakat distribution was targeted correctly.
Table 5.27 and graph below 5.20 present the scenario for the 1990s.
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Table 5.27
Median Zakat Received as Percentage of Adult 
Equivalised Household Income net of Zakat
Income
Groups 1990-91 1992-93 1993-94
1 4.5 6.8 10.2
2 2.5 2.1 4.0
3 1.4 3.2 6.3
4 2.1 1.2 2.5
5 - 2.3 2.4
6 - - -
7 - - -
8 - - -
9 - - -
10 - - -
11 - - -
Overall
Median 3.4 3.4 5.7
Source: Based on HIESs and Authors own calculations.
Graphs 5.20a, b & c
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What emerges from the comparative analyses of the average and the median zakat received 
as a percentage of total income net o f zakat for the 1990s is that the overall medians are 
many times lower than the total averages. This shows how the outliers in the income group 
influenced the average values. Additionally, the fall in the values of the lowest income 
group from the average to the median zakat received as a percentage of income net of zakat 
is considerable.
So far the above analysis has identified the targeting o f the recipient households. The 
analysis showed that the zakat was geared towards the lowest income groups, but as at the 
aggregate level, the coverage was thin for both decades as the percentage of recipient 
households was unimpressive. In general the section also revealed that for both decades, the 
size of zakat received was relatively insubstantial, reaching only an average 21% of the 
poverty line in the 1980s and an average 19% in the 1990s. Additionally, the median zakat 
size received was between two and five times lower than the average for not only the 
lowest income groups but for the overall average and median values for both decades.
The section also showed that for both decades, the percentage by which median zakat 
receipts supplemented the income (net of zakat) of the recipient household was highest in 
the lowest income group. However, for 1985-86 the level of inappropriate targeting was the 
highest.
These analyses do not, however, directly assess the zakat’s impact on poverty i.e. it does 
not assess to what extent zakat reduced the poverty gap and the headcount measure. 
Additionally the analysis does not directly measure zakat’s impact on inequality either. 
Thus, the following analysis attempts to provide answers to these queries.
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5.4 The Zakat’s  Effect on Poverty and Income Inequality
It was mentioned in Chapter One that the Islamic individual would organise his economic 
activities in a way that would not only be economically optimal but also spiritually 
gratifying, because a Muslim would aspire towards the eradication of poverty and illiteracy, 
hunger and disease. Additionally, it was pointed out that in the economic milieu, one of the 
main duties of the Islamic state, as directed by the Shariah, is to eradicate poverty. One of 
the major tools at the disposal of the Islamic state is the zakat, as enthusiasts of zakat argue 
that it has major potential for poverty alleviation. They also assert that zakat would have 
major positive effects on creating equality. This section assesses zakat’s effects on poverty 
and income inequality in Pakistan.
Poverty Analyses:
As mentioned in Chapter Four, this thesis uses the monetary approach in determining 
absolute poverty in Pakistan, as it is absolute poverty that characterises poverty in this 
country. Additionally, as mentioned in Chapter Four, the poverty line used in this thesis is a 
Havinga et al adult equivalised poverty line of Rs.214 per month, which has been inflated 
for the six years under consideration. This poverty line is based on 1984-85 prices and 
reflects monthly expenditure just adequate to acquire a simple diet providing daily calorific 
intake o f 1,500 to 2,000 calories.
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Table 5.28
Pakistan Poverty Statistics without Zakat based on the HIESs
Poverty Line 
(rupees- 
hundred)
Households with 
Adult Equivalent 
income below the 
Poverty Line (%)
Poverty Gap
(%)
1985-86 226 .0 20.9 -20.3
1986-87 233.9 18.8 -19.4
1987-88 244.9 17.1 -19.3
1990-91 313.4 19.0 -27.3
1992-93 383.7 22.3 -27.3
1993-94 4 22 .0 21.9 -26.0
Source: H avinga, I. C., H aanappel, F. W ., Louter, A . S., van den A ndel, W . A . "Poverty in Pakistan 1984-85."  
The Pakistan D evelopm ent R eview  28 , no. 4 Part II (1989): 85 1 -8 6 9 , w w w .datastream .net. H IESs and 
A uthor’s ow n calculations.
The table above shows the relevant poverty lines for the six years of analysis, together with 
the proportion of households with equivalised incomes below the poverty lines and the 
percentage by which households with equivalised incomes below poverty line fell i.e. the 
poverty gap. Approximately one-fifth of the households with equivalised incomes were 
living below the poverty line during the two decades under examination. While there seems 
to be some decline in the proportion of households with equivalised incomes below the 
poverty line towards the end of the 1980s, in the 1990s the proportion actually increased. 
The last column of the above table shows the percentage poverty gap. During the 1980s the 
poverty gap was narrowing, but during the 1990s the gap widened to more than 27% and so 
did inequality according to the Gini co-efficient (see table 4.6).
The measures of poverty used in this thesis are similar to those used by Shirazi in his study
of the effects of zakat in Pakistan for 1987-88 and 1990-91. These poverty measures are the
headcount (He) and poverty gap (Pg) approach. Apart from this, these are commonly used
396
measures of poverty that determine the percentage of the population that falls below the 
poverty line (He), and add up the extent to which individuals on average fall below the 
poverty line (Pg).
For each year, calculations have been made for the head count defined as:
H c = q / n *  100
Where q is the number of households below the poverty line and n is the total number of 
households. This measure gives the proportion of the poor households among the total 
households.
The greatest virtues of the headcount index are that it is simple to construct and easy to 
understand and communicate. However, the measure has at least two weaknesses. First, the 
headcount index does not take the intensity of poverty into account: as a welfare function 
the headcount index is unsatisfactory in that it violates the transfer principle that states that 
transfers from a richer to a poorer person should improve the measure of welfare. Thus if a 
somewhat poor individual were to give to a very poor individual, the headcount index 
would be unchanged, even though it is reasonable to suppose that overall poverty has 
lessened. Second, the head-count index does not indicate just how poor the poor are, i.e. 
income transfer from a poorer person below the poverty line to a richer person below the 
poverty line will not change the headcount.618
618 T. Anwar, "Absolute Poverty in Pakistan: Evidence and Alleviating Strategy," Journal o f  Rural 
Development and Administration 30, no. 2 (1998).p. 78
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To make up for these limitations a second measure of poverty approach is utilised in this 
thesis: the poverty gap approach. This approach gives a good indication of the depth of 
poverty, i.e. it depends on the distance of the poor below the poverty line.619 For each year, 
calculations have been made for the poverty gap defined as:
1 N
PG = - Y  
N t i
y  - p i
pi
*100
.Where N  is the number of households below the poverty line, y s is the adult equivalised 
income for households and pi  is the poverty line. The poverty gap thus measures an average 
percentage of how far people fall below the poverty line.
Both the number o f households below the poverty line and the poverty gap given in table 
5.28 above are calculated using the prQ-zakat adult equivalised income distribution, i.e. the 
income distribution under the assumption that zakat did not exist. To assess the impact of 
zakat on poverty alleviation the above quantities are also calculated after zakat is deducted 
and disbursed. Table 5.29 below compares in percentage terms the pre- and post -zakat 
poverty headcount and gap situation for each year in the 1980s.
619 Ibid.p. 78
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Table 5.29
Pre and PostZakat Income Poverty Head Count and Gap Measure
1985-86 1986-87 1987-88
AE Pre- 
Zakat 
Income
AE Post­
Zakat 
Income
% point 
difference
AE Pre- 
Zakat 
Income
AE Post­
Zakat 
Income
% point 
difference
AE Pre- 
Zakat 
Income
AE Post­
Zakat 
Income
% point 
difference
Head
Count 20.9342 21.5902 0.6561 18.7854 18.8084 0.0229 17.0750 17.1945 0.1195
Poverty
Gap -20.2707 -20.3769 -0.1062 -19.4452 -18.8565 0.5887 -19.2806 -18.6683 0.6123
Source: Based on the HIESs and Author’s own calculations.
From the above table it is evident that in all years under consideration the headcount 
actually increases if zakat is taken into account. However, this deterioration is very small 
and is much less than 1 percentage point, and as such can be classified as insignificant. For 
example in 1986-87, the number of households living below the poverty line increased after 
zakat, by four units, out of a total sample size of 17,455 households. Similarly in 1987-88, 
the number of household living below the poverty line rose by 22 units out o f a sample of 
18,407. And even in 1985-86, when the poverty headcount raised the most, the number of 
households increases by around 100 units, out o f a sample of 16,614. Thus these results 
could easily be driven by data ‘noise’ which also includes mis-recording, the fact that 
income and expenditure accounts are not kept by the households and that many statements 
of expenditure may be incorrect because of memory bias due to the long reference period. 
Additionally, the increase in the headcount can be influenced by intra-kin transfers within 
networks o f the very poor. As shown in Chapter Four, the highest zakat incidence is 
registered among the lowest income groups (see table 4.17) considering that the median 
zakat incidence for the 80’s was less than 4 rupees on average (see table 4.19). It appears 
that people just above the poverty line were actually paying zakat and consequently being 
pushed below it. This analysis shows that the zakat project did not result in an observable 
reduction in poverty, when assessed through the poverty headcount measure.
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As for the poverty gap, 1985-86 shows deterioration in poverty if zakat is taken into 
consideration, which is again consistent with the high percentage of zakat incidence in the 
lowest income group for this year. In 1986-87 and in 1987-88, however, there appears to be 
a reduction in the poverty gap. Although the impact is marginal, this reflects the fact that 
zakat disbursements for 1986-87 and 1987-88 were targeted correctly, (see tables 5.24 and
5.26).
A somewhat different picture emerges for the 1990s, as can be seen in table 5.30 below. 
Table 5.30
Pre and Post Zakat Income Poverty Head Count and Gap Measure
1990-91 1992-93 1993-94
AE Pre- 
Zakat 
Income
AE Post­
Zakat 
Income
% point 
difference
AE Pre- 
Zakat 
Income
AE Post­
Zakat 
Income
% point 
difference
AE Pre- 
Zakat 
Income
AE Post­
Zakat 
Income
% point 
difference
Head
Count 19.0424 19.0424 0.0000 22.2678 22.3499 0.0821 21.9318 21.8910 -0.0408
Poverty
Gap -27.286 -27.2405 0.0454 -27.2504 -27.0628 0.1876 -25.983 -25.8055 0.1776
Source: Based on the HIESs and Author’s own calculations.
There does not appear a clear trend for the poverty headcount measure in the 1990s. It
shows that in 1990-91 there was no difference in poverty, but the measure increased in
1992-93 and decreased in 1993-94. As in the 1980s, the differences are marginal and are
less than 1 percentage point. Though the targeting o f the zakat disbursements is correct in
the 1990s, this does not explain the headcount situation for 1990-91 and 1992-93. It may be
explained through the fact that those who received zakat in 1990-91 did not receive enough
to raise them above the poverty line. For 1993-94 the headcount due to zakat improved.
This could be due to the fact that the median zakat received in this year was proportionately
400
higher in the lowest income group as compared to the higher income groups (see table
5.27).
The poverty gap in the 1990s reveals a marginal improvement for all the years. This reveals 
that the median zakat received was targeted correctly at the lowest income group.
Shirazi undertook an evaluation of poverty due to zakat in Pakistan for 1987-88 and 1990- 
91. For 1987-88 (unlike the result shown in table 5.29) his results show a favourable picture 
o f zakat regarding the poverty headcount measure with a 0.5 percentage point decrease, 
opposed to an increase of 0.11 percentage points shown in table 5.29. However, his results 
do concur with those of the present analysis in that the poverty gap narrowed in 1987-88.621 
For 1990-91 his results for poverty headcount show a decrease of 0.75 percentage points622 
whereas it remained unchanged according to table 5.30. Regarding the reduction of the 
poverty gap, his results show that for 1990-91 the poverty gap was reduced by 3.2 
percentage points623 whereas according to table 5.30 the reduction was only 0.04 
percentage points.624
What comes across from the above paragraph is that though Shirazi’s results present a 
numerically positive scenario of the zakat system these results are not economically 
significant. Some differences in the results of the two studies can perhaps be explained by 
the fact that Shirazi used a per capita poverty line based on the basic needs approach and
620 Shirazi, System o f  Zakat in Pakistan, p. 88
621 Ibid. p. 88
622 Ibid. p. 90
623 Ibid. p. 90
624 It is important to note here that while reporting the headcount and poverty gap results, Shirazi exaggerates 
the results by presenting the differences in the headcount and poverty gap as percentages.
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the present thesis used an adult equivalised poverty line based on the calorific approach. 
Poverty measures are sensitive to differences in units of measurements.
Regarding the present thesis, in terms of poverty reduction due to zakat, the above analyses 
have shown that for the 1980s the headcount situation deteriorated whereas the poverty gap 
improved in 1986-87 and 1987-88. In the 1990s the poverty gap improved in all the years 
while the headcount situation deteriorated in 1992-93. Looking at these basic indicators of 
poverty alleviation, one can conclude that zakat’s role has not been decisively positive in 
reducing poverty in Pakistan. Whenever its positive effects have been felt, they have been 
unimpressive and marginal. And where instances of exacerbation of poverty are concerned, 
(though the increase in poverty in an already poor society can reflect badly on a system 
ushered in with religious zest) these have also been marginal and could possibly be 
accounted for by the fact that in many instances the highest zakat incidence is registered 
among the lowest income groups, that the increase in poverty can be influenced by intra-kin 
transfers within networks of the very poor or even that these results could easily be driven 
by data ‘noise? as described above. The main finding is that the zakat did not result in an 
obvious and noticeable reduction in poverty as measured by the headcount and the poverty 
gap measure.
The following analysis deals with zakat’s effect on inequality reduction. It is an important 
inquiry as inequality reduction is an important component o f zakat’s rationale according to 
the aspirations of the Islamists and the Pakistani Government’s objectives.
Inequality
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An extremely wide variety of statistical indices can be used to measure inequality. Sen 
divides these measures into two categories: objective or purely statistical, which would 
include the Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient, and the normative ones. Sen holds that 
the normative measures of income inequality try to measure inequality in terms of some 
normative notion of social welfare, so that a higher degree of inequality corresponds to a 
lower level of social welfare for a given total of income.625
One such index is the Atkinson index, which tries to measure income inequality in terms of 
some normative notion of welfare. In this thesis, it is this index that has been used to 
analyse the impact of zakat on income inequality in Pakistan. The Atkinson index of 
inequality has been chosen following in the footsteps o f Jehle’s work on the impact of zakat 
on inequality for Pakistan and its provinces for the year 1987-88.626
The rationale behind following Jehle’s methodology in measuring inequality via the 
Atkinson index is that this index embodies an explicit set of social values that are reflected 
in the form of different values of V ;  the ethical parameter. This ethical parameter can be 
given different values to project the degree of a policy’s aversion to inequality. Jehle holds 
that the normative values prescribed by Islam accord exactly with those advanced by John 
Rawls in his theory of social justice. He asserts that the Atkinson index allows the Rawlsian 
criterion of social justice, reflected in the value of e= -oo, to be quantified. However, as 
argued in Chapter One, Islam does not uphold complete equality, as reflected in e= -oo, but 
acknowledges differences in human beings due to their natural capabilities. Thus the 
Rawlsian maximum criterion of social justice is disqualified from the present analyses. The
625 See Jehle, "Islamic Perspective on Inequality in Pakistan."p. 297
626 Jehle, "Zakat and Inequality."
627 Ibid.
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Atkinson index allows flexibility through the different values that can be attributed to V , 
which indicate the ethical stances on inequality of a society or a policy. This flexibility 
makes it appropriate to determine the levels o f aversion to inequality or rather, the 
predilection for equality in an Islamic society.
The Atkinson index is calculated as follows:
AE e
1/e
I with e *  0
5=1 Im j
Where y s is the income of the adult equivalent, s ju is the average adult equivalent income 
across the survey and V  is the ethical parameter representing the social preference, ‘e ’ 
denotes the degree of inequality aversion; the lower the value of V  the greater is the 
aversion to inequality.
At one extreme, if e=l9 the society is indifferent to inequality and the Atkinson index 
assumes a value of zero, indicating that no inequality in the income distribution is 
perceived, no matter how unequal the income distribution is. At the other extreme, if V  
goes up to -oo, even the smallest difference in income among adult equivalents is felt 
intensely and the Atkinson index approaches a value of one, which represents the value of 
maximum inequality.
To gauge the effect of zakat on income inequality in Pakistan, different ethical relative 
indices o f income inequality are computed and compared for three alternative scenarios:
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First, a ‘prt-zakaf income distribution is considered. This distribution represents adult 
equivalised income for households that would have been obtained if those who gave zakat 
had no obligation to give, and if those who eventually received it did not receive any, i.e. 
without the institution of zakat. To obtain this distribution, households that reported 
receiving zakat (which is included in the HIES definition of income) had that deducted 
from their income.
Secondly, an intermediate income distribution is considered. This is the adult equivalised 
income distribution for households after zakat has been given by the givers but not received 
by the recipients. Thus this adult equivalised income distribution for households weighs the 
contributional aspect of zakat, and shows how the income distribution changed when the 
zakat contribution was deducted from the income of those who contributed. This 
intermediate step towards the evaluation of zakat for the reduction of income inequality 
helps to track the step-by-step impact of zakat on the income of the households.
Finally, the ‘post-zakaf income distribution is considered. This is the adult equivalised 
income distribution for households after zakat had been deducted from the income of those 
who give zakat and included in the income of those households who reported receiving it.
The comparison of the inequality index between the ‘pre-zakaf and ‘post-zakaf income
distributions suggests whether zakat has been successful or not in reducing inequality for
each year of analysis under different values of V . The introduction of an ‘intermediate’
distribution is, however, crucial to the analysis as it allows the gauging of the stage
(collection or disbursement) at which the institution o f zakat contributed mostly (if at all) to
a reduction in inequality. It is therefore highly useful in shedding light on the targeting of
the programme. If zakat is targeted properly one should theoretically expect the inequality
index to decline at each step o f the process, i.e. if the rich tend to give more zakat than the
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poor, then the intermediate inequality index will fall compared to the ‘pre-zakaf index. 
Additionally, the inequality index would continue to decline in the ‘post-zakaf distribution 
if the poorest tend to receive more zakat than the relatively rich. However, if the inequality 
index decreases in the intermediate stage and increases in the post -zakat scenario, this 
reflects the fact that the programme is being wrongly targeted or that there are major 
leakages in the system.
The following table presents the Atkinson inequality index under these three scenarios, 
evaluated at different degrees of inequality aversion. An ethical parameter value of 0.8 
represents a limit case, which implies an underlying social welfare function close to the 
utilitarian case. At the other extreme, a value of -3  approaches the other limiting case of a 
supposedly Islamic welfare function.
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Table 5.31
Atkinson Inequality index for Pakistan With, 
Without & Intermediate income (post-zakat 
for givers, pre- for receivers) Zakat
Ethical
Parameter 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1990-91 1992-93 1993-94
0.8
Pre-Zakat
Index 5.00% 4.66% 5.16% 6.99% 7.11% 6.54%
Intermediate- 
Zakat Index 5.02% 4.67% 5.18% 6.97% 7.11% 6.53%
Post-Zakat
Index 5.03% 4.66% 5.18% 6.95% 7.09% 6.52%
0.5
Pre-Zakat
Index 11.18% 10.65% 11.31% 15.36% 15.58% 14.53%
Intermediate- 
Zakat Index 11.23% 10.69% 11.37% 15.33% 15.59% 14.52%
Post-Zakat
Index 11.25% 10.63% 11.35% 15.28% 15.54% 14.50%
-0.33
Pre-Zakat
Index 23.32% 21.77% 22.52% 30.24% 32.22% 30.28%
Intermediate- 
Zakat Index 23.39% 21.87% 22.63% 30.22% 32.29% 30.28%
Post-Zakat
Index 23.45% 21.68% 22.52% 30.11% 32.13% 30.17%
-1
Pre-Zakat
Index 30.22% 28.98% 29.20% 42.32% 45.06% 40.06%
Intermediate- 
Zakat Index 30.31% 29.10% 29.33% 42.48% 45.23% 40.12%
Post-Zakat
Index 30.38% 28.66% 29.07% 42.34% 44.92% 39.89%
-3
Pre-Zakat
Index 45.18% 46.74% 44.86% 93.82% 93.44% 70.08%
Interm ediate- 
Zakat Index 45.34% 46.82% 44.96% 93.81% 93.41% 70.49%
Post-Zakat
Index 45.42% 42.36% 42.80% 93.82% 93.42% 70.02%
Source: Based on HIESs and Author’s own calculations.
The above table shows trends in inequality for the 1980s and the 1990s. As expected, the 
Atkinson inequality index is generally very low for large values of V  and it increases 
steadily as the value of V  declines.
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In the above table, 1985-86 is the only year that shows that inequality has increased 
consistently whatever ethical parameter value is chosen (although with the ethical 
parameter of 0.8 the differences are relatively small), suggesting that for this year zakat has 
not contributed to reducing inequality. The ‘post-zakaf index is always bigger than the 
‘pre-zakaf inequality index. This situation concurs with the results of poverty for this year 
given in table 5.29, which shows an increase in the headcount measure as well as the 
poverty gap according to post zakat income. Unlike in 1985-86, in 1992-93 and 1993-94 
there is an indiscriminate reduction in inequality across all the values of the ethical 
parameters. Although, this reduction is not always gradual across pre-intermediate and post 
zakat income. Also, the improvement is generally very small, and is in the range of some 
cents o f a percentage point. This situation almost concurs with the poverty analysis shown 
in table 5.30, which reveals that the poverty gap decreased for 1992-93 and 1993-94.
1986-87 has shown that but for the ethical value of 0.8 (where inequality remained 
unchanged), inequality declined from pre- to post -zakat. 1987-88 shows that the higher two 
values o f the ethical parameter seem to indicate an increase in the inequality index whereas 
the lower values indicate an improvement. The results for this year only partially agree with 
those of Jehle, as his study for the year 1987-88 reveals that for all the values of the ethical 
parameter, zakat tends to redistribute income from those better off to those worse off. For 
1990-91, the evidence indicates that the zakat policy was conducive to decreasing 
inequality when the society’s underlying welfare criterion was less sympathetic towards the 
least well off in the society, whereas for the lower two ethical parameters inequality tended 
to increase or remain unchanged.
628 Ibid. pp. 213
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The above analyses do not reveal the source of equality or inequality: i.e. is it at the 
collection or disbursement state that zakat affects inequality? To facilitate this comparison, 
table 5.32 below presents the change in the inequality index at each step of the process of 
the zakat policy. The ‘total change’ represents the difference (in percentage points) between 
the pre- and post-zakat Atkinson indices. It measures therefore the overall change in 
inequality due to zakat. Additionally, the ‘partial change due to zakat collection’ (which is 
the difference between intermediate zakat and prQ-zakat) and the ‘partial change due to 
zakat disbursement’ (the difference between post -zakat and intermediate zakat) measure the 
impact on income distribution and inequality due to the collection and disbursement of 
zakat.
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Table 5.32
Change in the Atkinson Inequality Index after Zakat (percentage points - a negative sign indicates a decline in 
___________ inequality) _______ ______ _________ _______ _______
Parameters 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1990-91 1992-93 1993-94
Total Change 0.031 0.007 0.029 -0.035 -0.014 -0.014
0.8 Partial Change After Zakat Collection 0.021 0.016 0.029 -0.014 0.006 -0.005
Partial Change After Zakat Disbursement 0.010 -0.009 -0.001 -0.022 -0.021 -0.009
Total Change 0.068 -0.016 0.043 -0.078 -0.036 -0.038
0.5 Partial Change After Zakat Collection 0.044 0.040 0.060 -0.028 0.016 -0.013
Partial Change After Zakat Disbursement 0.025 -0.056 -0.017 -0.049 -0.052 -0.025
Total Change 0.132 -0.097 -0.003 -0.133 -0.091 -0.111
-0.33 Partial Change After Zakat Collection 0.076 0.096 0.107 -0.019 0.074 -0.004
Partial Change After Zakat Disbursement 0.056 -0.193 -0.109 -0.114 -0.165 -0.107
Total Change 0.161 -0.316 -0.130 0.016 -0.137 -0.171
-1 Partial Change Due to Zakat Collection 0.091 0.128 0.126 0.156 0.172 0.060
Partial Change After Zakat Disbursement 0.069 -0.444 -0.256 -0.140 -0.308 -0.231
Total Change 0.237 -4.379 -2.058 0.005 -0.019 -0.058
-3 Partial Change After Zakat Collection 0.156 0.078 0.099 -0.003 -0.028 0.414
Partial Change After Zakat Disbursement 0.080 -4.457 -2.157 0.008 0.009 -0.473
Source: Based on HIESs and Author’s own calculations.
The above table shows that in 1985-86, where inequality increases for all the values of V , 
it increases due to collection and disbursement. For the other years in the 1980s where 
inequality increased for some values of V , it was mainly the collection that exacerbated 
this increase. The table also shows that with regards to the origin of the improvement in 
inequality, for 1986-87, 1987-88 and 1992-93, in most instances improvement came from 
disbursement. In fact in many cases the partial change due to zakat collection generated an
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increase in the inequality index rather that the expected decline in inequality. This implies 
that the collection aspect of zakat appears to be improperly targeted for these instances in 
these years and that zakat was being taken from the poor and disbursed to the equally poor 
or poorer sections of the society.
This is in line with the analyses in Chapter Three, which suggested that considering the 
shape of the zakat policy, the incidence would probably fall on the poorer sections of the 
society. Consequently Chapter Four showed that zakat incidence was mostly higher for the 
lower income groups.
On the other hand the disbursement of zakat was generally well targeted, as the inequality 
tended to decrease in most years/values in the ethical parameter. The reason why zakat’s 
performance in the disbursement part of the process is not enough to generate a consistent 
and significant overall reduction in equality also lies in the limited number of beneficiaries, 
again something that this chapter has already analysed. The present analysis of inequality 
suggests that the achievement of zakat has been economically poor, although in some cases 
it was statistically positive but not substantial.
Summing up, one can make a judgement about the differences in the index values between 
pre and post zakat income which is: although the analyses regarding zakat policy’s ability 
to combat inequality has presented some numerically positive results, these are not 
significant. The overall economic effect of zakat on inequality has been marginal. These 
analyses show that for many values of the ethical parameter, zakat met the Pakistani 
government’s objectives and fulfilled its religious commitment asserted by the Islamists,
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nonetheless its effectiveness as an inequality-reducing tool was negligible. This overall 
result is in general acquiescence with those of Jehle and Shirazi.
Conclusion
This chapter analysed the zakat disbursement policy in Pakistan at the national aggregate 
level and at the household level. The aim of the chapter was to test the effectiveness of the 
zakat policy in the light of the Pakistani government’s objectives and the Islamists’ 
assertions about the redistributional capacity of zakat. The chapter was to reveal the extent 
to which Pakistan’s zakat policy reduced poverty and decreased income inequality on a 
practical level.
This chapter also demonstrated that the Islamic state lacked commitment to the zakat 
policy. This is evident at the national aggregate level, where the zakat policy was not 
operating in a manner that would make it effective in terms of its objectives. These analyses 
showed that for the entire period analysed, zakat transfers from the CZA were 
unimpressive, lingering around 0.2% of GDP on average. Due to the absence of financial, 
budgetary and target planning, zakat collections were always higher than the 
disbursements. This led to high amounts of unspent zakat money at the CZC level. This 
practice of not releasing the funds infected the entire system at all levels. Funds were not 
released to the LZCs for disbursements to the poor, and instead were kept in the PZC 
accounts to collect interest. Furthermore, zakat money was invested in instruments, which 
led to loss of the money which meant a squandering of funds that should have been spent 
on welfare purposes for the poor.
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Moreover, there were no set rules for the timing and size of zakat disbursements, and 
wherever these rules did exist, these were never adhered to, and thus there was much 
arbitrariness with zakat disbursements. Furthermore, there was a lack of long-term 
commitment on the part of the zakat management towards the zakat policy, which could be 
seen through the preferential treatment given to zakat disbursements for subsistence rather 
than for rehabilitation.
There was a lack of clarity regarding zakat’s eligibility criterion. This ambiguity fashioned 
the zakat system in a manner that made the system not only prone to malpractices by the 
LZCs but also created the problems of irregular patterns o f zakat disbursements and delays 
in payments to individuals throughout the period analysed. The blurred nature of the 
eligibility criterion also kept the number of beneficiaries rather low due to uncertainty. 
Furthermore, the zakat disbursements appeared to be inadequate even for sustenance.
At the micro level, in terms of targeting the zakat was meeting its theological and official 
objectives, although it seemed that for the whole period under consideration, receiving 
zakat was a rare phenomenon. There seemed to be some improper targeting in the 1980s 
although the situation became relatively better for the 1990s. Additionally, zakat 
disbursements even at the household level seemed to be inadequate for both decades and 
these disbursements were not large enough to provide sustenance when compared to the 
poverty lines for the respective years.
For both the decades, the median zakat received as a percentage of income net of zakat in 
the lower income groups was significant. However, when compared to the poverty line it
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appears that over half of those who received zakat were not among the poorest members of 
the society.
For the two decades generally it appears that the lowest income households tended to 
receive more zakat in proportion to income than their relatively better-off counterparts. 
However, the results also reveal that the value of zakat received (as a proportion of income) 
in the relatively higher income groups was non-negligible, especially in the 1980s. As 
pointed out earlier, there appears to be some misallocation of zakat funds, which reveals a 
lack o f standardisation of zakat disbursements and also the provision of services, which is 
an indication of the commitment of the Islamic state to zakat policy as stated in Chapter 
Two.
From this chapter what appears to emerge is that in terms of the zakat’s official objectives, 
and the Islamists’ religious rhetoric, zakat’s function as an instrument to reduce poverty and 
inequality has not been decisively positive and whenever it did have positive effects, they 
have been unimpressive. Most of the redistribution has taken place between the poor, with 
the relatively wealthy households remaining rather unaffected. In plain words, zakat has not 
lived up to the gusto with which it was introduced.
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Conclusion
This thesis has addressed the question of whether or not the zakat delivered welfare and 
justice in Pakistan between 1980 and 1994. It concludes that there is a wide gulf between 
the ideological aspirations of the Islamists regarding the zakat and how it actually performs 
on the ground. It also concludes that the zakat could not fulfil its official objectives of 
reducing poverty and inequality effectively.
The thesis proposes that the reason for this failure is that even if giving zakat it is a divine 
duty, the zakat is also a political instrument that can be easily manipulated by the powerful 
Islamic state, which, contrary to what the Islamists assume, might not necessarily operate 
with the wellbeing of the masses in mind. In addition, the zakat can also suffer significantly 
if the Islamic state does not show full commitment to it as its religious nature would not 
command obdience. In the context of Pakistan, the ideological functions of the zakat have 
been hampered by the insincerity of the Islamic state as reflected in the zakat policy. This 
lack of commitment to the zakat contributed to its unimpressive performance in that it 
failed to exploit the wealth of the rich and bring justice to the poor. Moreover, the zakat 
was unable to create welfare in the society as it failed to alleviate poverty or reduce 
inequality to any significant degree.
The thesis started by describing the evolution of the Islamic economic system through an 
exploration of Islam’s economic philosophy. Islamists claim that the paramount goal of the 
Islamic economic system is not only the welfare of the individual but also o f society as a 
whole. Its rationale is that the system strives for the prevalence o f equality and justice.
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Islamists say that the Islamic economic system is different from the individualistic, selfish 
and acquisitive mentality of Capitalism; different from the incentive-dampening, initiative- 
smothering approach of Socialism to economic activity and finally, it is unlike Communism 
with its omnipresent state and restrictive approach to property rights and individual 
entrepreneurship. The Islamic economic system achieves the goal of societal welfare and a 
just economic society through the economic philosophy of Islam, which is its foundation. 
Through this system the Islamists aspire to provide scope for individual economic initiative 
while keeping the ills of the market mechanism under strict observation.
Islamic economic philosophy considers economic activity to be a form of worship and 
proposes that economics should not be seen as a positivist science but rather as an element 
of a broad-ranging theology. The incentive structure of this normative approach to 
economics is based on four axioms: the Unity of Allah, belief in the Day o f Judgement, 
Moderation, i.e. avoiding excessive consumption and not being extravagant and, finally, 
Fairness, i.e. the Islamic producer would denigrate the idea of profit and utility 
maximisation for his own self and instead aim for the maximisation of societal benefit. 
These axioms are the keystone of the faith of homo Islamicus and will be demonstrated in 
his actions.
The Islamists hold that the goals of the Islamic economic system are to fulfil the basic
needs of every individual in terms of providing subsistence and social security. They add
that it is the objective of the Islamic economic system to minimise any gap in the
distribution of resources between individuals, ensure the freedom of the individual and
create a Muslim universal brotherhood. The Islamic concept of equality aims to limit the
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disposable income of the rich by transferring adequate sums to the poor in addition to 
reducing the number of people in the poorest sectors of society. The Islamic economic 
system accomplishes its welfare goals via the functioning of the Islamic state, the absence 
o f riba and the operation of modarabah in the economy and imposition of the zakat. As 
pointed out in Chapter One, the definition of welfare and justice is largely absent from 
Islamic economic literature and this can cause much controversy where application is 
concerned.
Islamists assert that because of the Islamic state’s dominating economic interventionist 
powers, it will be successful in bringing about a just, fair and equitable society, as its 
operation will be conducive to the successful implementation of Islamic policies. As 
mentioned in Chapter Two, the Islamic state has extensive political powers through the post 
o f the amir and the institution of shura, which can exert immense influence on legislation 
thus affecting all aspects of Muslim society.
Islamists consider the zakat to be the cornerstone for realising the Islamic concept of justice 
and equality. The zakat is one of the fundamentals of Islam’s belief structure and is one of 
the most important religious duties in Islam. The zakat is charged annually at a flat rate of 
2.5% on the total personal net worth o f an individual’s assets although the zakat on 
agricultural produce (which is also called ushr) ranges between 5% and 10%. The zakat is 
considered the right o f the poor people in the wealth of the rich. The rationale o f the zakat 
is to assure the basic necessities of life for those who cannot undertake employment and 
can justify seeking assistance from society. Zakat funds are to be given to the needy.
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Islamists assert that the religious nature of the zakat will make people pay it willingly. They 
assert that the goal of the zakat is to alleviate poverty and they also affirm that it has major 
potential for the mobilisation of resources to reduce income inequality. Many Islamists hold 
that because the Islamic state has an obligation to deliver welfare to the people, it should 
therefore collect the zakat, yet others dispute this position arguing that the zakat should be a 
voluntary donation. The rate, nisab, and levy of the zakat are also aspects that are 
contentious. Thus the zakat’s workability can be hampered by its contentions nature, which 
has major repercussions for its effectiveness in meeting its targets of poverty alleviation 
and reducing inequality. The zakat’s effectiveness can also be diminished by its 
vulnerability to the dominating economic and political power of the Islamic state.
This thesis holds that the zakat is not only a religious duty meant for the economic
wellbeing of the deprived, but because of the economic implications of its nature, the zakat
is also an instrument through which the Islamic state gains political patronage and support.
Chapter Two has shown that the policy-making process in an Islamic polity can influence
the shape of zakat policy in a way that suits the broader political objectives of the Islamic
state. This can have implications for the achievement of the zakat’s welfare objectives.
Apparently Islamists have failed to acknowledge that even if a political and economic
system is based on divine injunctions, its welfare instruments can be used to gain political
influence and are therefore political structures whose policies are not created in a political
vacuum. This implies that the divine altruistic nature of the zakat does not protect it from
manipulation from interest groups that are part of the structure of the Islamic state (which is
pivotal for the operation of the zakat). It seems that the Islamists believe that because the
state is Islamic it would by default have internalised the philosophical values o f Islam and
would operate with the intention of promoting societal welfare. They assume that the
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different factions making up the Islamic state would sideline any aspiration or concern in 
favour of the wider societal good.
What would also hamper the zakat’s workability is if the Islamic state fails to make a 
concerted effort to show its commitment to the zakat. The Islamic state needs to 
demonstrate to the public that it has internalised Islamic philosophy and is working for the 
collective good of the people and is thus sincere about its welfare policy. For this reason it 
will have to establish an element of trust between itself and the individual. It is the factor of 
trust between the individual and the Islamic state that will determine the effectiveness of 
the policy and its mechanism. The Islamic state will have to create trust through 
reputational effects such as fairness in policy design and implementation, rigour in the 
enforcement of punishment for non-compliance, standardisation of policy provision and 
finally high levels of competence and honesty in the zakat bureaucracy.
It is contentious to assert that just because the policy is Islamic and imposed by the Islamic 
state it will be effective and accepted by the individual. The individual will make his/her 
own assessment regarding the Islamic character of the policy, i.e. the fairness o f the policy 
process and the shape of the imposed Islamic policy. Thus it is not automatic that the 
zakat’s Islamic status alone will create trust between the individual and the Islamic state, or 
that the Islamists’ semantic labelling such as ‘Islamic state’ and ‘homo Islamicus’ will 
transform the state or the individual into an epitome of Islamic altruism.
This thesis has tried, empirically, to test the above theoretical framework by assessing the
role of the Islamic state in utilising the zakat to promote welfare in society in a manner that
would reflect the ideals o f Islamic distributive justice. It has done so by examining the
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policy-making procedure of the zakat and its actual implementation regarding giving and 
disbursements at the national aggregate and household levels. Finally, the thesis has tested 
the performance of the zakat in terms of its religious and official rationale, i.e. the reduction 
o f poverty and income inequality.
Chapter Three undertook the first step by conducting a comparison between the views of 
the Council of Islamic Ideology (an institution fundamental to the Islamisation of Pakistan) 
and the details o f the policy as implemented by Zia’s Islamic state and came to the 
conclusion that zakat revenue was sacrificed to appease various political and economic 
elites. The hidden agenda behind the introduction of the zakat was to bolster Zia’s power 
and authority over the people he ruled as the zakat was a powerful instrument to gain the 
confidence of the poor masses.
This chapter placed the zakat within the history of Islam in Pakistan and explained that the 
reason the zakat was not imposed in Pakistan immediately after its creation was because the 
various governments that came to power in Pakistan used Islam only as a political platform 
to fortify their power without sincerity for the Islamic ideals. It also suggested that it was 
the schism in Pakistan’s Islamic Ideology, between a homeland for the Muslims and an 
Islamic state, which prevented Islamisation and the hence imposition of the zakat by 
various governments before Zia came to power in 1977.
Zia introduced Islamisation and invoked Pakistan’s ideological and Islam’s religious 
rhetoric to strengthen his rule and acquire political legitimacy. He felt the need to turn to 
Islam as he had disposed of a democratic leader.
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Zia’s Islamic state introduced a zakat policy that actually appeared to maintain the 
economic divisions of the society. The shape of the zakat policy seemed to replicate the 
weak politico-economic situation of the poor. In this respect, the ambiguity in the Shariah 
regarding many aspects o f the zakat (as seen in Chapter Two) permitted the Islamic state to 
shape zakat policy to suit its broader political interests.
Thus Chapter Three showed that the Islamic state constructed zakat policy in a way that 
would secure the maximum political and economic benefit to Zia, his government and the 
elite. This was to have huge implications for zakat revenue as the shape of the policy 
revealed that the Islamic tenets of justice and equality would be largely sacrificed under this 
policy. The scale of this impediment to the effectiveness of the zakat was analysed in 
chapters Four and Five.
Chapter Four took another fundamental step in answering the central question of the thesis 
by examining the way in which zakat policy affected zakat revenue. The chapter also 
considered the importance of the Islamic state’s commitment to the zakat policy for its 
effective operation. The chapter showed that the zakat did not contribute hugely to 
mobilising resources for poverty alleviation as was evident in terms of zakat raised as 
percentage of GDP. Additionally, zakat incidence seemed to be regressive, and was not 
successful in creating vertical equity because it failed to draw on the wealth o f the rich. In 
fact it was more burdensome for the poorer sections of society.
This chapter started by providing historical evidence regarding the lack of ability of the
governments that came to power in Pakistan to demonstrate credible commitment to their
declared objectives to the people of the country. This tendency to betray commitments
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affected the development of trust between the state and individuals in Pakistan, which had 
important repercussions for the future of the zakat policy with regard to its revenue levels.
To describe the betrayal of commitment, the chapter assessed the political aspects such as 
military coups and the denial of democracy and self-determination; problems with 
constitution formation; the repeated abrogation of constitutions; and finally the role of the 
bureaucracy in Pakistan. What came to the forefront in the short history of Pakistan was 
that as political actors and institutions vied for power, democracy and its institutions such 
as the legislature were compromised. The repeated imposition of martial law deprived the 
people of Pakistan of their basic civil rights. Dismissals of parliament and military coups 
did little to prove that the ruling elites were committed to empowering the people or 
endorsing policies advantageous to the masses. Such developments had consequences for 
the effectiveness of the zakat policy, particularly on the revenue side, where it seems to 
have met with scepticism and even resistance.
The chapter proceeded to show that this mistrustful and suspicious relationship between the 
individual and the state had a negative affect on the ideological claims of the Islamic 
economists, as is evident from the unimpressive zakat compliance rate and the low 
revenues collected. The study revealed that individuals transferred and transformed funds 
into assets on which zakat was not levied. The Islamists believe strongly that because the 
zakat is said to be the right of the poor to the wealth of the rich, its incidence would fall on 
the richer members of the Islamic society. But detailed household-level expenditure data 
revealed that zakat incidence was regressive, and was far from achieving vertical equity 
because it scarcely managed to exploit the wealth of the rich.
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In order to assess the importance of the role of the Islamic state’s commitment to zakat 
policy for its effective operation, the chapter proceeded to demonstrate that the 
effectiveness of the zakat was indeed hampered. Although the state claimed to be Islamic 
and had imposed a divinely ordained policy like the zakat, it (and the subsequent 
governments) failed to develop trust through the creation of reputational effects that would 
have been conducive to the smooth operation of the policy. In other words the state not 
only failed to create a fair zakat policy but also failed to implement the policy in a fair, 
efficient, effective and accountable manner. There was a high degree of politicisation of 
zakat institutions. There existed absence of effective punishment structures in cases o f non- 
compliance.
Chapter Five took the final step in addressing the main question of the thesis by examining
the benefit side of the zakat in Pakistan. It tried to assess the effectiveness of the zakat in
terms of its goals as asserted by the Islamists and officially stated by the state. The chapter
concluded that the zakat’s function as a poverty-reducing instrument has been
unimpressive. Whenever its effects were shown to be statistically positive, these were of
marginal significance; it failed to have a major impact on poverty and the reduction of
inequality. Additionally, the chapter showed that the zakat was being taken from the poor
and disbursed to the poor. The chapter demonstrated that at the national aggregate level for
most of the years zakat disbursements were questionably lower than collections. The
chapter also revealed that the various tiers o f the zakat institution were unable to carry out
policy guidelines. There was an absence of financial, budgetary and target planning.
Consequently, there were high levels of unspent zakat funds at the CZC level. The LZCs
could not release funds for disbursement to the poor as these were kept in the PZC accounts
to collect interest. Moreover, zakat money was invested in financial instruments that led to
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the loss of zakat money that was meant for the poor. There was much arbitrariness with 
regards to zakat disbursements to individuals as there was a lack of clarity regarding the 
zakat ‘s eligibility criterion. This ambiguity not only led to malpractices within the system 
but also created the problems of irregular zakat disbursements and delays in payments to 
individuals. Additionally, the ambiguity of the zakat eligibility criterion kept the number of 
beneficiaries rather low. Finally, the zakat disbursements appeared to be inadequate even 
for sustenance.
In many instances those who received zakat were not among the poorest in society. When 
compared against the poverty lines for the respective years, the disbursements seemed 
inadequate and were less than 30% of the poverty line. In addition, it seemed that for the 
whole period under consideration, receiving zakat was a rare phenomenon.
There also seemed to be improper targeting in the 1980s in zakat disbursements although 
the situation became relatively better in the 1990s. In the 1980s the value of zakat payments 
as a proportion of total income for recipients in higher income groups was not negligible. 
This misallocation showed that there was politicisation and a lack of standardisation of 
zakat disbursements, indicating the Islamic state’s lack of commitment to thq zakat policy.
With regards to the zakat’s effectiveness in terms of poverty alleviation, what comes to the
forefront is that the zakat did little to raise households above the poverty line, because the
individual value and instances of zakat disbursements were too small. With regards to
inequality, zakat did make a positive contribution to reducing inequality but only to a very
small degree. The reason for the marginal impact of the zakat on inequality lay in the small
number of zakat beneficiaries, which resulted in a meagre and insignificant overall
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reduction in equality. Interestingly, this reduction in inequality was mostly due to the 
disbursement side o f the zakat and not the collection side, because collection increased 
inequality. This implies that the zakat was being taken from the poor and disbursed among 
them.
This study of the zakat's implementation in Pakistan has been a test of the ideals that make 
up Islamic economics. It has been an examination of the coherence o f beliefs that form the 
basis of this philosophy. It has been an investigation into the claims of the Islamists who 
hold that the Islamic economic system is quintessential^ geared towards not only the 
welfare of the individual but of the society as a whole and that it pays utmost regard to 
equality and justice. It has been about testing empirically how ideal and effective the 
Islamic economic system is in developing economic strategies that would solve the 
economic problems of poor Islamic countries and bring about the fair allocation of 
resources, creating a more equal society and thus delivering its objectives o f welfare and 
justice.
The thesis has shown that there is an ideological failure of the Islamic economic
mechanism. The reason is embedded in the fact that there is a plethora of interpretations of
the Shariah regarding economic injunctions, not only across various Islamic sects but
within similar legal traditions as well. This vagueness of the Islamic law has been shown to
have implications for both individual and institutional behaviour. These ambiguities and
confusions have been compounded by the fact that the Islamic economic injunctions have
been translated into a system by both jurists and economists. This procedure has led to an
abnormal interaction between formal economics and Islamic economic ideas leading to not
only an incompatible but also an obscure theoretical amalgam lacking consistency and
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pragmatism in theorisation and application. Thus, the Islamic economic system lacks 
standardisation and proper theorising o f consumer, entrepreneurial, firm and state 
behaviour.
The Islamists do not seem to have realised that the lack o f clarity o f the Shariah might lead 
to an increased possibility of conflict and disorder within the system and thus its abuse. 
They seem to have overlooked the possibility o f the existence of such problems as free­
riding, opportunistic behaviour and egoism by the homo Islamicus, and the possibility that 
the Islamic state might exploit the power bestowed upon it by the Shariah. The reason for 
this is that the adherents of Islamic economic thought have expressed complete faith in the 
altruism of homo Islamicus and in the collective role of various social and economic 
institutions. They seem to consider the state of being a Muslim and the indoctrination of 
Islamic values to be a two-way street, which automatically leads to a no-conflict zone with 
no external constraints playing upon the individual. Their romanticism regarding Islamic 
economic ideals has led to a vacuum in research regarding institutional arrangements that 
define and establish sets of rules and procedures conducive to an effective operation of a 
system.
The lack of emphasis by the Islamists on universal practices such as commitment, 
enforcement, accountability and rules of engagement has resulted in poor policy design, 
ineffective implementation and inadequate enforcement. These failures manifest 
themselves through the zakat policy’s inability to be true to its objectives of creating the 
Islamic ideals of fairness and justice in society, i.e. the empirical failure of an ideology 
priding itself on its fair allocation of resources and creation of justice. It is this ideological 
and empirical failure of the zakat policy that has been demonstrated in this thesis.
426
However this does not imply that the idea of zakat reducing poverty and inequality can be 
shelved. Issues such as the acceptance o f universal applicability of zakat at the state level 
needs to be addressed. There should be a common understanding and recognition of the 
nature o f zakat as sanctioned by the Shariah which transcends the interpretations of various 
Islamic sects and binds these schools of thought by the essence o f zakat i.e. charity. Failure 
to do so makes zakat political and diminishes its humanitarian aspect. Additionally, after 
zakat has been translated into a policy, the next step is to treat zakat like any other policy 
i.e. thoroughly re-evaluate the policy, periodically re-assess zakat’s administrative 
organisation and execute exhaustive checks and balances of its functioning without leaving 
any aspect to the religious fervour of the people, only then can zakat achieve its noble 
objectives.
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Appendix A
This appendix presents the zakat incidence with and without the weighting factors provided 
in the HIES. The purpose is to show that the results in this study of zakat are not affected 
by the application of the weighting factors.
The weights (expansion or raising factors) as these are called are to correct for the presence 
of potential bias due to sampling methods in the surveys. In drawing a sample for a survey, 
allowance has to be made for the fact that the sampling procedure does not give all 
households in the country (through the strata according to which it is divided) an equal 
chance of being selected for the survey. Weights attempt to correct for the fact that different 
households in the country have different chances of being included in the sample for the 
survey. Additionally, raising factors are used to weight data in order to obtain nationally 
representative statistics. If no weights are given with the data, the resulting estimates are 
likely to be biased as different types of households may not be represented in the sample in 
the same proportion as they exist in the population as a whole.629 Thus to adjust for over- 
sampling of certain households in the HIES, weights are calculated and included in the 
HIES data sets.630
However the application of weights is important only if the study desires to infer results at 
the national aggregate level. The present study however, has micro-level concerns, relating 
to the households. It focuses on issues such as who pays and receives zakat in terms of
629 A. Deaton, The Analysis o f  Household Surveys A Microeconomic Approach to Development Policy  
(Washington: The International Banl for Reconstruction and Development/ The World Bank, 1997). pp. 15- 
16 & 44-45
630 Howes and Zaidi, "Notes on Some Household Surveys from Pakistan", p. 4
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differences between income groups. Simply, the central examination of this thesis 
concentrates on zakat incidence and zakat received across income groups for households.
To show if the application of weights to the household quantities affects the results reported 
in this thesis significantly, weights are applied to the calculation of zakat incidence per 
income group and the results are compared with un-weighted zakat incidence.
The weighted average of zakat incidence is computed for each income group measured at 
the household level, where the weights are the raising factors given in the survey data. The 
appendix has chosen the zakat incidence analysis for the application of weights as zakat 
given as proportion of income is one of the most central themes of this thesis and can be 
considered a true representative of the zakat analysis across the study.
For the 1980s the following tables and graphs show that the pattern o f average zakat 
incidence does not change significantly between weighted and un-weighted data. Indeed, 
for all the years in 1980s, zakat incidence is almost similar at each income group level and 
at the total average level for both the weighted and the un-weighted data. Hence the 
conclusions remain the same: as highlighted in section 4.2 B i.e. the burden of zakat 
incidence appears to fall mostly on the lower income groups.
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1985-86
U n -W eig h ted  & W eig h ted  A v e rag e  Z a k a t 
In c id e n c e  fo r  G iv e rs  (a s  a  p ro p o r tio n  of 
H o u se h o ld  In co m e)
AE
U n-W eig h ted  
A v e ra g e  Z ak a t 
In c id e n c e  fo r
W eig h ted  
A v e rag e  Z a k a t 
In c id e n c e  fo r
In c o m e G iv e rs  fo r G iv e rs  fo r
G ro u p s H o u s e h o ld s H o u s e h o ld s
1 5.23 5.41
2 4 .3 3 4.23
3 3.89 3.88
4 3.38 3.34
5 2.96 3.14
6 2.69 2.53
7 2.85 2.53
8 1.85 1.30
9 2.49 2.29
10 1.88 2.40
11 2.51 2.01
T otal 4 .07 4.07
Un-Weighted & W eighted Average Zakat Incidence for Givers for 
H ouseholds (1985-86)
6 ■  Un-Weighted Average Zakat Incidence for 
Givers for Households
■  Weighted Average Zakat Incidence for 
Givers for Households
5
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1 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 10 114
income groups
1986-87
U n -W eig h ted  & W eig h ted  A v e rag e  Z a k a t 
In c id e n c e  fo r  G iv e rs  (a s  a  p ro p o r tio n  o f 
H o u se h o ld  In co m e)
AE
U n-W eig h ted  
A v e ra g e  Z ak a t 
In c id e n c e  fo r
W eig h ted  
A v e rag e  Z a k a t 
In c id e n c e  fo r
In c o m e G iv e rs  fo r G iv e rs  fo r
G ro u p s H o u s e h o ld s H o u s e h o ld s
1 5.55 5.30
2 4 .49 4.37
3 3.49 3.51
4 3.03 3.09
5 2.83 3.06
6 2.58 2.48
7 3.76 3.43
8 2 .19 1.77
9 2.12 1.71
10 1.56 1.85
11 4 .27 3.91
T otal 4.10 4.05
Un-Weighted & W eighted A verage Zakat Incidence for G ivers for 
H ouseholds (1986-87)
income groups
I Un-Weighted Average Zakat Incidence for 
Givers for Households 
I Weighted Average Zakat Incidence for 
Givers for Households
1987-88
U n -W eig h te d  & W eig h ted  A v e rag e  Z a k a t 
In c id e n c e  fo r  G iv e rs  (a s  a  p ro p o r tio n  o f 
H o u se h o ld  In co m e)
AE
U n-W eig h ted  
A v e ra g e  Z ak a t 
In c id e n c e  fo r
W eig h ted  
A v e ra g e  Z a k a t 
In c id e n c e  fo r
In c o m e G iv e rs  fo r G iv e rs  fo r
G ro u p s H o u s e h o ld s H o u s e h o ld s
2 4.12 4.28
3 3.39 3.58
4 2.63 2.39
5 3.14 2.96
6 2.51 2.20
7 1.97 2.40
8 1.87 2.01
9 1.48 1.43
10 1.29 1.06
11 1.75 1.27
T otal 3.74 3.97
U n-W eighted & W eighted A verage Z akat Incidence fo r G ivers 
for H o u seh o ld s  (1987-88)
*  <D
<* S 1
I Un-Weighted Average Zakat Incidence 
for Givers for Households
I Weighted Average Zakat Incidence for 
Givers for Households
lilh
5 6 7
income groups
Source: Derived from the HIESs and Author’s own calculations.
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The same can be observed for the 1990s, i.e. the pattern o f zakat incidence does not alter. 
However one does observe a few prominent peaks such as in income group 6 in 1990-91, 
group 9 in 1992-93 and groups 6 and 9 for 1993-94.
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1990-91
U n -W eig h ted  & W eig h ted  A v e rag e  Z ak a t 
In c id e n c e  fo r  G iv e rs  (a s  a  p ro p o r tio n  o f 
H o u se h o ld  In co m e)
AE
U n w e i g h t e d
A v e ra g e  Z a k a t 
In c id e n c e  fo r
W eig h ted  
A v e rag e  Z a k a t 
In c id e n c e  fo r
In c o m e G iv e rs  fo r G iv e rs  fo r
G ro u p s H o u s e h o ld s H o u s e h o ld s
1 2.57 2.35
2 1.28 1.24
3 1.57 1.27
4 1.49 1.27
5 1.43 1.41
6 1.24 1.81
7 1.72 1.83
8 1.29 1.00
9 1.64 1.34
10 1.18 0.85
11 1.40 1.07
T otal 1.51 1.38
U n-W eighted & W eighted A verage Z akat Incidence for G ivers 
for H o u seh o ld s  (1990-91)
■  Un-Weighted Average Zakat Incidence for 
Givers for Households
■  Weighted Average Zakat Incidence for Givers 
for Households
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 11
income groups
1992-93
U n -W eig h ted  8i W e ig h te d  A v e ra g e  Z a k a t 
In c id e n c e  fo r  G iv e rs  (a s  a  p ro p o r tio n  of 
H o u se h o ld  In co m e)
AE
U n-W eigh ted  
A v e ra g e  Z a k a t 
In c id e n c e  fo r
W e ig h ted  
A v e rag e  Z a k a t 
In c id e n c e  fo r
In c o m e G iv e rs  fo r G iv e rs  fo r
G ro u p s H o u s e h o ld s H o u s e h o ld s
1 2.77 2.72
2 1.26 1.21
3 1.22 1.12
4 1.20 1.10
5 1.19 0.94
6 1.20 1.24
7 1.35 1.12
8 1.53 1.44
9 1.61 2.22
10 0.85 0.83
11 0.91 0.95
T otal 1.45 1.39
Un-W eighted & W eighted A verage Zakat Incidence for G ivers 
for H ouseho lds  (1992-93)
Un-Weighted Average Zakat Incidence 
for Givers for Households
Weighted Average Zakat Incidence for 
Givers for Households
I
8 9 10 11
income groups
1993-94
U n -W eig h ted  & W e ig h ted  A v e rag e  Z a k a t 
In c id e n c e  fo r  G iv e rs  (a s  a  p ro p o r tio n  of 
H o u se h o ld  In co m e )
AE
U n-W eig h ted  
A v e rag e  Z a k a t 
In c id e n c e  fo r
W e ig h ted  
A v e rag e  Z a k a t 
In c id e n c e  fo r
In c o m e G iv e rs  fo r G iv e rs  fo r
G ro u p s H o u s e h o ld s H o u s e h o ld s
1 1.76 1.80
2 1.03 1.06
3 1.07 1.00
4 1.08 1.04
5 1.45 1.61
6 1.78 1.39
7 1.21 1.22
8 0.79 0.75
9 2.02 2.43
10 1.53 1.68
11 1.10 1.02
T otal 1.19 1.19
U n-W eigh ted  & W eig h te d  A v e ra g e  Z a k a t In c id e n c e  fo r 
G iv e rs  fo r  H o u s e h o ld s  (1993-94)
S  2
<8 1
I Un-Weighted Average Zakat Incidence for 
Givers for Households
I Weighted Average Zakat Incidence for Givers 
for Households
f
I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
income groups
9 10 11
Source: Derived from the HIESs and Author’s own calculations.
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It may be assumed that the households in these income groups were underrepresented 
which the application of weights corrected for. Nonetheless, it is important to observe that 
the new peaks of the zakat incidence for these income groups reached by the application of 
weights do not alter the analysis of the burden of zakat incidence and neither do the total 
averages alter significantly. The results still show as in section 4.2 B that zakat incidence 
for the first two years of the 1990s reached its peak in the lowest income group. And that in 
1993-94 when zakat incidence reached its peak in the ninth income group, it was only 
marginally higher than the zakat incidence for the lowest income group.
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